

CHOICE and USEFUL
TREATISES:

1221
2000th / 1821

THE ONE
LUX ORIENTALIS;
OR

An Enquiry into the Opinion of the
EASTERN SAGES
Concerning the
PRÆEXISTENCE of SOULS.

Being a Key to unlock the Grand My-
steries of PROVIDENCE.

In Relation to Mans Sin and Misery.

THE OTHER, A
DISCOURSE of TRUTH,

By the late Reverend Dr. RUST Lord Bi-
shop of Dromore in Ireland.

WITH
ANNOTATIONS on themboth.

Πᾶσα ψὴς ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπὸ τοῦ οὐκ ὄντος.
Plato.

LONDON,

Printed for James Collins, and Sam. Lowndes over against
Exeter Exchange in the Strand, 1682. 2.

CHOICE and GUSTAV

THE FETTER

OF THE

LUX ORIENTALIS

OR

EASTERN SAGES

PRAXIS OF KNOWLEDGE

Being a Key to unlock the Grand Art
of KNOWLEDGE

in the Science of Man and Society

THE OTHER

DISCOVERIES OF THE

By the late Dr. R. O. S. 1801
Prop of the Society in 1801

WITH

Annotations on the whole

By the late Dr. R. O. S. 1801

LONDON

Printed for James Collins and Son, Stationers, and
Booksellers, in the Strand, 1801

TO THE
HONOURABLE
Sir JOHN FINCH.

SIR,

YOU may well be surpris-
ed at this unexpected
Dedication from one that
may seem an utter Stranger to
your Person ; but the fame of
your singular knowledge in the
choicest parts of Philosophy, and all
other worthy accomplishments, will
make this presumption of me, the
Publisher of these two Treatises,
as pardonable by your self, so, I
hope, justifiable to all the World.
Not to say that it is a peice of in-
dis-

The Epistle Dedicatory.

*dispensable justice that one of them
be Dedicated to you ; the Author
thereof being that Excellent Per-
son the Reverend Dr. Rust, late
Bishop of Dromore in Ireland,
once fellow of Christs Colledge in
Cambridge, to which you lately
have been so Noble a Benefactor.
Wherefore in hopes that you will
be pleased to take the Dedication
of this whole Book, the two Trea-
tises, and the Annotations there-
on in good part, craving pardon
for this boldness I humbly take
leave, and am,*

Honoured Sir,

*Your most obedient and
humble Servant.*

JAMES COLLINS.

The Publisher to the Reader.

These two Choice and Useful *Treatises* I present thee with, the name of the Author of the latter of them is set down in the Title Page, the Reverend Dr. *Rust* late Lord Bishop of *Dromore* in the Kingdom of *Ireland*; whose Vertues Parts and Abilities are copiously set out in a Letter of Mr. *Jos. Glanvill* prefixt to the *Discourse* it self. And it thou hast the curiosity to know who is the Author of the former *Treatise LUX ORIENTALIS* (who then thought fit to conceal his name as himself takes notice in his Epistle Dedicatory) I can assure thee, that it is the said Mr. *Jos. Glanvill*, a person reputed one of the most ingenious and florid Writers of his Age. But for my own part I must ingenuously confess, that I am no competent Judge, and consequently can be no fit *Encomiast* of the Abilities or Performances of Either. Only this I know, that both these *Treatises* have sold very well, and that there is none to be got of the *Discourse of Truth*; though it is not many years since it was Printed. And for *LUX ORIENTALIS*, which was Printed about twenty years ago, when the Book grew scarce, it was so much valued by the more eager and curious searchers into the profoundest points of Philosophy, that there was given for it by some, four or five times the price for which it was at first Sold.

The considerations whereof coming into my mind, I thought I should both gratifie the learned World and benefit my self, if I reprinted these two *Treatises* together. Which I do the more willingly,

because the former Editions were too false and corrupt, especially of *LUX ORIENTALIS*. Which faults of the Press, or MSS. are carefully corrected in this.

And besides that this Edition is more correct than the former, there are also *Annotations* added to each *Treatise* by one not unexercized in these kind of Speculations. And in the *Annotations* upon the *Discourse of Truth*, there is inserted a *DIGRESSION* that contains a brief Answer to Mr. *Baxters* *Placid Collation with the learned Dr. Henry More*.

And because men usually have a fondness even for the smaller Toyes or Trifles of well esteemed Writers after their decease, I have prefixed a *Latin Dedication* of *LUX ORIENTALIS* (which I opportunely had by me) before the Epistle Dedicatory: Which *Latin Dedication* the Author sent so prefixed, in a Copy to the Party it is made, and I have Printed it in the same order it was there found, that it may be one Monument amongst many other of the Authors *Wis* and *Ingeniuty*. I have also, that nothing may be wanting to thy Content, got a friend to devise an *Hieroglyphical Frontispice*, intended more especially for *LUX ORIENTALIS*. But I do not profess my self able to unriddle the meaning thereof. The best Interpreter will be the Book it self. To the reading whereof I leave thee and rest

Your humble Servant

JAMES COLLINS,

L U X *J. Byron*
ORIENTALIS,

OR

An Enquiry into the Opinion of the

Eastern Sages

Concerning the

PRÆEXISTENCE

OF

S O U L S.

Being a Key to unlock the
Grand Mysteries of

PROVIDENCE,

In relation to mans Sin and Misery.

Cardanus. *Quid jucundius quàm scire quid simus, quid fuerimus, quid erimus, atque cum his etiam Divina illa atque suprema post obitum mundique Vicissitudines?*

London, Printed for J. Collins, and S. Lowndes over against Exeter Exchange in the Strand, 1682.

System

B. U. X.

ORIENTALIS

LIBRARY

TR. EXISTENCE

SOLIS

PROVIDENCE

In the year 1800, the first volume of the
Library was presented to the University of
Cambridge, and since that time it has been
increasing in number and value.

The Library is now the property of the
University, and is open to all students
of the University, who are entitled to
use it for the purpose of study.

Doctissimo viro Domino Doctori

HENRICO MORO

Maximo Purioris Philosophiæ

Magistro & Sapientiæ

ORIENTALIS RESTAURATORI

In exiguum Summi

Affectûs Testimonium

E T

Æternæ Observantiæ Pignus

a suis Flammis mutuatam hanc

Orientis Scintillam

D.D.D.

Humillimus Virtutum ejus

Et candoris non minùs

Quam Doctrinæ Cultor ;

Qui ei exoptat Lucem Sem-

piternam, & petit ut

candidè accipiat

LUCEM ORIENTALEM.

LUCEM ORIENTALEM.

conditio accipit

invenit & petit ut

Qui ei exoptat Lucem Sem-

Grandis Choro

It conditio non parit

Hamillimus Virtutum eius

1711

Quodammodo

a sapientia in caritate

Altera Observantia Virtus

Altera Testimonium

In eximio

ORIENTALIS RESTAURATOR

Morsio & sapientia

Maximo Patris Philophris

HIERONIMO MORO

Doctore vno Doctori Doctori

TO THE
Much Honoured and Ingenious

FRANCIS WILLOUGHBY
ESQUIRE.

SIR,

TIS likely you will no less wonder at this unexpected sally of my pen; than at my having prefixed your name to a small Trifle, that owns no Author. Of the former, you will receive an account in the Preface. And the latter, if the considerations following are not of weight, to atone for; I know you have goodness enough to pardon, what I have not reason sufficient to excuse, or vindicate. Well meaning intentions are Apology enough, where candour, and ingenuity are the Judges. I was not induced then to this Address, be-

The Epistle Dedicatory.

because, I thought, I could oblige you; Worth describes it self in the fairest Character. But reflecting upon that delight and satisfaction, that I have received in discoursing with you on such matters; and knowing that your Noble Genius is gratified by such kind of speculations; I thought, I could not make more suitable payment for my content, or better acknowledge the favour I receive in your acquaintance, then by presenting you a Discourse about Præ-existence; and giving you a peculiar interest in it, as you have in its Author. Not that I would suggest, that you are a favourer of any strange opinions, or hold any thing in this particular, or any other, that is fit to be discountenanced. But I know you love to be dealing in high and generous Theories, even where your self are a dissenter, Nor is it the least evidence of the greatness and Heroick Nobleness of your Spirit; that amidst the flowing abundance

The Epistle Dedicatory.

dance of the World's Blessings, with which you are encircled, you can yet Dedicate your self to your beloved Contemplations, and look upon the Furniture and accomplishments of the mind, as better riches, than the largest doals of fortune, and the Wealth and Revenues of an ample inheritance. And methinks, while most others at the best, do but use the Donatives of Providence, you enjoy them. And, by a Nobler kind of Chymistry, extract from them a pleasure, that is not to be met with in all the trivial sports of empty Gallantry. To be revelling the Recesses of Nature, and the Beauties inside of the Universe, is a more Manly, yea Angelick felicity, than the highest gratifications of the senses; and happiness that is common to the Youthful Epicure, with his Hounds and Horses; yea, your ends are more August and generous, then to terminate in the private pleasure you take, even in those
Philoso-

The Epistle Dedicatory.

Philosophical Researches; For you are Meditating a more general good in those careful and profound inquiries you are making into Animals, and other concerning affairs of nature, which I hope, one day the World will be advantag'd by. But I must not ingage in an Encomium, in which I cannot be just, but I must be troublesome. For your modesty is no more able to bear it, then my Pen can reach. Wherefore I shall dismiss your eyes from this tiresome Attendance; and only beg, that you would assure your self that no Man is more your Servant, then

The Authour of

Lux Orientalis

THE
PREFACE.

IT is none of the least commendable indulgences of our Church, that she allows us a latitude of judging in points of *Speculation*; and ties not up mens Consciences to an implicate assenting to opinions, not necessary or *Fundamental*; which favourable and kind permission; is questionless a great obligation upon the ingenious, submissively to receive and observe her pious appointments for *peace* and *order*. Nor is there less *Reason* in this *parental indulgence*; than there is of *Christian charity* and *prudence*; since to tie all others up to our opinions, and to impose difficult and disputable matters under the Notion of *Confessions of Faith*, and *fundamentals of Religion*, is a most unchristian piece of

B Tyranny,

The Preface.

Tyranny, the foundation of *persecution*, and very root of *Antichristianisme*. So that I have often wondred, that those that heretofore would have forced all men to a compliance with their darling *notions*, and would have made a prey of them, that could not bow down before the *Idol* of their new-framed *Orthodoxy*; should yet have the face to object *persecution* and unchristian *Tyranny* to our Church Appointments; when themselves lie under a deep and Crimson guilt of those very same miscarriages, which they endeavour to affix upon those more innocent *Constitutions*. For is it not a far more blameable and obnoxious imposition to frame *Systems* of disputable *Opinions*, and to require their admittance into our *Creeds*, in the place of the most sacred, necessary, and fundamental verities; Than it is to appoint some harmless orders of *circumstance* and ceremony,

The Preface.

ceremony, which in themselves are indifferent and innocent? And let any equal Man be Judge, which is the greater *superstition*, either to *Idolize* and place *Religion* in things of dispute and meer opinions; or conscientiously to observe the *Sanctions* of that *Authority* we are bound to obey. But how all those ill applied reproaches of the *Church of England*, recoil upon those that discharge them, I have fully proved in a Discourse on this Subject, which in its due time may see the *Light*. But for the present I go on with what I was about; Therefore I say, 'tis a most commendable excellency in our *Ecclesiastical Constitutions*; which with all due regard ought to be acknowledged; That they lay stress on few matters of opinion, but such as are of important concernment, or very *meridian* truths, Which I mention not to this purpose, as if

The Preface.

men might therefore indulge themselves in what conceits and dangerous opinions soever their phancies might give birth to, (This were an unpardonable abuse of that noble and ingenuous Liberty that is afforded us;) But that they might see the beauty of those well temper'd Constitutions; and that the mouth of obloquy might be stopped that slanders our Church, as if it yielded no scope at all for *free inquiry*; when I dare say there is not a Church in Christendome, that in this regard is less taxable.

As for the opinion of *Præexistence*, the subject of the following Papers; it was never determined against by ours, nor any other Church, that I know of; And therefore I conceive is left as a matter of *School Speculation*, which without danger may be *problematically* argued on either hand. And I have so

great

The Preface.

great confidence in all true Sons of our common Mother, to think, that they will not fix any harsh and severe censures, upon the innocent *Speculations* of those, though possibly they may be *Errours*, who own the *Authority, Articles, Canons, and Constitutions* of that Church which they are so deservedly zealous for.

Therefore let me here premonish once for all, that I intend no Innovation in Religion, or disturbance of our established and received Doctrines, by any thing I have undertaken in this little *Treatise*; But only an innocent representation of an Antient and Probable opinion, which I conceive, may contribute somewhat towards the clearing and vindicating the *Divine Attributes*, and so representing the ever blessed Deity, as a more fit object of *Love and Adoration*, than the *Opinions* of the *World* make him. And what ever

The Preface.

may be thought of the thing it self, or the manage of this affair, I'm sure the end and design is concerning and important, and deserves at least a favourable construction of the undertaking. For there is nothing more for the interest of *Religion*, than that God be represented to his Creatures as amiable and lovely, which cannot be better done, than by clearing up his Providences and dealings with the Sons of men, and discovering them to be full of Equity, Sweetness and Benignity; so that though I should be mistaken in the opinion which I endeavour to recommend, yet I expect the candour of the ingenuous being betray'd into an error, if it be one, by so pardonable an occasion.

If it be excepted against this undertaking, that the Doctrine of *Præexistence* hath in a late Discourse been purposely handled; besides what

The Preface.

what the learned Dr. More hath written of it ; and therefore that this labour may seem a superfluous, unnecessary Repetition : I answer, that that very Treatise, *viz.* the Account of *Origen*, made some such thing as this expedient. For though the proof and management of this affair be there unexceptionable, as far as the Author is by his design engaged ; yet, he being confined to the reasons of *Origen*, and to the answering such objections, as the *Fathers* urged against him ; hath not so fully stated and cleared the business, but that there was room for after-undertakers. And 'tis a great disinterest to so strange and unusual a Doctrine as this, to be but partially handled : since so long, it will not be understood, and consequently be but exposed to contempt and ignominy. Nor can we hope that the world will be so favourable to a *Para-*

The Preface.

dex, or take so much pains for the understanding of that which they think a gross absurdity, as to collect those Principles that are scatter'd up and down the writings of that great and excellent Restorer of the *Platonic Cabbala*, and accommodate them to the interest of this opinion. So that I thought that till the *Reasons, Answers, Principles, and particular State of the Hypothesis* were brought all together, to talk of *Præexistence* in Earnest were but to make a mans self ridiculous, and the Doctrine, the common *Ludibrium* of fools and ignorants.

And yet I must confess my self to be so much a contemner of the half-witted censurers of things they know not, that this Reason alone could not have moved my pen the breadth of a letter; But some ingenious friends of mine, who were willing to do their Maker right, in a due

The Preface

apprehension of his Attributes and Providences, having read the *Letter of Resolution*, and thence being induced to think favourably of *Præ-existence*, were yet not fully satisfied in the proof, nor able to give stop to those *objections*, which their imperfect knowledge of the *Hypothesis* occasioned; wherefore they desired me to draw up a more full and particular Account of that Doctrine, which they had now a kindness for, and which wanted nothing more to recommend it to them, but a clear and full representation. For their satisfaction then, I drew up the following Discourse, intending at first, that it should go no further than their hands, whose interest in mine affections had commanded it; but they being more than I could well pleasure with written Copies, and perceiving others of my acquaintance also, to whom

The Preface.

I owe regard and service, to be in the like condition with these ; I was induced to let this *Little Trifle* tread a more *publick Stage* ; and to speak my mind to them from the *Press*.

If further reason be expected for mine undertaking a business in which others have been engaged, I would desire them to consider what an infinite of Books are written upon almost all subjects can be named. And I am confident, if they turn o're *Libraries*, they'l find no *theam*, that is of any consideration, less traced than this is. So that no body hath reason to call it a *Craimbe*, who considers, that there are multitudes, even of Scholars that have never seen or heard of any thing of this nature ; And there is not, that I know of, any one Book extant in any language besides this, that purposefully, solely, and fully treats of *Præexistence*. Wherefore who ever condemns

The Preface.

demns this as a superfluous ingagement, if he will be just, must pass the same censure upon well nigh every Discourse the Press is deliver'd of; for hee'l meet with few written on less handled subjects. I might urge also if there were need on't, that various representations of the same thing, fit the variety of phancies and gusts of perusers; and that may have force and prevalence to perswade in one, which signifies nothing in another. But 'tis enough; he that will judge me on this account, must pass the same Award on every Sermon he hears, and every Book he looks on; And such a censure will do me as little hurt, as him good, that passeth it.

Besides this exception, 'tis not unlikely that some may object, that I use *Arguments* that have already been pleaded in behalf of this opinion; which rightly understood,

The Preface.

is no matter of disrepute; since every one else doth it that deals in a Subject formerly written of. And I would have him that commenceth such a charge against me, to consult divers Authours who have handled the same subject; and if he find not the same Arguments and Reasons infinitely repeated every where, let him call me *plagiary*, and spare not. 'Tis true therefore I have not baulk't the reasons of *Origen*, *Dr. More*, or the Authour of the *Letter of Resolution*, because they had been used already; but freely own the assistance of those worthy Authours; however I think I have so managed, fortified, and secured them against exceptions, especially the most considerable, that I may reasonably expect a pardon, yea and an interest in them also. For 'tis the backing of an argument that gives it force and efficacy; which I have done to the
most

The Preface.

most weighty of them, at my proper cost and charges. Nor should I have been faithful to my cause, had I omitted any thing that I thought confirm'd it; upon any pretence whatever; since possibly this discourse may fall into the hands of some, who never met with those other Authors. And my design being a full proof, defence, and explication of *Præexistence*; it had been an unpardonable defect to have pretermitted those weighty reasons by which its learned assertors have enforced it.

If any yet should criminate me (as I know some did the *account of Origen*;) for using many of the same words, and some of the same phrases and expressions; that those others, who have writ about those matters, have made use of; I am not very careful to answer them in this matter; and I doubt this engagement

against

The Preface.

against those little scruples, will but seem importune to the judicious. For no body blames the frequent usage of words of Art ; or those which the first *Masters* or *Restorers* of any Doctrine have been wont to express their notions by ; since that such words and expressions are best understood, as have by custome, or the Authority of some great Authors, been appropriated to such Doctrines, as they have employed them in the service of. And should every man that writes on any subject, be obliged to invent a new, all the terms he hath need of, and industriously to shun those *proper expressive words* and *phrases* that are fitted to his hands, and the business he is about ; all things will be fill'd with *impertinency, darkness* and *confusion*.

It must be acknowledged then, that most of the peculiar *words* and *phrases* that either I, or any body else

The Preface.

else that will speak properly and intelligibly in this matter, make use of, are borrowed from the judicious and elegant contriver of them, the profound Restorer and Refiner of almost-extinct *Platonism*: Whose invention hath been so happy in this kind, that it hath served up those notions in the most *apposite, significant, comprehensive and expressive* words that could well be thought of. Wherefore 'twere an humour-some piece of folly for any man that deals in these matters, industriously to avoid such *termes and expressions* as are so adapted and fitted to this purpose, and so well known among those that are acquainted with this way of *Learning*; when without vanity he could not think to be better furnish'd from his own phancy.

If in the following papers I have used any *expressions* of others, which
these

The Preface.

these considerations will not warrant; I must beg pardon for my *memory*, which doth not use to be so serviceable. And where I writ this Discourse, I had not one of my books within my reach, that treated of *this*, or *indeed any other Subject*. Nor am I at leasure now to examine them and *this*, to see whether I can find any such *coincidences*; which a mans phancy dealing frequently in such matters, might insensibly occasion. If any there be, let those that find them out, pardon them, as the slips of a too *officious imagination*; or however else they treat them, they shall not much displease the Author.

And now that this Discourse may pass with less controul among those that shall light on it, I find my self ingag'd to speak a little to a double sort of Readers, who are like to be offended at my design, and averse

to

The Preface

to the *Doctrine* asserted in these *Papers*. And (1) some will boggle at *Præexistence*, and be afraid to entertain it, upon an apprehension that the Admission of this opinion will disorder and change the Frame of *Orthodox Divinity*; which, were there cause for such a jealousy, were but a commendable caution; but there's hope this may prove but a panick fear, or such a needless terror as surpriseth Children in the dark, when they take their best friends for some *Bug-Bear* that would carry them away, or hurt them. For 'tis but supposing (as I have somewhere intimated in the discourse it self) that God created all souls together as he did the Angels; That some of them sinned and fell with the other *Apostate Spirits*; and for their disobedience were thrust into a state of silence and insensibility; That the *Divine* goodness so provided for
G them;

The Preface.

them, that they should act a part again in *terrestrial Bodies*, when they should fitly be prepared for them; And that *Adam* was set up as our great *Protoplast* and *Representative*, who, had he continued in *Innocence* and *Integrity*, we had then been sharers in that happiness which he at first was instated in; but by his unhappy defection and disobedience we lost it; and became thus miserable in our *New life* in these earthly bodies. I say the Doctrine of *Præ-existence* thus stated, is, in nothing that I know of, an enemy to *common Theology*: all things hence proceeding as in our ordinary Systems; with this only difference, that this *Hypothesis* clears the *divine Attributes* from any shadow of harshness, or breach of equity, since it supposeth us to have sinned and deserved all the misery we suffer in this condition before we came hither: whereas

The Prefatē.

whereas the other teacheth, that we became both guilty and miserable by the single and sole offence of *Adam*, whenas we were not then in being, or as to our souls, as much as potentially in our great *Progenitour*; bears somewhat hardly upon the repute of the *Divine* perfections. So that if the wary Reader be afraid to venture upon the *Hypothesis*; that I have drawn up at the end, (which, I confess, I would not give him the least encouragement to meddle with) yet without danger he may admit of *Præexistence* as accommodated to the *Orthodox* Doctrine.

Nor should I indeed have meddled with the other *scheme*, which is built upon the *Principles* of meer *Reason* and *Philosophy*; but that those friends who drew the rest of the Discourse from me, engag'd me to give them an Account of the *Philosophical Hypothesis*. In which, I know, I have

The Preface.

Not in every particular, followed
the mind of the Masters of the *Ori-
genian Cathala*; but kept my self to
the conduct of those *Principles*, that
I judged most rational; though in-
deed the things wherein I differ, are
very few and inconsiderable. How-
ever for that reason I thought fit to
intitle no body to the *Hypothesis* that
I have made a draught of, lest I
should have affix't on any one, what
he would not have owned. But for the
main, those that understand it, know
the Fountain; and for others, 'tis no
great matter if they be ignorant.

Now if anyone judge me to be a
Proselyte to those *opinions*, because I
call them not all to nought, or damn
not those, that have a favour for them;
I know not how to avoid the doom
of their severe displeasure; having
said as much in the place where I treat
of those matters, to purge my self
of such a suspicion, as I thought neces-
sary

The Preface.

say to clear me, in the opinion of any competently ingenious. As for others, let me say what I can, I shall be what their wisdoms think fit to call me; And let that be what it will, I am very well content to bear it. I'll only add, to take off the ground of this uncharitable jealousy, that among the favourers of *Præexistence*, I know none that are adherers to those *opinions*; and therefore for me to have declaim'd against any, on this account, had been a piece of *Knight Errantry*; And those *Dons* that do so make *Giants* of the *Wind-mills* of their own *Imaginations*.

But, (2) There are another sort of Readers that I have a word to say to, who contemn and laugh at every thing that their narrow noddles comprehend not. This, I confess, is a good *easy* way of *confutation*, and if we may take every fool's simile for a

The Preface.

Demonstration, *Præexistence* will be routed, But the best on't is, to call things by their right names, this is but a vulgar childish humour arising from nothing but a fond deoting on the opinions we were first instructed in. For having made those the standard of truth and solidity, these prepossest discerners presently conclude every thing that is a stranger to their ears and understandings, and of another stamp from their *Education-receptions*, false and ridiculous; just like the common people, who judging all customs and fashions by their own, account those of other Nations absurd and barbarous. 'Tis well for those smiling *Corfuters*, that they were not bred in *Mahometism*, for then without doubt they would have made sport of *Christianity*. But since they are so disposed, let them laugh at the opinion I have undertaken for, till they understand

The Preface.

stand it; I know who in the judgment of wise men will prove *Ridiculous*. It was from this very principle that the most considerable truths, that ever the world was acquainted with, were to the *Jews*, a *stumbling block*, and to the *Greeks*, *foolishness*; and 'twas such a *spirit* as reigns in these Children of *self-confidence*, that call'd *S. Paul* a *babbler*. And methinks till these narrow-scall'd people could boast themselves *infallible*, and all their opinions, an *unerring Canon*, common modesty and civility should teach them better manners, than at first dash to judge that a ridiculous absurdity, which the greatest and wisest Sages, that inlightned the antient World, accounted so sound and probable a *Conclusion*. Especially it being a matter not determin'd against, but rather countenanc't in *Scripture*, as will appear hereafter. But *Opinionative Ignorance* is very weak

The Preface

and iminoral. And till those slight
and Vulgar discerners have learn'd
that first principle of true wisdom, *To*
judge nothing till they thoroughly under-
stand it, and have weigh'd it in the Bal-
lance of impartial Reason; 'tis to no
purpose to spend ones breath upon
them.

T H E

THE
CONTENTS

LUX ORIENTALIS.

Chap. 1.

THE opinions proposed concerning
the original of Souls. pag. 1

Chap. 2.

Daily creation of Souls is inconsistent
with the Divine Attributes. 3

Chap. 3.

(2) Traduction of Souls is impossible,
the reason for it weak and frivolous;
The proposal of Præexistence. 16

Chap. 4.

(1) Præexistence cannot be disproved.

Scripture saith nothing against it:
It's silence is no prejudice to this
Doctrine, but rather an Argument
for it, as the case standeth. Præex-
istence was the common opinion of

The Contents.

*our Saviour's times. How, probably,
it came to be lost in the Christian
Church.* 27

Chap. 5.

Reasons against Præexistence answered.

*Our forgetting the former state is
no argument to disprove it: Nor are
the other Reasons that can be pro-
duc'd, more conclusive. The proof of
the possibility of Præexistence were
enough, all other Hypotheses being
absurd and contradictory. But it
is prov'd also by positive Argu-
ments.* 45

Chap. 6.

*A second Argument for Præexistence
drawn from the consideration of the
Divine Goodness, which alwayes
doth what is best.* 51

Chap. 7.

*The first Evasion, that God acts freely,
and his meer will is reason enough
for his doing, or forbearing any thing,
is overthrown by four Considerations.*

Some

The Contents.

Some incident Evasions, viz. that Gods Wisdom, or his glory, may be contrary to this display of his goodness, in our being made of old, clearly taken off. 55

Chap. 8.

A second general Evasion, viz. that our Reasons cannot tell what God should do, or what is best, overthrown by several considerations. As is also a third, viz. that by the same Argument God would have been obliged to have made us impeccable, and not liable to Misery. 61

Chap. 9.

A fourth Objection against the Argument from Gods goodness, viz. That it will conclude as well that the World is infinite and eternal, Answered. The conclusion of the second Argument for Præexistence. 71

Chap. 10.

A third Argument for Præexistence, from

The Contents

from the great variety of mens speculative inclinations, and also the diversity of our Genius's, copiously urged. If these Arguments make Præexistence but probable, 'tis enough to gain it the Victory. 74

Chap. 11.
Great caution to be used in alledging Scripture for our speculative opinion. The countenance that Præexistence hath from the sacred writings both of the Old and New Testament; Reasons of the seeming uncouthness of these allegations. Præexistence stood in no need of Scripture-proof. 82

Chap. 12.
Why the Author thinks himself obliged to descend to some more particular Account of Præexistence. The presumption positively to determine how it was with us of old. The Authors design in the Hypothesis that follows. 90

Chap.

The Contents.

Chap. 18.

Seven Pillars on which the particular Hypothesis stands. 94

Pillar 1.

All the Divine designs and actions are laid and carried on by pure and infinite Goodness. 95

Pillar 2.

There is an exact Geometrical Justice that runs through the Universe, and is interwoven in the contexture of things. 97

Pillar 3.

Things are carried to their proper place and state, by the congruity of their natures; where this fails, we may suppose some arbitrary managements. 100

Pillar 4.

The Souls of men are capable of living in other bodies besides Terrestrial; And never act but in some body or other. 102

Pillar

The Contents.

Pillar 5.

The Soul in every State hath such a body as is fittest for those faculties and operations that she is most inclined to exercise.

105

Pillar 6.

The powers and faculties of the Soul are either (1) Spiritual, and intellectual: or (2) Sensitive: or (3) Plastick.

107

Pillar 7.

By the same degrees that the higher powers are invigorated, the lower are consopited and abated, as to their proper exercises, and e contra.

108

Chap. 14.

A Philosophical Hypothesis of the Souls Præexistence.

113

Her Æthereal State.

The Aereal State.

102

The Terrestrial State.

122

The

The Contents.

The next step of Descent, or After-state. 126

The Conflagration of the Earth. 137

The General Restitution. 142

THE

The Contents.
The next best of Descent, or
T H E
ERRATA Corrected thus:
The Constitution of the Earth.
In Lux Orientalis.

P Ag. 9. l. 6. For
pa. 61. l. 3. Reasons
p. 78. l. 1. his
p. 126. l. 6. course

Read
F. r.
Reason.
this
course.

In the Annotations.

pag. 34. l. 28. promptus
p. 38. l. 27. *ἐκείνων*
p. 45. l. 12. tye
p. 51. l. 5. Plaistick
p. 53. l. 7. Zoophiton's
p. 54. l. 29. Unquickly
p. 56. l. 8. *Ἀντίθετος*
p. 62. l. 19. other the *Ἀντίθετος*
p. 74. l. 8. property
p. 80. l. 2. doors: for
ibid. l. 21. properly
p. 84. l. 2. fitted
ibid. l. 21. restore
p. 94. l. 15. vigorous
p. 95. l. 8. this humane
p. 101. l. 30. *ὑποσώματα*
p. 104. l. 28. corporeal
p. 106. l. 13. alledged
p. 113. l. 20. Psychopanychites
ibid. l. 31. to
p. 119. l. 7. *ἡγεμονίαι*
p. 144. l. 23. ante. Interisse
p. 184. l. 26. Nymphs
p. 209. l. 15. *Δογμαχία*
p. 238. l. 26. slaves
p. 255. l. 11. *sesquialtera*
p. 265. l. 3. the steady
p. 268. l. 10. to those
p. 275. l. 2. Heaven's

promptus.
ἐκείνων
lye.
Plaistick.
Zoophyton's.
Unlucky.
Ἀντίθετος
over the *Ἀντίθετος*
properly.
doors for.
property.
fitted.
restore.
rigorous.
his humane.
ὑποσώματα
incorporeal.
allege.
Psychopanychites.
two
ἡγεμονίαι
anti. Interisse.
Nymphs.
Δογμαχία
slaves.
sesquialtera.
the: steady.
so those.
Heaven's.

LUX ORIENTALIS.

CHAP. I.

The opinions proposed concerning the original of Souls.

IT hath always been found a matter of discouraging difficulty, among those that have busied themselves in such *Inquiries*, To determine the *Soul's original*. Insomuch that after all the contests and disputes that have been about it, many of the wisest Inquisitors have concluded it *undeterminable*: or, if they have fate down in either of the two opinions, *viz.* of it's *immediate Creation*, or *Traduction* (which of later ages have been the only competitors); they have been driven to it, rather from the absurdities of the *opposite opinion*, which they have left; than drawn by any rational *alliciency* in that which they have taken to. And indeed, if we do but *impartially* consider the grand inconveni-

ences which each party urgeth against the others Conclusion, it would even tempt one to think, that both are right in their *apposition*, and neither in their *asserion*. And since each side so strongly oppugns the other and so weakly defends it self, 'tis a sure and suspicion that they are both mistaken. Wherefore if there be a *third* that can lay any probable claim to the truth, it deserves to be heard to plead its cause; and, if it be not chargeable with the contradictions or absurdities either of the one or other, to be admitted.

Now though these later ages have concluded the matter to lie between *immediate Creation*, and *seminal Traduction*; yet I find that the more *antient* times have pitcht upon *Præexistence*, as more likely than either; For the *Platonists*, *Pythagoreans*, the *Chaldean* wise men, the *Jewish Rabbins*, and some of the most learned and antient Fathers were of this opinion. Wherefore I think we owe so much at least to the *Memory* of those grave *Sages*, as to examine this *Doctrine* of theirs, and if neither of the later *Hypotheses* can ease our anxious minds, or free themselves from absurdities; and this *Grey Dogma* fairly clear all doubts, and be obnoxious to no such contradictions; I see no reason but we may give it a favourable admittance, till something else appear
more

Ch. 2. *A Key for Providence.* 3

more concinnous and rational. Therefore let us take some account of what the two first *opinions* alledge one against another, and how they are proved by their promoters and defendants. Now if they be found unable to withstand the shock of one anothers opposition; we may reasonably cast our eyes upon the third, to see what force it brings to vouch its interest, and how it will behave itself in the encounter.

CHAP. II.

Daily creation of Souls is inconsistent with the Divine Attributes.

THe first of these *opinions* that offers it self to Tryal is, that God daily creates humane souls, which immediately are united unto the bodies that Generation hath prepared for them. Of this side are our later Divines, and the generality of the Schoolmen. But not to be born down by Authorities, Let us consider what reason stands against it. Therefore,

(1) If our Souls came immediately out of the hands of God when we came first into these bodies, Whence then are those enormously brutish inclinations, that strong natural proclivity to vice and impiety, that are *exstant* in the children of men? All the works

4 *Præexistence of Souls*, Ch. 2.

of God bear his image, and are perfect in their kind. Purity is his nature, and what comes from him, proportionably to its capacity partakes of his perfections. Every thing in the *natural world* bears the superscription of his *wisdom* and *goodness*; and the same fountain cannot send forth *sweet waters* and *bitter*. Therefore 'tis a part of our allegiance to our Maker to believe, * that he made us *pure* and *innocent*, and if we were but just then framed by him when we were united with these *terrestrial bodies*, whence should we contract such degenerate propensions? Some tell us, that this impurity was immediately derived from the *bodies* we are united to; But, how is it possible, that purely *passive insensible* Matter should transfuse *habits* or *inclinations* into a Nature that is quite of another Make and Quality? How can such a cause produce an effect so disproportionate? * Matter can do nothing but by motion, and what relation hath *that* to a moral contagion? How can a *Body* that is neither capable of *sense* nor *sin*, infect a *soul*, as soon as 'tis united to it, with such vicious debauched dispositions?

But others think to evade by saying, That we have not these *depravities* in our natures, but contract them by *Custom*, *education*, and evil *usages*. How then comes it about, that those that have had the same care and industry used upon them,

Ch. 2. *A Key for Providence.* 5

them, and have been nurtured under the same discipline and severe oversight, do so vastly and even to wonder differ in their *inclinations*? * How is it that those that are under continual temptations to *vice*, are yet kept within the bounds of *virtue*, and sobriety? And yet that others, that have strong motives and allurements to the contrary, should violently break out into all kinds of extravagance and impiety? Sure, there is somewhat more in the matter than those general causes, which may be common to both; and which many times have quite contrary effects.

(2.) This *Hypothesis*, that God continually Creates humane souls in these bodies, consists not with the honour of the Divine Attributes. For,

(1.) How stands it with the *goodness* and *benignity* of that God, who is *Love*, to put pure and immaculate *spirits*, who were capable of living to him and with him, into such *bodies* as will presently defile them, deface his *image*, pervert all their *powers* and *faculties*, incline them to hate what he most loves, and love what his Soul hateth; and that, without any knowledge or concurrence of theirs, will quite marre them as soon as he hath made them, and of dear *Children*, render them *rebels* or *enemies*, and in a moment from being like *Angels* trans-

8 *Præexistence of Souls,* Ch. 2.

form them into the perfect resemblance of the first *Apostates, Devils?*

Is this an effect of those tender mercies that are over all his works? And

(2.) Hath that *Wisdom* that hath made all things to operate according to their natures, and provided them with whatever is necessary to that end, made myriads of noble *Spirits* capable of as noble operations, and presently plunged them into such a condition wherein they cannot act at all according to their first and proper *dispositions*, but shall be necessitated to the quite contrary; and have other noxious and depraved inclinations *fatally* imposed upon their pure natures? Doth that wisdom, that hath made all things in *number, weight, and measure*, and disposed them in such exact *harmony* and *proportions* use to act so *ineptly*? And that in the best and noblest pieces of his Creation? Doth it use to make and presently destroy? To frame one thing and give it such or such a nature, and then undo what he had done, and make it another? And if there be no such irregular methods used in the framing of *inferiour Creatures*, what reason have we to suspect that the *Divine Wisdom* did so vary from its self in its *noblest compassures*?

And (3.) Is it not a great affront to the *Divine Justice*, to suppose, as we are commonly taught, that as soon as we are *born*, yea, and

and in the *World*, we are obnoxious to eternal wrath and torments. if our Souls are then immediately created out of nothing? For, To be just is to give every one his due; and how can endless, unsupportable, punishments be due to innocent Spirits, who but the last moment came righteous, pure, and immaculate out of their Creators hands; and have not done or thought any thing since, contrary to his will or Laws, nor were in any the least capacity of sinning?

I, but the first of our order, our General head and Representative, sinned, and we in him; thus we contract guilt as soon as we have a Being, and are lyable to the punishment of his disobedience. This is thought to solve all, and to clear God from any shadow of unrighteousness. But whatever truth there is in the thing it self, I think it cannot stand upon the Hypothesis of the Souls immediate Creation, nor yet justify God in his proceedings. For, (4.) If I was then newly Created when first in this body; what was Adam to me, who sinned above 5000 years before I came out of nothing? If he represented me, it must be as I was in his Loins, that is, in him as an effect in a cause. But so I was not, according to this Doctrine; for my soul owns no Father but God, its immediate progenitor. And what am I concerned then in his sins, which had never my

will or consent, more than in the sins of *Mahomet*, or *Julius Caesar*? Nay, than in the sins of *Beelzebub* or *Lucifer*? And for my body, 'tis most likely, that never an *Atom* of *his*, ever came at me; or, if any did, he was no cause on't. Besides, *what* of it self is neither capable of *sense*, *sin*, *guilt*, nor *punishment*: or, (2.) Admitting that we become thus *obnoxious* as soon as in the body, upon the account of his *default*, How doth it comport with the divine *Justice*, in one moment to make such excellent Creatures, and in the next to render them so *miserable*, by thrusting them into a condition, so *factually obnoxious*, especially since they were capable of living and acting in *bodies* more perfect, and more accommodate to their new *undefiled* natures? Certainly, could they have been put to their choice whether they would have come into *being* upon such terms, they would rather have been *nothing* for ever. And God doth not use to make his Creatures so, as that, without their own *fault*, they shall have cause to unwish themselves.

Hitherto in this second *general Argument* I have dealt against those that believe and assert the *original depravity* of our *natures*: which those that deny, may think themselves not pinc'd by or concern'd in; Since they think they do no such dishonour to the *divine Attributes*, while they assert, that we were not made

Ch. 2. A Key for Providence. 9

in so deplorable and depraved a condition, but have so made ourselves by our *voluntary aberrations*. But neither is this a fit *Plaster* for the *sore*, supposing our *souls* to be *immediately created* and so sent into these *bodies*. For still it seems to be a diminutive and disparaging apprehension of the *infinite and immense Goodness* of God, that he should degrade such excellent creatures as our *souls* into a state so hazardous, * wherein he seeth it to be ten thousand to one, but that they will corrupt and defile themselves, and so make themselves miserable here, and to *eternity* hereafter. And certainly, be we as *indifferent* naturally to *good* and *evil* as can be supposed; yet great are the disadvantages to *virtue* that all men unavoidably meet with, in this state of *imperfection*.

For considering, that our *infant* and *growing* age is an age of *sense*, in which our *appetites*, and *passions* are very *strong*, and our *reasons* *weak*, and scarce any thing but a *chain* of *imagination*s, 'tis I say great odds, but that we should be carried to inordinacy, and exceed the bounds the divine laws have set us. So that our *lower powers* of *sense* and *passions* using to have the *lead*, will grow strong and impetuous, and thus 'tis an hundred to one but we shall be rooted in *vice*, before we come to the *maturity* of our *reasons*, or are capable of the *exercise* of *virtue*. And woful experience teach-

teacheth us, that most men run so far before they consider whither they are a-going, that the care and diligence of all their lives after, will scarce reclaim them. Besides, the far greatest part of the world are led into *wickedness* and all kinds of *debauchery*, by corrupt and vicious *education*. And 'tis not difficult to observe what an *enormous* strength, bad *education* hath to deprave and pervert well *dispos'd inclinations*. Which things consider'd, this way also methinks reflects a Disparagement on the *Divine Attributes*: Since by creating souls daily and putting them into such *bodies*, and such parts of the world as his *infinite Wisdom* sees will *debauch* them, and pervert them from the ways of *righteousness* and *happiness*, into those of *vice* and *misery*; he deals with them less mercifully than a parent among us would with his *Off-spring*. And to suppose God to have less goodness than his degenerate *creatures*, is to have very *narrow* apprehensions of his *perfections*, and to rob him of the honour due to his *Attributes*.

(3) It hath been urged with good *probability* by great and wise *Sages*, that 'tis an *unbecoming apprehension* of the *Majesty* on high, * to suppose him assistant to unlawful and unclean *actions*, by creating a *soul* to animate the impure *fetus*. And to think, It is in the power of *leutish* lust to determine *Omnipotence* to create a *Soul*, whensoever a couple

Ch. 2. A Key for Providence. 11

couple of *unclean Adulterers* shall think fit to join in their *bestial pleasures*; is methinks to have a very mean apprehension of the *divine Majesty* and *Power*. This is to make him the worst of *Servants*, by supposing him to *serve* his creature's vices, to wait upon the vilest actions, and to engage the same infinite Power that made the world for the perfecting what was begun by *dissolute Wanton*s. This Argument was used of old by pious and learned *Origen*, and hath been employed in the same service since, by his *modern* defendents. But I foresee an *evasion* or two, that possibly with some may stand for an *answer*, the removal of which will clear the business.

It may be pretended that God's attending to *create* souls for the supply of such *generations*, is but an act of his *justice*, for the *detection*, and consequently *punishment*, of such lawless offenders; which therefore will be no more matter of disparagement than the waiting of an *Officer* of *justice* to discover and apprehend a *Malefactor*.

But this Subterfuge cannot elude the force of the *Argument*, for it hath no place at all in most Adulteries; yea great *injustice* and *injury* is done many times by such *illegitimate* births; the Child of a *Stranger* being by this means admitted

to carry away the *inheritance* from the *lawful* off-spring. Besides, God useth not ordinarily to put forth his *Almighty power* to discover *secret miscarriages*, except sometimes for very remarkable and momentous ends, but leaveth *hidden iniquities* to be the objects of his own *castigations*. And if *discovery* of the fault be the main end of such *creations*, * methinks, that might be done at a cheaper rate, that should not have brought so much inconvenience with it, or have exposed his own *innocent* and *harmless* off-spring to undeserv'd *Reproach* and *Infamy*.

But further it may be suggested, that it is no more *indecent* for God to *create souls* to furnish those *unlawful Generations*, than it is that a man should be nourisht by meat that he hath unlawfully come by, or that the *Cattle* which he hath stoln should ingender with his own. But the difference of these instances from the case in hand is easily discernable; in that the *nourishment* and *productions* spoken of, proceed in a set orderly way of *natural causes*, which work *fatally* and *necessarily* without respect to *moral circumstances*; and there is no reason, it should be in the power of a sinful creature to engage his *Maker* to pervert or stop the course of nature, when he pleaseth. But in the case of *creating souls*, God is supposed to act by *explicite* and *immediate Will*, the suspending of which,

Ch. 2. *A Key for Providence.* 13

in such a case as this, is far different in point of credit and *decorum*, from his altering the settled *Laws* he hath set in the Creation, and turning the world upside down.

I might further add (4ly), That * it seems very *incongruous* and *unhandsome* to suppose, that God should create two *souls* for the supply of one *monstrous body*. And of such *prodigious productions* there is mention in *History*. That's a remarkable instance in *Sennertus*, of a *Monster* born at *Emmaus* with two *hearts*, and two *heads*; the diversity of whose *appetites*, *perceptions*, and *affections*, testified that it had two souls within that *bi-partite habitation*. Now, to conceive the most *wise Maker* and *Contriver* of all things, immediately to create two *souls*, for a *single body*, rather than suffer that *super-plus* of *matter* which constitutes the *monstrous excrescence* to prove *effete & inanimate*, is methinks a *derogatory apprehension* of his *wisdom*, and supposeth him to act more *ineptly* in the great and *immediate* instances of his power, than in the ordinary course of nature about less noble and accurate *productions*. Or, if it be pretended, that *Souls* were sent into them while the *bodies* were yet *distinct*, but that afterwards they grew into one: This, I say, will not heal the breach that this *Hypothesis* makes upon the *divine Wisdom*; it tacitely reflecting a shameful oversight upon *Omni-science*,

14 *Præexistence of Souls.* Ch. 2

science, that he should not be aware of the future *coalescence* of these bodies into one, when he made souls for them; or at least, 'tis to suppose him, *knowingly* to act *ineptly*. Besides, that the *rational soul* is not created till the body, as to the main strokes of it at least, is framed, is the general opinion of the Assertors of daily creation; So that then there is no room for this *evasion*.

And now one would think that an *opinion* so very *abnoxious*, and so lyable to such grand *inconveniences*, should not be admitted but upon most pressing *reasons* and *includible demonstrations*. And yet there is not an *argument* that I ever heard of from reason to enforce it, but only such as are brought from the impossibility of the way of *Traduction*, which indeed is chargeable with as great *absurdities*, as that we have been discoursing of.

'Tis true, several *scriptures* are prest for the service of the cause; but I doubt much against their *intent* and *inclination*. General *testimonies* there are to prove that God is the *Father* and *Creator* of *Souls*, which is equally true, whether we suppose it made just as it is *united* to these *bodies*, or did *præexist*, and was before them; But that it is just then *created* out of nothing when first it comes into these *earthly bodies*, I know not a word in the *inspired Writings* that speaks it. For that saying of our Saviour, *My Father worketh hitherto, and*

Ch. 2. *A Key for Providence.* 15

I work, is by the most judicious understood of the works of preservation and providence : Those of creation being concluded within the first *Hebdomade*, accordingly as is exprest in the *History*, * that God on the *seventh day* rested from all his works. Nor can there an instance be given of any thing created since, or is there any pretended, but that which hath been the subject of our *inquiry*; which is no inconsiderable *presumption*, that that was not so neither ; since the divine way of working is not *parti-colour* or *humoursome*, but *uniform* and *consonant* to the laws of exactest *wisdom*. So that for us to suppose that God, after the complicating of his *Creation*, and the laws given to all things for their *action*, and *continuance*, to be every moment working in a quite other way in one instance of beings, than he doth in all besides; is methinks a somewhat odd apprehension, especially when no *Reason* urgeth to it, and *Scripture* is silent. For such places as this [*the God of the Spirits of all flesh, the Father of Spirits. The spirit returns to God that gave it. The souls which I have made. We are his off-spring. Who formeth the spirit of man within him, and the like*] signifie no more, but that our souls have a nearer relation to God than our bodies, as being his immediate workmanship, made without any creature-interposal, and more especially regarded by him. But to
in-

inferred hence, that they were then produced when these bodies were generated, is *illogical* and *inconsequent*. So that all that these Scriptures will serve for, is only to disprove the Doctrine of *Traduction*, but makes not a tittle for the ordinary *Hypothesis of Daily Creation against Præexistence*.

CHAP. III.

(2) *Traduction of souls is impossible, the reasons for it weak and frivolous, the proposal of Præexistence.*

THUS then we have examin'd the first way of stating the *Soul's original*, that of *continual Creation*; and finding no sure resting place for our inquiry here, we remove to the second,

The way of *Traduction* or *seminal Propagation*. And the adherers to this *Hypothesis* are of two sorts, *viz.* either such as make the Soul to be nothing but a *per* sort of *matter*, or of those that confess it wholly *spiritual* and *immaterial*. I'll dispatch the former, briefly strike at the

root

Ch. 3: *A Key for Providence.* 17

root of their misconceit of the *Souls production*, and shew it cannot be *matter*, be it as pure as can be conceived.

Therefore (1) If the *soul* be *matter*, then whatever *perceptions* or *apprehensions* it hath, or is capable of, they were let in at the *senses*. And thus the great Patron of the *Hypothesis* states it, in his *Leviathan*, and other writings. But now clear, it is that our *Souls* have some *conceptions*, which they never received from *external sense*: For there are some *congenite implicit Principles* in us, without which there could be no *sensation*, * since the *images* of objects are very *small* and *inconsiderable* in our *brains*, comparatively to the vastness of the things which they represent, and very unlike them in *multitudes* of other *circumstances*; so that 'twere impossible we should have the *sensible representation* of any thing, * were it not that our *souls* use a kind of *Geometry*, or *mathematick Inference* in judging of external objects by those little hints it finds in *material impressions*. Which *Art* and the *principles* thereof were never received from *sense*, but are presupposed to all *sensible perceptions*. * And, were the *soul* quite void of all such *implicit notions*, it would remain as *senseless* as a stone for ever.

Besides, we find our minds fraught with principles *logical, moral, metaphysical*, which
E could

could never owe their original to *sense* otherwise, than as it gives us occasions of using them. * For *sense* teacheth no *general propositions*, but only affords *singulars* for *Induction*; which being an *Inference*, must proceed from an higher *principle* that owns no such dependence on the *senses*, as being found in the mind, and not deriv'd from any thing without. Also we find in our selves *mathematical notions*, and build certain *demonstrations* on them, which abstract from *sense* and *matter*. And therefore never had them from any *material power*, * but from something more sublime and excellent. But this Argument is of too large a consideration to be treated of here, and therefore I content my self with those brief Touches, and pass on.

(2) If the *soul* be *matter*, 'tis impossible it should have the *sense* of any thing: for either the whole *image* of the *object* must be received in one point of this *sensitive matter*; a thing absurd at first view, that such variety of distinct and orderly *representations* should be made at once upon a *single atom*; or the *whole image* is imprest upon every *point*, and then there would be as many *objects* as there are *points* in this *matter*; and so every thing would be infinitely *multiplied* in our *delusive senses*. Or finally, every part of the *soul* must receive a proportionable part
of

Ch. 3. *A Key for Providence.* 19

of the *image*; and then, how could those parts communicate their *perceptions* to each other, and what should *perceive* the *whole*? This Argument is excellently managed by the great Dr. H. More, in whose writings this fond *Hypothesis* is fully *triumpht* over, and *defeated*. Since therefore the very lowest degree of *perception*, *single* and *simple sense*, is incompatible to *meer body* or *matter*, we may safely conclude, that the higher and nobler operations of *imagining*, *remembring*, *reasoning*, and *willing* must have a cause and source that is not *Corporeal*. Thus therefore those that build the souls traduction upon this ground of its being only *body* and *modified matter*, are disappointed in the *foundation* of their *conclusion*.

But (2) Another sort of assertors of *traduction* teach the Soul to be *spiritual* and *incorporeal*, and affirm that by a vertue deriv'd from the first *benediction*, it can propagate its like; one *soul* emitting another as the body doth the matter of *Generation*. The manner of which *spiritual production* useth to be illustrated by one Candle's lighting another; and a mans begetting a thought in anothers mind, without diminishing of his own. This is the most favourable representation of this opinion, that I can think on. And yet, if we nearly consider it, it will appear most *absurd* and *unphilosophical*. For if one *soul* produce ano-

20 *Præexistence of Souls, Ch. 3.*

ther, 'tis either out of *nothing* or something *præexistent*. If the former, 'tis an *absolute creation*, which all *philosophy* concludes impossible for a *Creature*. And if it be pretended that the Parent doth it not by his proper *natural* virtue, but by a strength imparted by God in the first *bleſſing, Increase and multiply*, so that God is the prime *agent*, he only the *instrument*: I rejoin, that then either God hath thereby obliged himself to put forth a new and extraordinary *power* in every such occasion, distinct from his *influence* in the ordinary course of *nature*: Or else (2) he only concurs by his *providence*, as he doth to our other natural actions, we having this Ability bestowed upon our very natures. He that asserts the first, runs upon all the rocks that he would avoid in the former *Hypothesis of continual Creation*, and God will be made the cause of the *sin*, and *misery* of his spotless and blameless Creatures; which *absurdities* he cannot shun by saying, that God, by interposing in such *productions*, doth but follow the *rules* of acting, which he first made while man was innocent. For certainly, infinite *goodness* would never have tyed up it self to such *Laws of working*, as he foresaw would presently bring unavoidable *inconvenience, misery, and ruine* upon the best part of his *workmanship*. And for the second way, it supposeth God to have no more to do in this
action

Ch. 3. A Key for Providence. 21

action than in our eating and drinking. Consequently, here is a creation purely natural. And methinks, if we have so vast a power to bring the ends of contradictories together, something out of nothing, (which some deny to Omnipotence it self) 'tis much we cannot conserve in being our Creature so produced, nor our own intimate selves, since conservation is not more than Creation. And 'tis much, that in other things we should give such few specimens of so vast an ability; or, have a power so divine and excellent, and no faculty to discern it by.

Again, (2) if the Soul be immediately produced out of nothing, be the agent who it will, God or the Parent, it will be pure and simple. For, supposing our parents to be our Creators; they make us but as natural agents, * and so can only transmit their natural qualities, but not their moral pravitys. Wherefore there can no better account be given from this way how the Soul is so debauched and infected as soon as it comes into the body, than in the former, and therefore it fails in the main end it is designed for.

Thus we see then that the tradition of the Soul, supposing it to be produced out of nothing, cannot be defended.

Nor doth the second general way yield any more relief to this Hypothesis. For if it be made of any thing præexistent, it is either

22 *Præexistence of Souls, Ch. 3.*

of *matter* or *spirit*. The former we have undermined and overthrown already, in what was said against those, that hold it to be *body*. And if it be made out of any *Spiritual* substance, it must be the *soul* of the parent, (except we will revive the old *enthusiastick* conceit of its *being* a *particle* of the *divine essence*) which supposition is * against the nature of an *immaterial* being, a chief property of which, is to be *indiscernible*. Nor do the *similitudes* I mentioned in the proposal of the *Hypothesis*, at all fit the business; for one *candle* lights another, * by *separable emissions* that pass from the *flame* of that which is kindled, to the *wick* of the other. And *flame* is a *body* whose *parts* are in continual *flux*, as a *river*. But the substance of the *soul* is *stable*, *permanent*, and *indivisible*, which quite makes it another case. And for a mans informing anothers mind with a thought which he had not conceived, it is not a *production* of any *substance*, but only an occasioning him to exert an *operation* of his *mind* which he did not before. And therefore makes nothing to the *illustrating*, how a *Soul* can produce a *Soul*, a substance *distinct* and without it self: Thus we see how desperate the case of the *souls original* is in the *Hypothesis* of *Traduction* also. But yet to let it have fair play, we'll give it leave to plead it's cause; and briefly present

Ch. 3. A Key for Providence. 23

sent what is most material in its behalf.

There are but two reasons that I can think of, worth the naming: (1) *A man begets a man*, and a *man* he is not without a *Soul*, therefore 'tis pretended that the *soul* is begotten. But this argument is easily detected of palpable *sophistry*, and is as if one should argue, a man is *mortal*, therefore his *Soul* is *mortal*; or is *fat* and *lusty*, therefore his *Soul* is *fat*. The absurdity of which kinds of reasoning lyes in drawing that into a *strict* and *rigorous affirmation*, which is only meant according to *vulgar speech*, and is true only in some remarkable respect, or circumstance. Thus we say, *A man begets a man* because he doth the *visible* and *only sensible* part of him; The vulgar, to whom common speech is accommodate, not taking so much notice of what is past the ken of their *senses*. And therefore *Body* in ordinary speaking is set out for *Person*, as here *man* for the *body*. Sometimes the *noblest* part is used for the *whole*, as when 'tis said 70 *Souls* went down with *Jacob* into *Egypt*; therefore such arguments as the asserters of *traducion* make use of, which are drawn from vulgar schemes of speech, argue nothing but the desperateness of the cause, that needs such pitiful *sophistries* to recommend it. Such are these proofs which yet are some of the best I meet with, *The seed of the Woman shall break the Ser-*

penta head; Sixty six souls descended out of *Jacobs loins*; Adam begat a son in his own likeness, and such like. According to this rate of arguing the scripture may be made speak any thing that our humourous phancies please to dictate. And thus to rack the sacred writings, to force them whether they will or no to bring evidence to our opinions, is an affront to their Authority, that's next to the denying of it. I might add (2) that *begetting* also hath a latitude; and in common speech signifies not a strict and philosophical production; So that a man begets a man, though he only generates the body, into which fitly prepared descends a soul. And he that doth that upon which another thing necessarily follows, is said to be the cause of both.

(2) The adherents to *traduction* use to urge, that, except the whole man, soul and body, be propagated, there is no account can be given of our original defilement. And scripture gives evident testimony to that *early pollution*; for we are said to be *conceived in sin*, and *transgressors from the womb*.

We have already seen that indeed the way of *early creating souls*, cannot come off but with vilely aspersing the *divine attributes*. And it hath been hinted, that neither can *Traduction* solve the business: for if the Parent beget the soul out of nothing, it will be

Ch. 3. *A Key for Providence.* 25

as pure and clean as if God himself were its immediate Creator; for though a clean thing cannot come out of an unclean, when any thing of the substance of the producent is imparted to the effect; yet where 'tis made out of nothing, the reason is very different: Yea, the soul in all the powers that are concern'd in this production is now as clean and pure as ever 'twas; for it is suppos'd to do it by a capacity given, at its first creation while pure and innocent; in which respect it is not capable of moral contagion; this being an ability meerly natural and plastick, and not at all under the imperium or command of the will, the only seat of moral good and evil. Or, if our souls are but particles and descriptions of our parents, then I must have been guilty of all the sins that ever were committed by my Progenitors ever since Adam; and by this time, my soul would have been so deprav'd and debauch'd, that it would be now brutish, yea diabolical. Thus then we see, that even upon this reason, 'tis necessary, to pitch upon some other Hypothesis, to give an account of the pravity of our natures; which both these fail in the solution of. And since the former commits such violence upon the honour of the divine attributes, since the latter is so contrary to the nature of things, and since neither can give any satisfaction in the great affairs of providence and our natures, or have any incur-

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26 *Præexistence of Souls, Ch. 3.*

agement from the *Sacred Volume*; 'Tis I think, very excusable for us to cast our eyes abroad, to see if there be no other way, that may probably unriddle those *mysteries*, and relieve the minds of *anxious* and *contemplative* inquirers. In which search, if we light on any thing that doth sweetly accord with the *Attributes* of God, the *nature* of *things*, and unlocks the intricacies of *Providence*; I think we have found, what the two former *opinions* aim at, but cannot make good their pretences to; And may salute the *truth* with a joyful

Euphonia. Wherefore from the *modern* disputants, let us look towards the *ancient Sages*, those *Eastern Sophi*, that have fill'd the world with the fame of their *wisdom*; And since our inquiries are *benighted* in the *West*, let us look towards the *East*, from whence 'tis likely the desired *light* may display it self, and chase away the *darkness* that covers the *face* of those *theories*. Therefore it was the *opinion* of the *Indian Brachman*, the *Persian Magi*, the *Egyptian Gymnosophists*, the *Jewish Rabbins*, some of the *Græcian Philosophers*, and *Christian Fathers*, that the souls of men were created all at first; and at several times and occasions upon forfeiture of their better life and condition, dropt down into these *terrestrial* bodies. This the learned among the *Jews* made a part of their *Cabbala*, and pretend to have received

it from their great *Law-giver*, *Moses*; which *Hypothesis*, if it appear but probable to an *impartial* inquiry, will even on that account be preferable to both the former, which we have seen to be desperate.

CHAP. IV.

(1) *Præexistence cannot be disproved. Scripture saith nothing against it. It's silence is no prejudice to this Doctrine, but rather an Argument for it, as the case standeth. Præexistence was the common opinion of our Saviour's times. How, probably, it came to be lost in the Christian Church.*

Therefore let us see what title it can shew for our *assent*, or whether it can prove it self worthy of the *Patronage* of those great *Authors* that have owned it.

(10) Then, Whether this Doctrine be true or no; I'm confident it cannot be proved false; for if all *Souls* were not *made* together, it must be, either because God could not do it;

28 *Præexistence of Souls, Ch. 4*

it; or because he *would* not. For the first, I suppose very few have such *narrow Conceptions* of the *divine power*, as to affirm that *omnipotence* could not produce all those beings at first, which apart he is suppos'd to *create daily*; which implies no *contradiction*, or as much as *difficulty*, to be *conceived*; and which *de facto* he hath done in the case of *Angels*. Or, if *inconsistence* with any *Attribute* should be pretended, *that* shall be prov'd quite otherwise hereafter; And the *amicable* consistence of this *Hypothesis* with them, yea, the *necessity* of it, from this very consideration of the *divine Attributes*, shall be argued in the process.

Therefore, whoever concludes that God made not all *souls* of old, when he produced the world out of nothing, must confess the reason of this assertion to be, because he *would not*. And then I would ask him how he came to know what he affirms so boldly? Who acquainted him with the *Divine Counsels*? Is there a word said in his *revealed Will* to the contrary? or, hath he by his *holty* penmen told us that either of the other ways was more *suitable* to his *deceitful* pleasure? Indeed, 'tis very likely that a strong and ready *phancy*, possess'd with a persuasion of the falshood of this *Hypothesis*, might find some half phrases in *Scripture*, which he might suborn to sing to the tune of his *imagination*. For, in such a

Miscel-

Ch. 4. *A Key for Providence.* 29

Miscellaneous piece as the *Bible* is, it will not be difficult for a man that's strongly resolv'd against an opinion, to find somewhat or other that may seem to him to speak the language of his *preconception*; And therefore it shall go hard, but that those whom their *education* or *prejudice* have engaged against this *Hypothesis*, will light on some obscure pieces of *texts*, and broken sentences or other, that shall seem to condemn what they disapprove of. But I am securely confident, that there is not a sentence in the *sacred volume*, from end to end, that ever was intended to teach, that all *Souls* were not *made of old*; or that, by a legitimate consequence, would infer it. And if any there be that seem to look another way, I dare say they are *collateral*, and were never designed by the *divine* Authors for the purpose they are made to serve, by the enemies of *Præexistence*. Wherefore not to conceal any thing that with the least shew of probability can be pretended from the *sacred volume* in discountenance of the Doctrine of *Præexistence*, I'll bring into view whatever I know to have the least face of a *Testimony* to the contrary, in the *divine Revelations*. That so, when it shall appear that the most specious *Texts* that can be alledg'd, have nothing at all in them to disprove the *souls præexistence*, we may be secure that God hath not discovered to us in his

written

30 *Præexistence of Souls*, Ch. 4

written will, that 'twas not his pleasure to create all souls together.

Therefore (1.), It may be pretended, that the Doctrine of *Præexistence* comports not with that *innocence* and *integrity* in which the Scripture determines *Adam* to have been made. Since it supposeth the *descent* into these *bodies* to be a *culpable lapse* from an higher and better state of *Life*, and this to be a state of *incarceration* for former *delinquencies*. To this I answer,

(1) No one can object any thing to purpose against *Præexistence* from the *unconceivableness* of it, until he know the particular *frame* of the *Hypothesis*, without which, all *impugnations* relating to the *manner* of the thing, will be wide of the mark, and but little to the business. Therefore, if the Objector would have patience to wait till we come to that part of our undertaking, he would find that there was but little ground for such a *scruple*. But however, to prevent all cavillings, in this place I'll shew the *invalidity* of this *objection*. Wherefore,

(2) There is no necessity from the Doctrine of *Præexistence* to suppose *Adam* a *Delinquent*, before his noted *transgression* in a *terrestrial* body: for considering, that his *body* had vast *advantages* above ours, in point of *Beauty*, *Purity*, and *Serviceableness*

Ch. 4. * *A Key for Providence.* 31

to the Soul, what harshness is there in conceiving that God might send one of those *immaculate Spirits* that he had made, into such a Tenement, that he might be his *steward* in the affair of this *lower Family*; and an *overseer*, and *ruler* of those other Creatures that he had ordered to have their dwelling upon earth? I am sure, there is no more contrariety to any of the *Divine Attributes* in this *supposition*, than there is in that, which makes God to have sent a *pure spirit*, which he had *just* made, into such a *body*. Yea,

(3) Supposing that some *Souls* fell, when the *Angels* did (which the process of our discourse will shew to be no unreasonable supposition) this was a *merciful provision* of our *Maker*, and a generous undertaking for a *Seraphick* and *untainted Spirit*. For by this means, fit and congruous *matter* is prepared for those *Souls* to reside and act in, who had rendred themselves unfit to *live* and *enjoy* themselves in more *refined bodies*. And so those *Spirits* that had *sinned* themselves into a state of *silence* and *inactivity*, are by this *seasonable means*, which the *divine Wisdom* and *Goodness* hath contrived for them, put once more into a capacity of acting their parts anew, and coming into play again. Now if it seem hard to any to conceive how so noble a *Spirit* in such an *advantageous body*, should

32 *Præexistence of Souls,* * Ch. 4

should have been imposed upon by so gross a *delusion*, and submit so *impotently* to the first *temptation*; He may please to consider, that the difficulty is the same, supposing him just then to have been *made*; if we grant him but that *purity* and those great *perfections* both of *will*, and *understanding*, which *orthodox theology* allows him.

Yea, again (4.) I might ask, What *inconvenience* there is in supposing, that *Adam* himself was one of those *delinquent Souls*; * which the divine *pity* and *compassion* had thus set up again; that so, so many of his excellent *Creatures* might not be lost and undone irrecoverably; but might act anew, though upon a lower stage in the universe. A due consideration of the *infinite fecundity* and fulness of the *divine goodness* will, if not *warrant*, yet *excuse* such a *supposition*.

But now if it be demanded, What *advantage* *Adam's* standing had been to his posterity, had he continued in the state of *innocence*; and how *sin* and *misery* is brought upon us by his *Fall*, according to this *Hypothesis*? I answer, that then among many other great *privileges*, he had transmitted downwards by way of natural *generation* that excellent and *blessed temper* of *body*; which should have been like his own *happy crasis*. So that our *apprehensions* should have been more

more large and free ; our affections more regular and governable ; and our inclinations to what is good and vertuous, strong and vigorous. For we cannot but observe in this state, how vast an influence the temper of our bodies hath upon our minds ; both in reference to intellectual and moral dispositions. Thus, daily experience teacheth us, how that, according to the ebb or flow of certain humours in our bodies, our wits are either more quick, free, and sparkling, or else more obtuse, weak, and sluggish. And we find that there are certain clean and healthy dispositions of body which make us cheerful, and contented ; others on the contrary morose, melancholy, and dogged. And 'tis easie to observe how age or sickness sowers, and crabbe our natures. I might instance in almost all other qualities of the mind, which are strangely influenc't and modified according to the bodies constitution. But none will deny so plain a truth ; and therefore I forbear to insist further on it. Nor need I mention any more advantages ; so many, and such great ones, being consequent upon this. But our great Protoplast and representative, falling through his unhappy disobedience, besides the integrity and rectitude of his mind, he lost also that blessed constitution of Body, which would have been so great a priviledg to his offspring : so that

34 *Praeexistence of Souls*, Ch. 4.

it became now *corrupt, weak, and indisposed* for the nobler exercises of the Soul; and he could transmit no better to us, than himself was owner of. Thus we fell in him, and were made *miserable* by his *transgression*. We have bodies conveyed to us, which strangely do bewitch and betray us. And thus we all bear about us the marks of the *first apostacy*. There are other sad effects of his *defection*, but this may suffice for my present purpose. Thus we see how that the *derivation of original depravity from Adam* is as clear in this *Hypothesis*, as can be pretended in either of the other. And upon other Accounts it seems to have much the advantage of both of them. As will appear to the *unprejudiced* in what is further to be discoursed of.

Finally, therefore, If the urgers of the Letter of *Genesis* of either side, against this *Hypothesis*, would but consider, That the Souls that descend hither, for their *prævarication in another state*, lye in a long condition of *silence and insensibility*, before they appear in *terrestrial bodies*; each of them then might, from the doctrine of *Praeexistence* thus stated, gain all the *advantages* which he supposeth to have by his *own opinion*, and avoid all those *absurdities* which he seeth the other run upon. If the Asserters of *daily Creation* think it clear from Scripture that

God

Ch. 4. *A Key for Providence.* 35

God is the Father of Spirits, and immediate maker of Souls, they'll find the same made good and assented to in this Hypothesis. And if they are unwilling to hold any thing contrary to the Nature of the Soul, which is immortal and indiscernible, the Doctrine of Preexistence amicably closeth with them in this also.

And if the Patrons of Tradition would have a way, how sin and misery may be propagated from our first Parent without aspersing the divine Attributes, or affirming any thing contrary to the phenomena of Providence; and Nature; this Hypothesis will clear the business; It giving us so fair an Account how we all dye in Adam, without blotting the Wisdom; Justice, or Goodness, of God, or affirming any thing contrary to the Appearances of Nature.

I have been the longer on this Argument, because 'tis like to be one main objection; And we see it is so far from prejudicing, that it is no inconsiderable evidence of the truth of Preexistence.

And now, besides this that I have named, I cannot think of any Arguments from Scripture against this Doctrine, considerable enough to excuse a mention of them. However, if the candid Reader will pardon the impertinency I'll present to view what I find most colourable.

36 *Præexistence of Souls,* Ch. 4

Therefore (2), It may be some are so inadvertent as to urge against our souls having been of old, that, *Sacred writ says We are but of Yesterday*; which expression of *divine Scripture*, is unquestionless to be understood of our appearance on this stage of Earth. And is no more an *Argument* against our *Præexistence*, than that other phrase of his, *Before I go hence*, and *Be no more*, is against our *future existence* in an other state after the present life is ended. Nor will it prove more the business it is brought for, than the expression of *Rachels weeping for her Children because they were not*; will infer, that they were, *absolutely nothing*. Nor can any thing more be made.

(3.) Of that place in *Ecclesiastes*, *Yet, better is he than both they*, (meaning the dead and living) *which hath not yet been*; since, besides that 'tis a like scheme of speech with the former, it seems more to favour, than discountenance *Præexistence*; for what is *absolutely nothing* can neither be worse, nor better. Moreover, we coming from a state of silence and inactivity when we drop into these bodies, we were before, as if we had not been; and so there is better ground in this case, for such a manner of speaking, than in meer *non-appearance*; which yet *Scripture* phraseth a *Not being*.

* And now I cannot think of any place
in

Ch. 4. A Key for Providence. 37

in the *Sacred volume* more that could make a tolerable plea against this *Hypothesis*, of our *Souls* having been before they came into these *bodies*; except

(4.) Any will draw a *negative Argument* from the *History* of the *Creation*, concluding that the *Souls* of men were not made of *old*, because there is no mention there, of any such matter. To which I return briefly, That the same Argument concludes against the being of *Angels*, of whose *Creation* there is no more say'd in the first *story* than of this *inferiour* rank of *Spirits*, *Souls*. The reason of which *silence* is commonly taken to be, because *Moses* had here to do with a rude and *illiterate* people, who had few or no apprehensions of any thing beyond their *senses*, and therefore he takes notice to them of nothing but what was *sensible* and of common observation. This reason is given also why *minerals* were omitted. 'Twere an easy matter, to shew how the outward *cortex*, the *Letter* of this *History* is adapted to mean and vulgar apprehensions, whose *narrowness* renders them incapable of *sublimen speculations*. But that being more than needs for our present purpose, I shall forbear to speak further of it.

I might (2.) further add, that great and learned *Interpreters* tell us, that all sorts of *Spirits*, *Angels*, and *Souls* are *symbolically*

38 *Præexistence of Souls,* Ch. 4

meant by the *creation* of *heaven*, and *light*. And, if it were directly in the way of our present business, it might be made appear to be no improbable conjecture. But I refer him that is curious in this particular to the great Restorer of the *antient Cabbala*, the Learned Dr. H. More in his *conjectura Cabalistica*.

And now from the consideration of the silence of the *first History*, we descend to the last and most likely to be urged *scripture*, which is to this purpose.

(5.) We are not to step beyond the *divine Revelations*, and since God hath made known no such Doctrine as this, of the Souls *Præexistence* any where in his word, we may reasonably deny it, or at least have no ground to imbrace it. This is the most important *objection* of all the rest, and most likely to prepossess timorous and wary inquirers against this *Hypothesis*; wherefore I conceive that a full answer to this doubt, will prevent many scrupulous *Hesitations*, and make way for an unprejudic'd hearing of what I have further to alledge in the behalf of this *opinion*. And

(7.) I wish that those that urge *Scripture* silence to disprove *præexistence* would consider, how silent it is both in the case of *Daily Creation*, and *Traduction*; we have seen already that there is nothing in *Sacred writ*

Ch. 4. *A Key for Providence.* 39

to warrant either, but only such *Generals* from which the *respective Patrons* of either Doctrine would inter their own conclusion, though indeed they all of them with better right and congruity prove *Pneexistence*.

(2.) I suppose those that argue from *Scripture-silence* in such cases mistake the design of *Scripture*, which is not to determine *points* of *speculation*, but to be a *rule of Life and Manners*. Nor doth it otherwise design the teaching of *Doctrinals*, than as they have a tendency to promote the *divine life, righteousness and Holiness*. It was never intended by it's *inspired Authors* to fill our *Heads* with *notions*, but to regulate our disorderly *appetites and affections*, and to *direct* us the way to a nobler *happiness*. Therefore those that look for a *systeme of opinions* in those otherways-designed writings, do like him that should see for a body of natural Philosophy, in *Epicætetus* his *morals*, or *Seneca's Epistles*.

(3.) *Christ* and his *Apostles* spoke and writ as the condition of the persons with whom they dealt administred occasion, as as did also the other *pen-men*. Therefore doubtless there were many noble Theories which they could have made the world acquainted with, which yet for want of a fit occasion to draw them forth, were never

upon Record. And we know, few *speculative* truths are delivered in Scripture, but such as were called forth by the *controversies* of those times: And *Præexistence* was none of them, it being the constant opinion of the Jews, as appears by that Question, *Matth.*, was it for this man's sin or his Fathers, that he was born blind, which supposeth it of the *Disciples* also. Wherefore

(4.) There was little need of more teaching of that, which those times were sufficiently instructed in: And indeed, as the case stands, if Scripture-silence be *Argumentative*, 'twill be for the advantage of *Præexistence*; since it being the *then common opinion*, and the *Disciples* themselves being of that belief, 'tis very likely, had it been an error, that our Saviour or his Apostles would have witnessed against it. But there being not a word yet fall from them in disapproval of that *opinion*, though sometimes occasions were administered (as by the *Question* of the *Disciples*, and some other occurrences) 'tis a good presumption of the soundness of it.

Now that *Præexistence* was the common opinion of the Jews, in those times might be made good with full and convictive evidence, were it worth our labour to insist much upon this Inquiry; but this being only a *by-consideration*, a brief touch of it will suffice us. One of the great Rabbins therefore,

Ch. 4. A Key for Providence. 41

fore, * Mr. Ben Israel in his *Problems de Creatione*, assures us, that *Praeexistence* was the common belief of all wise men among the Jews, without exception. And the Author of the Book of *Wisdom*, who certainly was a Jew, probably *Philo*, plainly supposeth the same Doctrine in that Speech, *For I was a witty Child, and had a good Spirit, wherefore the rather being good, I came into a body undefiled.* As also did the Disciples in their foremention'd Question to our Saviour; For except they supposed, that he might have *sinned* before he was born, the Question had been *senseless* and *impertinent*. Again, when Christ askt them, *whom men said he was* they answered, that some said *John the Baptist*, others *Elias*, others *Jeremias* or one of the *Prophets*, which sayings of theirs suppose their belief of a *Metempsychosis* and consequently of *Praeexistence*. These, one would think, were very proper occasions for our Saviour to have rectified his *mistaken* followers, had their *supposition* been an *error*, as he was wont to do in cases not more considerable. Therefore if the enemies of *Praeexistence* will needs urge *Scriptures supposed silence* against it; they have no reason to take it amiss if I shew them how their Argument recoyls upon themselves, and destroy their *own* cause, instead of their *Adversaries*.

(5.) Besides, there were doubtless many Doctrines entertain'd by the *Apostles* and the more learned of their followers, which were disproportion'd to the capacities of the *generality*, who hold but little *Theory*.

There was *strong meat* for the more grown and *manly* Christians, as well as *milk* for *babes*, and weaker *Constitutions*. Now *Scripture* was designed for the benefit of the *most*, and *they* could little understand, and less make use of a *speculation* so remote from *common conceit*, as *Præexistence*. Among us, *wise men* count it not so proper to deal forth *deep* and *mysterious points* in *Divinity* to *common* and *promiscuous Auditories*. Wherefore the *Apostles* and others of their more improv'd and capable *disciples* might have had such a *Doctrine* among them, though it were never expressly defined in their *publick writings*. And the Learned *Origen* and some other of the *Antients* affirm that *Præexistence* was a *Cabbala* which was handed down from the *Apostolick* ages, to *their times*; and we know *those* were *early*, and had therefore better advantages of knowing the certainty of such a *Tradition*, than we at so vast a *distance*.

Nor need any wonder how it came at length to be lost, or at least kept but among a *few*, who considers the *grossness* of succeeding ages, when such multitudes could
swallow

swallow the dull and coarse *Anthropomorphic Doctrines*; much less, if he reflects upon that *black night* of barbarick ignorance which spread it self over this western world, upon the *incursion* of those rude and unciviliz'd Nations that ore-ran the Empire: out of which darkness, 'twas the work of some Centuries to recover the then obscured Region of *Civility* and *Letters*. Moreover, it would allay the *admiration* of any one inquisitive in such researches, when he shall have taken notice of the starting up and prevailing of *School-Divinity* in the world, which was but *Aristotles Philosophy* theologiz'd. And we know that *Philosophy* had the luck to swim in the general esteem and credit, when *Platonism* and the more *antient wisdom*, a branch of which, *Præexistence* was, were almost quite sunk and buried. So that a *Theology* being now made, out of *Aristotelian principles*, 'tis no wonder that *Præexistence* was left out, nothing being supposed to have been said of it, by the great Author of that *Philosophy*; and his admiring *Señators* were loath to borrow so considerable a *Theory*, from their Masters neglected Rival, *Plato*.

But (6) at once to remove this stone of offence out of the way, I think *Scripture* is not so silent in this matter as is imagin'd. And I'm confident, more can be said from those

44 *Præexistence of Souls, Ch. 4.*

those *divine* writings in behalf of *Præexistence*, than for many *opinions*, that it's opposers are very fond of, and think to be there evidently asserted. And had this been a commonly received Doctrine, and mens Wits as much exercised for the defence on't, as they have been for the *common dogmata*, I nothing doubt, but that *Scriptures* would have been heaped up in abundance for it's *justification*, and it would have been thought to have been plainly witness too, in the inspired volume. For, as mens, *phan- cies* will readily furnish them with a proof of that, of whose truth they are strongly prepossessed; So, on the contrary, they'll be very backward to see any evidence of that which is strange to them, and which hath alwaies been reputed an *Absurdity*. But my *Scripture-evidence* is not so proper for this place, I intending to make it an Argument by it self. Therefore if the urger of this *objection*, will but have a little patience till I come so far on the way of my *discourse*, I hope he may be satisfied that *Præexistence* is not such a stranger to *Scripture* as he conceits it.

C H A P. V.

Reasons against Præexistence answered. Our forgetting the former state is no argument to disprove it: nor are the other Reasons that can be produc'd, more conclusive. The proof of the possibility of Præexistence were enough, all other Hypotheses being absurd and contradictory. But it is prov'd also by positive Arguments.

NOW therefore to proceed, let us look back upon our progress, and so enter on what remains. We have seen, that God could have created all Souls at first had he so pleased, and that he hath revealed nothing in his written Will to the contrary. And now if it be found also, that he hath not made it known to our *Reasons* that 'twas not his will to do so, we may conclude this first particular, *That no one can say, that the Doctrine of Præexistence is a falsehood.* Therefore let us call to Account the most momentous

46 *Præexistence of Souls,* Ch. 5.

tous reasons that can be laid against it, and we shall find that they all have not weight enough in the least to move so rational and *solid* an opinion.

(1.) Then, 'tis likely to be urged, that had we *lived* and acted in a former state; * we should doubtless have retain'd some remembrance of that condition; But we having no *memory* of any thing backwards before our appearance upon this *present* stage; it will be thought to be a considerable presumption, that *Præexistence* is but a *phantasy*.

But I would desire such kind of reasoners to tell me, how much they remember of their state and condition in the *womb*; or of the *Actions* of their first *infancy*. And I could wish they would consider, that not one passage in an hundred is *remembered* of their *grown* and *riper* age. Nor doth there scarce a *night* pass but we *dream* of many things which our *waking* *Memories* can give us no Account of; yea, *old* age and some kinds of *diseases* blot out all the *images* of things *past*, and even in this state cause a *total oblivion*. * Now if the *Reasons* why we should lose the *remembrance* of our former life be *greater*, than are the *causes* of *forgetfulness* in the *instances* we have produced, I think it will be clear, that this Argument hath but little force against the *opinion*.

tion we are inquiring into. Therefore if we do but reflect upon that long state of *silence and inactivity* that we emerged from, when we came into these bodies; and the *vast change* we under-went by our sinking into this new and unwonted *habitation*, it will appear to the considerate, that there is greater reason why we should have forgotten our former *Life*, than any thing in *this*. And if a *disease* or *old age* can rase out the *memory* of *past actions*, even while we are in one and the same *condition* of *Life*, certainly so long and deep a *svoon* as is absolute *insensibility* and *inertness*, may much more reasonably be thought to blot out the *memory* of an *other Life*, whose passages probably were nothing like the *transactions* of *this*.

And this also might be given as an other Reason of our forgetting our former *state*, since usually things are brought to our remembrance by some like occurrences. But

(2.) Some will argue, If *this* be a state of *punishment* for former miscarriages, how comes it about then, that 'tis a better condition than that we last came from, *viz.* the state of *silence and insensibility*? I answer, That if we look upon our present *terrestrial* condition as an effect of our *defection* from the *higher Life*, and in reference to our former happiness lost by our own default

48 *Præexistence of Souls*, Ch. 5.

fault, 'tis then a *misery* and a *punishment*. But if we compare our *now-being* with the state of *inactivity* we were deliver'd from, it may then be called an *After-Game of the divine Goodness*, and a *Mercy*. As a *Malefactor*, that is at first put into a dark and disconsolate dungeon, and afterwards is remov'd to a more comfortable and light-some prison, may acknowledge his remove to be a *favour* and *deliverance* compared with the *place* he was last confin'd to; though with respect to his *fault* and former *liberty*, even this condition is both a *misery* and a *misery*. It is just thus in the present case, and any one may make the application.

But it will be said, (3) If our *Souls* liv'd in a *former state*, did they *act* in *bodies*, or without them? The former they'l say is absurd, and the latter incongruous and unlikely; since then all the *powers* the *Soul* hath to exert in a *body*, would have been *idle* and to no purpose. But (1) the most that can be argued from such like *objections*, is, that we know not the *manner* of the *thing*; and are no Arguments against the assertion it self. And were it granted that the *particular state* of the *Soul* before it came hither is *inconceivable*, yet this makes no more against it, than it doth against it's *after-condition*; which these very *objectors* hold
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Ch. 5. *A Key for Providence.* 49

to be so, as to the *particular, modus*. But (2) Why is it so absurd that the Soul should have *assumed* another kind of *body*, before it came into *this*? Even here 'tis *immediately* united to a purer *vehicle*, moves and acts the grosser body by it; And why then might it not in its former and *purer state* of *Life* have been joyn'd only to such a *refined body*, which should have been suitable to its own *perfection* and *purity*? I'me sure, many, if not the most of the *Antient Fathers*, thought *Angels* themselves to be *embodied*, and therefore they reputed not *this* such a gross absurdity. But an occasion hereafter will draw our pen this way again, and therefore I pass it to a third return to this *objection*.

(3.) Therefore, though it were granted that the *Soul* lived afore-times without a *body*, what greater *incongruity* is there in such a *supposition*, than that it should live and *act* after *death* without any union with *matter* or any *body* whatsoever, as the *objectors* themselves conceive it doth? But all such objections as these will fly away as mists before the Sun, when we shall come particularly to state the *Hypothesis*. And therefore I may be excused from further troubling my self and the Reader about them here. Especially since, as hath been intimated, they prove nothing at all, but that

the objectors cannot conceive what manner of state that of *Præexistence* was, which is no prejudice to the opinion it self; that *our Souls were extant before these earthly bodies.*

Thus then I hope I have clearly enough made good that *all Souls might have been Created from the beginning*; for ought any thing that is made known, either in the *Scriptures* or our *reasons* to the contrary.

* And thereby have removed those *prejudices* that Would have stood in the way of our *conclusion*. Wherefore we may now without controul, from our proof of, *That it may be so*, pass on to enquire, whether indeed, *it is so*; and see, whether it may as well be *asserted*, as *defended*.

And truly considering that both the other ways are *impossible*, and this *third* not at all *unreasonable*, it may be thought needless to bring more forces into the field to gain it the victory, after its enemies are quite scattered and defeated. Yet however, for the *pomp* and *triumph* of truth, though it need not their service, we shall add some *positive Arguments*, whereby it may appear, that not only all other ways are *dangerous* and *unpassable*, and *this irreproveable*; but also that there is *direct evidence* enough to prove it *solid* and *rational*. And I make my first consideration of this kind, a *second Argument*.

CHAP. VI.

A second Argument for Præexistence drawn from the consideration of the Divine Goodness, which always doth what is best.

(2) **T**HEN, whoever conceives rightly of God, apprehends him to be infinite and immense Goodness, who is always shedding abroad of his own exuberant fullness: There is no straitness in the Deity, no bounds to the ocean of Love. Now the divine Goodness refers not to himself, as ours extends not unto him. He acts nothing for any self-accomplishment, being essentially and absolutely complete and perfect. But the object and term of his goodness is his creatures good and happiness, in their respective capacities. He is that infinite fountain that is continually overflowing; and can no more cease to shed his influences upon his indigent dependents than the sun to shine at noon. * Now as the infinite Goodness of the deity, obligeth him always to do good, so by the same reason to do that which is best; since to omit any degrees of good would argue a defect in good-

52 *Præexistence of Souls,* Ch. 6.

ness, supposing *wisdom* to order, and *power* to execute. He therefore that supposeth God not always to do what is *best*, and *best* for his *Creatures* (for he cannot act for his own *Good*) apprehends him to be less *good* than can be *conceived*, and consequently not *infinitely so*. For what is *infinite*, is beyond *measure* and *apprehension*.

Therefore to direct this to our purpose, God being *infinitely good*, and that to his *Creatures*, and therefore doing always what is *best* for them, methinks it roundly follows that our *souls* lived and enjoy'd themselves of old before they came into these *bodies*. For since they were *capable* of living, and that in a much better and *happier* state long before they descended into this region of *death* and *misery*; and since that condition of *life* and *self-enjoyment* would have been *better*, than *absolute not-being*; may we not safely conclude from a due consideration of the *divine goodness*, that it was *so*? What was it that gave us our *being*, but the *immense goodness* of our *Maker*? And why were we drawn out of our *nothings*, but because it was *better* for us to *be*, than *not to be*? Why were our *souls* put into *these bodies*, and not into some more *squalid* and *ugly*; but because we are capable of *such*, and 'tis *better* for us to *live* in *these*, than in those that are less *suitable* to our

Ch. 6. *A Key for Providence.* 53

our natures? And had it not been *better* for us, to have enjoy'd our selves and the bounty and favours of our *Maker* of old, as did the other order of *intellectual* creatures, than to have layn in the comfortless *night of nothing* till t'other day? Had we not been *better* on't to have lived and acted in the joyful regions of light and blessedness with those Spirits that at first had being, than just now to jump into this sad plight, and state of *sin* and *wretchedness*?

Infinite Power could as well have made us all at once, as the *Angels*; and with as good *congruity* to our *natures* we might have *liv'd* and been happy without these bodies, as we shall be in the *state of separation*: since therefore it was *best* for us, and as easie for our *Creator* so to have effected it, where was the *defect*, if it was not so? Is not this to flurr his *goodness*, and to *strait-lace* the *divine beneficence*? And doth not the contrary *Hypothesis* to what I am pleading for, represent the *God of Love* as less *good* and *bountiful*, than a *charitable* Mortal, who would neglect no opportunity within his reach of doing what good he could to those that want his help and assistance?

I confess, the world generally have such *Narrow* and *unbecoming apprehensions*

of God, and draw his picture in their imaginations so like themselves, that few I doubt will feel the force of this Argument; and mine own observation makes me enter the same suspicion of its success that some others have who have used it. 'Tis only a very deep sense of the divine goodness can give it any persuasive energy. And this noble sentiment there are very few that are possess'd of. However to lend it what strength I can, I shall endeavour to remove some prejudices that hinder it's force and efficacy; And when those spots and scum are wiped away, that mistake and inadvertency have fastened on it, 'twill be illustrious by its own brightness.

CHAP. VII.

This first Evasion, that God acts freely, and his meer will is reason enough for his doing, or forbearing any thing, overthrown by four Considerations. Some incident Evasions, viz. that Gods Wisdom, or his glory, may be contrary to this display of the divine goodness, in our being made of old, clearly taken off.

(1.) **T**herefore, will some say, God worketh freely, nor can he be obliged to act but when he pleaseth. And this will and pleasure of his is the reason of our beings, and of the determinate time of our beginning. Therefore if God would not that we should have been made sooner, and in a better state of life, his will is reason enough, and we need look no further. To this evasion, I thus Reply.

(1.) 'Tis true indeed, God is the most Free Agent, because none can compel

56 *Præexistence of Souls,* Ch. 7.

him to *act*, none can *hinder* him from *acting*. Nor can his *Creatures* oblige him to any thing. But then

(2.) The *divine liberty* and *freedom* consists not in his *acting* by meer *arbitrari-ous will*, as disjunct from his other *Attri-butes*. For he is said to *act* according to the *Counsel* of his own *will*. So that his *wisdom* and *goodness* are as it were the *Rules* whereby his *will* is directed. Therefore though he cannot be *obliged* to *act* by any thing *without himself*, yet he may by the *Laws* of his own *essential rectitude* and *per-fection*. Wherefore¹ conceive he is said, *not to be able to do* those things (which he might well enough by *absolute power*) that con-sist not with his *ever blessed Attributes*. Nor by the same reason can he *omit* that which the *eternal Law* of his most perfect nature *obligeth* him to. The summ is, * *God* never *acts* by *meer will* or *groundless humour*, that is a *weakness* in his *imperfect Creatures*; but according to the *immutable Rules* of his *ever blessed essence*. And therefore,

(3.) 'Tis a *derogation* from his *infinite Majesty* to assert any thing contrary to his *Goodness* upon pretence of his *will* and *pleasure*. For whatever is most *suta-ble* to this most blessed *Attribute*, and con-tradicts no other, that be sure he *willeth*. Wherefore,

(4) IF

Ch. 7. *A Key for Providence.* 57

(4) If it be better, and more agreeable to the *divine goodness* that we should have been in an happier state, before we came into these bodies, *Gods will* cannot then be pretended to the contrary, (especially it having been proved already, that he hath no way revealed any such *will* of his) but rather it is demonstratively clear that his *will* was, it *should* be so. Since as God never acts in the absence of his *wisdom* and *goodness*, so neither doth he abstain from acting when those great *Attributes* require it.

Now if it be excepted again (2) That 'tis true that this *Hypothesis* is most suitable to the *divine goodness*, and the consideration of that alone would infer it: But how know we but his *Wisdom* contradicts it? I return briefly, That if it be confest to be so correspondent to, and inferrible from one *Attribute*, and cannot be prov'd inconsistent with another, my business is determined. Therefore let those that pretend an inconsistency, prove it. (2) The *Wisdom* of God is that *Attribute* and *essential perfection*, whereby the *divine* actions are directed to their end, which is always good, and best: Therefore to do that which is best, cannot thwart the *divine wisdom*, but always includes and supposeth it: Whence it follows, that what so comports with *goodness*, cannot stand opposite to *Wisdom*.

Wisdom

Wisdom in God being indeed nothing else but *goodness*, contriving and directing for the Creature's *good* and happiness. For we must remember, what was said above, that *what is infinitely full and perfect, can have no ends for any self-advantage*; and therefore the *ends* of the *divine wisdom* are something *without himself*, and consequently the *good and perfection* of his *Creatures*. So that unless it can be proved to have been contrary to *ours*, or any other *Creatures good*, that we should have been extant as soon as the *Light*, it cannot be concluded to have any *contradiction* to the *divine wisdom*.

But it will be said again, (3) *Gods glory* is his great end, for the promoting of which his wisdom *directs* all his *Actions*; and consequently, that which may be *best* for the *Creature*, may not be so conducive to the *divine Glory*, and therefore not agreeable with his *wisdom*.

Now, though I think the world hath a very mistaken apprehension of *Gods glory*, yet I shall not here ingage in more controversies, than I must needs. 'Tis enough for my present purpose to intimate; That *Gods glory* is no *by-end* or *self-accumulation*, nor an *addition* of any thing to Him which he was not eternally possesst of; nor yet is it any thing that stands in opposition to the *good* of his *Creation*; But the *display* and *communi-*
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Ch. 7. A Key for Providence. 59

nation of his excellencies; among the which,
his goodness is not the least considerable, if it
be not that most divine and fundamental At-
tribute which gives perfection to all the rest.
 So that we may assure our selves, that
 when ever his *goodness* obligeth him to acti-
 on, his *glory* never stands in *opposition*. For
 even this is his *glory*, to *communicate* to his
 creatures suitably to his own *absolute fulness*,
 and to act according to the direction of his
essential perfections; yea, though we should
 state his *glory* to consist alone, in the *honour*
 and *renown* of his Attributes, yet even then
 the *Hypothesis* of our having been made in
 the *beginning* will accumulate to his *praises*,
 and represent him to his creatures as more
illustrious; since it is a more *magnificent ap-*
prehension of his *goodness*, and clears his other
Attributes from those stains of dis-repute
 that all other suppositions cast upon them.
 And though his *glory* should consist, as too
 many fondly imagine, in being *praised* and ad-
 mired by his *creatures*, even on this account
 also it would have obliged him to have
made us all of old, rather than opposed
 it; since, then, his excellencies had been
 sung forth by a more numerous *Quire*,
 in continual *Hallelujahs*. Now if it should
 be urged, * that *God made all things for*
himself, and therefore is not obliged to con-
 sult the *good* of his creatures in all his Acti-
 ons:

ons: I rejoyne, that *God's making all things for himself*, can argue no more than his making all things for his own ends, viz. the ends of goodness. Besides, the best Criticks make that place to speak no more but this, That *God orders all things according to himself*; that is, according to the rules of his own nature and perfections.

Thus then, we see that for *God* to do that which is best for his Creatures, is neither contrary to his will and pleasure, his wisdom, nor his glory, but most consonant to all of them. And therefore since the *Præexistence of Souls*, is so agreeable to the divine goodness, and since nothing else in the *Deity* opposeth, but rather sweetly conspires with it, methinks this argument were enough to conclude it. But yet there are other *Evasi- ons* which would elude this *Demonstration*; I shall name the most considerable and leave it to the judicious to determine, whether they can disable it.

CHAP. VIII.

A second general Evasion, viz. that our Reasons cannot tell what God should do, or what is best, overthrown by several considerations. As is also a third, viz. that by the same Argument God would have been obliged to have made us impeccable, and not liable to Misery.

W Herefore the *second* general evasion is, That our *Reasons* cannot conclude what God should do, there being vast fetches in the *divine wisdom* which we comprehend not, nor can our *natural light* determine what is best. I answer (1) Our Saviour himself, who was the best Judge in the case, teacheth us, that the Reason of a man may in some things conclude what God will do, in that saying of his, *If ye be- ing evil, know how to give good things to your Children, much more shall your Father which is in Heaven give his Spirit to them that ask him:* Plainly intimating, that we may se-
curely

curely argue from any thing that is a *perfection* in our selves, to the same in *God*. And if we, who are *imperfectly good*, will yet do as much *good* as we can, for those we *love* and *tender*; with greater confidence may we conclude, that *God*, who is *infinitely so*, will confer upon his *creatures* whatever *good* they are capable of. Thus we see our *saviour* owns the capacity of *reason* in a case that is very near the same that we are dealing in.

And *God* himself appeals to the *reasons* of men to judge of the *righteousness* and *equity* of this ways. *Ye men of Israel and inhabitants of Jerusalem, judge between me and my vineyard*; which place I bring to shew that meer natural *reason* is able to judge in some cases *what is fit for God to do*, and what is *fit* to his *essence* and *perfections*. And if in any,

Methinks (2) its *capacity* in the case before us should be own'd as soon as in any. For if *reason* cannot determine and assure us, that a *blessed* and *happy Being* is *better* than *None* at all; and consequently, that it was *best* for our souls to have been, before they were in this *state of wretchedness*; and thence conclude, that it was very congruous to the *divine goodness* to have made us in a former and better condition; I think then (1) That it cannot give us the assurance of any thing, since

Ch. 8. *A Key for Providence.* 63

since there is not any principle in *Metaphysics* or *Geometry* more clear than this, viz. *That an happy Being, is better than absolute Not-being.* And if our *reasons* can securely determine this, 'tis as much as we need at present. Or if this be not certain, how vain are those Learned men that dispute whether a state of the extremest *miser*y a creature is capable of, and that *everlasting*, be not better than *Non-entity*? (2) If we cannot certainly know that it had been *Better* that we should have existed in a life of happiness, proportion'd to our natures of old, than have been meer *nothing*, till some few years since; we can never then own and acknowledg the *divine goodness* to us in any thing we enjoy. For if it might have been as *good* for us *not to Be*, as *to Be*, and *happily*; Then it might have been as *good* for us to have wanted any thing else that we enjoy, as to have it; and consequently, we cannot own it as an effect of God's *goodness* that he hath bestowed any blessing on us. For if *Being* be not *better* than *Not-being*, then 'tis no effect of goodness that we *are*; and if so, then 'tis not from goodness that we have any thing else, * since all other things are inferiour to the good of *Being*. If it be said, It had been better indeed for us, to have lived in a *former* and *happier* state; but it may be, it had not been *so* for the *universe*; and the *general good* is to be preferred.

64 *Præexistence of Souls,* Ch. 8.

ferr'd before that of *particulars*;

I say then, and it may serve for a (3) answer to the *general objection*: If we may deny that to be done by *almighty goodness*, which is undoubtedly *best* for a whole *species* of his creatures, meerly on this account, that, for ought we know, it may be for the advantage of some others, though there be not the least appearance of any such matter; we can never then argue any thing from the *divine goodness*. It can never then be prov'd from that *glorious Attribute*, that he hath not made some of his creatures *on purpose* that they might be *miserable*; nor can it be concluded thence, that he will not *annihilate* all the *pure* and *spotless* Angels; both which I suppose, any sober inquirer will think congruously deducible from the *divine goodness*. And if to say, *for ought we know*, It may be *best* for some other creatures, that those should be *miserable*, and these *annihilated*, be enough to disable the Argument; on the same account we shall never be able to prove ought from *this*, or any other *Attribute*. I might add,

(2) There is not the least colourable pretence for any such suspicion. For, would the *world* have been too little to have contain'd those *souls*, without jussling with some others? or, would they by violence have taken any of the priviledges of the other

Ch. 8. *A Key for Providence.* 65

intellectual Creatures from them? If so, how comes it about that at last they can all so well consist together? And, could other Creatures have been more disadvantage'd by them, when they were *pure and innocent*, than they will at last, when they are so many of them *debauched and depraved*?

(3) If this be enough to answer an *Argument*, to say, *for ought we know, it may be thus and thus*, when there is not the least sign or appearance of any such thing, then *nothing* can ever be *proved*, and we are condemned to *everlasting Scepticism*. We should never, for instance, from the *order, beauty, and wise contrivance* of the things that do appear, prove there is a *God*, if it were sufficient to answer, That things are indeed so made in this *earth*, on which we are extant; but, it may be, they are framed very *odly, ridiculously*, and *ineptly* in some other *worlds*, which we know nothing of. If this be *answering*, any thing might be *answered*. But there is yet another *objection* against mine *Argument* from the *Divine Goodness*, which looks very formidably at a distance, though when we come near it, we shall find, it will not bear the tryal. And it may thus be urged.

(3) If the *Goodness* of God always obligeth him to do what is *best*, and *best* for

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his *Creatures*, How is it then, that we were not made *impeccable*, and so not *obnoxious* to *miser*y? Or how doth it consist with that overflowing *Goodness* of the *Deity*, that we were let to lie in a long state of *silence* and *insensibility*, before we came into these bodies? This seems a pressing difficulty, but yet there's hopes we may dispatch it. Therefore,

(1) Had we been made *impeccable*, we should have been another kind of *Creatures* than now; since we had then wanted the *Autonomy* or *liberty of will* to good and evil; which is one of our *essential Attributes*. Consequently, there would have been one *species* of *beings* wanting to compleat the *universe*; and it would have been a *shut* to the *divine Goodness* not to have given being to such *Creatures* as in the *Idea* were fairly *possible*, and contradicted no other *Attribute*. Yea, though he foresaw that some would *sin* and make themselves *miserable*, yet the foreseen *lapse* and *miser*y of those, was not an *evil* great enough to over-balance the *good* the *species* would reap by being partakers of the *divine Goodness* in the *land of the Living*; Therefore however 'twas goodness to give such *Creatures* being. But it will be urged upon us, If *Liberty* to good and evil be so essential to our natures, what think we then of the
blessed

Ch. 8. A Key for Providence. 67

bleſſed ſouls after the *Reſurrection*; are not they the ſame *Creatures*, though without the *liberty* of *ſinning*? To return to this; I think thoſe that affirm, that the bleſſed have not this *natural liberty*, as long as they are united to a *body*, and are capable of reſenting it's *pleaſures*, ſhould do well to prove it. * Indeed they may be *morally immutable* and *il-lapſible*: but this is *grace*, not *nature*; a *re-ward* of *obedience*, not a neceſſary *annex* of our *Beings*. But will it be ſaid, why did not the divine Goodneſs endue us all with this *moral ſtability*? Had it not been better for us to have been made in this condition of *ſe-curity*, than in a ſtate ſo *dangerous*? My re-tur to this doubt will be a ſecond An-ſwer to the main *Objection*.

Therefore *Secondly*, * I doubt not, but that 'tis much better for *rational* *Creatures*, that this ſupream happineſs ſhould be the *Reward* of *vertue*, rather than entail'd upon our *natures*. For the procurement of that which we might have miſt of, is far more *ſenſibly gratifying*, than any *neceſſary* and unac-quired injoyment; we find a greater plea-ſure in what we gain by *industry*, *art*, or *ver-tue*, than in the things we were *born* to. And had we been made ſecure from *ſin* and *miſery* from the firſt moment of our *Being*, we ſhould not have put ſo high a *rate* and *value* upon that privilege.

68 *Præexistence of Souls, Ch. 8*

(3) Had we been at first establish'd in an *impossibility* of *lapsing* into *evil*; Then many choice *vertues*, excellent branches of the *divine* Life had never been exercis'd, or indeed have been at all. Such are *Patience*, *Faith*, and *Hope*; the objects of which are, *evil*, *futurity*, and *uncertainty*. Yea,

(4) Had we been so fix'd in an *inamissible* *happiness* from the *beginning*, there had then been no *virtue* in the world; nor any of that matchless *pleasure* which attends the exercise thereof. For *virtue* is a kind of *victory*, and supposeth a *conflict*. Therefore we say, that God is *good* and *holy*, but not *veracious*. Take away a *possibility* of *evil*, and in the *Creature* there is no *moral* goodness. And then no *Reward*, no *Pleasure*, no *Happiness*.

Therefore in sum (5ly), The *divine* *Goodness* is manifested in making all *Creatures* *subtly* to those *Idea's* of their *natures*, which he hath in his *All-comprehensive* *Wisdom*. And their *good* and *happiness* consists in *acting* according to those *natures*, and in being furnish'd with all things necessary for such *actions*. Now the *divine* *Wisdom* is no *arbitrary* *thing*, that can change, or alter those settled *immutable* *Idea's* of things that are there represented. It lopps not off *essential* *Attributes* of some *Beings*, to *inculate* them upon others: But distinctly comprehending
all

Ch. 8. \ *A Key for Providence.* 69

all things, assigns each *Being* its proper nature, and qualities. And the *Divine* goodness, according to the wise direction of the eternal Intellect, in like distinct and orderly manner produceth all things: viz. according to all the variety of their respective *Idea's* in the divine wisdom. * Wherefore as the goodness of God obligeth him not to make every Planet a fixt Star, or every Star a Sun; So neither doth it oblige him to make every degree of Life, a rational Soul, or every Soul, an impeccable Angel. * For this were to tie him to contradictions. Since therefore, such an order of Beings, as rational and happy, though free, and therefore mutable creatures, were distinctly comprehended in the *Divine Wisdom*; It was an effect of God's Goodness, to bring them into being, even in such a condition, and in such manner, as in their eternal *Idea's* they were represented.

Thus then we see, it is not contrary to the infinite plenitude of the *Divine Goodness* * that we should have been made *peccable* and liable to *defection*: And being thus in our very essential constitutions *lapsible*; 'twas no defect in the goodness of our Maker that he did not interpose by his absolute omnipotency, to prevent our actual *prævarication* and *apostasy*. Since his goodness obligeth him not to secure us upon any terms whatever, but upon such, as may most promote the general

good and advantage. And questionless, 'twas much better that such, as would wilfully depart from the laws of their blessed natures, and break through all restraints of the divine commands, should feel the smart of their *disobedience*; than that *providence* should disorder the constitution of nature to prevent the punishment, which they drew upon themselves: Since those *apostate* spirits remain instances to those that stand, of the *divine justice*, and *severity* against *sinners*, and so may contribute not a little to their *security*. And for that long *night* of *silence*, in which multitudes of souls are buried before they descend into *terrestrial matter*, it is but the due reward of their former *disobedience*; for which, considering the *happy circumstances* in which they were made, they deserv'd to be nothing for ever. And their re-instating in a condition of *life* and self-injoyment after so highly culpable *delinquencies*, is a great instance of the over-flowing fulness of the *divine compassion* and *benignity*.

Thus then we see, That Gods making us *lapsible* and permitting us to *fall*, is no prejudice in the least to the infinite fecundity of his *goodness*, and his making all things *best*. So that mine Argument for *Præexistence* bottom'd on this Foundation, stands yet firm and immoveable, notwithstanding the rude assault of this *objection*. From which I pass to a *fourth*.

C H A P. I X.

A (4th.) Objection against the Argument from God's goodness, viz. That it will conclude as well that the World is infinite and eternal, Answered. The conclusion of the second Argument for Præexistence.

T Herefore fourthly, it will be excepted, If we may argue from the *divine goodness*, which always doth what is best, for the *Præexistence* of Souls; then we may as reasonably thence conclude, that the world is both *infinite* and *eternal*, since an *infinite communication* of goodness is better than a *finite*. To this, because I doubt I have distressed the Readers patience already, I answer briefly.

(1) Every one that believes the *infinite-ness* of Gods *goodness* is as much obliged to answer this *objection*, as I am. For it will be said, *infinite goodness* doth good *infinitely*, and consequently the *effects* to which it doth *communicate* are *infinite*. For if they are not so, it might have *communicated* to more, and thereby have done more good, than now

is supposed to do, and by consequence now is not *infinite*. And to affirm that goodness is *infinite*, where what it doth and intends to do is but *finite*, will be said to be a *contradiction*, since *goodness* is a *relative* term, and in God always respects somewhat *ad extra*. For he cannot be said to be good to himself, he being a nature that can receive no *additional perfection*. Wherefore this *Objection* makes no more against mine *Argument*, than it doth against the *Infinity* of the *Divine Goodness*, and therefore I am no more concern'd in it than others. Yea (2 ly.) the Scripture affirms that which is the very strength of mine *Argument*, viz. That God made all things best; *Very Good*, saith our Translation: but the *Original*, *טוב* *טוב*; and *טוב* is a *particle* of the *Superlative*. And therefore every one that owns its sacred *Authority* is interested against this *Objection*. For it urgeth, it had been far more *splendid*, *glorious*, and *magnificent* for God to have made the *universe* *commensurate* to his own *immensity*; and to have produced *effects* of his *power* and *greatness*, where ever he himself is, viz. in *infinite* space and *duration*, than to have confined his *omnipotence* to work only in one little spot of an *infinite* *inane* capacity, and to begin to act but t other day. Thus then the late *creation*, and *finiteness*, of the *World*, seem to conflict with the undoubted oracle of truth

Ch. 9. *A Key for Providence.* 73

truth as well as with mine *Argument*; and therefore the *Objection* drawn thence is of no validity. (3) Those that have most strenuously defended the orthodox doctrine against the old opinion of the eternity and infinity of the world, * have asserted it to be impossible in the nature of the thing. And sure the divine benignity obligeth him not to do contradictions; or such things, as in the very notion of them, are impossible. But in the case of *Præexistence*, no such thing can be reasonably pretended, as above hath been declared; and therefore there is no escaping by this *Evasion* neither. Nor can there any thing else be urged to this purpose, but what whoever believes the infinity of the divine bounty will be concern'd to answer; And therefore 'twill make no more against me, than against a truth on all hands confessed. Let me only add this, That 'tis more becoming us, to enlarge our apprehensions of things so, as that they may suit the Divine Beneficence, than to draw it down to a compliance with our little schemes, and narrow models.

Thus then I have done with the *Argument* for *Præexistence* drawn from the Divine Goodness. And I have been the longer on it, because I thought 'twas in vain to propose it, without taking to task the principal of these objections, that must needs arise in the minds of those that are not used to this way of arguing.

And

And while there was no provision made to stop up those *Evasions*; that I saw this *Argument* obnoxious to; the using of it, I was afraid, would have been a *prejudice*, rather than a *furthurance* of the *cause* I ingaged it in. And therefore I hope the ingenious will pardon this so necessary piece of tediousness.

CHAP. X.

A third Argument for Præexistence, from the great variety of mens speculative inclinations; and also the diversity of our Genius's, copiously urged. If these Arguments make Præexistence but probable, 'tis enough to gain it the Victory.

BUT now I proceed to another *Argument*. Therefore, *Thirdly*, If we do but reflect upon what was said above, against the *Souls daily Creation*, from that enormous *pravity* which is so deeply rooted in some mens *natures*, we may thence have a considerable evidence of *Præexistence*. For as this strong *natural propensity* to vice and *impiety* cannot possibly consist with the *Hypothesis* of the *souls* coming just out of Gods hands *pure* and

Ch. 10. A Key for Providence. 73

immaculate; so doth it most aptly suit with the doctrine of its *præexistence*: which gives a most clear and apposite account of the *phenomenon*. For let us but conceive the Souls of men to have grown *degenerate* in a former condition of life, * to have contracted strong and inveterate *habits* to vice and lewdness, and that in various manners and degrees; we may then easily apprehend, when some mens *natures* had so incredibly a *depraved tincture*, and such *impetuous, ungovernable, irreclaimable inclinations* to what is vicious; while others have nothing near such wretched propensions, but by good education and good discipline are *mouldable to virtue*; This shews a clear way to *unriddle* this *amazing mystery*, without blemishing any of the *divine Attributes*, or doing the least *violence* to our *faculties*.

Nor is it more difficult to conceive, how a *soul* should awaken out of the state of *inactivity* we speak of, with those *radical inclinations* that by long practice it had contracted, * than how a *Swallow* should return to her old trade of living after her winter *sleep* and *silence*; for those *customs* it hath been addicted to in the other state, are now so deeply fastened and rooted in the *soul*, that they are become even *another nature*.

Now then, if *Præexistence* be not the truth, 'tis very strange that it should so exactly

actly answer the *Phaenomena* of our natures, when as no other *Hypothesis* doth any while tolerably suit them. And if we may conclude that false, which is so correspondent to all *appearances*, when we know nothing else that can yield any probable account of them, and which is not in the least *repugnant* to any *inducement* of belief, we then strangely forget our selves when we *determine* any thing. We can never for instance, conclude the *Moon* to be the cause of the *flux* and *reflux* of the Sea, from the answering of her *approaches* and *recesses* to its *ebbs* and *swellings*. Nor at this rate can the cause of any thing else be determined in nature.

But yet besides, (2) we might another way inforce this *Argument*, from the strange difference and diversity that there is in mens *wits* and *intellectual crasseis*, as well as in the dispositions of their *wills* and *appetites*. Even the natural tempers of mens *minds* are as vastly different, as the *qualities* of their *bodies*. And 'tis easie to observe in things purely *speculative* and *intellectual*, even where neither *education* or *custom* have interposed to sophisticate the natural *innuendo*, that some men are strangely *propense* to some *opinions*, which they greedily drink in, as soon as they are duly represented; yea, and find themselves burthened and oppress'd, while their *education* hath kept them in a *contrary belief*, * when

Ch. 10. *A Key for Providence.* 77

as *others* are as fatally set against these *opinions*, and can never be brought favourably to resent them.

Every *Soul* brings a kind of *sense* with it into the world, whereby it *tastes* and *relisheth* what is suitable to its peculiar *temper*. And *notions* will never lie easily in a mind, that they are not fitted to; some can never apprehend *that* for other than an *Absurdity*, which others are so clear in, that they almost take it for a *First Principle*. And yet the former hath all the same evidence as the latter. This I have remarkably taken notice of, in the opinion of the *extension* of a *spirit*. Some that I know, and those *inquisitive*, *free*, and *ingenuous*, by all the proof and evidence that is, cannot be reconciled to it. Nor can they conceive any thing *extended*; but as a *Body*. Whereas other deep and impartial searchers into nature, cannot apprehend *it* any thing at all, if not *extended*; but think it must then be a *mathematical point*, or a meer non-entity.

I could instance in other speculations, which I have observ'd some to be passionate Embracers of upon the first proposal; when as no arguments could prevail on others, to think them tolerable. But there needs no proof of a manifest observation.

Therefore before I go further, I would demand, whence comes this meer *notional* or
specu-

speculative variety? * Were his difference about *sensibles*, yea, or about things depending on the *imagination*, the *influence* of the body might then be suspected for a *cause*. But since it is in the most *abstracted Theories* that have nothing to do with the grosser *phantasies*; since this *diversity* is found in *minds* that have the greatest care to free themselves from the *deceptions* of *sense*, and intanglements of the body, what can we conclude, but that the soul it self is the *immediate* subject of all this *variety*, and that it came *prejudiced* and *prepossest* into this body with some *implicit notions* that it had learnt in another? And if this *congruity* to some *opinions*, and averſeness to others be *congenial* to us, and not *advenient* from any thing in *this state*, 'tis methinks clear that we were in a former. * For the Soul in its *first* and *pure* nature hath no *idiosyncrasies*, that is, hath no *proper* natural inclinations which are not competent to others of the same kind and condition. Be ſure, they are not fatally *determin'd* by their natures to *false* and *erroneous apprehensions*. And therefore since we find this determination to one or other falſhood in many, if not moſt in this ſtate, and ſince 'tis very unlikely 'tis derived *only* from the *body*, *cuſtom*, or *education*, what can we conceive on't, but that our Souls were tainted with theſe *peculiar* and *wrong* *corruptions*

ons before we were extant upon this stage of Earth?

Besides, 'tis easie to observe the strange and wonderful *variety* of our *genius's*; one mans nature inclining him to one kind of study and imployment, anothers to what is very different. Some almost from their very *cradles* will be addicted to the making of figures, and in little *mechanical* contrivances; others love to be *riming* almost as soon as they can speak plainly, and are taken up in small essays of *Poetry*. Some will be scrawling *Pictures*, and others take as great delight in some pretty offers at *Musick* and *vocal harmony*. Infinite almost are the ways in which this *pure natural diversity* doth discover it self. * Now to say that all this variety proceeds primarily from the meer *temper* of our *bodies*, is me thinks a very poor and unsatisfying Account. * For those that are the most like in the *Temper, Air, Complexion* of their bodies, are yet of a vastly differing *Genius*. Yea, they that have been made of the same clay, cast in the same mould, and have layn at once in the same natural bed, the womb; yea whose bodies have been as like as their state and fortunes, and their *education* and usages the same, yet even they do not unfrequently differ as much from each other in their *genius* and *dispositions* of the *mind*, as those that in all these par-
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particulars are of very different condition. Besides, there are all kind of *makes, forms, dispositions, tempers, and complexions* of body, that are addicted by their natures to the same *exercises and employments*: so that to ascribe this to any *peculiarity* in the body, is me seems a very improbable solution of the *Phænomenon*. And to say all these *inclinations* are from *custom or education*, is the way not to be believed, since all experience testifies the contrary.

What then can we conjecture is the cause of all this *diversity*, but that we had taken a great *delight and pleasure* in some things like and *analogous* unto these, in a former condition, which now again begins to put forth it self, when we are awakened out of our *silent recess* into a state of *action*? And though the *employments, pleasures and exercises* of our former *life*, were without question very different from these in the present estate; yet 'tis no doubt, but that some of them were more *consamiliar and analogous* to some of our *transactions*, than others: so that as any exercise or employment here is more suitable to the particular dispositions that were predominant in the other state, with the more peculiar kindness is it regarded by us, and the more greedily do our inclinations now fasten on it. Thus if a *Musician* should be interdicted the use of all *musical instruments*, and yet

Ch. 10. A Key for Providence. 81

yet might have his choice of any other Art or Profession; tis likely he would betke himself to *Learning* or *Poetry*; these exercises requiring the same *disposition* of wit and *genius*, as his beloved *Musick* did. And we in like manner, being by the fate of our wretched *descent* hindered from the direct exercising our selves about the objects of our former *delights* and *pleasures*, do yet as soon as we are able, take to those things which do most correspond to that *genius* that formerly inspired us.

And now tis time to take leave of the *Arguments* from *Reason* that give evidence for *Preexistence*. If any one think that they are not so *demonstrative*, but that they may be *answered*, or at least *evaded*; I pray him to consider how many demonstrations he ever met with, that a good wit, resolv'd in a contrary cause, could not shuffle from the edge of. Or, let it be granted, that the *Arguments* I have alledged are no *infallible* or *necessary* proofs; yet if they render my cause but *probable*, yea but *possible*, I have won what I contended for. For it having been made manifest by as good evidence as I think can be brought for any thing, that the way of *new creations* is most *inconsistent* with the *honor* of the blessed *Attributes* of *God*: And that the other of *Traduction* is most *impossible* and *contradictory* in the nature of things:

82 *Præexistence of Souls*, Ch. II.

*There being now no other way left but *Præexistence*, if *that* be *probable* or but barely *possible*, 'tis enough to give it the *victory*. And whether all that hath been said prove so much or no, I leave to the *indifferent* to determine. I think he that will say it doth not, can bring few proofs for any thing, which according to his way of judging will deserve to be called *Demonstrations*.

CHAP. XI.

Great caution to be used in alledging Scripture for our speculative opinions. The countenance that Præexistence hath from the sacred writings both of the old and new Testament; Reasons of the seeming uncountness of these allegations. Præexistence stood in no need of Scripture-proof.

IT will be next expected, that I should now prove the Doctrine I have undertaken for, by *Scripture evidence*, and make good what I said above, That the *divine oracles* are not so silent in this matter as is imagined. But truly I have so tender a sense of the sacred Authority of that *Holy volume*, that I dare not be so bold with it, as to force it to speak what I think it *intends* not; A *presumption*, that is too common among our
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confident *opinionists*, and that hath occasioned great troubles to the Church, and disrepute to the *inspired* writings. For, for men to ascribe the *odd* notions of their *over-heated* imaginations to the Spirit of God, and *eternal truth*, is me thinks a very bold and impudent *bellying* it. Wherefore I dare not but be very *cautious* what I speak in this matter, nor would I willingly urge Scripture as a proof of any thing, but what I am sure by the *whole tenor* of it, is therein contained: And would I take the *liberty* to fetch in every thing for a *Scripture-evidence*, that with a little *industry* a man might make *serviceable* to his design; I doubt not but I should be able to fill my *Margent* with *Quotations*, which should be as much to *purpose* as have been cited in general CATECHISMS and CONFESSIONS of FAITH, and that in points that must forsooth be dignified with the sacred title of FUNDAMENTAL. But Reverend ASSEMBLIES may make more bold with Scripture than *private persons*; And therefore I confess I'm so *timorous* that I durst not follow their example: Though in a matter that I would never have *imposed* upon the belief of any man, though I were *certain* on't, and had *absolute* power to enjoin it. I think the only way to preserve the reverence due to the *oracles of Truth*, is never to urge their

84 *Præexistence of Souls, Ch. II.*

Authority but in things very *momentous*, and such as the whole *current* of them gives an *evident* *franchise* to. But to make them speak every *trivial* conceit that our sick brains can imagine or *dream* of, (as I intimated) is to *villifie* and *deflowre* them. Therefore though I think that several *Texts* of *Scripture* look very fairly upon *Præexistence*, and would encourage a man, that considers what strong *Reasons* it hath to back it, to think, that very *probably* they mean some thing in *favour* of this *Hypothesis*; yet I'll not urge them as an *irrefutable* proof, being not willing to lay more stress upon any thing than it will bear. Yet, I am most willing to *confess* the *weakness* of my *Cause* in what joyn't loever I shall discover it. And yet I must needs say, that whoever compares the *Texts* that follow, with some particulars mention'd in the *answer* to the objection of *Scripture-silence*, will not chuse but acknowledge that there is very fair probability for *Præexistence* in the *written* word of God, as there is in that which is *engraven* upon our rational *natures*. Therefore to bring together here what *Scripture* saith in this *matter*,

1. I'll lightly *touch* an *expression* or two of the *old* Testament, which not *improperly* may be applyed to the business we are in search of. And methinks God himself in his *posing* the

the great instance of patience, *Job*, seems to intimate somewhat to this purpose, viz. that all spirits were in being when the *Foundations* of the earth were laid : when saith he, the *morning stars sang together*, and all the *Sons of God shouted for joy*. By the former very likely were meant the *Angels*, and 'tis not improbable but by the latter may be intended the blessed untainted *Souls*. At least the particle *All* me thinks should comprize this order of spirits also. And within the same period of discourse, having question'd *Job* about the nature and place of the *Light*, he adds, *I know that thou wast then born, for the number of thy days are many*, as the *Septuagint* render it. * And we know our *Saviour* and his *Apostles* have given credit to that *Translation* by their so constant following it. Nor doth that saying of God to *Jeremias* in the beginning of his charge seem to intimate less, *Before I formed thee in the Belly I knew thee, and before thou camest out of the womb I gave thee wisdom* ; * as reads a very creditable version. Now though each of these places might be drawn to another sense, yet that only argues that they are no necessary proof for *Præexistence*, which I readily acknowledge ; nor do I intend any such matter by alledging them. However I hope they will be *confest* to be applicable to this sense ; and if there be other grounds that

86 *Præexistence of Souls,* Ch. II.

swade this Hypothesis to be the truth, 'tis I think very probable that these Texts intend it *favour*, which whether it be so or no, we have seen already.

2. For the Texts of the New Testament that seem to look pleasingly upon *Præexistence*, I shall as briefly *hint* them as I did the former. * And *me* thinks that passage of our Saviour's prayer, *Father, Glorifie me with the same glory I had with thee before the world began*, sounds somewhat to this purpose.

The glory which he prays to be restored to, seems to concern his *humane* nature only; for the *divine* could never lose it. And therefore it *supposeth* that he was in his *humanity* existent before: And that his soul was of old before his appearance in a *Terrestrial* body. Which seems also to be intimated * by the expressions of his coming from the Father, descending from Heaven, and returning thither again, which he very frequently makes use of. And we know the *Divinity* that fills all things, cannot move to, or quit a place, it being a manifest *imperfection*, and contrary to his *Immensity*.

I might add those other expressions of our Saviour's taking upon him the *form* of a *Servant*, of rich for our sakes becoming poor, and many others of like import, all which are very clear if we admit the doctrine of *Præexistence*, but without it somewhat perplex and

Ch. 11. *A Key for Providence.* 87

and intricate: since these things, applyed to him as God, are very improper and disagreeing, but oppositely suit his Humanity, to which if we refer them, we must suppose our Hypothesis of *Præexistence*. But I omit further prosecution of this matter, * since these places have been more diffusely turged in a late discourse to this purpose.

Moreover the Question of the Disciples, * *Was it for this mans sin, or for his Fathers that he was born blind?* and that answer of theirs to our Saviours demand, whom men said he was; in that some said he was John the Baptist, some Elias, or one of the Prophets; both which I have mentioned before; do clearly enough argue, that both the Disciples and the Jews believed *Præexistence*. And our Saviour saith not a word to disprove their opinion. But I spake of this above.

Now however uncouth these allegations may seem to those that never heard these Scriptures thus interpreted; yet I am confident, had the opinion of *Præexistence* been a received Doctrine, and had these Texts been wont to be applyed to the proof on't, they would then have been thought to assert it, with clear and convictive evidence. But many having never heard of this Hypothesis, and those that have, seldom meeting it mentioned but as a silly dream or antiquated absurdity, 'tis no wonder that they never sus-

pect it to be lodg'd in the *Sacred volume*, so that any attempt to confirm it *there*, must needs seem rather an offer of *wit* than serious judgment. And the *places* that are cited to that purpose having been frequently read and heard of, by those that never discerned them to *breath* the least *air* of any such matter as *Præexistence*, their *new* and *unexpected* application to a thing so *little* thought of, must needs seem a *wild* fetch of an *extravagant* imagination. But however *unconclusive* the *Texts* alledged may seem to those a strong *prejudice* hath shut up against the *Hypothesis*; The *learned Jews*, who were perswaded of this *Doctrine*, thought it clearly enough contain'd in the *Old Volume* of holy writ; and took the *citations*, named above, for current Evidence. And though I cannot *warrant* for their *Judgment* in *things*, yet doubtless they were the *best* Judges of their own *Language*. Nor would our *School-Doctors* have thought it so much a stranger to the *New*, had it had the luck to have been one of their *opinions*, or did they not too frequently apply the *sacred Oracles* to their own fore-conceived *notions*.

But whether what I have brought from *Scripture* prove any thing or nothing, 'tis not very material, since the *Hypothesis* of *Præexistence* stands secure enough upon those *Pillars* of *Reason*, which have their *Foundation*

dation in the *Attributes* of God, and the *Phænomena* of the world. And the *Right Reason* of a Man, is one of the *Divine* volumes, in which are written the indeble *Idea's* of eternal Truth: so that what it dictates, is as much the voice of God, as if in so many words it were clearly *express'd* in the *written Revelations*. It is enough therefore for my purpose, if there be nothing in the *sacred* writings contrary to this *Hypothesis*; which I think is made clear enough already; and though it be granted that *Scripture* is absolutely *silent* as to any assertion of *Pre-existence*, yet we have made it appear that its having said nothing of it, is no *prejudice*, but an *advantage* to the cause.

CHAP. XII.

Why the Author thinks himself obliged to descend to some more particular Account of Praeexistence. 'Tis presumption positively to determine how it was with us of Old. The Authors design in the Hypothesis that follows.

✓ **N**OW because inability to apprehend the manner of a Thing is a great prejudice against the belief on't; I find my self obliged to go a little further than the bare proof, and defence of Praeexistence. For though what I have said, may possibly induce some to think favourably of our conclusion, That the souls of men were made before they came into these bodies; yet while they shall think that nothing can be conceived of that former state, and that our Praeexistent condition cannot be represented to Humane Understanding, but as a dark black solitude: it must needs weaken the perswasion of those that are less confirmed, and fill the minds of the inquisitive with a dubious trouble

trouble and Anxiety. For searching and contemplative Heads cannot be satisfied to be told, That our *souls have lived and acted in a former condition*, except they can be helpt to some more particular apprehension of that State; How we lived and acted of old, and how probably we fell from that better life, into this Region of misery and imperfection.

Now though indeed my Charity would prompt me to do what I can for the relief and ease of any modest Inquirer; yet shall I not attempt to satisfy punctual and eager curiosity in things *hidden and unsearchable*. Much less shall I positively determine any thing in matters so lubricous and uncertain. And indeed considering how imperfect our now state is, how miserable shallow our understandings are, and how little we know of our present selves, and the things about us, it may seem a desperate undertaking to attempt any thing in this matter. Yea, when we contemplate the vast *circuits* of the *Divine Wisdom*, and think how much the thoughts and actions of *Eternity* and *Omni-science* are beyond ours, *who are but of Yesterday, and know nothing*, it must needs discourage Confidence it self from determining, how the *Oeconomy* of the world of life was order'd, in the day the *Heavens* and *Earth* were framed. There are doubtless infinite ways

ways and methods according to which the unsearchable wisdom of our Maker could have disposed of us, which we can have no conceit of; And we are little more capable of unperringly resolving our selves now, how it was with us of old, than a Child in the womb is to determine, what kind of life it shall live when it is set at liberty from that *dark inclosure*. Therefore let shame and blushing cover his face that shall confidently affirm that 'twas *thus* or *thus* with us in the *state* of our *Fore-Beings*.

However, to shew that it may have been that our *Souls* did *Præexist*, though we cannot punctually and certainly conclude upon the *Particular State*, I shall presume to draw up a conceivable *Scheme* of the *Hypothesis*; And if our narrow minds can think of a way how it might have been, I hope no body will deny that the *divine wisdom* could have contriv'd it so, or infinitely better than we can imagin in our little models.

And now I would not have it thought that I go about to insinuate or represent any opinions of my own, or that I am a votary to all the notions I make use of, whether of the *Antient*, or more modern *Philosophers*. For I seriously profess against all determinations in this kind. But my business only is, by some imperfect hints and guesses to help to apprehend a little how the *state* of

Præ-

Ch. 12. *A Key for Providence.* 93

Præexistence might have been, and so to let in some beams of *ancient* and *modern light* upon this *immense* darkness. * Therefore let the Reader if he please call it a *Romantick Scheme*, or *imaginary Hypothesis*, or what name else best fits his *Phancy*, and he'll not offend me; Nor do I hold my self concern'd at all to vindicate the truth of any thing here that is the fruit of mine own invention or composition; Though I confess I could beg civilities at least for the notions I have borrowed from great and worthy Sages. And indeed the *Hypothesis* as to the main, is derived to us from the *Platonists*: though in their writings 'tis but *Gold in Oar*, less pure and perfect: But a late great *Aristotle* hath excellently refined it. And I have not much work to do, but to bring together what he up and down hath scattered, and by a method-order, and some connexions and notions of mine own, to work it into an intire and uniform mass.

Now because the Frame of the *particular Hypothesis* is originally *Philosophical*, I shall therefore not deprave it by mingling with it the opinions of *modern Theologers*, or distort any thing to make it accommodate to their *dogmata*, but solely and sincerely follow the light of *Reason* and *Philosophy*. For I intend not to endeavour the late alteration of the ordinary *systeme* of *Divinity*, nor design any thing

2. least?

thing in this place but a representation of some harmless *Philosophical* conjectures: In which I shall continually guide my self by the Attributes of God, the *Phænomena* of the world, and the best discoveries of the nature of the soul:

CHAP. XIII.

(7) Pillars on which the particular *Hypothesis* stands.

NOW the *Fabrick* we are going to build, will stand like as the *House of Wisdom* upon seven Pillars; which I shall first erect and establish, that the *Hypothesis* may be firm and sure like a House that hath Foundations, Therefore the first *Fundamental Principle* I shall lay, is this

First Pillar.

(1) *All the Divine designs and actions are laid and carried on by pure and infinite Goodness.*

AND methinks this should be owned by all for a manifest and indisputable Truth; But some odd opinions in the world are an interest against it, and therefore I must be fain to prove it. Briefly then, Every rational Being acts towards some end or other; That end where the Agent acts regularly and wisely, is either some self-good or accomplishment, or 'tis the good and perfection of some thing else, at least in the intention. Now God being an absolute and immense fulness, that is incapable of any the least shadow of new perfection, cannot act for any good that may accrue to his immutable self; and consequently, whatever he acts, is for the good of some other Being: so that all the divine actions are the communications of his perfections, and the issues of his Goodness; which, being without the base alloy of self-interest, or partial fondness, and not comprised within any bounds or limits, as
his

96 *Præexistence of Souls*, Ch. 13.

his other *perfections* are not, but far beyond our narrow conception, we may well call it *pure and infinite benignity*. This is the *original* and *root* of all things, so that this blessed, ever blessed *Attribute* being the *Spring* and *Fountain* of all the *Actions* of the Deity, his designs can be no other but the *contrivances* of *Love* for the compassing the *good* and *perfection* of the *universe*. Therefore to suppose God to *act* or *design* any thing that is not for the good of his *Creatures*, is either to phancy him to *act* for no *end* at all, or for an *end* that is contrary to his *design*. *Nature*. Finally therefore, the very *notion* of *infinite fulness* is to be *communicating* and *overflowing*; And the most congruous apprehension that we can entertain of the *Infinite* and *eternal Deity*, is* to conceive him as an *immense* and all *glorious Sun*, that is continually *communicating* and sending abroad its *beams* and *brightness*; which conception of our *Maker*, if 'twere deeply imprinted on us, would I am confident set our apprehensions right in many *Theories*, and chase away those *black* and *disfmal* notions which too many have given harbour to. But I come to erect the

Second

Second Pillar.

(2) Then, *There is an exact Geometrical Justice that runs through the Universe, and is interwoven in the contexture of things.*

THis is a result of that wise and Almighty Goodness that presides over all things. For this Justice is but the *distributing* to every thing according to the requirements of its nature. And that *benign wisdom* that contrived and framed the natures of all Beings, doubtless so provided that they should be suitably furnished with all things proper for their respective conditions.

And that this *Nemesis* should be twitted into the very *natural constitutions* of things themselves, is methinks very reasonable; since questionless, *Almighty Wisdom* could so perfectly have formed his works at first, as that all things that he saw were *regular, just,* and for the good of the *Universe*, should have been brought about by those *stated Laws*; which we call *nature*; without an ordinary engagement of *absolute power* to effect them;

98 *Præexistence of Souls*, Ch. 13.

And it seems to me to be very becoming the wise Author of all things so to have made them in the beginning, as that by their own *internal spring and wheels*, they should orderly bring about whatever he intended them for, without his often *immediate interposal*. For this looks like a more magnificent apprehension of the *Divine power* and *Prescience*, since it supposeth him from everlasting ages to have *foreseen* all future occurrences, and so wonderfully to have seen and constituted the great *machina* of the world, that the *infinite variety* of motions therein, should effect nothing but what in his *eternal wisdom* he had concluded *fit and decorous*: But as for that which was *so*, it should as certainly be compassed by the *Laws* he appointed long ago, as if his *omnipotence* were at work every *moment*. On the contrary, to engage *Gods absolute* and extraordinary *power*, in all events and occurrences of things, it seems to think meanly of his *wisdom*; as if he had made the world so, as that it should need *omnipotence* every now and then to mend it, or to bring about those his destinations, which by a shorter way he could have effected, by his *instrument Nature*. Can any one say that our *supposition* derogates from the *Divine concurrence* or *Providence*? For on these, depend continually both the being and operations of all things, since

Ch. 13. *A Key for Providence.* 99

since without them they would cease to *act*, and return to *their old nothing*. And doubtless God hath not given the ordering of things out of his own hands; but holds the *power*, to *alter*, *innovate*, or *change* the *course* of nature as he pleaseth. And to act by extraordinary means, by *absolute omnipotence*, when he thinks fit to do so.

The sum of what I intend, is, that Gods *works* are perfect; and as his *Goodness* is discover'd in them, so is his *Justice* wrought into *their very essential constitutions*: so that we need not suppose him to be immediately engaged in every event and all distributions of things in the world, or upon all occasions to exercise his *power* in extraordinary actions, but that he leaves such managements to the *Oeconomy* of second causes. And now next to this, (for they are of kin) I raise

K 2

The

The third Pillar.

(3) *Things are carried to their proper place and state, by the congruity of their natures; where this fails, we may suppose some arbitrary managements.*

THE *Congruity* of things is their suitability to such or such a state or condition; And 'tis a great *Law* in the *Divine* and first *constitutions*, that things should incline and move to what is suitable to their natures. This in *sensibles* is evident in the motions of *consent* and *sympathy*. And the *ascent* of *light*, and *descent* of *heavy* bodies, must I doubt when all is done, *be resolv'd into a *principle* that is not meerly corporeal. Yea, supposing all such things to be done by the *Laws* of *Mechanicks*, why may we not conceive, that the other rank of Beings, *Spirits*, which are not subject to corporeal motions, are also dispos'd of by a *Law* proper to their natures; which since we have no other name to express it by, we may call *congruity*? We read in the sacred *History* that *Judas* went to his *own* place; And 'tis very probable that *Spirits* are conveyed to their proper

Ch. 13. *A Key for Providence.* 101

proper *states* and *residence*, * as naturally as the *fire* mounts, or a *stone* descends. The *Platonists* would have the *Soul* of the world to be the great *Instrument* of all such *distributions*, as also of the *Phænomena*, that are beyond the *powers* of *matter*: And 'tis no unlikely *Hypothesis*: But I have no need to ingage further about this: nor yet to speak more of this first part of my *Principle*, since it so nearly depends on what was said in behalf of the former *Maxim*. Yet of the latter we need a word or two.

When therefore we cannot give account of things either by the *Laws* of *Mechanicks* or conceivable *Congruities*, (* as likely some things relating to the *States* of *Spirits*, and immaterial Beings can be resolv'd by neither) I say then, we may have recourse to the *Arbitrary* managements of those *invisible Ministers* of *Equity* and *Justice*, which without doubt the world is plentifully stor'd with. For it cannot be conceived that those *active Spirits* are idle or unemployed in the *momentous* concerns of the *Universe*. Yea, the *sacred* volume gives evidence of their interposals in our affairs. I shall need mention but that remarkable instance in *Daniel*, of the indeavours of the *Prince* of *Persia*, and of *Grecia*, to hinder *Michael*, and the other *Angel*, that were ingaged for the affairs of *Judea*; Or if any would evade this, what

think they of all the apparitions of Angels in the old Testament, of their pitching their Tents about us, and being *Ministring Spirits* for our good. To name no more such passages. Now if those noble *Spirits* will ingage themselves in our trifling concernments, doubtless they are very sedulous in those affairs that tend to the good and perfection of the Universe. But to be brief; I advance.

The Fourth Pillar.

(4) * *The Souls of men are capable of living in other bodies besides Terrestrial; And never act but in some body or other.*

For (1.) when I consider how deeply in this state we are immerfed in the *body*, I can methinks scarce imagin, that presently upon the quitting on't, we shall be stript of all corporeity; for this would be such a jump as is seldom or never made in nature; since by almost all instances that come under our observation 'tis manifest, that the useth to act by due and orderly gradations, and takes no precipitous leaps from one extreme to another. 'Tis very probable therefore, that

Ch. 13. *A Key for Providence.* 103

that in our immediately next state we shall have another *vehicle*. And then, (2.) considering that our Souls are *immediately united* to a more *tenuous* and *subtile* body here, than this gross outside; 'Tis methinks a good presumption, that we shall not be stript and divested of our *inward stole* also, when we leave this *dull Earth* behind us. Especially (3.) if we take notice how the highest and noblest *faculties* and *operations* of the Soul are help'd on by somewhat that is *corporeal*, and that it imployeth the bodily *Spirits* in its sublimest *exercises*; we might then be perswaded, that it always useth some body or other, and never acts without one. And (4.) since we cannot conceive a *Soul* to *live* or *act* that is *insensible*, and since we know not how there can be *sense* where there is no *union* with *matter*, we should me seems be induc'd to think, that when 'tis *disjoin'd* from all *body*, 'tis *inert* and *silent*. * For in all *sensations* there is *corporeal motion*, as all *Philosophy* and *Experience* testifies: And these *motions* become *sensible* representations, by virtue of the *union* between the Soul and its *confederate matter*; so that when it is loose and *dis-united* from any *body* whatsoever, it will be unconcern'd in all *corporeal motions*, (being a *penetrable substance*) and no *sense* or *perception* will be conveyed by them.

Nor will it make any thing at all against

this *Argument* to urge, that there are Not and purely *unembodied Spirits* in the *Universe*, which *live* and *act* without relation to any *body*, and yet these are not *insensible*: For what they *know*, and how they *know* we are very incompetent Judges of, they being a sort of *Spirits* specifically distinct from our order: and therefore their *faculties* and *operations* are of a very *diverse* consideration from *ours*. So that for us to *deny* what we may reasonably argue from the *contemplation* of our own *natures*, because we cannot comprehend the natures of a species of creatures that are far above us, is a great mistake in the way of reasoning.

Now how strange soever this *Principle* may seem to those, whom *customary opinions* have seasoned with another *belief*, yet considering the *Reasons* I have alledged, I cannot forbear concluding it very *probable*; and if it prove hereafter serviceable for the helping us in some concerning *Theories*, I think the most wary and timorous may admit it, till upon good grounds they can disprove it.

The

The Fifth Pillar.

(5) *The Soul in every state hath such a body as is fittest for those faculties and operations that it is most inclined to exercise.*

TIs a known Maxim, *That every thing that is, is for its operation*; and the Contriver and Maker of the World hath been so bountiful to all Beings, as to furnish them with all *suitable and necessary* requisites for their respective *actions*; for there are no *propensities* and *dispositions* in nature, but some way or other are brought into *actual exercise*, otherwise they were meer *nullities*, and *impertinent appendices*. Now for the employment of all kinds of *faculties*, and the exerting all manner of *operations*, all kinds of *instruments* will not suffice, but only such, as are proportion'd and adapted to the *exercises* they are to be used in, and the *Agents* that imploy them. 'Tis clear therefore, that the *Soul of Man*, a noble and vigorous *Agent*, must be fitted with a *suitable body*, according to the *Laws* of that exact *distributive Justice* that runs through the *Universe*; and such a one is most *suitable*, as is fittest for those
 exer-

exercises it propends to ; for the *body* is the *Souls instrument*, and a necessary requisite of action : Whereas should it be otherwise, God would then have provided worse for his worthiest Creatures, than he hath for *those* that are of a much *inferiour* rank and order. For if we look about us upon all the Creatures of God, that are exposed to our Observation, we may seal this Truth with an *infallible Induction* ; That *there is nothing but what is fitted with all suitable requisites to act according to its nature*. The *Bird* hath *wings* to waft it aloft in the thin and subtile *aire* ; the *Fish* is furnished with *fins*, to move in her liquid *element* ; and all other *Animals* have *Instruments* that are proper for their peculiar inclinations : So that should it be otherwise in the case of *Souls*, it would be a great blot to the wise managements of *Providence* ; and contrary to its usual *methods* ; and thus we should be dis-furnished of the best and most *convictive Argument*, that we have to prove that a *Principle* of exactest *wisdom* hath made and ordered all things.

The Sixth Pillar:

- (6) *The Powers and Faculties of the Soul, are either* (1) *Spiritual, and Intellectual* : (2) *Sensitive* : Or, (3) *Plastick*.

NOW (1) by the *intellectual* powers I mean all those that relate to the *soul*, in its naked and abstracted *conception*, as it is a *spirit*, and are exercised about *immaterial* Objects ; as, *virtue, knowledge, and divine love* : This is the *Platonical* *Nē* ; and that which we call the *mind* : The two other more immediately relate to its espoused *matter* : For (2) the *sensitive* are exercised about all the objects of *sense*, and are concerned in all such things as either *gratifie*, or *disgust* the *body*. And (3) the *Plastick* are those faculties of the *soul*, whereby it *moves* and *forms* the *body*, and are without *sense* or *Animadversion* : The exercise of the *former*, I call the *Higher life* ; and the operations of the *latter*, the *lower* ; and the *life* of the *body*. Now that there are such *faculties* belonging to our natures, and that they are exercised upon such and such *objects* respectively, plain experience avoucheth,

cheth, and therefore I may be excused from going about to prove so universally acknowledged a truth : Wherefore I pass to

The Seventh Pillar.

(7) *By the same degrees that the higher powers are invigorated, the lower are consopited and abated, as to their proper exercises, & è contra.*

(1) **T**hat those Powers should each of them have a tendency to action and in their turns be exercised, is but rational to conceive, since otherwise they had been *superfluous*. And (2) that they should be *inconsistent* in the *supremest exercise* and *in-actuation*, is to me as probable. For the Soul is a *finite* and limited Being, and therefore cannot operate diverse ways with equal intention at once. That is, cannot at the same time employ all her faculties in the highest degree of exercise that each of them is capable of. For doubtless did it ingage but one of those alone, the *operations* thereof would be more *strong* and *vigorous*, than when they are conjunctly exercis'd, their Acts and Objects being very divers. So that I say, that these *faculties* should act together

Ch. 13. *A Key for Providence.* 109

ther in the highest way they are capable of, seems to be contrary to the nature of the Soul. And I am sure it comports not with experience; for those that are endowed with an high degree of exercise of one faculty, are seldom, if ever, as well provided in the rest. 'Tis a common and daily observation, that those that are of most heightned and strong *Imaginations*, are defective in *Judgment*, and the faculty of *close reasoning*. And your very larg and capacious *Memories*, have seldom or never any great share of either of the other *perfections*. Nor do the deepest *Judgments* use to have any thing considerable either of *Memory* or *Phancy*. And as there are fair instances even in this state, of the *inconsistence* of the *faculties* in the highest exercise; so also are there others that suggest unto us,

(3.) *That by the same degrees that some Faculties fail in their strength and vigour, others gain and are improved.* We know that the shutting up of the *senses*, is the letting loose and inlarging of the *Phancy*. And we seldom have such *strong imaginations* waking, as in our *dreams* in the *silence* of our other *faculties*. As the *Sun* recedes, the *Moon* and *Stars* discover themselves; and when it returns, they draw in their baffled beams, and hide their heads in *obscurity*. But to urge what is more close and pressing, It is an unerring remarque, that those that want the use

use of some one *natural part* or *faculty*, are wont to have very liberal amends made them by an *excellency* in some others. Thus those that nature hath deprived of *sight*, use to have wonderfully *tenacious memories*. And the *deaf* and *dumb* have many times a strange kind of *sagacity*, and very remarkable *mechanical ingenuities*: Not to mention other instances; for I'll say no more than I must needs. Thus then experience gives us encouraging probability of the truth of the *Theorem* asserted. And in its self 'tis very reasonable; for (as we have seen) the *Soul* being an *active nature*, is always propending to the exercising of one faculty or other, and that to the utmost it is able, and yet being of a *limited capacity*, it can employ but one in light of exercise at once; which when it loseth and abates of its *strength* and *supream vigour*; some other, whose improvement was all this while hindred by this its *ingrossing Rival*, must by consequence begin now to display it self, and awaken into a more *vigorous action*: so that as the former loseth, the latter proportionably gaineth.

And indeed 'tis a great instance of the *divine wisdom*, that our *faculties* are made in so *regular* and *equilibrions* an order. For were the same powers still *uppermost* in the greatest light of *activity*, and so *unalterably* con-

constituted, there would want the beauty of *variety*, and the other faculties would never act to that pitch of *perfection* that they are capable of. There would be no *Liberty* of *Will*, and consequently no *Humane Nature*. Or if the *Higher Powers* might have less'n'd, and shi'd without a *proportionable* increase of the *lower*, and they likewise have been *remitted*, without any advantage to the other *faculties*, the *Soul* might then at length fall into an irrecoverable *recess* and *inactivity*.

But all these inconveniences are avoided by supposing the principle we have here insisted on; And it is the last that I shall mention.

Briefly then, and if it may be more plainly, the *higher faculties* are those, whereby the *Soul* acts towards *spiritual* and *immaterial* objects: and the *lower* whereby it acts towards the *Body*. Now it cannot with equal *vigour* exercise it self both ways together; and consequently the more it is taken up in the *higher operations*, the more prompt and vigorous it will be in *these exercises*, and less so about those that concern the *body*, &c. *Converse*.

Thus when we are very deeply engaged in *intellectual contemplations*, our outward *senses* are in a manner *shrunk* up and *cramped*: And when our *senses* are highly exercised

cised and gratified, those operations *monopolize* and *employ* us. Nor is this less observable in relation to the *Plastick*. For frequent and severe *Meditations* do much *mortifie* and *weaken* the *body*; And we are most *nourisht* in our *sleep* in the *silence* of our *senses*. Now what is thus true in respect of *acts* and *particular exercises*, is as much so in *states* and *habits*. Moreover, 'tis apparent that the *Plastick* is then most strong and vigorous when our other faculties are wholly unemploy'd, from the *state* of the *womb*. For *nature* when she is at her *Plastick* work, ceaseth all other operations. The same we may take notice of, in *Silk-worms* and other *Insects*, which lie as if they were *dead* and *insensible*, while their *lower powers* are forming them into another *appearance*. All which things put together, give good evidence to the truth of our Axiom.

I'll conclude this with one Remark more, to prevent mistake; Therefore briefly; As the *Soul* always acts by the *Body*; so in its highest *exercises* it useth some of the *inferiour powers*; which, therefore must operate also. So that some *senses*, as *sight* and somewhat *analogous* to *hearing* may be employ'd in considerable degree, even when the *highest life* is most *predominant*; but then it is at the command and in the services of those *nabler powers*; wherefore the *sensitive life* can

Ch. 14. *A Key for Providence.* 113

cannot for this cause be said to be *invigorated*, since 'tis under *servitude* and *subjection*, and its *gusts* and *pleasures* are very *weak* and *flaccid*. And this is the reason of that clause in the *Principle* (*as to their proper exercises.*)

Having thus laid the Foundation, and fixt the Pillars of our building, I now come to advance the Superstructure.

CHAP. XIV.

*A Philosophical Hypothesis of the Souls
Præexistence.*

THE *Eternal* and *Almighty Goodness*, the blessed *spring* and *root* of *all things*, made all his *creatures*, in the *best*, *happiest*, and most *perfect* condition, that their respective *natures* rendred them capable of, By *Axiom* the *first*; and therefore they were then constituted in the *inactuation* and *exercise* of their *noblest* and most *perfect* powers. Consequently, the *souls* of men, a considerable part of the *divine workmanship*, were at first made in the *highest invigoration* of the *spiritual* and *intellective faculties* which were exercised in *virtue*, and in *blisful contemplation* of the *supream Deity*; wherefore now by *Axiom* 6 and 7, * the ig-
L nobler

114 *Præexistence of Souls*, Ch. 14.

nobler and lower powers, or the life of the body, were languid and remiss.

So that the most *tenuous, pure and simple matter* being the fittest *instrument* for the most *vigorous* and *spiritual* faculties according to *Principle 2, 4, and 5*. The Soul in this condition was *united* with the most *subtile* and *æthereal matter* that it was capable of *inacting*; and the *inferior powers*, those relating to the *body*, being at a very *low ebb* of *exercise*, were wholly *subservient* to the *superiour*, and imployed in nothing but what was *serviceable* to that *higher life*. So that the *senses* did but present occasions for *divine love*, and *objects* for *contemplation*; * and the *plastick* had nothing to do, but to *mould* this *passive* and *easy body*, accordingly as the concerns of the *higher faculties* required. Thus then did we at first live and act in a *pure* and *æthereal body*; and consequently in a place of *light* and *blessedness*, by *Principle 3d*. But particularly to describe, and point at this *paradisaical residence*, can be done only by those that live in those *serene regions* of *lightsome glory*: Some *Philosophers* indeed have adventured * to pronounce the place to be the *Sun*, that vast *Orb* of *splendor* and *brightness*; though it may be 'tis more probable, that those *immense tracts* of *pure* and *quiet æther* that are above *Saturn*, are the joyous place of our ancient *celestial abode*:

Ch. 14. A Key for Providence. 115

bode: But there is no determination in matters of such lubricous uncertainty, where ever it is, 'tis doubtless a place and state of wonderful *bliss* and *happiness*, and the *highest* that our natures had fitted us to.

In this state we may be supposed to have lived in the blisful exercise of *vertue*, *divine love* and *contemplation*, through very long tracts of *duration*.

But though we were thus *unconceivably happy*, yet were we not *immutably so*; for our highest perfections and noblest faculties being but *finite*, may after long and vigorous exercise, somewhat abate and remit in their sublimest operations, and *Adam* may fall asleep; In which time of *remission* of the *higher powers*, the *lower* may advance and more lively display themselves than they could before, by *Axiom 7*; for the soul being a little slackt in its pursuits of *immaterial objects*, the *lower powers* which before were almost wholly taken up and imployed in those high services, are somewhat more releast to follow a little the *tendencies* of their proper natures. And now they begin to convert towards the *body*, and warmly to resent the delights and pleasures thereof; Thus is *Eve* brought forth, while *Adam* sleepeth. The *lower life*, that of the body is now considerably awakened, and the *operations* of the *higher*, proportionably abated.

116 *Præexistence of Souls*, Ch. 14

However, there is yet no *anomy* or *disobedience*, for all this is but an innocent exercise of those faculties which God hath given us to *employ*, and as far as is consistent with the *divine laws* to *gratise*. For it was no fault of ours that we did not uncessantly keep our *spiritual powers* upon the most *intense* exercises that they were capable of exerting; * we were made on set purpose *defatigable*, that so all *degrees* of *life* might have their exercise; and our *Maker* designed that we should feel and taste the joys of our *congenite* bodies, as well as the pleasures of those *seraphick aspires* and injoyments.

And me thinks it adds to the *felicity* of that *state*, that our happiness was not one *uniform* piece, or continual *repetition* of the same; but consisted in a most *grateful variety*, viz. in the pleasure of all our faculties, the *lower* as well as the *higher*; for those are as much gratified by suitable exercises and enjoyments as *these*; and consequently according to their *proportion* capable of as great an *happiness*: Nor is it any more derogation from the *divine goodness*, that the *noblest* and *highest life* was not always exercised to the height of its capacity, than that we were not made all *Angels*, all the *Planets* so many *Suns* and all the *variety* of the *Creatures* formed into one *Species*: Yea, as was intimated above, 'tis an instance of the *divine benignity*;

ty, that he produced things into being, according to the vast *plenitude* of Forms that were in his *all-knowing mind*; and gave them *operations* suitable to their respective *natures*; so that it had rather seemed a defect in the divine dispensations, if we had not had the pleasure of the proper exercise of the *lower faculties* as well as of the *higher*. * Yea, me thinks 'tis but a reasonable reward to the *body*, that it should have its delights and gratifications also, whereby it will be fitted for further serviceableness. For doubtless it would be in time spent and exhausted were it continually employed in those *high* and less proportioned *operations*.

Wherefore God himself having so order'd the matter, that the inferiour life should have its turn of *invigoration*; it can be no evil in us, * that that is executed which he hath so determined, as long as we pass not the bounds that he hath set us. *Adam* therefore was yet innocent, though he joyed in his beloved *Spouse*, yea, and was permitted to feed upon all the fruits of this Paradise, the various results of corporeal pleasure, as long as he followed not his own *will* and *appetites* contrarily to the *divine commands* and *appointments*.

But at length unhappily the *delights* of the *body* betray us, through our over indulgence to them, and lead us captive to *anomy*

and disobedience. The sense of what is grateful and pleasant by insensible degrees gets head over the apprehension of what is just and good; the Serpent and Eve prove successful tempters; * Adam cannot withstand the inordinate appetite, but feeds on the forbidden fruit; viz. the dictates of his debauched will, and sensual pleasure. And thus now the body is gotten uppermost, the lower faculties have greater exercise and command than the higher, those being very vigorously awakened, and these proportionably shrunk up, and conspired; wherefore by Axiom 3. and 5. the soul contracts a less pure body, which may be more accommodate to sensitive operations; and thus we fall from the highest Paradise the blissful regions of life and glory, and become Inhabitants of the Air.

Not that we are presently quite divested of our *Æthereal state*, as soon as we descend into this less perfect condition of life, for retaining still considerable exercises of the higher life, though not so ruling and vigorous ones as before, the soul must retain part of its former vehicle, to serve it as its instrument, in those its operations: For the *æthereal body* contracts coarseness and impurity by the same degrees as the immaterial faculties abate in their exercise; so that we are not immediately upon the expiring of the highest congruity wholly stript of all remains
of

Ch. 14. *A Key for Providence.* 119

of our *celestial bodies*, but still hold some portion of them, within the *grosser vehicle*, while the *spirit*, or *higher life* is in any degree of *actuation*.

Nor are we to suppose that every *slip* or *indulgence* to the *body* can detrude us from our *ethereal happiness*; but such a *change* must be wrought in the *soul*, as may spoil its *congruity* to a *celestial body*, which in time by degrees is effected: Thus we may probably be supposed to have fallen from our *supream felicity*.

But *others* of our *order* have made better use of their *injoyments*, and the indulgences of their Maker; and though they have had their *Perige's* as well as their *Apogæ's*: I mean their *Verges* towards the *body* and its joys, as well as their *Aspire* to nobler and sublimer objects, yet they kept the station of their *Natures*, and made their orderly *returns*, without so remarkable a *defection*: And though possibly some of them may sometimes have had their *slips*, and have waded further into the pleasures of the *body* than they ought to have done, yet partly by their own timely care and consideration, and partly by the divine assistance, they recover themselves again to their condition of *primigenial innocence*. But we must leave them to their *felicity*, and go on with the *History* of our own *descent*. Therefore

120 *Praeexistence of Souls, Ch. 14*
after we are *deitrudd* from our *etherial* condition, we next descend into the *Aereal*.

The Aereal State.

NOW our bodies are more or less pure in this condition, proportionably to the degrees of our *apostacy*: So that we are not absolutely miserable in our first step of *descent*; but indeed *happy* in comparison of our now condition: As yet there may be very considerable remains of *vertue* and *divine love*, though indeed the *lower life*, that of the body be grown very *strong* and *rampant*: So that as yet we may be supposed to have lapst no lower than the best and purest Regions of the *Air*, by Axiom 2 and 3. And doubtless there are some, who by striving against the *inordinacy* of their *Appetites*, may at length get the victory again over their *bodies*, and so by the assistance of the *Divine Spirit*, who is always ready to promote and assist good beginnings, may re-enkindle the *higher life*, and so be translated again to their old *celestial habitations* without descending lower.

But others irreclaimably persisting in their *Rebellion*, and sinking more and more into the *body*, and the relish of its *joys* and *pleasures*, these are still verging to a *lower* and more degenerate *state*; so that at the last the

Ch. 14. *A Key for Providence.* 121

the *higher powers* of the Soul being almost quite laid *asleep* and *consopited*, and the *sensitive* also by long and tedious exercises being much tired, and abated in their vigour, * the *plastick faculties* begin now fully to *awaken*; so that a body of *thin* and *subtile air* will not suffice its now so highly exalted *energy*, no more than the *subtile Aether* can suffice us *terrestrial animals* for *respiration*; wherefore the *aereal congruity* of *life* expires also, and thus are we ready for an *earthly body*.

But now since a *soul* cannot *unite* with any *body*, but with such only as is fitly prepared for it, by *Principle 3.* and there being in all likelihood more *expirations* in the *Air*, than there are prepared *bodies* upon *earth*, it must needs be, that for some time it must be destitute of any *congruous matter* that might be joyned with it; And consequently by *Principle 4.* 'twill lye in a *state of inactivity* and *silence*. Not that it will for ever be lost in that forgotten *recess* and *solitude*, * for it hath an *aptness* and *propensity* to act in a *terrestrial body*, which will be reduced into *actual exercise*, when fit *matter* is prepared. The Souls therefore, that are now laid up in the *black night* of *stupidity* and *inertness* will in their proper seasons be *awakened* into *life* and *operation* in such *bodies* and *places* of the earth, as by their dispositions they are fitted

fitted for. So that no sooner is there any matter of due *vital* temper, afforded by *generation*, but immediately a *soul* that is suitable to such a *body*, * either by meer *natural congruity*, the *disposition* of the *soul* of the *world*, or some more *spontaneous agent* is *attracted*, or *sent* into this so *befitting tenement*, according to Axiom 2. and 3.

Terrestrial State.

NOW because in this state too we use our *sensitive faculties*, and have some, though very small reliques of the *higher life* also; therefore the *soul* first makes it self a *vehicle* out of the most *spiritous* and yielding parts of this *spumous terrestrial matter*, which hath some analogy both with its *ethereal* and *aereal* state. This is as it were its *inward vest*, and immediate *instrument* in all its operations. By the help of this it *understands*, *reasons*, and *remembers*, yea *forms* and *moves* the *body*. And that we have such a *subtile aery vehicle* within this *terrestrial*, our manifest *sympathizing* with that element, and the necessity we have of it to all the *functions* of *life*, as is palpable in *respiration*, is me thinks good ground for conjecture. And 'tis not improbable but even within this it may have a *purser fire* and *ether* to which it is *united*, being some little remain of what it had of old.

In

Ch. 14. A Key for Providence. 123

In this *state* we grow up merly into the life of *sense*, having little left of the *higher life*, * but some apish shews and imitations of *reason*, *vertue*, and *religion*: By which alone with *speech*, we seem to be distinguisht from *Beasts*, while in reality the *brutish nature* is *predominant*, and the concernments of the body are our great *end*, our only *God* and *happines*s; this is the condition of our now degenerate, lost natures. However, that ever over-flowing *goodness* that always aims at the happines of his creatures, hath not left us without all means of recovery, but by the gracious and benign dispensations which he hath afforded us, hath provided for our *restauration*; which some (though but very few) make so good use of, that being assisted in their well meant and sincere indeavours by the *divine spirit*, they in good degree *mortifie* and *subdue* the *body*, conquer *self-will*, unruly *appetites*, and disorderly *passions*, and so in some measure by *Principle 7.* awaken the *higher life*, which still directs them upwards to *vertue* and *divine love*; which, where they are perfectly kindled, carry the Soul, when dismiss from this prison, * to its old *celestial abode*: For the *spirit* and *noblest faculties* being so recovered to life and exercise require an *athereal body* to be united to, and that an *athereal place* of residence, both
which,

124 *Præexistence of Souls*, Ch. 14.

which, the divine *Nemesis* that is wrought into the very nature of things bestoweth on them by Principle the second.

But they are very few that are thus immediately restored to the *celestial paradise*, upon the quitting of their earthly bodies. For others that are but in the way of recovery, and dye imperfectly vertuous, meer *Philosophy* and *natural reason* (within the bounds of which we are now discoursing) can determin no more, * but that they step forth again into *aery vehicles*; that *congruity* of life immediately awakening in them after *this* is expired. In this state their happiness will be more or less, proportionably to their *vertues*, in which if they persevere, we shall see anon how they will be recover'd. But for the present we must not break off the clue of our account, by going backwards before we have arriv'd to the utmost verge of *descent* in this *Philosophical Romance*, or *History*; the Reader is at his choice to call it which he pleaseth.

Wherefore let us cast our eyes upon the *Most*, in whom their life on earth hath but confirmed and strengthened, their *degenerate sensual*, and *brutish propensions*; And see what is like to become of them, when they take their leave of these *terrestrial* bodies.

Only first a word of the *state of dying Infants*, and I come immediately to the next
step

Ch. 14. *A Key for Providence.* 125

step of descent. * Those therefore that pass out of *these bodies*, before the *terrestrial congruity* be *spoild, weakened, or orderly un-*
wound; according to the tenour of this *Hypothesis*, must return into the state of *in-*
activity.

For the *Plastick* in them is too highly *a-*
wakened, to inactuate only an *aereal* body;
And, there being no other more *congruous,*
ready, and at hand for it to enter, it must
needs step back into its former state of *in-*
sensibility, and there wait its turn, till be-
fitting *matter* call it forth again into *life* and
action. This is a conjecture that *Philosophy*
dictates, which I vouch not for a truth;
* but only follow the clue of this *Hypothesis.*
Nor can there any danger be hence concei-
ved that those whose *congruities* orderly ex-
pire, should fall back again into a state of
silence and *inertness;* * since by long and hard
exercises in this body, the *plastick life* is
well tamed and debilitated, so that now
its activity is proportioned to a more *tenuous*
and *passive vehicle,* which it cannot fail to
meet with in its next condition. For 'tis on-
ly the *terrestrial body* is so long a *preparing.*
But to

The next step of Descent, or After-state.

TO give an Account of the *After-state* of the more *degenerate* and yet *descending* souls, some fancy a very odd *Hypothesis*, imagining that they pass hence into some other more course and inferior *Planet*, in which, they are provided with bodies suitable to their so depraved natures; But I shall be thought *extravagant* for the mention of such a supposition; Wherefore I come to what is less *obnoxious*.

When our souls go out of these bodies therefore, they are not presently discharged of all the matter that belonged to this condition, but carry away their *inward* and *aereal* state to be partakers with them of their *after fortunes*; only leaving the useless earth behind them. For they have a *congruity* to their *aery* bodies, though that which they had to a *terrestrial*, is worn out and defaced.

Nor need we to wonder how it can now have an *aereal aptitude*, when as that *congruity* expired before we descended hither; If we consider the reason of the *expiration* of its former *vital aptitude*, which was not so much through any defect of power to actuate such a body, but through the excess of *invigoration* of the *Plastick*, which was then grown so *strong*, * that an *aereal* body
was

Ch. 14. *A Key for Providence.* 127

was not enough for it to display its force upon. But now the case is altered, these *lower powers* are *worn* and *wearied* out, by the toylsome exercise of *dragging* about and managing such a *load* of *flesh*; wherefore being so *castigated*, they are duly attemper'd to the more *easy* body of *air* again, as was intimated before; to which they being already *united*, they cannot miss of a proper habitation.

But considering the *stupor*, *dulness* and *inactivity* of our *declining* age, it may seem unlikely to some, that after death we should immediately be resuscitated into so *lively* and *vigorous* a *condition*, as is the *aereal*, especially, since all the *faculties* of *sense* and *action*, are observed gradually to fail and abate as we draw nearer to our *exit* from this *Stage*; which seems to threaten, that we shall next *descend* into a state of more *stupor* and *inertness*. But this is a groundless *jealousie*; for the *weakness* and *lethargick inactivity* of old age, ariseth from a *defect* of those *Spirits*, that are the *instruments* of all our *operations*, which by long exercise are at last *spent* and *scattered*. So that the remains can scarce any longer stand under their unweildy *burthen*; much less, can they perform all *functions* of *life* so *vigorously* as they were wont to do, when they were in their due *temper*, *strength*, and *plenty*. However notwithstanding this
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128 *Præexistente of Souls*, Ch. 14.

inability to manage a *sluggish, stubborn, and exhausted terrestrial* body, there is no doubt, but the *Soul* can with great ease, when it is discharged of its former *load*, actuate its *thin aery* vehicle; and that with a brisk *vigour* and *activity*. As a man that is overladen, may be ready to faint and sink, till he be relieved of his burthen; and *then*, he can run away with a cheerful vivacity. So that this decrepit condition of our decayed natures cannot justly prejudice our belief, that we shall be erected again, into a state of *life* and *action* in *aereal* bodies, after this *congruity* is expired.

But if all alike live in *bodies* of *air* in the next *condition*, * where is then the difference between the *just* and the *wicked*, in *state*, *place* and *body*? For the *just* we have said already, that some of them are re-instated in their *pristine* happiness and felicity; and others are in a *middle* state, within the confines of the *Air*, perfecting the *inchoations* of a better *life*, which commenc'd in this. As for the *state* and *place* of those that have lived in a continual course of *sensuality* and *forgetfulness* of God; I come now to declare what we may fancy of it, by the help of *natural light*, and the conduct of *Philosophy*.

And in order to this discovery I must premise somewhat concerning the *Earth*, this
Globe

Ch. 14. *A Key for Providence.* 129

Globe we live upon; which is, that we are not to conceive it to be a full *bulky mass* to the center, but rather that 'tis somewhat like a sucked Egg, in great part, an hollow sphere, so that what we tread upon, is but as it were, an Arch or Bridge, to divide between the upper and the lower regions: Not that this inward hollownes is a meer void capacity; for there are no such *chasms* in nature, but doubtless replenisht it is with some fluid bodies or other, and it may be a kind of air, fire and water: Now this *Hypothesis* will help us easily to imagin how the earth may move, notwithstanding the pretended indisposition of its Bulk; and on that account I believe it will be somewhat the more acceptable with the free and ingenious.

Those that understand the *Cartesian Philosophy*, will readily admit the *Hypothesis*, at least as much of it as I shall have need of: But for others, I have little hopes of perswading them to any thing, and therefore I'll spare my labour of going about to prove what they are either incapable of, or at first dash judge ridiculous: And it may be most will grant as much as is requisite for my purpose, which is, *That there are huge vast cavities within the body of the Earth*; and it were as needless, as presumptuous, for me to go about to determine more: Only I shall mention a *probability*, that this gross

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130 *Præexistence of Souls*, Ch. 14

crust which we call *earth*, is not of so vast a *profundity* as is supposed, and so come more press to my business.

'Tis an ordinary observation among them that are employed in *Mines* and *subterraneous vaults* of any depth, that *heavy* bodies lose much of their *gravity* in those hollow *caverns*: So that what the strength of several men cannot stir above ground, is easily moved by the single force of one under it: Now to improve this experiment, 'tis very likely that *gravity* proceeds from a kind of *magnetism* and *attractive* vertue in the *earth*, which is by so much the more strong and vigorous, by how much more of the *attrabent* contributes to the *action*, and proportionably *weaker*, where less of the *magnetick* Element exerts its *operation*; so that supposing the *solid earth*, to reach but to a certain, and that not very great distance from the surface, and 'tis obvious this way to give an account of the *Phænomenon*.

*For according to this *Hypothesis* the *gravity* of those bodies is *less*, because the *quantity* of the *earth* that draws them is *so*; whereas were it of the same nature and solidity to the *center*, this diminution of its *bulk*, and consequently *vertue* would not be at all considerable, nor in the least sensible: Now though there are other causes pretended for this effect, yet there is none so like-

Ch: 14. *A Key for Providence.* 1311

likely, and easie a solution as this, though I know it also is obnoxious to exceptions, which I cannot now stand to meddle with; all that I would have, is, that 'tis a probability, * and the mention of the *fountains* of the *great deep* in the *sacred History*, as also the *flaming Vulcano's* and *smoking mountains* that all relations speak of, are others.

* Now I intend not that after a certain distance all is *fluid matter* to the center. For the *Cartesian Hypothesis* distributes the *subterranean* space into distinct regions of *divers matter*, which are divided from each other by as *solid walls*, as is the open air from the *inferiour Atmosphere*: Therefore I suppose only that under this *thick outside*, there is next a *vast* and large region of *fluid matter*, * which for the most part very likely is a *gross* and *fetid* kind of *air*, as also considerable proportions of *fire* and *water*, under all which, there may be other *solid* floors, that may compass and cover more vaults, and vast hollows, the contents of which 'twere vanity to go about to determine, only 'tis very likely, that as the admirable *Philosophy* of *Des Cartes* supposeth, * the lowest and *central* Regions may be filled with *flame* and *ether*, which suppositions, though they may seem to some to be but the groundless excursions of busie imaginations; yet those that know the *French Philosophy*, and see

132 *Præexistence of Souls*, Ch. 14.

there the Reasons of them, will be more candid in their censures, and not so severe to those not ill-framed *conjectures*.

Now then being thus provided, I return again to prosecute my main intendment; Wherefore 'tis very probable, that the *wicked* and *degenerate* part of mankind, * are after death committed to those squalid *subterraneous* habitations; in which *dark prisons*, they do severe *penance* for their past *impieties*, and have their *senses*, which upon earth they did so fondly indulge, and took such care to gratifie, now persecuted with *darkness*, *stench*, and *horror*. Thus doth the *divine justice* triumph in punishing those vile *Apostates* suitably to their *delinquencies*.

Now if those vicious souls are not carried down to the *infernal caverns* by the meer *congruity* of their natures, as is not so easie to imagine; we may then reasonably conceive, * that they are driven into those *dungeons* by the *invisible Ministers* of Justice, that manage the affairs of the world by *Axiom 3*. For those pure *Spirits* doubtless have a deep *sense* of what is *just*, and for the good of the *universè*; and therefore will not let those inexcusable wretches to escape their deserved *castigations*; or permit them to reside among the *good*, lest they should infect and poyson the better world, by their examples. Wherefore, I say, they are disposed of into those

Ch. 14. *A Key for Providence.* 133

those *black under-Abysses*, where they are suited with company like themselves, and match't unto *bodies as impure*, as are their depraved *inclinations*. Not that they are all in the same place, and under the like *torments*; but are variously distributed according to the merits of their *natures and actions*; some only into the *upper prisons*,* other to the *Dungeon*: And some to the most intolerable *Hell*, the *Abyss of fire*. Thus doth a just *Nemesis* visit all the quarters of the *Universe*.

Now those miserable prisoners cannot escape from the places of their confinement; for 'tis very likely that those watchful *spirits* that were instrumental in committing them, *have a strict and careful eye upon them to keep them within the confines of their goal, that they rove not out into the regions of *light and liberty*, yea, 'tis probable that the *bodies* they have contracted in those *squalid mansions*, may by a kind of fatal *magnetism* be chained down to this their proper element. Or, they having now a *congruity* only to such *fetid vehicles*, may be no more able to abide the *clear and light/some Air*; than the *Bat* or *Owl* are able to bear the *Suns noon-day beams*; or, the *fish* to live in these thinner *Regions*. This may be the reason of the *infrequency* of their appearance; and that they most commonly get them away at the approach

of light. Besides all this, some there are who suppose that there is a kind of *polity* among themselves; which may * under severe penalties, prohibit all unlicensed *excursions* into the *upper world*; though I confess this seems not so probable, and we stand in no need of the supposition. For though the *laws* of their natures should not detain them within their *proper residences*; yet the care and oversight of those watchful Spirits, who first committed them, will do it effectually. And very oft when they do appear, they signify that they are under restraint, and come not abroad, but by permission; as by several credible Stories I could make good; But for brevity I omit them.

Now though I intend not this *Hypothesis*, either for a discovery of infallible truth, or declaration of mine own opinions, yet I cannot forbear to note the strange *coincidence* that there is between *Scripture expressions* in this matter, some main strokes of the *Orthodox Doctrine*, and this *Philosophical conjecture* of the state and place of the wicked. This is represented in the *Divine Oracles* as a *deep pit*, a *prison*, a place of *darkness*, *fire*, and *brimstone*; and the going thither, is named a *descent*. All which most appositely agree with the representation we have made; And the usual *Periphrasis* of *Hell torment*, *fire*, and *brimstone*, is wonderfully applicable

cable to the place we have been describing; since it abounds with *fuliginous flames*, and *sulphureous stench* and *vapours*; And, as we have conjectur'd, the lowest *cavity*, is nothing *else* but a *vault of fire*. For the other expressions mentioned, every one can make the application. So that when a man considers this; he will almost be tempted to think, that the *inspired writers* had some such thing in their *fancies*. And we are not to run to *tropes* and *figures* for the *interpretation* of *plain* and *literal descriptions*; except some weighty reason force us to such a *Refuge*.

Moreover *Hell* is believed among the *Orthodox* to have degrees of *torments*, to be a place of uncomfortable *horror*, and to stand at the greatest distance from the *seat* and *habitation* of the *blessed*. All which, and more that I could reckon up, cannot more clearly be made out and explained, than they are in this *Hypothesis*.

Thus then we see the *irreclaimably wicked* lodg'd in a place and condition very *wretched* and *calamitous*. If any of them should be taught by their *miseries* to renounce and forsake their *impieties*; or should have any *dispositions* to *virtue* and *divine love* re-inkindled in them; meer *Philosophy* would conclude, that in time they might then be delivered from their sad *duration*; But we know what *Theology* hath determin'd. And in-

136 *Præexistence of Souls*, Ch. 14.

deed those *brutish Apostates* are so *fixt* and *rooted* in their *sensual* and *rebellious propensions*, that those who are not yet as far distant from their *Maker* as they can be, are still verging *downwards*; And possibly being quite void of the *divine grace*, and any considerable exercises of *reason* and *conscience*, they may never stop till they have run through all the *infernal stages*, and are arriv'd to the *extremest* degree of misery, that as yet any are obnoxious to.

Wherefore the *earth* and all the *infernal Regions* being thus monstrously depraved; 'tis time for the *Divine Justice* to shew some remarkable and more than ordinary *severity* upon those *remorseless Rebels*; and his goodness is as ready to deliver the virtuous from this stage of *wretchedness* and *impiety*. When therefore *those* have compleated the number of their iniquities, and these are fit for the mercy of so great a *deliverance*; then shall the great decree for *judgment* be executed; which though it cannot be expected that *meer Philosophy* should give an unerring and punctual account of, yet we shall follow *this light* as far as it will lead us; not intrenching upon the *sacred rights* of *Divinity*, nor yet *baulking* what the ancient *Eastern Cabbala*, assisted by later *discoveries* into nature, will dictate; But sincerely following the *Hypothesis*, we shall leave all its *errors* and

Ch. 14. A Key for Providence. 137

and *misguidances* to be corrected by the more sacred *Canons*. So that where we shall discern the *wisdom* of the *World* to have misdirected the most *knowing* and sedulous *inquirers*, we may duly acknowledge the great benefit of that *light* which we have received to guide us in matters of such vast and concerning *speculation*,

The Conflagration of the Earth.

T Herefore at length, when the time pre-appointed by the *divine wisdom* for this *execution*, is come ; * The *internal, central fire* shall have got such strength and *irresistible* vigour, that it shall easily melt and dissolve that *fence* that hath all this while inclosed it ; And all those other smaller *fires*, which are lodged in several parts of the *lower Regions* joyning themselves with this mighty *flame*, shall prey upon what ever is *combustible*, and so rage first within the bowels of the *earth*, beginning the *tragick execution* upon those *dammned spirits* that are there *confined* ; these having been reserved in the *chains of darkness* to the *judgment of this great day* ; and now shall their hell and misery be completed, and they receive the full reward of their *impieties* ! which doubtless will be the most intolerable and severe torment that can be imagined, these fierce and merciless
flame,

flames sticking close to, yea, piercing through and through their bodies, which can remove no where to avoid this fiery over-spreading vengeance.

And now the *subterranean vaults* being thus all on fire, it cannot be long ere this *prevailing combustion* take hold of the upper regions, wherefore at last with irresistible violence it breaks forth upon *these* also: So that the great pyre is now kindled, *smoak, fire, darkness, horror and confusion*, cover the face of all things. Wherefore the miserable inhabitants of the earth and *inferiour air*, will be seized on by the devouring Element, and suffer in that fire that was reserved for the perdition of *ungodly men*.

But shall the righteous perish with the wicked? And shall not the Judge of all the earth do right? Will not the sincere and virtuous both in the Earth and Air be secured from this *sad fate*? And how can their deliverance be effected? Doubtless Providence that in all things else hath been righteous and equal, will not fail in this last scene; but provision will be made for their recovery from this vengeance that hath taken hold of the wicked. But all natural causes failing here, since their bodies are not pure enough to waft them up the quiet regions of the *un-infested æther*; and the higher

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Ch.14. *A Key for Providence.* 139

congruity of life, being yet but imperfectly *inchoated*; they would be detained prisoners here below by the *chains* of their *unhappy natures*, were there not some *extraordinary interposure* for their rescue and enlargement; wherefore when we contemplate the *infinite fertility* of the *divine goodness*, we cannot think, that he will let those *seeds of piety and vertue*, which himself hath sown and given some increase to, to come to nought; or the *honest possessors* of them, fatally to miscarry: But that he will imploy his *power* for the compleating what he hath begun, and the deliverance of those, who have relyed upon his mercies. But for the particular way and method how this great *transaction* will be accomplisht, *Philosophy* cannot determine it.

Happy therefore are we, who have the discoveries of a more certain *Light*, which doth not only secure us of the thing, but acquaints us with the way and means, that the *Divine Wisdom* hath resolv'd on, for the *delivery* of the *righteous*. So that hereby we are assured that our ever blessed *Redeemer* shall appear in the *clouds* before this fiery Fate shall have quite taken hold of the Earth, and its condemned inhabitants. The *Glory* of his appearance with his *Cælestial Legions*, shall raise such strong *love, joy, and triumph* in his now passionately ena-

140 *Præexistence of Souls*, Ch. 14.

enamoured expectants, as shall again enkindle that *high* and *potent* principle, the Spirit, which being thoroughly awakened and excited, will melt the grossest consistence into *liquid Æther*, so that our bodies being thus turned into the *purest flame*, we shall ascend in those *fiery Chariots* with our Glorious Redeemer, and his illustrious and blessed Attendants to the *Cælestial* habitations. This is the Resurrection of the just, and the Recovery of our antient blessedness.

Thus have some represented this great transaction; But I dare warrant nothing in this matter beyond the declarations of the Sacred Scriptures; therefore to proceed in our *Philosophical conjectures*, However the good shall be delivered, be sure the *wicked* shall be made a prey to the *Scorching Element*, which now rageth every where, and suffer the Judgment threatned. But yet the most degenerate part of Mankind (if we consult meer *Reason* and the Antient *Eastern Cabbala*) who are detained Prisoners in the now *inflamed Atmosphere*, shall not for ever be abandon'd to misery and ruin. For they are still pretended to be under the eye and tender care of that *Almighty goodness*, that made and preserveth all things, that punisheth not out of *malice or revenge*, and therefore will not pursue them to their utter

Ch. 14. *A Key for Providence.* 141

utter undoing for ever : But hath set bounds to their *destruction*, and in *infinite Wisdom* hath so ordered the matter that none of his Creatures shall be lost eternally, or endure such an endless misery, than which *not Being* it self were more *eligible*. Wherefore those curious contemplators phancy, that the unsupportable pain and anguish which hath long stuck to those miserable creatures, will at length so consume and destroy that *insensible pleasure* and *congruity* that unites Soul and Body, that the thus miserably cruciated Spirit must needs quit it's unfit habitation; and there being no other body within its reach that is capable of a *vital* union, according to the tenor of this *Hypothesis*, it must become *senseless* and *inactive* by Axiom, 4. And so be buried in a state of *silence* and *inertness*.

At length when these greedy flames shall have devoured what ever was *combustible*, and converted into a *smoak* and *vapour* all grosser *concretions*, that great orb of fire that the *Cartesian Philosophy* supposeth to constitute the center of this *Globe*, shall perfectly have recovered its pristine *nature*, * and so following the Laws of its *proper motion*, shall fly away out of this *vortex*, and become a *wandering Comet*, till it settle in some other.

But if the next *Conflagration* reach not
so

so low as the Inmost regions of the *Earth*,
 * so that the central fire remains unconcern'd, and unemploy'd in this *combustion*, this *Globe* will then retain its wonted place among the *Planets*. And that so it may happen, is not improbable, since there is plenty enough both of *fiery principles* and *materials* in those Regions that are nearer to the surface, to set the *Earth* into a *Light-some flame*, and to do all that execution that we have spoken of. Some conceive therefore, that the *conflagration* will not be so deep and *universal* as this opinion supposeth it; But that it may take beginning from a less distance, and spend it self upwards. And to this purpose they represent the sequel of their *Hypothesis*.

The General Restitution.

THose *thick* and *clammy* vapours which erstwhile ascended in such vast measures, and had fill'd the *vault* of *Heaven* with *smoak* and *darkness*, must at length obey the *Laws* of their nature and gravity, and so descend again in abundant *showres*, and mingle with the *subsiding ashes*, which will constitute a *mudd vegetative* and *fertile*. For those warm and benign beams, that now again begin to visit the *desolate Earth*, will excite those *seminal principles* into action,

Ch. 14. *A Key for Providence.* 143

on, which the *Divine Wisdom* and *goodness* hath mingled with all things. Wherefore they operating according to their natures, and the dispositions which they find in the restored matter, will shoot forth in all sorts of *flowers, herbs, and trees*; making the whole *Earth* a *Garden of delight and pleasure*; And erecting all the *Phaenomena* proper to this *Element*. By this time the *Air* will be grown *vital* again and far more pure and pleasant, than before the *fiery purgation*. Wherefore they conceive, that the disbodied Souls shall return from their unactive and *silent recess*, and be joyned again to bodies of purified and duly prepared *Air*. For their *radical aptitude* to matter still remained, though they fell *asleep* for want of bodies of fit temper to unite with.

This is the summ of the *Hypothesis* as it is represented by the profoundly Learned Dr. H. More, with a *copious and pompous eloquence*.

Now supposing such a *recess* of any Souls into a state of inactivity, such a *Restitution* of them to *life* and *action* is very reasonable; since it is much better for them to *live* and *operate* again, than to be useless in the *universe*, and as it were nothing for ever. And we have seen above, that the *Divine goodness* doth always what is *best*,
and

144 *Præexistence of Souls*, Ch. 14

and his *wisdom* is not so shallow as to make his Creatures so as that he should be fain to banish them into a state that is next to *non-entity*, there to remain through all *duration*. Thus then will those lately tormented Souls, having smarted for their past iniquities, be recovered both from their *state of wretchedness* and *insensibility*; and by the unspeakable *benignity* of their *Maker*, placed once more in such conditions, wherein by their own endeavours, and the divine assistance they may amend what was formerly amiss in them, and pursue any *good Resolutions* that they took while under the lash of the fiery tortures; Which those that do, when their *good inclinations* are perfected, and the *Divine Life* again enkindled, they shall in due time re-ascend the *Thrones* they so unhappily fell from, and be circled about with unexpressible felicity. But those that for all this, follow the same ways of *sensuality* and *rebellion*, against their merciful deliverer, they shall be sure to be met with by the same *methods* of *punishment*; and at length be as miserable as ever.

Thus we see the *Air* will be *re-peopled* after the *conflagration*: but how the *Earth* will so soon be restored to *Inhabitants*; is a matter of some difficulty to determine, since it useth to be furnished from
the

Ch. 14. A Key for Providence. 145

the *Aereal* regions, which now will have none left that are fit to plant it. For the *good* were delivered thence before the *conflagration*: And those that are newly come from under the fiery lash and latter state of *silence*, are in a hopeful way of *recovery*; At least, their *aereal congruity* cannot be so soon expired, as to fit them for an early return to their *terrestrial prisons*. Wherefore to help our selves in this rencounter, we must remember, that there are continually multitudes of souls in a state of *inactivity*, for want of suitable bodies to unite with, there being more that dye to the *aery* state, than are born into this *terrestrial*. In this condition were *myriads*, when the general *Fever* seiz'd this great *destemper'd* body; who therefore were unconcern'd in the *conflagration*, and are now as ready to return into *life* and *action* upon the *Earth's* happy *restoration*, as if no such thing had happened.

Wherefore they will not fail to descend into fitly *prepared matter*, and to exercise all the functions proper to this condition. Nor will they alone be inhabitants of the *Earth*. For all the variety of other *Animals*, shall live and act upon this *stage* with them; all sorts of souls insinuating themselves into those bodies, which are fit for their respective natures.

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Thus

Thus then supposing habitable *congruous* bodies, there is no doubt, but there will be humane *Souls* to *actuate* and *inform* them; but all the difficulty is to conceive how the *matter* shall be *prepared*. For who shall be the common *Seeds-man* of succeeding Humanity, when all mankind is swept away by the *fiery deluge*? And to take Sanctuary in a *Miracle* is *unphilosophical* and *desperate*. I think therefore, it is not *improbable* (I mean according to the dust of this *Hypothesis*) but that in this *renewed youth*, of the so lately *calcined* and *purified Earth*, there may be some pure *efflorescences* of *balmy matter*, not to be found now in its exhausted and decrepit *Age*, that may be proper *vehicles of life*, into which souls may descend without further *preparation*; And so orderly shape and form them, as we see to this day several sorts of other creatures do, without the help of generation. For doubtless there will be great plenty of *unctuous spirituous matter*, when the most inward and *recondite* spirits of all things, shall be dislodg'd from their *old close residences*, and scatter'd into the *Air*; where they will at length, when the fierce agitation of the fire is over, gather in considerable proportion of *tenuous vapours*; which at length descending in a *crystalline liquor*, and mingling with the finest parts of the *newly modified*

Ch. 14. *A Key for Providence.* 447

fied Earth, will doubtless compose as *genital* a matter as any can be prepared in the bodies of *Animals*. And the *calm* and *wholesome Air* which now is duly purged from its noxious *reeks* and *vapours*, and abounds with their *saline spirituous humidity*, will unquestionably be very propitious to those tender *inchoations* of *life*; and by the help of the Sun's favourable and gentle *beams*, supply them with all necessary materials.

Nor need we puzzle ourselves to phancy, how those *Terre Filii*, those young sons of the Earth will be fortified against the injuries of *weather*, or be able to provide for themselves in their first and tender *infancy*; since doubtless, if the supposition be admitted, * those *immediate births* of *unassisted* nature will not be so tender and *helpless* as we, into whose very constitutions *delicacy* and *effeminateness* is now twisted. For those *masculine productions* which were always exposed to the open *Air*, and not *cloyster'd* up as we, will feel no more incommodity from it, than the young fry of fishes do from the coldness of the water they are spawn'd in. And even now much of our tenderness and *delicacy* is not natural but *contracted*. For *poor Children* will indure that hardship that would quickly dispatch those that have had a more careful and officious nurture. And without question we should do many things

148 *Præexistence of Souls*, Ch. 14.

for *self-preservation* and *provision*, which now we yield no signs of; had not custom prevented the *endeavours* of *nature*, and made it expect assistance. For the *Indian Infants* will swim currently, when as soon as they are born, they are thrown into the water. And nature put to her shifts, will do many things more than we can suspect her able for the performance of; which consider'd, 'tis not hard to apprehend, but that those Infant *Aborigines* are of a very different temper and condition from the weak products of now decayed nature; having questionless, more pure and *serviceable bodies*, *senses* and other *faculties* more *active* and *vigorous*, and *nature* better exercised; so that they may by a like *sense* to that which carries all creatures to their proper food, pursue and take hold of that nutriment which the *free* and *willing* Earth now offer'd to their mouths; till being advantaged by *Age* and *growth*, they can move about to make their choice. * But all this is but the *frolick* exercise of my pen chusing a *Paradox*; And 'tis time to give over the pursuit.

To make an end then, we see that after the *Conflagration* the earth will be *inhabited* again, and all things proceed much-what in like manner as before. But whether the *Catastrophe* of *this* shall be like the former or no, I think is not to be determined. For

as one world hath perisht by water, and this present shall by fire, 'tis possible the next period may be by the *Extinction* of the *Sun*. But I am come to the end of the line, and shall not go beyond this present Stage of *Providence*, or wander into an *Abyss* of uncertainties, where there is neither *Sun* nor *Star* to guide my notions.

Now of all that hath been represented of this *Hypothesis*, there is nothing that seems more *extravagant* and *Romantick* than those notions that come under the two last *Generals*; And yet so it falls out, that the main matters contained under them, one would think to have a strange consonancy with some expressions in the *Sacred Oracles*. For clear it is from the *divine Volume*, that the wicked and the *Devils* themselves are reserved to a further and more severe *Judgment* than yet afflicteth them; It is as plainly declared to be a *vengeance* of fire that abides them, as a complement of their torments: And that the *Earth* shall be burnt, is as explicitly affirmed, as any thing can be spoken. Now if we put all these together, they look like a probability, that the *conflagration* of the *Earth* shall consummate the *Hell* of the wicked. And * those other expressions of *Death*, *Destruction*, *Pendition* of the ungodly, and the like, seem to show a favourable regard to the State of Silence

150 *Præexistence of Souls*, Ch. 14
and *inactivity*. Nor is there *lets* appearing
countenance given to the *Hypothesis* of *Resti-*
tution,* in those passages which predict *New*
Heavens and a *New Earth*, and seem to inti-
mate only a *change* of the present.

And yet I would have no body be so cre-
dulous as to be taken with little appearan-
ces, nor do I mention these with an intent
that they should with full consent be deliv-
ered to intend the asserting any such Doctr-
ines; But that there is shew enough both
in Reason and Scripture for these Opinions
to give an occasion for an *Hypothesis*, and
therefore that they are not meer arbitrary
and idle imaginations.

Now whatever becomes of this particu-
lar draught of the Souls several conditions of
life and action, the main Opinion of *Præ-*
existence is not at all concerned. This Scheme
is only to shew, that natural and imperfect
Reason can frame an *Intelligible Idea* of it;
And therefore questionless the Divine *Wif-*
dom could form and order it, either so, or
with infinitely more accuracy and exactness.
How it was with us therefore of Old, I know
not; But yet that we may have been, and
acted before we descended hither, I think is
very probable. And I see no reason but
why *Præexistence* may be admitted without
altering any thing considerable of the ordi-
nary *Systeme* of *Theology*. But I shut up
with

Ch. 14. *A Key for Providence.* 151
with that modest conclusion of the Great
Des Cartes:

That although these matters seem hardly
otherwise intelligible than as I have here ex-
plained them :

Yet nevertheless remembering I am not in-
fallible, I assert nothing ; * but submit all I
have written to the Authority of the *Church*
of *England*, and to the matured judgments
of graver and wiser men ; Earnestly de-
siring that nothing else may be entertained
with credit by any persons, but what is able
to win it by the force of evident and victo-
rious reason. *Des Cartes Princ. Philos. lib.*

4. *CVIL.*

FINIS.

A
DISCOURSE
OF
TRUTH.

BY THE
Reverend Doctor
RUST,
Late LORD BISHOP of
DROMORE in IRELAND.

LONDON,
Printed for J. Collins, and S. Louys over a-
gainst Exeter Exchange in the
Strand, 1682.

A
DISCOURSE
OF
TRUTH.

BY THE
Reverend Doctor
R U S T,
Late Lord Bishop of
DROMORE in IRELAND.

LONDON
Printed for J. Colburn and S. Lowry, and
John P. Parker, in the
Strand, 1831.

A
LETTER

Concerning the
Subject and the Author.

SIR,

I Have now perused, and returned
the Manuscript you sent me; it
had contracted many and great
Errours in the Transcription, which I
have corrected: I was enabled to do
it by a written Copy of the same
Discourse, which I have had divers
years in my Hands. The Subject is
of great and weighty importance, and
the Acknowledgment of the Truths
here asserted and made good, will lay
a Foundation for right conceptions in
the Doctrines that concern the De-
crees

crees of God. For the first Errour, which is the ground of the rest, is, That things are good and just, because God Wills them so to be; and if that be granted, we are disabled from using the arguments taken from natural Notions, and the Attributes and Perfections of the Divine Nature, against the Blackest and most Blasphemous Opinions that ever were entertained concerning Gods proceedings with the Sons of Men. If there be no settled Good and Evil, Immutable and Independent on any Will or Understanding, then God may have made his reasonable Creatures on purpose to damn them for ever. He may have absolutely decreed that they should sin, that he may damn them justly; He may most solemnly and earnestly prohibit Sin by his Laws, and declare great displeasure against it; and yet by his ineluctable Decrees force men to all the sin that is committed in the World:

World: He may vehemently protest his
unfeigned desire of their Life and
Happineſs, and at the ſame time ſe-
cretly reſolve their Eternal Deſtruction;
He may make it his Glory and
Pleaſure to triumph eternally in the
torments of poor Worms, which him-
ſelf hath by his unalterable and irre-
ſiſtible Will made miſerable; yea, (as
the diſcourſe inſtancerh) he may af-
ter his Decrees concerning the Sal-
vation of the Elect, after the death
of his Son for them, and the miſſion
of his Spirit to them, and after all
the promiſes he hath made to aſſure
them; thruſt them alſo at laſt into the
dreadful Regions of Death and Woe;
I ſay if there be no immutable re-
ſpects in things, but Juſt and Un-
juſt, Honourable and Diſhonourable,
Good and Cruel, Faithful and Deceit-
ful, are reſpects made by meer arbi-
trary Will, it will be in vain to
diſpute from Them againſt any ſuch
dismal

dismal Opinions : yea it will be great
folly to argue for the Simplicity of the
Divine Nature against the vile con-
ceits of the old Anthropomorphites,
and the Blasphemies of the present
Muggletonians, of God's having
a Corporal shape, Parts and Mem-
bers, if there be no necessary Inde-
pendent Connexion, betwixt Immen-
sity, Spirituality and Perfection. But
this being established, that there are
immutable respects in things, and
that such and such are Perfection-
ons, and their contrary, Defects and
imperfections; hence it will follow,
that it is impossible the foremention-
ed Doctrines can be true concerning
God, who cannot lye, cannot deny
himself: viz. He being Absolute and
Infinite Perfection, cannot act any
thing that is Evil or imperfect; But
all the expressions in Scripture, that
at first sight look towards such a
sense, must be interpreted by the gene-
ral

ral Analogy and course of them, which declares his Infinite, Immutable Excellencies, and these Notions of himself, which he hath written on the Souls of Men.

So that the Subject of this little Discourse, is of vast Moment, and the truth asserted in it, is, I think, confirmed with an irresistible Strength and force of Reasoning; and not to be convinced by it, will argue either great weakness of Understanding, in not perceiving consequences that are so close and plain; or great obstinacy of Will, in being shut up by prejudices, and preconceiv'd Opinions against Light that is so clear and manifest.

The Author was a Person with whom I had the Honour and Happiness of a very particular acquaintance; a man he was of a clear Mind, a deep Judgment and searching Wit: greatly learned in all the best sorts of Knowledge, old and new, a thoughtful and diligent

diligent Enquirer, of a free Understanding, and vast Capacity, joyn'd with singular Modesty, and unusual Sweetness of Temper, which made him the Darling of all that knew him: He was a person of great Piety and Generosity; a hearty Lover of God and Men: An excellent Preacher, a wise Governour, a profound Philosopher, a quick, forcible, and close Reasoner, and above all, a true and exemplary Christian. In short, he was one who had all the Qualifications of a Primitive Bishop, and of an extraordinary Man. This I say not out of kindness to my Friend, but out of Justice to a Person of whom no Commendation can be extravagant. He was bred in Cambridge, and Fellow of Christ's Colledge, where he lived in great Esteem and Reputation for his eminent Learning and Vertues; he was one of the first that overcame the prejudices of the Education of the late
un-

unhappy Times, in that University, and was very Instrumental to enlarge others. He had too great a Soul for the trifles of that Age, and saw early the nakedness of Phrases and Phancies; He out-grew the pretended Orthodoxy of those days, and addicted himself to the Primitive Learning and Theology, in which he even then became a great Master.

After the return of the Government, the excellent Bishop Taylor, foreseeing the vacancy in the Deanery of Connor, sent to Cambridge, for some Learned and Ingenious Man, who might be fit for that Dignity. The motion was made to Dr. Rust, which corresponding with the great Inclination he had to be conversant with that incomparable Person, he gladly accepted of it, and hastn'd into Ireland, where he landed at Dublin about August 1661. He was received with much Respect and Kindness

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ness by that great and good Bishop; who knew how to value such Jewels; and preferr'd to the Deanery as soon as it was void, which was shortly after. He continued in that Preferment during the Bishops Life, always dearly lov'd, and even admir'd by him.

At his Death (that sad stroke to all the Lovers of Religion and Learning) he was chosen for the last solemn Office to his Deceased Father and Friend; and he Preach't such a Funeral Sermon as became that extraordinary Person and himself. It hath been since published, and I suppose you may have seen it, upon the lamented Death of Bishop Taylor, which hapned August 13th. 1667. The Bishopricks were divided; Dr. Boyle Dean of Cork, was nominated Bishop of Downe and Connor; and Dr. Rust Dean of Connor, Bishop of Dromore; he lived in the Deanery

Deanery about six years, in the Bishoprick but three; for in December 1670, he dyed of a Fever (in the prime of his years) to the unspeakable grief of all that knew his Worth, and especially of such of them as had been blest by his Friendship, and most sweet and indearing Conversation. He was buried in the Quire of his own Cathedral Church of Dromore, in a Vault made for his Predecessour Bishop Taylor, whose Sacred Dust is deposited also there: and what Dormitory hath two such Tenants?

This is the best account I can give you of the Work and the Author: and by it you may perceive his Memory deserves to live, and this product of him: but there is so much reverence due to the Manes of so venerable a Person, that nothing should be hastily published under his honour'd name. I know, had he designed this Exercitation for the Publick, he would have

made it much more compleat and exact than we now have it ; but as it is, the Discourse is weighty , and substantial, and may be of great use. As it goes about now in written Copies it, is (I perceive) exceedingly depraved , and in danger of being still worse abused ; The Publication would preserve it from further corruptions. However I dare not advise any thing in it, but this, that you take the judgment of that Reverend Doctor you mention (the deceased Authors Friend and mine,) and act according as he shall direct. I am,

Your real Friend,

Jos. Glanvil.



A
DISCOURSE
OF
TRUTH.

SECT. I.

That Truth is twofold; In the Object, and in the Subject. That in the Object what it is; And that it is antecedent to and independent of any Will or Understanding whatever.

TRUTH is of æquivocal signification, and therefore cannot be defined before it be distinguish'd. It is twofold; Truth in *things*, which you may call Truth in the Object: and Truth in the *Understanding*, which is Truth in the Subject. By the first I mean nothing else but that Things necessarily are what they are: And that there are necessary mutual respects and relations of Things one unto an-

other. Now that things are what they are, and that there are mutual Respects and Relations eternal, and immutable, and in order of Nature* antecedent to any Understanding either created or uncreated, is a thing very plain and evident; For it's clearer than the Meridian Light, that such Propositions as these, *Homo est animal rationale, Triangulum est quod habet tres angulos*, are not arbitrary dependencies upon the Will, Decree, or Understanding of God; but are necessary and eternal Truths; and wherein 'tis as impossible to divide the Subject, and what is spoken of it, as it is for a thing not to be what it is, which is no less than a Contradiction; And as indispensable are the mutual respects and relations of things both in Speculatives and Morals.

SECT. II.

The necessity of there being certain Arguments, Means and Objects for certain Conclusions, Ends and Faculties; and that every thing will not suit every thing.

FOR can it be imagin'd that every Argument can be made a proportioned Medium to prove every Conclusion? * that any thing may be a suitable means to any end? that any Object may be conformable to any Facult

Faculty? Can Omnipotence it self make these Propositions, That twice two are four, or that Parallels cannot intersect, clear and convincing Arguments to prove these grand Truths, *That Christ came into the World to dye for Sinners, and is now exalted as a Prince and a Saviour at the Right Hand of God?* * Is it possible that there should be such a kind of Geometry, wherein any problemes should be demonstrated by any Principles; *quidlibet ex quolibet*; as that a *Quadrangle* is that which is comprehended of four right Lines: * Therefore the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones?

SECT. III.

An Instance or two of gross and horrid Absurdities, consequent to the denying the mutual respects and relations of things to be eternal and indispensable.

CAN the infinite Wisdom it self make the damning of all the Innocent and the unspotted Angels in Heaven a proportionate means to declare and manifest the unmeasurable greatness of his Grace and Love, and goodness towards them? Can Lying, Swearing, Envy, Malice, nay Hatred of God and Goodness it self, be made the most acceptable Service of God, and the readiest

way to a mans Happiness? And yet all these must be true, and infinitely more such contradictions than we can possibly imagin, if the mutual respects and relations of things be not eternal and indispensable: which that they are, I shall endeavour to prove.

SECT. IV.

The Entrance into the first part of the Discourse, which is of Truth in the Object: That the Divine Understanding does not make the Respects and Relations of its Objects, but finds them or observes them.

First, we must premise that *Divine Understanding cannot be the Fountain of the Truth of things; *nor the Foundation of the references of one to another. For it is against the nature of all Understanding, to make its Objects. *It is the nature of Understanding, *ut moveatur, illuminetur, formetur, &c.* Of its Object, *ut moveat, illuminet, formet.* *Intellectus in actu primo* hath it self unto its object, as the Eye unto the Sun; it is irradiated, inlightened and actuated by it: And *Intellectus in actu secundo*, hath it self unto its Object, as the Image to that it represents; and the perfection of Understanding consists in being actuated by,
and

and in an adequate Conformity to its object, according to the nature of all Idea's, Images or Representations of things. The Sum is this, * No Idea's or Representations are or make the things they represent; all Understanding is such; therefore no Understanding doth *make* the Natures, Respects and Relations of its Objects.

SECT. V.

That the Divine Will does not determine the References and Dependencies of things, because that would subvert his other Attributes.

* **I**T remains then, that absolute, arbitrary and independent Will must be the Fountain of all Truth; and must determine the References and Dependencies of things; * which assertion would in the *First* place destroy the nature of God, * and rob him of all his Attributes. For then it's impossible that there should be such a thing as Divine *Wisdom* and *Knowledge*, which is nothing else but an apprehension of common notions, and the natures and mutual respects and relations of things. For if the Nature of God be such, that his arbitrary imagination that such and such things have such and such natures and
Depen-

Dependencies, doth make those things to have those Natures or Dependencies, he may as easily Unimagine that Imagination; and then they that before had a mutual Harmony, Sympathy and Agreement with one another, shall now stand at as great a distance and opposition. And thus the Divine Understanding will be a mere Protean *Chimera*, a Casual Conflux of intellectual Atomes: Contradictions are true, if God will understand them so, and then the foundation of all Knowledge is taken away, and God may as truly be said to know nothing as every thing; nay, * any Angel or Man may as truly be said to know all things, as God himself; for then every thing will be alike certain, and every apprehension equally conformable to Truth. These are infallible consequences, and a thousand more as absurd as these, if contradictory Propositions may be both true; and whether they be so or no, it's a meer casual Dependence upon the Arbitrary pleasure of God, if there be not a necessary immutability and eternal opposition betwixt the being and the not being of the same thing, at the same time and in the same respect. Likewise all those Truths we call *Common Notions*, (the Systeme and Comprehensions of which, is the very Essence of Divine Wisdom; as the conclusions issu-

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ing from them, not by any operose deduction, but a clear intuitive light, are the very Nature of Divine Knowledge, * if we distinguish those two Attributes in God. I say, all these propositions of immediate and indemonstrable Truth, if these be only so, because so understood by God, and so understood by God because he pleased so to have them, and not because there is an indispensable relation of Harmony and Proportion betwixt the Terms themselves; then it is a thing meerly casual, and at the pleasure of God to change his former apprehensions, and Ideas of those Truths, and to make their contradictories as Evident, Radical and Fundamental as themselves but even now were; and so Divine Wisdom and Knowledge will be a various, fickle and mutable thing, a meer tumult and confusion. All these consequences infallibly flow from this certain Principle, That upon a changeable and uncertain Cause, Effects must needs have a changeable and uncertain Dependence. And there is nothing imaginable in it self, more changeable and uncertain than *Will* not regulated by the dictates of Reason and Understanding.

SECT. VI.

The avoidance of the foregoing ill consequences by making God immutable, with an Answer thereto.

IF any deny these Consequences and Deductions, * because they suppose that God is mutable and changeable; I answer, by bringing this as another absurdity, that if there be no indispensable and eternal respects of things, it will rob God of his Immutability, and unchangeableness: for if there be no necessary dependence betwixt *Unchangeableness* and *Perfection*, what should hinder, but that if God please to *think it so*, it will be his perfection to be changeable? and if *Will*, as *such*, be the only principle of his Actions, it is infallibly his Perfection to be so. For 'tis the Perfection of every Being to act according to the principle of its Nature, and it is the nature of an arbitrary Principle to act or not, to do or undo upon no account but its own will and pleasure; to be determined, and tied up, either by it self, or from abroad, is violent and contranatural.

SECT. VII.

An hideous, but genuine Inference of a Pamphleteer from this principle, that absolute and Sovereign Will is the Spring and Fountain of all Gods actions.

AND therefore from this principle, that absolute and Sovereign Will is the Spring and Fountain of all Gods Actions, it was rightly inferr'd by a late Pamphleteer, that God will one day damn all Mankind, Good and Bad, Believers and Unbelievers, notwithstanding all his Promises, Pretensions or Engagements to the contrary; because this damning all mankind in despite of his Faithfulness, Justice, Mercy and Goodness will be the greatest advancement of his Sovereignty, Will and Prerogative imaginable. His words are, *God hath stored up Destruction both for the perfect and the wicked, and this does wonderfully set forth his Sovereignty; his exercising whereof is so perfect, that when he hath tied himself up fast as may be, by never so many promises, yet it should still have its scope, and be able to do what it will, when it will, as it will: Here you have this principle improved to the height. And however you may look upon this Author as some new Light, or Ignis fatuus of*
the

the times, yet I assure you in some pieces by him set forth; he is very sober and rational.

SECT. VIII.

That the Denial of the mutual Respect and Relations of things unto one another to be eternal and unchangeable, despoils God of that universal Rectitude of his Nature.

IN the next place, to deny the mutual respects and *rationes rerum* to be immutable and indispensable, * will spoil God of that *universal rectitude* which is the greatest Perfection of his Nature: For then Justice, Faithfulness, Mercy, Goodness &c. will be but contingent and arbitrary Issues of the Divine Will. This is a clear and undeniable Consequence. For if you say these be indispensable perfections in God, for instance, if *Justice* be so, then there is an eternal relation of Right and Equity betwixt every Being and the giving of it that which is its propriety; if *Faithfulness*, then there is an indispensable agreement betwixt a promise and the performance of it; if *Mercy*, then there is an immutable and unalterable suitableness and harmony between an indigent Creature, and pity and commiseration; if *Goodness*, then there is an everlasting Proportion

portion and symmetry between fulness and its overflowing and dispredding of it self, which yet is the thing denyed: * For to say they are indispensibly so, because God understands them so, seems to me extream incogitancy; for that is against the nature of all understanding, which is but the Idea and Representation of things, and is then a true and perfect Image, when it is exactly conformed to its Object; And therefore, if things have not mutual respects and relations eternal and indispensable, then all those perfections do solely and purely depend upon absolute and independent Will, as *Will*; And consequently, it was and is indifferent in it self that the contrary to these, as, *Injustice, Unfaithfulness, Cruelty, Malice, Hatred, Spite, Revenge, Fury*; and whatever goes to the constitution of Hell it self, should have been made the top and highest perfections of the Divine Nature: which is such Blasphemy as cannot well be named without horror and trembling. For instead of being a God, such a nature as this is, joyned with Omnipotency, would be a worse Devil than any is in Hell. And yet this is a necessary and infallible consequence from the denial of these mutual respects and relations of things unto one another, to be eternal and unchangeable.

SECT. IX.

That the Denial of the unchangeableness of the said mutual Respects and Relations of things to one another, takes away all Knowledge of God and of our own Happiness, and lays a Foundation of the most incurable Scepticism imaginable.

AND as by the denial of these, the Nature of God is wholly destroyed, so in the second place, the *mind* of *Man* would have no certainty of Knowledge, or assurance of Happiness. He can never come to know there is a God, and consequently not the Will and Mind of God, which if there be no intrinsecal and indispenfible respects and relations of things, must be the ground and foundation of all Knowledge; for what means or arguments should we use to find out, or prove a Divine Nature? It were folly and madness to sit down and consider the admirable contrivement and artifice of this great Fabrick of the Universe; how that all natural things seem to act for some end, though themselves take no Cognizance of it: How the Sun by its motion and situation, or (which is all one) by being a Centre of the Earths Motion, provides Light and Heat, and Life for this inferiour World,

World, how living Creatures bring forth a most apt compoſure and ſtructure of parts and members, and with that a being endued with admirable Faculties, and yet themſelves have no insight into, nor conſultation about this incomparable Workmanſhip; how they are furniſhed with Powers and Inclinations for the preſervation of this Body when it is once brought into the World; how without previous deliberation they naturally take in that Food which without their intention or animadverſion is concocted in their Ventricle; turned into Chyle, that Chyle into Bloud, that Bloud diffuſed through the Veins and Arteries, and therewith the ſeveral Members nourished, and decays of ſtrength repaired; May, the gathering from all theſe (which one would think were a very natural conſequence) that there is a wiſe Principle which directs all theſe Beings unknown to you, in their ſeveral motions, to their ſeveral ends, (ſuppoſing the dependence and relations of things to be contingent and arbitrary) were a piece of folly and incogitancy; For how can the Order of thoſe things ſpeak a wiſe and underſtanding Being, which have no relation or reſpect unto one another, but their whole agreement, ſuitableneſs and proportion is a meer casual iſſue of abſolute and independent Will? If any thing may be the cauſe of any effect, and a proportionate

SECT. X.

*That the denying the Eternal and immutable
Respects of things frustrates all the noble
Effays of the mind or understanding of
man.*

THUS you see the noble faculties of man, his Mind and Understanding, will be to no end and purpose, but for a Rack and Torture; for what greater unhappiness or torment can there be imagined, than to have Faculties, whose Accomplishment and Perfection consists in a due conformation unto their objects, and yet to have no objects unto which they may be conformed; to have a Soul unmeasurably breathing after the embraces of Truth and Goodness, and after a search and enquiry after one and the other, and to find at last they are but airy, empty and uncertain Notions, depending upon the arbitrary determinations of boundless and independent Will; which determinations she sees it beyond her reach ever to come to any knowledge of?

SECT. XI.

That in the abovesaid denial are laid the Foundations of Rantism, Debauchery, and all Dissoluteness of Life.

Here you have likewise the true Foundations of that we call *Rantism*; for if there be no distinction 'twixt Truth and Falshood, Good and Evil, in the nature of the things themselves, and we never can be assured what is the mind and pleasure of the suprem and absolute Will (because Veracity is not intrinsically and *ex natura rei*, a Perfection, but only an Arbitrarious, if any Attribute in the Deity) * then it infallibly follows, that it is all one what I do, or how I live; and I have as much reason to believe that I am as pleasing unto God, when I give up my self unto all Filthiness, Uncleaness and Sin; when I swell with Pride, Envy, Hatred and Malice, &c. as when I endeavour with all my Might and Strength to purge and purifie my Soul from all pollution and defilement both of Flesh and Spirit; and when I pursue the mortification of all my carnal Lusts and Inclinations: And I have fully as much ground and assurance, that the one is the ready Way to Happiness, as the other.

SECT. XII.

That our assurance of future Happiness is quite cut off by the Denying of the Eternal and immutable respects of things.

ANd this is another branch of this *second* Absurdity, from the denial of the intrinsecal and eternal respects and relations of things, that a man would not have any assurance of future Happiness; for though it be true indeed, or at least we fancy to our selves that God hath sent *Jesus Christ* into the world, and by him hath made very large and ample promises, that whosoever believes in him and conforms his life unto his precepts, shall be made heir of the same Inheritance and Glory which Christ is now possessed of and invested with in the Kingdom of his Father; yet what ground have we to believe that God does not intend only to play with and abuse our Faculties, and in conclusion to damn all those that believe and live as is above expressed; and to take *them only* into the Injoyments of Heaven and Happiness, who have been the great Opposers of the Truth, and Gospel, and Life and Nature of *Jesus Christ* in the world? For if there be no eternal and indispensable Relation of Things,

Things, then there's no intrinsecal Evil in Deceiving and Falsifying, in the damning the Good, or saving obstinate and contumacious Sinners (whilst such) notwithstanding any promises or threatnings to the contrary : and if the things be in themselves indifferent, it is an unadvised Confidence to pronounce determinately on either side. Yea further, suppose we should be assured that God is *Verax*, and that the Scripture doth declare what is his Mind and Pleasure ; yet if there be not an intrinsecal opposition betwixt the Being and not Being of a thing at the same time, and in the same respect ; then God can make a thing that hath been *done*, *undone* ; and that whatever hath been done or spoken either by himself, or Christ, or his Prophets, or Apostles, should never be done, or spoken by him or them ; though He hath come into the world, yet that He should not be come ; though he hath made these promises, yet that they should not be made ; though God hath given us Faculties, that are capable of the enjoyment of himself, yet that he should not have given them us ; and that yet we should have no Being, nor think a thought while we fancy and speak of all these contradictions : In fine, it were impossible we should know any thing, * if the opposition of contradictory terms depend upon the

arbitrary resolves of any Being whatsoever. If any should affirm, that the terms of common Notions have an eternal and indispensable relation unto one another, and deny it of other truths, he exceedingly betrays his folly and incogitancy; for these common Notions and principles are foundations, and radical truths upon which are built all the deductions of reason and Discourse, and with which, so far as they have any truth in them, they are inseparably united. All these consequences are plain and undeniable, and therefore I shall travel no further in the confirmation of them.

SECT. XIII.

Several Objections propounded, against the scope of this Discourse hitherto, from the Independency of the Divine Understanding and Will.

Against this Discourse will be objected, that it destroys God's *Independency* and *Self-sufficiency*; *for if there be truth antecedently to the Divine Understanding, the Divine Understanding will be a meer passive principle, acted and enlightened by something without itself, as the Eyes, by the Sun, and lesser Objects, which the Sun irradiates: and if there be
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mutual congruities, and dependencies of things in a moral sense, and so, that such and such means have a natural and intrinsic tendency, or repugnance to such and such ends, then will God be determined in his actions from something without himself, * which is to take away his independency, and Self-sufficiency. The pardoning of Sin to repenting Sinners seems to be a thing very suitable to infinite Goodness and Mercy, if there be any suitableness, or agreement in things antecedently to Gods Will; therefore in this case will God be moved from abroad, and as it were determined to an act of Grace. This will also undermine and shake many principles and opinions which are look'd upon as Fundamentals, and necessary to be believed: It will unlink and break that chain and method of Gods Decrees, which is generally believed amongst us. God's great plot, and design from all Eternity, as it is usually held forth, was to advance his Mercy and Justice in the Salvation of some, and Damnation of others; We shall speak only of that part of Gods design, the advancement of his Justice in the Damnation of the greatest part of Mankind, as being most pertinent for the improving of the strength of the Objection against our former Discourse.

SECT.

SECT. XIV.

A main Objection more fully insisted on, namely how well the advancement of Gods Justice in the Damnation of the greatest part of Mankind consists with the scope of this Discourse, especially it being stated as is here set down.

THat God may do this, He decrees to create man, and being created, decrees that man should sin; and because, as some say, man is a meer passive principle, not able, no not in the presence of objects, to reduce himself into action; Or because in the moment of his creation, as others, he was impowered with an indifferency to stand or fall; Therefore, lest there should be a frustration of God's great design; he decrees in the next place, infallibly to determine the Will of man unto Sin, that having sinned he might accomplish his Damnation; and what he had first, and from all eternity in his intentions, the advancement of his Justice. Now if there be such an intrinsic relation of things, as our former Discourse pretends unto, this Design of God will be wholly frustrated. For it may seem clear to every mans understanding, that it is not for the Honour and Advancement

ment of Justice to determine the Will of man to sin, and then to punish him for that sin unto which he was so determined; Whereas if God's Will, as such, be the only Rule and Principle of Actions, this will be an accommodate means (if God so please to have it) unto his design. The Summ is, We have seem'd in our former discourse to bind and tye up God, who is an absolute and independent Being, to the petty formalities of Good and Evil, * and to fetter and imprison freedom, and liberty it self, in the fatal and immutable chains, and respects of things.

SECT. XV.

An Answer to that Objection that concerns the Understanding of God, shewing that the Divine Understanding does not depend upon the natures and mutual respects of things, though they be its Objects.

I Answer. This objection concerns partly the Understanding of God, and partly his Will; As for the divine understanding, the Case is thus; There are certain Beings, or natures of things which are Logically possible; it implyes no contradiction that they should be, although it were supposed, there were no power that could bring them
into

into being; which natures, or things, supposing they were in being, would have mutual relations of agreement or opposition unto one another, which would be no more distinguished from the things themselves, than Relations are from that which founds them. Now the Divine Understanding is a representation, or comprehension of all those natures or beings thus *logically*, and in respect of God absolutely possible, and consequently it must needs be also a comprehension of all these Sympathies, and Antipathies, either in a natural or a moral way, which they have one unto another: for they, as I said, do necessarily, and immediately flow from the things themselves, as relations do, *posito fundamento, & termino*. Now the Divine understanding doth not at all depend upon these natures, or relations, though they be its Objects; for the nature of an Object doth not consist in being *motivum facultatis*, as it is usually with us, whose apprehensions are awakened by their presence; but its whole nature is sufficiently comprehended in this, that it is *terminativum Facultatis*; and this precisely doth not speak any dependency of the faculty upon it, especially in the divine understanding; where this *objective, terminative* presence flows from the fecundity of the Divine Nature: for the things themselves are so far from

from having any being antecedently to the Divine Understanding; that had not it been their exemplary pattern, and *Idea*, they had never been created, and being created they would lye in darkness; (I speak of things that have not in them a Principle of understanding, not conscious of their own natures, and that beauteous harmony they have among themselves) were they not irradiated by the Divine Understanding, which is as it were an universal Sun that discovers and displays the natures and respects of things, and does as it were draw them up into its beams.

SECT. XVI.

An Answer to, that Objection which concerns the Will of God, shewing, that Liberty in the Power or Principle, is no where a Perfection, where there is not an Indifferency in the things or actions about which it is conversant.

TO the second part of the *Objection*, the strength whereof is, that * to tye up God in his actions to the reason of things, destroys his Liberty, Absoluteness, and Independency. I answer, it is no imperfection for God to be determined to Good; It is no bondage, slavery, or contraction, to be bound

bound up to the eternal Laws of Right and Justice : It is the greatest impotency and weakness in the world to have a power to evil, and there is nothing so diametrically opposite to the very being and nature of God. *Sic pro ratione voluntas*, unless it be as a redargution and check to impudent and daring Inquirers, is an account no where justifiable. The more any Being partakes of reason and understanding, the worse is the imputation of acting arbitrarily, & *pro imperio*. We can pardon it in Women and Children, as those from whom we do not expect that they should act upon any higher principle ; but for a man of reason and understanding, that hath the Laws of goodness and rectitude (which are as the Laws of the Medes and Persians that cannot be altered) engraven upon his mind, for him to cast off these golden reins, and to let up arbitrary Will for his Rule and Guide, is a piece of intolerable rashness and presumption. This is an infallible rule, that liberty in the power or principle is no where a perfection, where there is not an indifference in the things or actions about which it is conversant. And therefore it is a piece of our weakness and imbecility, that we have nature so indetermined to what is good. These things need no proof, indeed cannot well be proved, otherwise than they prove them-

themselves: for they are of immediate truth, and prove themselves they will, to a pure unprejudiced mind.

SECT. XVII.

That the Discourse hitherto does not infer any dependency of God upon anything without himself; But only occasions are offered to him of acting according to his own intimate nature and essence.

2. * **O**UR former Discourse doth not infer any dependency of God, upon anything without himself; for God is not excited to his actions by any foreign, or extrinsecal motives; what he does, proceeds from the eternal immutable respects, and relations, or reasons of things, and where are these to be found, but in the eternal and divine Wisdom? For what can infinite Wisdom be, but a steady, and immoveable comprehension of all those natures and relations? and therefore God in his actions, does not look abroad, but only consults, (if I may so speak) the *Ideas* of his own mind. What Creatures do, is but the offering a particular case, for the reducement of a general principle into a particular action: or the presentment of an occasion for God to act according to the principles of his own

nature; when we say that God pardoneth Sin upon repentance, God is not moved to an act of Grace from any thing without himself; for this is a Principle in the divine Wisdom, that pardon of Sin to repenting Sinners, is a thing very suitable to infinite goodness, and this Principle is a piece of the Divine Nature. Therefore when God upon a particular act of repentance puts forth a particular act of grace, it is but as it were a particular instance to the general rule, which is a portion of Divine Perfection, when 'tis said, *to him that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance*, the meaning is, He that walks up unto that light, and improves that strength, that God hath already communicated unto him, shall have more abundant Incomes of light and strength from God: It doth not follow that God is moved from without to impart his Grace. For this is a branch of Divine Wisdom; it is agreeable to the infinite goodness of God, to take notice of, and reward the sincere, though weak endeavours of his Creatures, after him; so that what is from abroad, is but a particular occasion to those Divine Principles to exert, and put forth themselves.

SECT. XVIII.

The second part of the Discourse, which briefly treats of Truth in the Subject; what it is: What in God, and what in the Creature; And that in both it is, A Representation or Conception in the mind, conformable to the unchangeable Natures and mutual Respects of things.

THUS have we spoken concerning the truth of things, or Truth in the Object. It follows that we speak

Concerning Truth in the power, or faculty, which we called Truth in the Subject; which we shall dispatch in a few words.

* Truth in the power, or faculty is nothing else but a conformity of its conceptions or *Idea's* unto the natures and relations of things, which in God we may call an actual, steady, immoveable, eternal Omniformity, as *Plotinus* calls the Divine Intellect, *ἡ νύμφη*, which you have largely described by him. And this the *Platonists* truly call the Intellectual World, for here are the natures of all things pure, and unmix'd, purged from all those dregs, refined from all that dross and alloy which cleave unto them in their particular instances. All inferiour and sublunary things,

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not excluding Man himself, have their excrescences, and defects; Exorbitances, or privations are moulded up in their very frames and constitutions. There is somewhat extraneous, heterogeneous, and preternatural in all things here below, as they exist amongst us; but in that other world, like the most purely fined gold, they shine in their native and proper glory. Here is the first goodness, the benign Parent of the whole Creation, with his numerous off-spring, the infinite throng of Created Beings: Here is the fountain of Eternal Love, with all its streams, and rivulets: Here is the Sun of uncreated glory, surrounded with all his rayes, and beams: Here are the eternal, and indispensable Laws of right and Justice, the immediate and indemonstrable principles of Truth, and goodness: Here are steady and immoveable rules, for all cases and actions, however circumstantiated, from which the Will of God, though never so absolute, and independent, from everlasting to everlasting, shall never depart one Tittle. * Now all that Truth that is in any Created Being, is by participation and derivation from this first understanding, and fountain of intellectual light. And that truth in the power of faculty is nothing but the conformity or its conceptions, or *Ideas* with the natures
and

and relations of things, is clear and evident in it self, and necessarily follows from what hath been formerly proved concerning the truth of things themselves, * antecedently to any *understanding*, or *will*; * for things are what they are, and cannot be otherwise without a contradiction, and their mutual respects and dependences Eternal and unchangeable, as hath been already shew'd: so that the conceptions and *Ideas* of these natures and their relations, can be only so far true * as they conform and agree with the things themselves, and the harmony which they have one to another.

FINIS.

THE
CONTENTS
OF THE
DISCOURSE OF TRUTH.

Sect. 1.

THAT Truth is twofold; In the
Object and in the Subject.
That in the Object, what it is; And
that it is antecedent to and independ-
ent of any Will or Understanding
whatever. p. 165

Sect. 2.

The necessity of there being certain Ar-
guments, Means and Objects for cer-
tain Conclusions, Ends and Faculties;
And that every thing will not suit
every thing. 166

Sect. 3.

An Instance or two of the gross and
horrid Absurdities, consequent to the
denying the mutual respects and re-
lations

The Contents.

*lations of things to be eternal and
indispensible.* 167

Sect. 4.

*The Entrance into the first part of the
Discourse, which is, of Truth in the
Object: That the Divine Under-
standing does not make the Respects
and Relations of its Objects, but finds
them or observes them.* 168

Sect. 5.

*That the Divine Will does not deter-
mine the References and Depen-
dences of things, because that would
subvert his other Attributes.* 169

Sect. 6.

*The avoidance of the foregoing ill con-
sequences by making God immutable,
with an Answer thereto.* 172

Sect. 7.

*An hideous, but genuine Inference of a
Pamphleteer from this principle,
That absolute and Sovereign Will
is the Spring and Fountain of all
Gods actions.* 173

Sect.

The Contents.

Sect. 8.

That the Denial of the mutual Respects and Relations of things unto one another to be eternal and unchangeable, despoils God of that universal Rectitude of his Nature. 174

Sect. 9.

That the Denial of the unchangeableness of the said mutual Respects and Relations of things to one another, takes away the Knowledge of God and of our own Happiness, and lays a foundation of the most incurable Scepticism imaginable. 176

Sect. 10.

That the denying the Eternal and Immutable Respects of things, frustrates all the noble Effays of the mind or understanding of man. 180

Sect. 11.

That in the abovesaid Denial are laid the Foundations of Rantism, Debauchery, and of all Dissoluteness of Life. 181

Sect.

The Contents.

Sect. 12.

That our Assurance of future Happiness is quite cut off by the denying of the Eternal and Immutable Respects of Things. 182

Sect. 13.

Several Objections propounded, against the scope of this Discourse hitherto, from the Independency of the Divine Understanding and Will. 184

Sect. 14.

A main Objection more fully insisted upon, namely, How well the Advancement of Gods Justice in the Damnation of the greatest part of Mankind, consists with the scope of this Discourse, especially it being so stated as is here set down. 186

Sect. 15.

An Answer to that Objection that concerns the Understanding of God, shewing that the Divine Understanding does not depend upon the natures and mutual Respects of things, though they

The Contents.

they be its Objects. 187

Sect. 16.

An Answer to that Objection which concerns the Will of God, shewing, That Liberty in the Power or Principle, is no where a Perfection, where there is not an Indifferency in the things or actions about which it is conversant.

189

Sect. 17.

That the Discourse hitherto does not infer any Dependency of God upon any thing without himself; But only occasions are offered to him of acting according to his own intimate Nature and Essence.

191

Sect. 18.

The second part of the Discourse which briefly treats of Truth in the Subject: What it is. What in God, and what in the Creature. And that in both it is, A representation or conception in the mind conformable to the unchangeable natures and mutual Respects of things.

193

Annotations
UPON THE
Two foregoing TREATISES,
LUX ORIENTALIS,
OR,
An Enquiry into the OPINION
OF THE
EASTERN SAGES
Concerning the
Præ-existence of Souls,
AND THE
Discourse of **TRUTH.**

Written for the more fully clearing and further
confirming the main DOCTRINES
in each TREATISE.

By one not unexercized in these kinds of
SPECULATION.

LONDON : Printed for *J. Collins*, and *S. Lounds*, over against
Exeter-Change in the Strand. 1682.

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Annotations

U P O N

LUX ORIENTALIS.

THese two Books, *Lux Orientalis* and the *Discourse of Truth*, are luckily put together by the *Publisher*, there being that suitability between them, and mutual support of one another. And the Arguments they treat of being of the greatest importance that the Mind of man can entertain herself with, the consideration thereof has excited so sluggish a Genius as mine to bestow some few *Annotations* thereon, not very anxious or opetose, but such as the places easily suggest; and may serve either to rectifie what may seem any how oblique, or illustrate what may seem less clear, or make a supply or adde strength where there may seem any further need. In which I would not be so understood as that I had such an anxiety and

fondness for the Opinions they maintain, as if all were gone if they should fail; but that the Dogmata being more fully, clearly, and precisely propounded, men may more safely and considerately give their Judgments thereon; but with that modesty as to admit nothing that is contrary to the Judgment of the truly Catholick and Apostolick Church.

Chap. 2. p. 4. *That he made us pure and innocent, &c.* This is plainly signified in the general Mosaick History of the Creation, that all that God made he saw it was good; and it is particularly declared of *Adam and Eve*, that they were created or made in a state of Innocency.

Pag. 4. *Matter can do nothing but by motion, and what relation bath that to a moral Contagion?* We must either grant that the figures of the particles of Matter and their motion, have a power to affect the Soul united with the Body, (and I remember *Josephus* somewhere speaking of Wine, says, it does regenerate, as it were, the Soul into another life and sense of things) or else we must acknowledge that the parts of Matter are alterable into qualifications, that cannot be resolved into mere mechanical motion and figure; whether they be thus altered by the vital power of the Spirit of Nature, or however it comes to pass. But that Matter has a considerable in-

influence upon a Soul united thereto, the Author himself does copiously acknowledge in his fourth Chapter of this Book; where he tells us, that according to the disposition of the Body, our Wits are either more quick, free, and sparkling, or more obtuse, weak, and sluggish; and our Mind more chearful and contented, or else more morose, melancholick, or dogged, &c. Wherefore that he may appear the more consistent with himself, it is likely he understands by this Moral Contagion the very venome and malignity of vitious Inclinations, how that can be derived from Matter, especially its power consisting in mere motion and figuration of parts. The Psalmist's description is very apposite to this purpose, *Psal. 58. The ungodly are froward even from their mothers womb; as soon as they are born they go astray and speak lyes. They are as venomous as the poyson of a serpent, even like the deaf adder that stoppeth her ear.* That there should be such a difference in the Nativity of some from that of others, and haply begot also of the same Parents, is no slight intimation that their difference is not from their Bodies, but their Souls; in which there is so sudden Eruptions of vitious Inclinations which they had contracted in their former state, not repressed nor extinct in this, by reason of *Adam's* lapse, and his losing the Paradisiacal body in which he was created, and which should, if it

had not been for his Fall, been transmitted to his Posterity ; but that being lost, the several measures of the pristine Vitiosity of humane Souls discover themselves in this life, according to the just Laws of the Divine Nemesis essentially interwoven into the nature of things.

Pag. 5. *How is it that those that are under continual temptations to Vice, are yet kept within the bounds of Vertue, &c.* That those that are continually under temptations to Vice from their Childhood, should keep within the bounds of Vertue, and those that have perpetual outward advantages from their Childhood to be vertuous, should prove vitious notwithstanding, is not rationally resolved into their free will ; for in this they are both of them equal : and if they had been equal also in their external advantages or disadvantages, the different event might well be imputed to the freedom of their Will. But now that one, notwithstanding all the disadvantages to Vertue should prove vertuous, and the other, notwithstanding all the advantages to Vertue should prove vitious ; the reason of this certainly to the considerate will seem to lie deeper than the meer liberty of Will in man. But it can be attributed to nothing, with a more due and tender regard to the Divine Attributes, than to the *pre-existent* state of humane Souls, according to the Scope of the Author.

Page. 9. For still it seems to be a diminutive and disparaging apprehension of the infinite and immense goodness of God, that he should detrude such excellent Creatures, &c. To enervate this reason, there is framed by an ingenious hand this Hypothesis, to vie with that of Pre-existence: That Mankind is an Order of Beings placed in a middle state between Angels and Brutes, made up of contrary Principles, viz. *Matter* and *Spirit*, indued with contrary faculties, viz. *Animal* and *Rational*, and encompassed with contrary Objects proportioned to their respective faculties, that so they may be in a capacity to exercise the Vertues proper and peculiar to their compounded and heterogeneous nature. And therefore though humane Souls be capable of subsisting by themselves, yet God has placed them in Bodies full of brutish and unreasonable Propensions, that they may be capable of exercising many choice and excellent Vertues, which otherwise could never have been at all; such as Temperance, Sobriety, Chastity, Patience, Meekness, Equanimity, and all other Vertues that consist in the Empire of *Reason* over *Passion* and *Appetite*. And therefore he conceives that the creating of humane Souls, though pure and immaculate, and uniting them with such brutish Bodies, is but the constituting and continuing such a Species of Being, which is an Order betwixt *Brutes* and *Angels*; into which

latter Order, if men use their faculties of the *Spiritual* Principle in them well, they may ascend : Forasmuch as God has given them in their *Spiritual* Principle (containing *Free Will*, and *Reason* to discern what is best) a power and faculty of overcoming all their inordinate Appetites.

This is his Hypothesis, mostwhat in his own words, and all to his own sence, as near as I could with brevity express it : And it seems so reasonable to himself, that he professes himself apt to be positive and dogmatical therein. And it might very well seem so to him, if there were a sufficient faculty in the Souls of men in this World, to command and keep in order the Passions and Appetites of their Body, and to *be* and *do* what their Reason and Conscience tells them they should *be* and *do*, and blames them for not *being* and *doing*. So that they know more by far than they find an ability in themselves to perform. Extremely few there are, if any, but this is their condition : Whence all *Philosophers* (that had any sence of Vertue and Holiness) as well as *Jews* and *Christians*, have looked upon Man as in a lapsed state, not blaming God, but deploring the sad condition they found themselves in by some foregoing lapse or fault in Mankind. And it is strange that our own Consciences should flie in our faces for what we could never have helped.

It is witty indeed which is alleadged in the behalf of this Hypothesis, viz. That the *Rational* part of man is able to command the lower *Appetites*; because if the superiour part be not strong enough to govern the inferiour, it destroys the very being of *moral* Good and Evil: Forasmuch as those acts that proceed out of *necessity* cannot be *moral*, nor can the superiour Faculties be obliged to govern the inferiour, if they are not able, because nothing is obliged to impossibilities. But I answer, if inabilities come upon us by our *own fault*, the defects of action then are upon the former account *moral*, or rather *immoral*. And our Consciences rightly charge us with the Vitiocities of our Inclinations and Actions, even before we can mend them here, because they are the consequences of our former Guilt.

Wherefore it is no wonder that there is found a flaw in a subtilty that would conclude against the universal Experience of men, who all of them, more or less, that have any sense of Morality left in them, complain that the inferiour powers of the Soul, at least for a time, were too hard for the superiour. And the whole mass of Mankind is so generally corrupt and abominable, that it would argue the wise and just God a very unequal Matcher of innocent Souls with brutish Bodies, they being universally so hugely foiled or overcome in the conflict, if he indeed were the immediate
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Matcher of them. For how can that be the effect of an equilibrions or sufficient Free Will and Power, that is in a manner perpetual and constant? But there would be near as many Examples one way as the other, if the Souls of men in this state were not by some precedent lapse become unable to govern, as they ought, all in them or about them that is to be subjected to their Reason. No fine Fetches of Wit can demolish the steady and weighty structure of sound and general Experience.

Pag. 9. *Wherein he seeth it, ten thousand to one but that they will corrupt, &c.* The Expression [ten thousand to one] is figurative, and signifies how hugely more like it is that the Souls would be corrupted by their Incorporation in these Animal or Brutish Bodies, than escape Corruption. And the effect makes good the Assertion: for *David* of old (to say nothing of the days of *Noah*) and *Paul* after him, declare of Mankind in general, that they are altogether become abominable; there is none that doth good, no not one. Wherefore we see what efficacy these Bodies have, if innocent Souls be put into them by the immediate hand of God, as also the force of Custom and corrupt Education to debauch them; and therefore how unlikely it is that God should create innocent Souls to thrust them into such ill circumstances.

Pag. 10. *To suppose him assistent to unlawful*
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and unclean Coitions, by creating a Soul to animate the impure Fetus, &c. This seemed ever to those that had any sense of the Divine Purity and Sanctity, or were themselves endued with any due sensibleness and discernment of things, to be an Argument of no small weight. But how one of the more rude and unhewn Opposers of *Pre-existence* swaggers it out of countenance, I think it not amiss to set down for a pleasant Entertainment of the Reader.

Admit, says he, that Gods watchful Providence waits upon dissolute Voluptuaries in their unmeet Conjunctions, and sends down fresh created Spirits to actuate their obscene Emissions, what is here done which is not very high and becoming God, and most congruous and proportionable to his immense Grandeur and Majesty, viz. To bear a part amongst Pimps and Bawds, and pocky Whores and Woremasters, to rise out of his Seat for them, and by a free Act of Creation of a Soul, to set his Seal of Connivance to their Villanies; who yet is said to be of more pure Eyes than to endure to behold Wickedness. So that if he does (as his Phrase is) pop in a Soul in these unclean Coitions, certainly he does it winking. But he goes on: For in the first place, says he, his condescension is hereby made signal and eximious; he is gloriously humble beyond a parallel, and by his own Example lessons us to perform the meanest works, if fit and profitable, and to be content even to drudge

drudge for the common benefit of the World. Good God! what a Rapture has this impure Scene of Venerie put this young Theologer into, that it should thus drive him out of his little Wits and Senses, and make him speak inconsistencies with such an affected Grace and lofty Eloquence! If the act of Gods freely creating Souls, and so of assisting wretched Sinners in their foul acts of Adultery and Whoredom, be a *glorious* action, how is it an *Abasement* of him, how is it his *Humiliation*? and if it be an *humbling* and debasing of him, how is it *glorious*? The joyning of two such *actus*, are indeed without *parallel*. The creating of an humane Soul immortal and immaculate, and such as bears the Image of God in it, as all immaculate Souls do, is one of the most glorious actions that God can perform; such a Creature is it, as the Schools have judged more of value than the frame of the whole visible World. But to joyn such a Creature as this to such impure corporeal matter, is furthermore a most transcendent Specimen of both his *Skill* and *Soveraignty*; so that this is an act of further *Super-exaltation* of himself, not of *Humiliation*. What remains then to be his *Humiliation*, but the condescending to assist and countenance the unclean endeavours of Adulterers and Adulteresses? Which therefore can be no Lesson to us for *Humility*, but a Cordial for the faint-hearted in

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Debauchery, and degeneracy of Life; wherein they may plead, so instructed by this rural Theolog, that they are content to drudge for the common profit of the World. But he proceeds.

And secondly, says he, *hereby he elicits Good out of Evil, causing famous and heroick persons to take their Origine from base occasions; and so converts the Lusts of sensual Varlets to nobler ends than they designed them.* As if an heroick Off-spring were the genuine effect of Adultery or Fornication, and the most likely way to People the World with worthy Personages. How this raw Philosopher will make this comply with his Profession of Divinity, I know not; whereas, it teaches us, that Marriage is honourable, but Whoremongers and Adulterers God will judge; and that he punishes the Iniquities of the Parents on their Children. But this bold Sophist makes God adjudge the noblest Off-spring to the defiled Bed, and not to punish, but reward the Adultery or Whoredom of debauched persons, by giving them the best and bravest Children: Which the more true it could be found in experience, it would be the stronger Argument for Pre-existence; it being incredible that God, if he created Souls on purpose, should crown Adultery and Whoredom with the choicest Off-spring.

And then thirdly and lastly, says he, *hereby*
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he often detects the lewdness of Sinners, which otherwise would be smothered, &c. As if the All-wise God could find no better nor juster means than this to discover this Villany. If he be thus immediately and in an extraordinary way assistant in these Coitions, were it not as easie for him, and infinitely more decorous, to charge the Womb with some *Mole* or *Ephemorous Monster*, than to plunge an immaculate humane Soul into it? This would as effectually discover the Villany committed, and besides prevent the charge Parishes are put to in maintaining Bastards. And now that we have thus seen what a mere nothing it is that this Strutter has pronounced with such sonorous Rhetorick, yet he is not ashamed to conclude with this Appeal to I know not what blind Judges: *Now, says he, are not all these Actions and Concerns very graceful and agreeable to God?* Which words in these circumstances no man could utter, were he not of a crass, insensible, and injudicious Constitution, or else made no Conscience of speaking against his Judgment. But if he speak according to his Conscience, it is manifest he puts Sophisms upon himself, in arguing so weakly.

As he does a little before in the same place, where that he may make the coming of a Soul into a base begotten Body in such a series of time and order of things as the *Pre-existent-riaries*

fiaries suppose, and Gods putting it immediately upon his creating it into such a Body, to be equally passable, he uses this slight Illustration: *Imagine, saith he, God should create one Soul, and so soon as he had done, instantly pop it into a base begotten Body; and then create another the matter of an hours space before its precipitation into such a Receptracle: which of these Actions would be the most diminutive of the Creators honour? would not the difference be insensible; and the scandal, if any, the same in both? Yet thus lies the case just betwixt the Pre-existentiaries and us.* Let the Reader consider how senseless this Author is in saying the case betwixt the *Pre-existentiaries* and him is just thus, when they are just *nothing* akin: for his two Souls are both unlapsed, but one of the *Pre-existentiaries* lapsed, and so subjected to the Laws of Nature. In his case God acts freely, raising himself, as it were, out of his Seat to create an immaculate Soul, and put into a foul Body; but in the other case God onely is a looker on, there is onely his Permission, not his Action. And the vast difference of time, he salves it with such a Quibble as this, as if it were nothing, because thousands of Ages ago, in respect of God and his Eternity, is not an hour before. He might as well say the difference betwixt the most glorious Angel and a Flea is nothing, because in comparillon of God both are so indeed. Wherefore this

Anti-Pre-existential is such a Trifler, that I am half ashamed that I have brought him upon the Stage.

But yet I will commend his Craft, though not his Faithfulness, that he had the wit to omit the proposing of *Buggery* as well as of *Adultery*; and the endeavouring to shew how graceful and agreeable to God, how congruous and proportionate it were to his immense Grandeur and Majesty, to create a Soul on purpose (immaculate and undefiled) to actuate the obscene Emissions of a Brute having to do with a Woman, or of a Man having to do with a Brute: For both Women and Brutes have been thus impregnated, and brought forth humane Births, as you may see abundantly testified in *Fortunius Licetus*; it would be too long to produce Instances.

This Opinion of Gods creating Souls, and putting them into Bodies upon incestuous and adulterous Coitions, how exceeding absurd and unbecoming the Sanctity of the Divine Majesty it seemed to the Churches of *Æthiopia*, you may see in the History of *Jobus Ludolphus*. How intolerable therefore and execrable would this Doctrine have appeared unto them, if they had thought of the prodigious fruits of successful Buggery? The words of *Ludolfus* are these: *Per absurdum esse si quis Deum astrictum dicat pro adulterinis & incestuosis partibus animas quotidie novas creare*. Hist. *Æthiop.*

Aethiop. lib. 3. cap. 5. What would they then say of creating a new Soul, for the Womb of a Beast bugger'd by a Man, or of a Woman bugger'd by a Beast!

Pag. 12. Methinks that may be done at a cheaper rate, &c. How it may be done with more agreeableness to the Goodness, Wisdom, and Justice of God, has been even now hinted by me, nor need I repeat it.

Pag. 13. It seems very incongruous and unhandsome, to suppose that God should create two Souls for the supply of one monstrous Body. And there is the same reason for several other Monstrosities, which you may take notice of in *Fortunius Licetus*, lib. 2. cap. 58. One with seven humane heads and arms, and Ox-feet; others with Mens bodies, but with a head the one of a Goose, the other of an Elephant, &c. In which it is a strong presumption humane Souls lodged, but in several others certain. How does this consist with Gods fresh creating humane Souls pure and innocent, and putting them into Bodies? This is by the aforesaid *Anti-Pre-existential* at first answered onely by a wide gape or yawn of Admiration. And indeed it would make any one stare and wonder how this can consist with Gods immediately and freely intermeddling with the Generation of Men, as he did at first in the Creation. For out of his holy hands all things come clean and neat. Many little efforts he

makes afterwards to salve this difficulty of Monsters, but yet in his own judgment the surest is the last; *That God did purposely tye fresh created Souls to these monstrous shapes, that they whose Souls sped better, might humbly thank him.* Which is as wisely argued, as if one should first with himself take it for granted that God determines some men to monstrous Debaucheries and Impieties, and then fancy this the use of it, that the Spectators of them may with better pretence than the Pharisee, cry out, Lord, we thank thee that we are not as these men are. There is nothing permitted by God, but it has its use some way or other; and therefore it cannot be concluded, because that an Event has this or that use, therefore God by his immediate and free Omnipotence effected it. A *Pre-existential* easily discerns that these Monstrosities plainly imply that God does not create Souls still for every humane Coition, but that having pre-existed, they are left to the great *Laws* of the *Universe* and *Spirit of Nature*; but yet dares not conclude that God by his free Omnipotence determines those monstrous Births, as serviceable as they seem for the evincing so noble a Theory.

Pag. 15. *That God on the seventh day rested from all his works.* This one would think were an Argument clear enough that he creates nothing since the celebration of the first seventh

seventh days rest. For if all his works are rested from, then the creation of Souls (which is a work, nay a Master-piece amongst his works scarce inferiour to any) is rested from also. But the above-mentioned Opposer of Pre-existence is not at a loss for an Answer; (for his Answers being slight, are cheap and easie to come by :) He says therefore, That this supposeth onely that after that time he ceased from creating new Species. A witty Invention! As if God had got such an easie habit by once creating the things he created in the six days, that if he but contained himself within those kinds of things, though he did hold on still creating them, that it was not *Work*, but mere *Play* or *Rest* to him, in comparison of his former labour. What will not these men fancy, rather than abate of their prejudice against an opinion they have once taken a toy against! When the Author to the Hebrews says, *He that has entred into his rest, has ceased from his own works, as God ceased from his*; verily this is small comfort or instruction, if it were as this *Anti-Pre-existentiary* would have it: for if God ceased onely from creating new Species, we may, notwithstanding our promised *Rest*, be tyed to run through new instances of *labours* or *sins*, provided they be but of those kinds we experienced before. To any unprejudiced understanding, this sence must needs seem forced and unnatural, thus to

restrain Gods Rest to the *Species* of things, and to engage him to the dayly task of creating *Individuals*. The whole *Æthiopian* Church is of another mind: *Qui animam humanam quotidie non creari hoc argumento asserunt, quod Deus sexto die perfecit totum opus Creationis.* See *Ludolfus* in the place above-cited.

Chap. 3. pag. 17. *Since the Images of Objects are very small and inconsiderable in our brains, &c.* I suppose he mainly relates to the Objects of Sight, whose chief, if not onely Images, are in the fund of the Eye; and thence in vertue of the Spirituality of our Soul extended thither also, and of the due qualification of the Animal Spirits are transmitted to the *Perceptive* of the Soul within the brain. But how the bignesses and distances of Objects are conveyed to our cognoscence, it would be too tedious to signify here. See *Dr. H. Moore's Enchiridion Metaphysicum*, cap. 19.

Pag. 17. *Were it not that our Souls use a kind of Geometry, &c.* This alludes to that pretty conceit of *Des Cartes* in his *Dioptricks*, the solidity of which I must confess I never understood. For I understand not but that if my Soul should use any such Geometry, I should be conscious thereof, which I do not find myself. And therefore I think those things are better understood out of that Chapter of the Book even now mentioned.

Pag. 17. *And were the Soul quite void of all such implicit Notions, it would remain as senseless, &c.* There is no sensitive Perception indeed, without Reflection; but the Reflection is an immediate attention of the Soul to that which affects her, without any circumstance of Notions intervening for enabling her for sensitive Operations. But these are witty and ingenious Conjectures, which the Author by reading *Des Cartes*, or otherhow, might be encouraged to entertain. To all sensitive Objects the Soul is an *Abrasa Tabula*, but for *Moral* and *Intellectual* Principles, their Idea's or Notions are essential to the Soul.

Pag. 18. *For Sense teacheth no general Propositions, &c.* Nor need it do any thing else but exhibit some particular Object, which our Understanding being an *Ectypum* of the *Divine Intellect* necessarily, when it has thoroughly sifted it, concludes it to answer such a determinate Idea eternally and unalterably one and the same, as it stands in the *Divine Intellect*, which cannot change; and therefore that Idea must have the same properties and respects for ever. But of this, enough here. It will be better understood by reading the *Discourse of Truth*, and the Annotations thereon.

Pag. 18. *But from something more sublime and excellent.* From the *Divine* or *Archetypal Intellect*, of which our Understanding is the *Ectypum*, as was said before.

Pag. 21. *And so can onely transmit their natural qualities.* They are so far from transmitting their *Moral* Pravities, that they transmit from themselves no qualities at all. For to create a Soul, is to concreate the qualities or properties of it, not out of the Creator, but out of nothing. So that the substance and all the properties of it are out of nothing.

Pag. 22. *Against the nature of an immaterial Being, a chief property of which is to be indiscernible.* The evasion to the force of this Argument by some *Anti-Pre-existentiaries* is, that it is to philosophize at too high a rate of confidence, to presume to know what the nature of a Soul or Spirit is. But for brevities sake, I will refer such Answerers as these to Dr. *H. Moore's* brief Discourse of the *true Notion of a Spirit*, printed lately with *Saducismus Triumphatus*; and I think he may be thence as sure that *Indiscernibility* is an essential property of a Spirit, as that there are any Spirits in the Universe: and this methinks should suffice any ingenuous and modest Opposer. But to think there is no knowledge but what comes in at our Senses, is a poor, beggarly, and precarious Principle, and more becoming the dotage of *Hobbianism*, than men of clearer Parts and more serene Judgments.

Pag. 22. *By separable Emissions that pass from the flame, &c.* And so set the Wick and Tallow on motion. But these separable Emissions

ons that pass from the flame of the lighted Candle, pass quite away, and so are no part of the flame enkindled. So weak an Illustration is this of what these Traducters would have.

Chap. 4. pag. 32. *Which the Divine Piety and Compassion hath set up again, that so, so many of his excellent Creatures might not be lost and undone irrecoverably, but might act anew, &c.* To this a more elegant Pen and refined Wit objects thus: Now is it not highly derogatory to the infinite and unbounded Wisdom of God, that he should detrude those Souls which he so seriously designs to make happy, into a state so hazardous, wherein he seeth it to be ten thousand to one but that they will corrupt and defile themselves, and so make them more miserable here and to eternity hereafter? A strange method of recovering this, to put them into such a fatal necessity of perishing: 'tis but an odd contrivance for their restauration to Happiness, to use such means to compass it which 'tis ten thousand to one but will make them infinitely more miserable. This he objects in reference to what the Author of *Lux Orientalis* writes, chap. 2. where he says, *It is a thousand to one but Souls detruded into these bodies will corrupt and defile themselves, and so make themselves miserable here and to eternity hereafter.*

And much he quotes to the same purpose

out of the *Account of Origen*. Where the Souls great disadvantages to Vertue and Holiness, what from the strong inclinations of the Body, and what from National Customs & Education in this Terrestrial State, are lively set out with a most moving and tragical Eloquence, to shew how unlikely it is that God should put innocent and immaculate Souls of his own creation immediately, into such Bodies, and so hard and even almost fatal condition of miscarrying. Upon which this subtile *Anti-Pre-existentiary*: Thus you see, saith he, what strong Objections and Arguments the *Pre-existential*ies urge with most noise and clamour, are against themselves. If therefore these Phænomena be inexplicable, without the *Origenian Hypothesis*, they are so too with it; and if so, then the result of all is, that they are not so much Arguments of *Pre-existence* as Aspersions of *Providence*. This is smartly and surprizingly spoken. But let us consider more punctually the state of the matter.

Here then we are first to observe, how cunningly this shrewd Antagonist conceals a main stroke of the Supposition, viz. That the Divine Pity and Compassion to lapsed Souls, that had otherwise fallen into an eternal state of Silence and Death, had set up *Adam* for their relief, and endued him with such a Paradisiacal body of so excellent a constitution to be transmitted to all his Posterity, and invested him,

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in vertue of this, with so full power *non peccandi*, that if he and his Posterity were not in an happy flourishing condition as to their eternal interest of Holiness and Vertue, it would be long of himself. And what could God do more correspondently to his Wisdom and Goodness, dealing with free Agents, such as humane Souls are, than this? And the thing being thus stated, no Objections can be brought against the Hypothesis, but such as will invade the inviolable Truths of Faith and Orthodox Divinity.

Secondly, We are to observe, how this cunning Objector has got these two *Pre-existentials* upon the hip for their youthful flow-ers of Rhetorick, when one says, it is hundreds to one; the other, ten thousand to one, that Souls will miscarry put into these disadvantages of the Terrestrial state, by which no candid Reader will understand any more, than that it is exceeding difficult for them to escape the pollutions of this lower World once incorporated into Terrestrial Bodies. But it being granted possible for them to emerge, this is a great grace and favour of the Divine Goodness to such peccant wretches, that they are brought out of the state of eternal *Silence* and *Death*, to try their Fortunes once more, though incumbred with so great difficulties which the Divine *Nemesis* suffers to return upon them. That therefore they are *at all* in a condition
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of recovery, is from the *Goodness* and *Mercy* of God; that their condition is to *hard*, from his *Justice*, they having been so foully peccant. And his wisdom being only to contrive what is most agreeable to his Mercy and Justice, it is not at all derogatory to the infinite and unbounded Wisdom of God thus to deal with lapsed Souls. For though he does seriously intend to make them happy, yet it must be in a way correspondent to his *Justice* as well as *Mercy*.

Thirdly and Lastly, Besides that the Spirit of the Lord pervades the whole Earth ready to assist the sincere; there is moreover a mighty weight of mercy added in the Revelation of our Lord Jesus Christ to the world, so that the retrieving of the Souls of men out of their *Death* and *Silence* into this Terrestrial state, in which there is these helps to the sincere, it is manifestly worthy the Divine Wisdom and Goodness. For those it takes no effect with, (they beginning the world again on this stage) they shall be judged onely according to what they have done here, there being an eternal obliteration as well as oblivion of the acts of their Pre-existent state; but those that this merciful Dispensation of God has taken any effect upon here, their sincere desires may grow into higher accomplishments in the future state. Which may something mitigate the horreur of that seeming universal

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sal squalid estate of the Sons of men upon earth. Which in that it is so ill, is rightly imputed by both *Jews* and *Christians* and the divinest *Philosophers* to a Lapse, and to the *Mercy* and *Grace of God* that it is no worse. From whence it may appear, that that argument for *Pre-existence*, that God does not put newly created innocent Souls into such disadvantageous circumstances of a terrestrial Incorporation, though partly out of *Mercy*, partly out of *Justice*, he has thought fit lapsed Souls should be so disposed of, that this I say is no aspersion of Divine Providence.

Pag. 36. *And now I cannot think of any place in the sacred Volume more, that could make a tolerable plea against this Hypothesis, &c.* It is much that the ingenious Author thought not of *Rom. 9. 11.* [For the Children being not yet born, neither having done either good or evil, that the purpose of God according to Election might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth.] This is urged by *Anti-pre-existentiaries*, as a notable place against *Pre-existence*. For, say they, how could *Esau* and *Jacob* be said neither to have done good nor evil, if they pre-existed before they came into this world? For if they pre-existed, they acted; and if they acted, they being rational Souls, they must have done either good or evil. This makes an handsome shew at first sight; but if we consult *Gen. 25.* we shall plainly

ly see that this is spoke of *Jacob* and *Esau* yet strugling in the Womb; as it is said in this Text, *For the Children being not yet born*; but strugling in the Womb, as you may see in the other. Which plainly therefore respects their actions in this life, upon which certainly the mind of *St. Paul* was fix'd. As if he should have expressly said: For the Children being not yet born, but strugling in the Womb, neither having done either good or evil in this life as being still in the Womb, it was said of them to *Rebeckah*, *The elder shall serve the younger*. Which sufficiently illustrates the matter in hand with *St. Paul*; that as *Jacob* was preferred before *Esau* in the Womb, before either of them was born to act here on the Earth, and that therefore done without any respect to their actions; so the purpose of God touching his people should be of free Election, not of Works.

That of *Zachary* also, Chap. 12. 1. I have heard alledged by some as a place on which no small stress may be laid. The Lord is there said to be the *Former of the Spirit of Man within him*. Wherefore they argue, If the Spirit of Man be formed *within him*, it did never pre-exist *without him*. But we answer, That *πρωτον ἀνθρώπου ἐν αὐτῷ* is but the same that *πρωτον ἀνθρώπου πρὸ ἐν αὐτῷ*. And then the sence is easie and natural, that the Spirit that is in man, God is the Former or Creator of it. But this Text de-

defines nothing of the time of forming it. There are several other Texts alledged, but it is so easie to answer them, and would take up so much time and room, that I think fit to omit them; remembring my scope to be short *Annotations*, not a tedious *Commentary*.

Pag. 41. *Mr. Ben Israel in his Problems De Creatione assures us, that Pre-existence was the common belief, &c.* That this was the common opinion of the wiser men amongst the Jews, *R. Menasse Ben Israel* himself told me at *London* with great freedom and assurance; and that there was a constant tradition thereof; which he said in some sence was also true concerning the Trinity, but that more obscure. But this of Pre-existence is manifest up and down in the Writings of that very ancient and learned Jew *Philo Judæus*; as also something toward a Trinity, if I remember aright.

Chap. 5. Pag. 46. *We should doubtless have retained some remembrance of that condition.* And the rather, as one ingeniously argues, because our state in this life is a state of punishment. Upon which he concludes, *That if the calamities of this life were inflicted upon us only as a punishment of sins committed in another, Providence would have provided some effectual means to preserve them in our memories. And therefore, because we find no remainders of any such Records in our minds, 'tis, says he, sufficient*
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evidence to all sober and impartial inquirers, that our living and sinning in a former state is as false as inevident.

But to this it may be answered, That the state we are put in, is not a state *only* of punishment, but of a merciful trial; and it is sufficient that we find our selves in a lapsed and sinful condition, our own Consciences telling us when we do amiss, and calling upon us to amend. So that it is needless particularly to remember our faults in the other world, but the time is better spent in faithfully endeavouring to amend our selves in this, and to keep our selves from all faults of what nature soever. Which is a needless thing our memory should discover to us to have been of old committed by us, when our Consciences urge to us that they are never to be committed; and the Laws of holy Law-givers and divine Instructors, or wise Sages over all the world, assist also our Conscience in her office. So that the end of Gods Justice by these inward and outward Monitors, and by the cross and afflicting Rancounters in this present state, is to be attained to, *viz.* the amendment of Delinquents if they be not refractory.

And we were placed on this stage as it were to begin the world again, so as if we had not existed before. Whence it seems meet, that there should be an utter obliteration of all that is past, so as not to be able by memory to

to connect the former life and this together. The memory whereof, if we were capable of it, would be inconsistent with the orderly proceedings of this, and overdoze us and make us half moped to the present Scene of things. Whereas the Divine Purpose seems to be, that we should also experience the natural pleasures and satisfactions of this life, but in an orderly and obedient way, keeping to the prescribed rules of Virtue and Holiness. And thus our faithfulness being exercised *en tous desirs* in those things which are more *estranged* from our nobler and diviner nature, God may at last restore us to what is more properly our own.

But in the mean time, that saying which the Poet puts in the mouth of *Jupiter*, touching the inferiour Deities, may not misbeseem the mercy and wisdom of the true God concerning lapsed Souls incorporate into terrestrial Bodies.

*Has quoniam cæli nondum dignamur honore,
Quas dedimus certè terras habitare sinamus.*

Let them not be distracted betwixt a sensible remembrance of the Joys and Glories of our exteriour Heaven above, and the present fruition of things below, but let them live an holy and heavenly life upon Earth, exercising their Graces and Vertues in the use and enjoyment of these lower earthly Objects, till I call them

them up again to Heaven, where, after this long swoond they are fallen into, they will more seasonably remember their former Paradisiacal state upon its recovery, and reagnize their ancient home. Wherefore if the remembering or forgetting of the former state depend absolutely upon the free contrivance of the Divine Wisdom, Goodness, and Justice, as this ingenious Opposer seems to suppose, I should even upon that very point of fitness conceive that an utter oblivion of the former state is interwoven into the fate and nature of lapsed Souls by a Divine *Nemesis*, though we do not conceive explicitly the manner how. And yet the natural reasons the Author of *Lux Orientalis* produces in the sequel of his Discourse, seem highly probable.

For first, As we had forgot some lively Dream we dreamt but last night, unless we had met with something in the day of a peculiar vertue to remind us of it, so we meeting with nothing in this lower stage of things that lively resembles those things in our former state, and has a peculiar fitness to rub up our Memory, we continue in an utter oblivion of them. As suppose a man was lively entertain'd in his sleep with the pleasure of dreaming of a fair Crystal River, whose Banks were adorned with Trees and Flags in the flower, and those large Flies with blue and golden-colour'd Bodies, and broad thin Wings curiously wrought

wrought and transparent; hovering over them, with Birds also singing on the Trees, Sun and Clouds above, and sweet breezes of Air, and Swans in the River with their wings sometimes lifted up like sails against the wind. Thus he passed the night, thinks of no such thing in the morning, but rising goes about his occasions. But towards evening a Servant of a Friend of his presents him with a couple of Swans from his Master. The sight of which Swans striking his *Perceptive* as sensibly as those in his Dream, and being one of the most extraordinary and eximious Objects of his Night-vision, presently reminds him of the whole scene of things represented in his sleep. But neither Sun, nor Clouds, nor Trees, nor any such ordinary thing could in any likelihood have reminded him of his Dream. And besides, it was the lively resemblance betwixt the Swans he saw in his sleep, and those he saw waking, that did so effectually rub up his memory. The want therefore of such occurrences in this life to remind us of the passages of the former, is a very reasonable account why we remember nothing of the former state.

But here the Opposers of Pre-existence pretend that the joyous and glorious Objects in the other state do so pierce and transport the Soul, and that she was inured to them so long, that though there were nothing that resembled

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them

them here, the impression they make must be indelible, and that it is impossible she should forget them. And moreover, that there is a similitude betwixt the things of the upper World and the lower, which therefore must be an help to memory.

But here, as touching the first, they do not consider what a Weapon they have given into my hand against themselves. For the long inuredness to those Celestial Objects abates the piercingness of their transport; and before they leave those Regions, according to the *Platonick* or *Origenian* Hypothesis, they grow cooler to such enjoyments: so that all the advantages of that piercing transport for memory, are lost. And besides, in vertue of that piercing Transport, no Soul can call into memory what she enjoyed formerly, but by recalling herself into such a Transport, which her Terrestrial Vehicle makes her incapable of.

For the memory of external Transactions is sealed upon us by some passionate corporeal impress in conjunction with them (which makes them whip Boys sometimes at the boundaries of their Parish, that they may better remember it when they are old men;) which Impress if it be lost, the memory of the thing it self is lost. And we may be sure it is lost in Souls incorporate in Terrestrial Vehicles, they having lost their Aereal and Cele-

Celestial, and being fatally incapacitated so much as to conceit how they were affected by the External Objects of the other World, and so to remember how they felt them. And therefore all the descriptions that men of a more Æthereal and Entheous temper adventure on in this life, are but the Roarings of their Minds in vertue of their Constitution towards the nature of the heavenly things in general, not a recovery of the memory of past Experience; this State not affording so lively a representment of the *Pathos* that accompanied the actual *sense* of those things, as to make us *think* that we once *really* enjoyed them before. That is onely to be collected by Reason; the noble exercise of which faculty, in the discovering of this *Arcanum* of our Pre-existence, had been lost, if it could have been detected by a compendious Memory. But if ever we recover the memory of our former State, it will be when we are re-entred into it; we then being in a capacity of being really struck with the same *Pathos* we were before, in vertue whereof the Soul may remember this was her pristine condition.

And therefore to answer to the second, Though there may be some faintness of resemblance betwixt the things of the other State and this, yet other peculiarities also being required, and the former sensible *Pathos* to be recovered, which is impossible in this State, it

is likewise impossible for us to remember the other in this.

The second Argument of the Author for the proving the unlikeliness of our remembering the other State is, the *long intermission* and *discontinuance from thinking of those things*. For 'tis plain that such discontinuance or desuetude bereaves us of the memory of such things as we were acquainted with in this World. Insomuch as if an ancient man should read the Verses or Themes he made when he was a School-boy, without his name subscribed to them, though he pumpt and sweat for them when he made them, could not tell they were his own. How then should the Soul remember what she did or observ'd many hundreds, nay thousands of years ago?

But yet our Authors Antagonist has the face to make nothing of this Argument neither: Because, forsooth, it is not so much the desuetude of thinking of one thing, but the thinking of others, that makes us forget that one thing. What a shuffle is this! For if the Soul thought on that one thing as well as on other things, it would remember it as well as them. Therefore it is not the thinking of other things, but the not thinking of *that*, that makes it forgotten. *Ufus promptus facit*, as in general, so in particular. And therefore disuse in any particular slackens at first, and after abolishes the readiness of the Mind to think thereof.

thereof. Whence sleepiness and sluggishness is the Mother of Forgetfulness, because it disguises the Soul from thinking of things. And as for those seven Chronical Sleepers that slept in a Cave from *Decius* his time to the reign of *Theodosius junior*, I dare say it would have befotted them without a Miracle, and they would have rose out of their sleep no more wise than a Wisp; I am sure not altogether so wise as this awkward Arguer for memory of Souls in their Pre-existent state after so hugely long a discontinuance from it. But for their immediately coming out of an Æthereal Vehicle into a Terrestrial, and yet forgetting their former state, what Example can be imagined of such a thing, unless that of the *Messias*, who yet seems to remember his former glorious condition, and to pray that he may return to it again? Though for my part I think it was rather Divine Inspiration than Memory, that enabled him to know that matter, supposing his Soul did pre-exist.

Our Authors third and last Argument to prove that lapsed Souls in their Terrestrial condition forget their former state, is from observation how deteriorating changes in this earthly Body spoils or quite destroys the Memory, the Soul still abiding therein; such as Casualties, Diseases, and old Age, which changes the tenour of the Spirits, and makes them less useful for memory, as also 'tis likely the

Brain it self. Wherefore there being a more deteriorating change to the Soul in coming into an earthly Body, instead of an aerial or æthereal, the more certainly will her memory of things which she experienced in that state, be washed out or obliterated in this.

Here our Authors Antagonist answers, That though changes in *body* may often weaken, and sometimes utterly spoil the memory of things past, yet it is not necessary that the Souls changing of *her body* should therefore do so, because it is not so injurious to her faculties. Which if it were, not onely our *Memory*, but *Reason* also should have been casheered and lost by our migration out of those Vehicles we formerly actuated, into these we now enliven; but that still remaining sound and entire, it is a signe that our Memory would do so too, if we had pre-existed in other bodies before, and had any thing to remember. And besides, if the bare translocation of our Souls out of one body into another, would destroy the memory of things the Soul has experienced, it would follow, that when People by death are summoned hence into the other state, that they shall be quite bereaved of their Memory, and so carry neither applause nor remorse of Conscience into the other World; which is monstrously absurd and impious. This is the main of his Answer, and most what in his own words. But of what small force it is, we shall now discover, and how little pertinent to the business. For

For first, we are to take notice that the deteriorating change in the Body, or deteriorating state by change of Bodies, is understood of a debilitating, diminutive, or privative, not depravative deterioration ; the latter of which may be more injurious to the faculties of the Soul, though in the same Body, such a deteriorating change causing Phrensies and outrageous Madness. But as for diminutive or privative deterioration by change, the Soul by changing her Aereal Vehicle for a Terrestrial, is (comparing her latter state with her former) much injured in her faculties or operations of them ; all of them are more slow and stupid, and their aptitude to exert the same Phantasms of things that occurred to them in the other State, quite taken away, by reason of the heavy and dull, though orderly constitution of the Terrestrial Tenement ; which weight and stupor utterly indisposes the Soul to recall into her mind the scene of her former state, this load perpetually swaying down her thoughts to the Objects of this.

Nor does it at all follow, because Reason is not lost, therefore Memory, if there were any such thing as Pre-existence, would still abide. For the universal principles of Reason and Morality are essential to the Soul, and cannot be obliterated, no not by any death : but the knowledge of any particular external Objects is not at all essential to the Soul, nor conse-

quently the memory of them; and therefore the Soul in the state of silence being stript of them, cannot recover them in her incorporation into a Terrestrial Body. But her Reason, with the general principles thereof, being essential to her, she can, as well as this State will permit, exercise them upon the Objects of this Scene of the Earth and visible World, so far as it is discovered by her outward senses, she looking out at those windows of this her earthly Prison, to contemplate them. And she has the faculty and exercise of *Memory* still, in such a sense as she has of *sensitive* Perception, whose Objects she does remember, being yet to all former impresses in the other state a mere *Abraza Tabula*.

And lastly, it is a mere mistake of the Opposer, or worse, that he makes the *Pre-existentials* to impute the loss of memory in Souls of their former state, merely to their coming into other Bodies; when it is not bare change of Bodies, but their descent into worse Bodies more dull and obstupifying, to which they impute this loss of memory in lapsed Souls. This is a real death to them, according to that ancient Enigm of that abstruse Sage, *Ζῶμεν ὡς τὸν ἑκείναι θάνατον, πρὸς τὸν δὲ τὸν ἑκείναι βίον*. We live their death, namely of separate Souls, but are dead to their life. But the changing of our Earthly Body for an Aereal or Æthereal, this is not Death, but *Reviviscency*, in which all the energies

gies of the Soul are (not depressed, but) exalted, and our Memory with the rest quickened; as it was in *Esdra*s after he had drunk down that Cup offered to him by the Angel, full of Liquor like Fire, which filled his Heart with Understanding, and strengthened his Memory, as the Text says.

Thus we see how all Objections against the three Reasons of lapsed Souls losing the memory of the things of the other state, vanish into smoke. Wherefore they every one of them single being so sound, all three put together methinks should not fail of convincing the most refractory of this Truth, That though the Soul did pre-exist and act in another state, yet she may utterly forget all the Scenes thereof in this.

Pag. 46. *Now if the reasons why we lose the remembrance of our former life be greater, &c.* And that they are so, does appear in our Answer to the Objections made against the said Reasons, if the Reader will consider them.

Pag. 50. *And thereby have removed all prejudices, &c.* But there is yet one Reason against Pre-existence which the ingenious Author never thought of, urged by the *Anti-Pre-existentiaries*, namely, That it implies the rest of the Planets peopled with Mankind, it being unreasonable to think that all Souls descended in their lapse to this onely Earth of Ours. And if there be lapsed Souls there; how shall they
be

be recovered? shall Christ undergo another and another death for them? But I believe the ingenious Author would have looked upon this but as a mean and trifling Argument, there being no force in any part thereof. For why may not this Earth be the onely Hospital, *Nosocomium* or *Cæmeterium*, speaking Platonically, of sinfully lapsed Souls? And then suppose others lapsed in other Planets, what need Christ die again for them, when one drop of his Blood is sufficient to save myriads of Worlds? Whence it may seem a pity there is not more Worlds than this Earth to be redeemed by it. Nor is it necessary they should historically know it. And if it be, the Eclipse of the Sun at his Passion by some inspired Prophets might give them notice of it, and describe to them as orderly an account of the *Redemption*, as *Moses* does of the *Creation*, though he stood not by while the World was framed, but it was revealed to him by God. And lastly, it is but a rash and precarious Position, to say that the infinite Wisdom of God has no more ways than one to save lapsed Souls. It is sufficient that we are assured that this is the onely way for the saving of the Sons of *Adam*; and these are the fixt bounds of revealed Truth in the Holy Scripture which appertains to us Inhabitants on Earth. But as for the Oeconomy of his infinite Wisdom in the other Planets, if we did but reflect upon our

our absolute ignorance thereof, we would have the discretion not to touch upon that Topick, unless we intended to make our selves ridiculous, while we endeavour to make others so.

Chap. 6. pag. 51. *Now as the infinite goodness of the Deity obligeth him always to do good, so by the same to do that which is best, &c.* To elude the force of this chief Argument of the *Pre-existentialies*, an ingenious Opposer has devised a way which seems worth our considering, which is this; *viz.* By making the Idea of God to consist mainly in Dominion and Sovereignty, the Scriptures representing him under no other notion than as the Supreme Lord and Sovereign of the Universe. Wherefore nothing is to be attributed to him that enters with the uncontrollableness of his Dominion. And therefore, says he, they that assert Goodness to be a necessary Agent that cannot but do that which is best, directly supplant and destroy all the Rights of his Power and Dominion. Nay, he adds afterwards, That this notion of Gods goodness is most apparently inconsistent, not onely with his Power and Dominion, but with all his other moral Perfections. And for a further explication of his mind in this matter, he adds afterwards, *That the Divine Will is indued with the highest Kind of liberty, as it imports a freedom not onely from*

from foreign Violence, but also from inward Necessity: For spontaneity, or immunity from coercion, without indifferency, carries in it as great necessity as those motions that proceed from Violence or Mechanism. From whence he concludes, That the Divine Will cannot otherwise be determined than by its own intrinsic energie. And lastly, Forasmuch as no Courtisie can oblige, but what is received from one that had a power not to bestow them, if God necessarily acted according to his Goodness, and not out of mere choice and liberty of Will, there were no thanks nor praise due to him; which therefore would take away the duties of Religion. This is the main of his Hypothesis, whereby he would defeat the force of this Argument for the Pre-existence of Souls, taken from the Goodness of God. Which this Hypothesis certainly would do, if it were true; and therefore we will briefly examine it.

First therefore I answer, That though the Scriptures do frequently represent God as the Lord and Sovereign of the Universe, yet it does not conceal his other Attributes of Goodness and Mercy, and the like. But that the former should be so much inculcated, is in reference to the begetting in the People Awe and Obedience to him. But it is an invalid consequence, to draw from hence that the Idea of God does mainly consist in Dominion and Sovereignty; which abstracted from his other Attri-

Attributes of Wisdom and Goodness, would be a very black and dark representation of him, and such as this ingenious Writer could not himself contemplate without averſation and horror. How then can the Idea of God chiefly conſiſt in this? It is the moſt terrifying indeed, but not the moſt noble and accompliſhing part in the Idea of the Deity.

This Sovereignty then is ſuch as is either bounded or not bounded by any other Attributes of God. If bounded by none, then he may do as well unwiſely as wiſely, unjuſtly as juſtly. If bounded by Wiſdom and Juſtice, why is it bounded by them, but that it is better ſo to be than otherwiſe? And Goodneſs being as eſſential to God as Wiſdom and Juſtice, why may not his Sovereignty be bounded by that as well as by the other, and ſo he be bound from himſelf of himſelf to do as well what is beſt as what is better. This conſiſts with his abſolute Sovereignty, as well as the other. And indeed what can be abſolute Sovereignty in an intelligent Being, if this be not? *viz.* fully and entirely to follow the will and inclinations of its own nature, without any check or controul of any one touching thoſe over whom he rules.

Whence, in the ſecond place, it appears that the aſſerting that Gods goodneſs is a neceſſary Agent (in ſuch a ſenſe as Gods Wiſdom and Juſtice are, which can do nothing but what is
wiſe

wise and just) the asserting, I say, that it cannot but do that which is the *best*, does neither directly nor indirectly supplant or destroy any Rights of his Power or Dominion, forasmuch as he does fully and plenarily act according to his own inclinations and will touching those that are under his Dominion. But that his Will is always inclined or determined to what is best, it is the Prerogative of the Divine Nature to have no other Wills nor Inclinations but such.

And as for that in the third place, That this notion of Gods Goodness is inconsistent with all his other moral Perfections, I say, that it is so far from being inconsistent with them, that they cannot subsist without it, as they respect the dealings of God with his Creatures. For what a kind of Wisdom or Justice would that be that tended to no good ? But I suspect his meaning is by *moral* Perfections, Perfections that imply such a power of doing or not doing, as is in *humane* actions ; which if it be not allowed in God, his Perfections are not *moral*. And what great matter is it if they be not, provided they be as they are and ought to be, *Divine* ? But to fancy *moral* actions in God, is to admit a second kind of *Anthropomorphitism*, and to have unworthy conceits of the Divine Nature. When it was just and wise for God to do so or so, and the contrary to do otherwise, had he a freedom to decline the

the doing so? Then he had a freedom to do unjustly and unwisely.

And yet in the fourth place he contends for the highest kind of liberty in the Divine Will, such as imports a freedom not onely from foreign Violence, but also from inward Necessity, as if the Divine Will could be no otherwise determined, than by its own intrinsic Energie, as if it willed so because it willed so; which is a sad principle. And yet I believe this learned Writer will not stick to say, that God cannot tye, cannot condemn myriads of innocent Souls to eternal Torments. And what difference betwixt *Impossibility* and *Necessity*? For *Impossibility* it self is onely a Necessity of not doing; which is here internal, arising from the excellency and absolute perfection of the Divine Nature. Which is nothing like Mechanism for all that; Forasmuch as it is from a clear understanding of what is best, and an unbyassed Will, which will most certainly follow it, nor is determined by its own intrinsic Energy. That it is otherwise with us, is our imperfection.

And lastly, That Beneficence does not oblige the Receiver of it to either Praise or Thanksgiving when it is received from one that is so essentially good, and constantly acts according to that principle, when due occasion is offered, as if it were as absurd as to give thanks to the Sun for shining when he can do

no otherwise; I say, the case is not alike, because the Sun is an inanimate Being, and has neither Understanding nor Will to approve his own action in the exerting of it. And he being but a Creature, if his shining depended upon his Will, it is a greater perfection than we can be assured would belong to him, that he would unfailingly administer Light to the World with such a steadiness of Will, as God sustains the Creation.

Undoubtedly all Thanks and Praise is due to God from us, although he be so necessarily good, that he could not but create us and provide for us; forasmuch as he has done this for our sakes merely (he wanting nothing) not for his own. Suppose a rich Christian so inured to the works of Charity, that the Poor were as certain of getting an Alms from him, as a Traveller is to quench his thirst at a publick Spring near the Highway; would those that received Alms from him think themselves not obliged to Thanks? It may be you will say, they will thank him, that they may not forfeit his Favour another time. Which Answer discovers the spring of this Misconceit, which seems founded in self-love, as if all Duty were to be resolved into that, and as if there were nothing owing to another, but what implied our own profit. But though the Divine Goodness acts necessarily, yet it does not blindly, but according to the Laws of Decorum and

and Justice; which those that are unthankful to the Deity, may find the smart of. But I cannot believe the ingenious Writer much in earnest in these points, he so expressly declaring what methinks is not well consistent with them. For his very words are these: *God can never act contrary to his necessary and essential properties, as because he is essentially wise, just and holy, he can do nothing that is foolish, unjust, and wicked.* Here therefore I demand. Are we not to thank him and praise him for his actions of Wisdom, Justice, and Holiness, though they be necessary?

And if *Justice, Wisdom, and Holiness*, be the *essential* properties of God, according to which he does necessarily act and abstain from acting, why is not his *Goodness*? when it is expressly said by the Wisdom of God incarnate, *None is good save one, that is God.* Which must needs be understood of his essential Goodness. Which therefore being an essential property as well as the rest, he must necessarily act according to it. And when he acts in the Scheme of Anger and Severity, it is in the behalf of Goodness; and when he imparts his Goodness in lesser measures as well as in greater, it is for the good of the *Whole*, or of the *Universe*. If all were Eye, where were the Hearing, &c. as the Apostle argues? So that his Wisdom moderates the prompt outflowings of his Goodness, that it may not outflow so, but that in

the general it is for the best. And therefore it will follow, that if the Pre-existence of Souls comply with the *Wisdom, Justice, and Holiness* of God, that none of these restrain his prompt and parturient Goodness, that it must have caused humane Souls to pre-exist or exist so soon as the Spirits of Angels did. And he must have a strange quick-sightedness that can discern any clashing of that act of Goodness with any of the abovesaid Attributes.

Chap. 7. pag. 56. *God never acts by mere Will or groundless Humour, &c.* We men have unaccountable inclinations in our irregular and depraved Composition, have blind lusts or desires to do this or that, and it is our present ease and pleasure to fulfil them; and therefore we fancy it a privilege to be able to execute these blind inclinations of which we can give no rational account, but that we are pleased by fulfilling them. But it is against the Purity, Sanctity, and Perfection of the Divine Nature, to conceive any such thing in Him; and therefore a weakness in our Judgments to fancy so of him, like that of the *Anthropomorphites*, that imagined God to be of Humane shape.

Pag. 59. *That God made all things for himself.* It is ignorance and ill nature that has made some men abuse this Text to the proving that God acts out of either an humourous or selfish prin-

principle, as if he did things merely to please himself as self, not as he is that sovereign *unself-inreressed Goodness*, and perfect *Rectitude*, which ought to be the measure of all things, But the Text implies no such matter: For if you make למענו a Compound of a Preposition and Pronoun, that so it may signifie [for himself] which is no more than *propter se*, it then will import that he made all things to satisfy his own *Will and Pleasure*, whose *Will and Pleasure* results from the richness of his eternal *Goodness and Benignity* of Nature, which is infinite and ineffable, provided always that it be moderated by *Wisdom, Justice, and Decorum*. For from hence his Goodness is so stinted or modified, that though he has made all things for his own *Will and Pleasure* who is infinite Goodness and Benignity, yet there is a day of Evil for the Wicked, as it follows in the Text, because they have not walked answerably to the Goodness that God has offered them; and therefore their punishment is in behalf of abused Goodness. And Bayns expressly interprets this Text thus: *Universa propter seipsum fecit Dominus*; that is, says he, *Propter bonitatem suam; juxta illud Augustini, DE DOCTRINA CHRISTIANA, Quia bonus est Deus, sumus & in quantum sumus boni sumus.*

But למענו may be a Compound of a Participle and a Pronoun, and then it may signifie

[for them that answer him] that is, walk an-
 ferably to his Goodness which he affords them,
 or [for them that obey him] either way it
 is very good fence. And then in opposition
 to these, it is declared, that the Wicked, that
 is, the Disobedient or Despisers of his Good-
 ness, he has (not made them wicked, but they
 having made themselves so) appointed them
 for the day of Evil. For some such Verb is to
 be supplied as is agreeable to the matter, as in
 that passage in the Psalms; *The Sun shall not
 burn thee by day, neither the Moon by night.*
 Where [burn] cannot be repeated, but some
 other more suitable Verb is to be supplied.

Chap. 8. pag. 63. *Since all other things are
 inferiour to the good of Being.* This I suppose
 is to be understood in such a fence as that say-
 ing in Job, *Skin for skin, and all that a man has,
 will he give for his life.* Otherwise the condi-
 tion of Being may be such, as it were better not
 to be at all, whatever any dry-fancied Meta-
 physicians may dispute to the contrary.

Pag. 67. *Indeed they may be morally immu-
 table and illapsable; but this is Grace, not Nature,*
 &c. Not unless the Divine Wisdom has es-
 sentially interwoven it into the natural con-
 stitution of our Souls, that as after such a time
 of the exercise of their Plaistick on these Ter-
 restrial Bodies, they, according to the course
 of Nature, emerge into a plain use of their Rea-
 son,

son, when for a time they little differed from Brutes; so after certain periods of time well improved to the perfecting their Nature in the sense and adherence to Divine things, there may be awakened in them such a *Divine Plastic faculty*, as I may so speak, as may eternally fix them to their Celestial or Angelical Vehicles, that they shall never relapse again. Which Faculty may be also awakened by the free Grace of the Omnipotent more maturely. Which if it be, Grace and Nature conspire together to make a Soul everlastingly happy. Which *actual Immutability* does no more change the species of a Soul, than the *actual exercise of Reason* does after the time of her stupour in Infancy and in the Womb.

Pag. 67. *I doubt not but that it is much better for rational Creatures, &c.* Namely, such as we experience our humane Souls to be. But for such kind of Intellectual Creatures as have nothing to do with matter, they best understand the priviledges of their own state, and we can say nothing of them. But for us under the conduct of our faithful and victorious Captain, the Soul of the promised *Messias*, through many Conflicts and Tryals to emerge out of this lapsed state, and regain again the possession of true Holyness and Vertue, and therewith the Kingdom of Heaven with all its Beauty and Glories, will be such a gratification to us, that we had never been capable

of such an excess thereof, had we not experienced the evils of this life, and the vain pleasures of it, and had the remembrance of the endearing sufferings of our blessed Saviour, of his Aids and Supports, and of our sincere and conscientious adhering to him, of our Conflicts and Victories to be enrolled in the eternal Records of the other World.

Pag. 69. *Wherefore as the Goodness of God obligeth him not to make every Planet a fixt Star, or every Star a Sun, &c.* In all likelihood, as Galileus had first observed, every fixed Star is a Sun. But the comparison is framed according to the conceit of the Vulgar. A thing neither unusual with, nor misbecoming Philosophers.

Pag. 69. *For this were to tye him to Contradictions, viz. to turn one specificall form or essence into another.* Matter indeed may receive several modifications, but is still real Matter, nor can be turned into a Spirit; and so Spirits specifically different, are untransmutable one into another, according to the distinct Idea's in the eternal Intellect of God. For else it would imply that their essential properties were not essential properties, but loose adventitious Accidents, and such as the essence and substance of such a Spirit, could subsist as well without as with them, or as well with any others as with these.

Pag. 69. *That we should have been made peccable*

cable and liable to defection. And this may the more easily be allowed, because this defection is rather the affecting of a less good, than any pursuing of what is really and absolutely evil. To cavil against Providence for creating a Creature of such a double capacity, seems as unreasonable as to blame her for making *Zoophiton's*, or rather *Amphibion's*. And they are both to be permitted to live according to the nature which is given them. For to make a Creature fit for either capacity, and to tie him up to one, is for God to do repugnantly to the Workmanship of his own hands. And how little hurt there is done by experiencing the things of either Element to Souls that are reclaimable, has been hinted above. But those that are wilfully obstinate, and do despite to the Divine Goodness, it is not at all inconsistent with this Goodness, that they bear the smart of their obstinacy, as the ingenious Author argues very well.

Chap. 9. pag. 73. *Have asserted it to be impossible in the nature of the thing, &c.* And this is the most solid and unexceptionable Answer to this Objection, That it is a Repugnancy in Nature, that this visible World that consists in the motion and succession of things, should be either *ab aeterno*, or infinite in extension. This is made out clearly and amply in Dr. H. Moore's *Enchiridion Metaphysicum*,

cap. 10. which is also more briefly toucht upon in his Advertisements upon Mr. *Jos. Glanvil's* Letter written to him upon the occasion of the Stirrs at *Tedworth*, and is printed with the second Edition of his *Saducismus Triumphatus*. We have now seen the most considerable Objections against this Argument from the Goodness of God for proving the Pre-existence of Souls, produced and answered by our learned Author.

But because I find some others in an Impugner of the Opinion of Pre-existence urged with great confidence and clamour, I think it not amiss to bring them into view also, after I have taken notice of his acknowledgment of the peculiar strength of this Topick, which he does not onely profess to be in truth the strongest that is made use of, but seems not at all to envy it its strength, while he writes thus.

That God is infinitely good, is a Position as true as himself; nor can he that is furnished with the Reason of a man, offer to dispute it. Goodness constitutes his very Deity, making him to be himself; for could he be arayed with all his other Attributes separate and abstract from this, they would be so far from denominating him a God, that he would be but a prodigious Fiend, and plenipotentary Devil. This is something a rude and uncourtly Asseveration, and unluckly division of the Godhead into two parts, and calling one part a Devil. But it is not to be

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imputed to any impiety in the Author of *No-Pre-existence*, but to the roughness and boarishness of his style, the texture whereof is not onely *Fustian*, but over-often hard and stiff *Buckram*. He is not content to deny his assent to an Opinion, but he must give it disgraceful Names. As in his Epistle to the Reader, this darling Opinion of the greatest and divinest Sages of the World visiting of late the Studies of some of more than ordinary Wit and learning, he compares it to a Bug and sturdy Mendicant, that pretends to be some Person of Quality; but he like a skilful Beadle of Beggars, lifting up the skirts of her Veil, as his Phrase is, shews her to be a Counterfeit. How this busie Beadle would have behaved himself, if he had had the opportunity of lifting up the skirts of *Moses's* Veil when he had descended the Mount, I know not. I dare not undertake for him, but that according to the coarseness of his phancy he would have mistaken that lucid Spirit shining through the skin of *Moses's* face, for some *fery Fiend*, as he has somewhere the *Spirit of Nature* for an *Hobgoblin*. But there is no pleasure in insisting upon the rudenesses of his style; he is best where he is most unlike himself, as he is here in the residue of his Description of the Divine Goodness.

'Tis Goodness, says he, *that is the Head and Glory of Gods perfect Essence; and therefore when*
Moses

Moses importuned him for a Vision of his Glory, he engaged to display his Goodness to him. Could a man think that one that had engaged thus far for the *infiniteness* of Gods Goodness, for its *Headship* over the other Attributes, for its *Glory* above the rest, nay for its *Constitutiveness* of the very Deity, as if this were the onely *Ἀυτὸς*, or *God himself*, the rest of Him divided from this, a prodigious Fiend, or plenipotentiary Devil, should prove the Author of *No-Pre-existence* a very contradiction to this Declaration? For to be able to hold *No-Pre-existence*, he must desert the *Ἀυτοσύνη* of God, and betake himself to the Devil-part of him, as he has rudely called it, to avoid this pregnant proof for Pre-existence taken from the *infinite Goodness of God*. And indeed he has pickt out the very worst of that black part of God to serve his turn, and that is *Self-will* in the worst sense. Otherwise Goodness making God to be himself, if it were his true and genuine Self-will, it were the Will of his infinite Goodness, and so would necessarily imply Pre-existence.

But to avoid the dint of this Argument, he declares in the very same Section for the Supremacy of the *Will* over the *Goodness* of the Divine Nature. Which is manifestly to contradict what he said before, That Goodness is the *Head* and *Glory* of Gods perfect Essence. For thus *Will* must have a *Supremacy* over the
Head

Head of the Deity. So that there will be an Head over an Head, to make the God-head a Monster. And what is most insufferable of all, That he has chosen an Head out of the *Devil-part* of the Deity, to use his own rude expression, to controul and lord it over what is the *only God himself*, the rest a Fiend separate from this, according to his own acknowledgment. These things are so infinitely absurd, that one would think that he could have no heart to go about to prove them; and yet he adventures on it, and we shall briefly propose and answer what he produceth.

And this Supremacy of the *Will*, saith he, over the Goodness of the Divine Nature, may be made out both by Scripture and other forcible Evidences. The Scriptures are three; the first, *Psal. 135. 6. Whatsoever the Lord pleased, that did he in heaven, and in the earth, and in the seas, and in all deep places.* Now if we remember but who this Lord is, viz. he whom Goodness makes to be himself, we may easily be assured what pleased him, namely, that which his Wisdom discerned to be the best to be done; and therefore it is very right, that whatsoever he pleased he should do throughout the whole Universe. The second place is *Mat. 20. 15. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with mine own?* Yes I trow, every one must acknowledge that God has an *ivra* (for the

the word is ~~his~~ in the Original) to dispose of what is his own ; and indeed all is his. No one has either a right or power to controul him. But this does not prove that he ever disposes of any thing otherwise than according to his Wisdom and Goodness. If his Goodness be ever limited, it is limited by his Wisdom, but so then as discerning such a limitation to be for the best. So that the measure of Wisdoms determination is still Goodness, the only Head in the Divine Nature, to which all the rest is subordinate. For that there are different degrees of the Communication of the Divine Goodness in the Universe, is for the good of the Whole. It is sufficient to hint these things ; it would require a Volume to enlarge upon them. And then for the last place, *Exod. 33. 19. I will be gracious to whom I will be gracious.* This onely implies that he does *pro suo jure*, and without any motive from any one but himself, communicate more of his Goodness to some Men or Nations than others. But that his Wisdom has not discovered this to be best for the whole constitution of things, I challenge any one to prove. But of this we shall have occasion to speak more afterward. These are the Scriptures.

The other forcible Evidences are these : The first, The late Production of the World. The second, The patefaction of the Law but to one single People, namely, the Jews. The third,

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The timing the *Messias's* Nativity, and bringing it to pass, not in the Worlds Infancy or Adolescence, but in *ἡλικία τοῦ ἁγίου*, *Heb.* 1. 2. in its declining Age. The fourth, The perpetuity of Hell, and interminableness of those Tortures which after this life shall incessantly vex the impious. The fifth and last, God's not perpetuating the Station of Pre-existent Souls, and hindering them from lapsing into these Regions of Sin and Death. These he pretends to be forcible Evidences of the Sovereignty of Gods Will over his Goodness, forasmuch as if the contrary to all these had been, it had been much more agreeable to the Goodness of God.

As for the first of these forcible Arguments, we have disarmed the strength thereof already, by intimating that the World could not be *ab æterno*. And if it could not be *ab æterno*, but must commence on this side of Eternity, and be of finite years, I leave to the Opposer to prove that it has not been created as soon as it could be; and that is sufficient to prove that its late Production is not inconsistent with that principle, that Gods Goodness always is the measure of his Actions. For suppose the World of as little continuance as you will, if it was not *ab æterno*, it was once of as little; and how can we discern but that this is that very time which seems so little to us?

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As for the second, which seems to have such force in it, that he appeals to any competent Judge, if it had not been infinitely better that God should have apertly dispensed his Ordinances to all Mankind, than have committed them onely to *Israel* in so private and clancular a manner; I say, it is impossible for any one to be assured that it is at all better. For first, If this Priviledge which was peculiar, had been a Favour common to all, it had lost its enforcement that it had upon that lesser number. Secondly, It had had also the less surprizing power with it upon others that were not Jews, who might after converse with that Nation, and set a more high price upon the Truths they had travelled for, and were communicated to them from that People. Thirdly, The nature of the thing was not fitted for the universality of Mankind, who could not be congregated together to see the Wonders wrought by *Moses*, and receive the Law with those awful circumstances from Mount *Sinai* or any Mount else. Fourthly, All things happened to them in Types, and themselves were a Type of the true *Israel* of God to be redeemed out of their Captivity under Sin and Satan, which was worse than any *Egyptian* Servitude: Wherefore it must be some peculiar People which must be made such a Type, not the whole World. Fifthly, Considering the great load of the Ceremonial Law which

which came along with other more proper Priviledges of the Jews, setting one against another, and considering the freedom of other Nations from it, unless they brought any thing like it upon themselves, the difference of their Conditions will rather seem several Modifications of the communicated Goodness of God to his Creatures, than the neglecting of any : Forasmuch as, sixthly and lastly, though all Nations be in a lapsed condition, yet there are the Reliques of the Eternal Law of Life in them. And that things are no better with any of them than they are, that is a thousand times more rationally resolved into their demerits in their pre-existent state than into the bare Will of God, that he will have things for many Ages thus squalid and forlorn, merely because he will. Which is a Womans Reason, and which to conceive to belong to God, the Author of *No-Pre-existence* has no reason, unless he will alleadge that he was styled *Ἀπηνόουτος* of the Ancients for this very cause.

Wherefore the Divine Nemesis lying upon the lapsed Souls of men in this Terrestrial State, whose several Delinquencies in the other World and the degrees thereof God alone knows, and according to his Wisdom and Justice disposes of them in this : It is impossible for any one that is not half crazed in his Intellectuals, to pretend that any Acts of Providence that have been since this Stage of the Earth

Earth was erected, might have been infinitely better otherwise than they have been, or indeed better at all.

*Power, Wisdom, Goodness, sure did frame
This Universe, and still guide the same;
But thoughts from Passion sprung, deceive
Vain Mortals: No man can contrive
A better course than what's been run
Since the first circuit of the Sun.*

This Poetical Rapture has more solid truth in it than the dry Dreams and distorted Fancies, or Chimerical Metamorphoses of earthly either Philosophers or Theologs, that precluding the rest of the Godhead from his Goodness, make that remaining part a foul Fiend or Devil; and yet almost with the same breath pronounce the *Will* of this Devil of their own making, which is the most poysonous part of him, to have a Supremacy other the *Autocrat*, over the *Divine Goodness*; which makes God to be *Himself*, that is, to be God, and not a plenipotentary Devil. Wherefore we see from these few small hints, (for it were an infinite Argument fully to prosecute) how feeble or nothing forcible this second Evidence is.

Now for the third Evidence, The timing of the *Messiah's* Nativity, That it was not in the Infancy of the World, but rather in its declining Age, or in the latter times. In which times

times the *Ancient* of Days, according to his counsel and purpose, (which the *Eternal Wisdom* that was to be incarnate assented and subscribed to) sent his Son into the World, the promised *Messiah*. This did the *Ancient* of Days and the *Eternal Wisdom* agree upon. But on the immense Privilege of *Youth* and Confidence! The Author of *No-Pre existence* says, it had been better by far, if they had agreed upon the Infancy of the World. As if this *young* Divine were wiser than the *Ancient* of Days, or the *Eternal Wisdom* itself. I, but he will modestly reply, That he acknowledges that the *Ancient* of Days and the *Eternal Wisdom* are wiser than he, but that they would not make use of their Wisdom. They saw as clearly as could be, that it was far better that the *Messiah* should come in the Infancy of the World; but the Father would not send him then, merely because he would not send him. That his *Will* might act freely as mere *Will* prescinded from Wisdom and Goodness! This is the plain state of the business, and yet admitted by him, who with that open freeness and fulness professes, that prescind the Divine Goodness from the Godhead, what remains is a prodigious Fiend or Devil. What is then mere *Will* and *Power* left alone, but a blind *Hurricane* of Hell; which yet must have the Supremacy, and over-power the Divine Wisdom and Goodness itself. His Zeal against Pre-

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existence has thus infatuated and blinded this young Writers Intellectuals, otherwise he had not been driven to these Absurdities, if he had been pleased to admit that Hypothesis.

As also that Wisdom and Justice, and Fitness and Decorum attend the Dispensation of Divine Goodness; so that it is not to be communicated to every Subject after the most ample manner, nor at every time, but at such times, and to such Subjects, and in such measures as, respecting the whole compages of things, is for the best. So that Goodness bears the Sovereignty, and according to that Rule, perpetually all things are administered, though there be a different Scene of things and particulars in themselves vastly varying in Goodness and Perfection one from another as the parts of the Body do. And so for Times and Ages, every season of the year yield different Commodities: nor are we to expect Roses in Winter, nor Apples and Apricocks in Spring. Now the infinite and incomprehensible Wisdom of God comprehending the whole entire Scene of his Providence, and what references there are of one thing to another, that this must be thus and thus, because such and such things preceded; and because such things are, such and such must be consequent; which things past and to come lie not under our eye: I say, if this hasty Writer had considered this, he need not have been driven to such a rude solution of this

this present Problem, why the *Messiah* came no sooner into the World, *viz.* Merely because God willed it should be so, though it had been far better if it had been otherwise; but he would have roundly confessed, that undoubtedly this was the best time and the fittest, though it was past his reach to discover the reasons of the fitness thereof.

This as it had been the more modest, so it had been the more solid solution of this hard Problem. I but then it had not put a bar to this irrefragable Argument from the Goodness of God, for proving Pre-existence: Which he is perswaded in his own Conscience is no less than a demonstration, unless it be acknowledged that the *Will* of God has a *Supremacy* over his Goodness; and therefore in spite to that abhorred Dogma of Pre-existence, he had rather broach such wild stuff against the glory of God, than not to purchase to himself the sweet conceit of a glorious victory over such an Opinion that he has taken a groundless toy against, and had rather adventure upon gross Blasphemies than entertain it.

The devout Palmist, *Psal.* 36. speaking of the Decrees of God and his Providence over the Creation, *Thy righteousness*, says he, *is as the great mountains, thy judgments are a great deep.* And St. Paul, *Rom.* i. i. after he has treated of intricate and amazing points, cries out, *⁂ ⁂ ⁂*, *Oh the depth of the riches both of the wisdom*

and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out! Now according to the rudeness of our young Writer, there is no such depth of Wisdom, or unsearchableness in the Judgments and Decrees of God and his Providences in the World that most amaze us, but the reasons of them lie very obvious and shallow. Where we fancy that things might have been better otherwise, (though of never so grand import, as the coming of the *Messiah* is) it is easily resolved in to the Supremacy of the *Will* of God, which it has over his *Wisdom* and *Goodness*. He willed it should be so, because he would it should be so, though it had been far better if the *Messiah* had come sooner. But see the difference! betwixt an inspired Apostle, and a young headed Theologist: This latter resolves these unsearchable and unintelligible Decrees of God and passages of Providence, into the mere *Will* of God, *lording* it over the *Divine Wisdom* and *Goodness*: But the Apostle, by how much more unsearchable his Judgments and Decrees are, and the ways of his Providence past finding out, the greater he declares the depth of the richness of his *Wisdom*, which is so ample, that it reaches into ways and methods of doing for the best beyond the Understanding of men. For most assuredly, while the depth of the *Wisdom* of God is acknowledged to carry on the ways of Providence, it must be also acknowledged

knowledge'd that it acts like itself, and chuseth such ways as are best, and most comporting with the Divine Goodness; or else it is not an act of Wisdom, but of Humour or Oversight.

But it may be the Reader may have the curiosity to hear briefly what those great Arguments are, that should induce this young Writer so confidently to pronounce, that it had been far better that the *Messiah* should have come in the Infancy of the World, than in the times he came. The very quintessence of the force of his arguing, extracted out of the verbosity of his affected style, is neither more nor less than this: That the World before the coming of Christ, who was to be the Light of the World, was in very great Darkness; and therefore the sooner he came, the better. But to break the assurance of this Arguer for the more early coming of Christ,

First, we may take notice out of himself, chap. 3. *That the Light of Nature is near akin not onely to the Mosaick Law, but to the Gospel itself; and that even then there were the assistances of the Holy Ghost to carry men on to such vertuous Accomplishments as might avail them to eternal Salvation.* This he acknowledges probable, and I have set it down in his own words. Whence considering what a various Scene of things there was to be from the Fall of *Adam* to the end of the World, it became the great and wise *Dramatist* not to bring upon the Stage

the best things in the first Act, but to carry on things pompously and by degrees; something like that Saying of *Elias*, Two thousand years under the Light of Nature, two thousand under the Law, and then comes the Nativity of the *Messiah*, and after a due space the happy Millennium, and then the Final Judgment, the compleated Happiness of the Righteous in Heaven, and the Punishment of the Wicked in Hell-fire. But to hasten too suddenly to the best, is to expect Autumn in Spring, and Virility or Old Age in Infancy or Childhood, or the *Catastrophe* of a Comedy in the first Act.

Secondly, we may observe what a weak Disprover he is of Pre-existence, which like a Gyant would break in upon him, were it not that he kept him out by this false Sconce of the *Supremacy* of the Divine *Will* over his *Wisdom* and *Goodness*; which Conceit, how odious and impious it is, has been often enough hinted already. But letting Pre-existence take place, and admitting that there is, according to Divine Providence; an orderly infemination of lapsed Souls into humane Bodies, through the several Ages of the World, whose lapse had several circumstantial differences, and that men therefore become differently fitted Objects of Grace and Favour; how easie is it to conceive God according to the fitnesses of the generality of Souls in such or such periods of times,

times, as it was more just, agreeable, or needful for them, so and in such measures to have dispensed the Gifts of his ever-watchful and all-comprehending Providence to them, for both time and place. This one would think were more tolerable than to say, That God wills merely because he wills; which is the Character of a frail Woman, rather than of a God, or else, as this Writer himself acknowledges, of a Fiend or Devil. For such, says he, is God in the rest of his Attributes, if you seclude his Goodness. What then is that action which proceeds onely from that part from which Goodness is secluded? So that himself has dug down the Sconce he would entrench himself in, and lets *Pre-existence* come in upon him, whether he will or no, like an armed Giant; whom let him abhor as much as he will, he is utterly unable to resist.

And thirdly and lastly, Suppose there were no particular probable account to be given by us, by reason of the shortness of our Understandings, and the vast fetches of the all-comprehensive Providence of God, why the coming of the *Messiah* was no earlier than it was; yet according to that excellent Aphorism in Morality and Politicks, *Optimè præsumendum est de Magistratu*, we should hope, nay be assured it was the best that he came when he did, it being by the appointment of the infinite good and all-wise God, and cry out with St.

Paul. Ob the depth of the riches of both the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out! And in the Psalmist, Thy judgments are like a great deep. O Lord, thou preservest man and beast. And so acknowledge his Wisdom and Goodness in the ordering his Creatures, even there where his ways are to our weak and scant Understandings, most inexplicable and unsearchable. Which Wisdom and Goodness as we have all reason to acknowledge in all matters, so most of all in matters of the greatest concernment; that there most assuredly God wills not thus or thus merely because he wills, but because his Wisdom discerns that it is for the best. And this is sufficient to shew the weakness of this third Evidence for proving the Supremacy of the Divine Will over his Wisdom and Goodness.

His fourth Evidence is, *The Perpetuity of Hell*, and interminableness of those Tortures which after this life vex the Wicked. For, says he, had the penalties of mens sins here been rated by pure Goodness, free and untroubled by any other principle, it is not probable that they should have been punished by an eternal Calamity, the pleasures of them being so transient and fugitive. Thus he argues, and almost in the very same words; and therefore concludes, that the authority of Gods Will interposed, and *pro suo jure*, having the

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Supremacy over his *Goodness*, over-swayed the more benign Decree; and *Will*, because it would have it so, doomed sinners to these *eternal* Torments. But I would ask this Sophister, Did the *Will* of God in good earnest sentence sinners thus in Decree, merely because he willed it, not because it was either good or just? What a black and dismal Reproach is here cast upon the Divine Majesty! That he sentences sinners thus because he will, not because it is just. The sense whereof is, So he will do, right or wrong. But the Patriarch *Abraham* was of another mind, *Shall not the Judge of the whole Earth do right?* This he said even to Gods face, as I may so speak. Wherefore God doing nothing but what is *just*, does nothing but what is also *good*. For *Justice* is nothing but *Goodness modified*.

Nor is it asserted by those that make *Goodness* the measure of Gods Providence, that the modification and moderation thereof is not by his *Wisdom* and *Justice*. So that this Sophister puts [pure] to Goodness, merely to obscure the sense, and put a Fallacy upon his Reader. The sins of men here are not rated by *pure* Goodness, but by that *modification* of *Goodness* which is termed *Justice*; which is not a distinct principle from Goodness, but a branch thereof, or Goodness it self under such a modification, not mere *Will* acting because it will, right or wrong, good or evil. Wherefore

fore the state of the Question is not, whether the eternal Torments of Hell are consistent with the *pure* Goodness of God, but with his Justice. But if they are eternal merely from his *Will*, without any respect to *Justice*, his *Will* does will what is infinitely beyond the bounds of what is just, because endless is infinitely beyond that which has an end. Such gross Absurdities does this Opposer of Pre-existence run into, to fetch an Argument from the supposititious *Supremacy* of the *Will* of God over his *Wisdom* and *Goodness*.

But as touching the Question rightly proposed, whether the Perpetuity of Hell to sinners consists with the Justice of God, a man ought to be chary and wary how he pronounces in this point, that he slip not into what may prove disadvantageous to the Hearer. For there are that will be scandalized, and make it serve to an ill end, whether one declare for eternal Torments of Hell, or against them. Some being ready to conclude from their *Eternity*, that Religion itself is a mere *Scarecrow* that frights us with such an incredible *Mormo*? others to indulge to their Pleasures, because the Commination is not frightful enough to deter them from extravagant Enjoyments, if Hell Torments be not eternal. But yet I cannot but deem it a piece of great levity in him that decided the Controversie, as the complaisant Parson did that about the May-pole; they
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of his Parish that were for a May-pole, let them have a May-pole; but they that were not for a May-pole, let them have no May-pole. But this in sobriety one may say, that the use of *αἰών* and *αἰώνιος* in Scripture is indifferent to signifie either that which is properly everlasting, or that which lasts a long time. So that by any immediate infallible Oracle, we are not able to pronounce for the Eternity or Perpetuity of Hell-torments. And the Creeds use the phrase of Scripture, and so some may think that they have the same latitude of interpretation. But it is the safest to adhere to the sense of the Catholick Church, for those that be bewilder'd in such Speculations.

But what the Writer of *No-Pre-existence* argues from his own private Spirit, though it be not inept, yet it is not over-firm and solid. *But that the Penancies of Reprobates are endless, I shall ever thus perswade my self, saith he, either the Torments of Hell are eternal, or the Felicities of Heaven are but temporary (which I am sure they shall never be :) for the very same word that is used to express the permanence of the one, measures out the continuance of the other; and if ζωὴ αἰώνιος denotes everlasting life, a blessedness that shall never end, (Mat. 25. ult.) what can κλάυος αἰώνιος in the same verse signifie, but perpetual punishment, a misery that shall never cease?* This is pretty handsomly put together, but as I said, does not conclude firmly what is driven

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at. For it being undeniably true that *αιωνος* signifies as well that which onely is of a *long continuance*, as what is *properly everlasting*; and it being altogether rational, that when words have more significations than one, that signification is to be applied that is most agreeable to the subject it is predicated of, and *αιωνος* in that higher sence of property and *absolutely everlasting*, not being applicable to *αιωνος*, but upon this Writers monstrous supposition, that the *Will* of God has a *Supremacy* over his *Wisdom*, *Goodness*, and *Justice* (as if the righteous God could act against his own Conscience, which no honest man can do) it is plain, that though *αιωνος* in *Ζωη αιωνος* signifie properly *everlasting*, that there is no necessity that it should signifie so in *αιωνος αιωνος*, but have that other signification of *long continuance*, though not of *everlastingness*, and that continuance *so long*, as if *considered*, would effectually rouse any man out of his sins; and *Eternity* not *considered*, will not move him. This one would think were enough to repress the confidence of this young Writer.

But I will adde something more out of his fellow *Anti-Pre-existentiary*. That *Comminations* are not, though *Promises* be obligatory. ✓ Forasmuch as in *Comminations* the *Comminator* is the *Creditor*, and he that is menaced the *Debtor* that owes the punishment (with which that Latine Phrase well agrees, *dare pœnas*) but

but in *Promises*, he that promiseth becomes *Debtor*, and he to whom the *Promise* is made, *Creditor*. Whence the *Promiser* is plainly obliged to make good his *Promise*, as being the *Debtor*: But the *Comminator*, as being the *Creditor*, is not obliged to exact the punishment, it being in the power of any *Creditor* to remit the Debt owing him if he will. Wherefore in this *Commination* of *eternal fire*, or everlasting punishment, though ^{Alon.} signify here properly *everlasting*, as well as in *everlasting life*, yet because this latter is a *Promise*, the other onely a *Commination*, it does not follow, that as surely as the *Righteous* shall be rewarded with everlasting life, so surely shall the *Wicked* be punished with everlasting fire, in the most proper and highest extent of the signification of the word. Because God in his *Comminations* to the *Wicked* is onely a *Creditor*, and has still a right and power to remit either part or the whole Debt; but to the *Righteous*, by virtue of his *Promise*, he becomes a *Debtor*, and cannot recede, but must punctually keep his word.

To all which I adde this Challenge: Let this Writer, or any else if they can, demonstrate that a Soul may not behave herself so perversely, obstinately, and despihtfully against the Spirit of Grace, that she may deserve to be made an everlasting Hackstock of the Divine *Nemesis*, even for ever and ever. And if she deserve it, it is but just that she have it;

it; and if it be just, it is likewise good. For *Justice* is nothing else but *Goodness* modified in such sort, as *Wisdom* and sense of *Decorum* sees fittest. But the Election of *Wisdom* being always for the best, all things considered, it is plain that Justice and the execution thereof, is for the best; and that so *Goodness*, not mere *Will* upon pretence of having a *Supremacy* over *Goodness*, would be the measure of this sentencing such obdurate sinners to eternal punishment. And this eternal punishment as it is a piece of vindicative Justice upon these obdurate sinners, so it naturally contributes to the establishment of the Righteous in their Celestial Happiness. Which, this Opposer of Pre-existence objects somewhere, if Souls ever fell from, they may fall from it again. But these eternal Torments of Hell, if they needed it, would put a sure bar thereto. So that the *Wisdom* and *Goodness* also of God is upon this account concerned in the eternal punishments of Hell, as well as his *Justice*. That it be to the unreclaimable, as that *Orphick Elementick* *Wm* calls it,

— *animis prope fixis animis.*

The fifth and last forcible Argument, as he calls them, for the proving the Sovereignty of Gods Will over his Goodness, is this. If Gods *Goodness*, saith he, be not under the command of his *Will*, but does always what is best, why did it not perpetuate the Station of Pre-existent

stent Souls, and hinder us (if ever we were happy in a sublimer state) from lapsing into these Regions of Sin and Death? But who does not at first sight discern the weakness of this Allegation? For it is plainly *ἀλογον τι καὶ ἀναιρον*, an absurd thing, and contrary to Reason, to create such a species of Being, whose nature is free and mutable, and at the first dash to dam up or stop the exercise of that freedom and capacity of change, by confining it to a fixt Station. As ridiculous as to suppose a living Creature made with wings and feet, and yet that the Maker thereof should take special care it should never flie nor go. And so likewise, that the mere making of such an Order of Beings as have a freedom of Will, and choice of their Actions, that this is misbecoming the Goodness of God, is as dull and idiotical a conceit, and such as implies that God should have made but one kind of Creature, and that the most absolutely and immutably happy that can be, or else did not act according to his Goodness, or for the best: Which is so obvious a Falshood, that I will not confute it. But it is not hard to conceive that he making such a free-willed Creature as the Souls of men, *scilicet cum mundo condito*, and that in an happy condition, and yet not fixing them in that Station, may excellently well accord with the *Soveraignty* of his *Goodness*, nor any one be constrained to have recourse to the *Supremacy* of

of his *Will* over his *Goodness*, as if he did it because he would do it, and not because it was best.

For what can this freedom of *Will* consist in so much as in a temptableness by other Objects that are of an inferiour nature, not so divine and holy as the other, to which it were the security of the Soul to adhere with all due constancy, and therefore her duty. But in that she is temptable by other Objects, it is a signe that her present enjoyment of the more Divine and Heavenly Objects, are not received of her according to their excellency, but according to the measure and capacity of her present state, which though very happy, may be improved at the long run, and in an orderly series of times and things, whether the Soul lapse into sin or no. For accession of new improvements increaseth Happiness and Joy. Now therefore, I say, suppose several, and that great numbers, even innumerable myriads of pre-existent Souls, to lapse into the Regions of Sin and Death, provided that they do not sin perversely and obstinately, nor do despite to the Spirit of Grace, nor refuse the advantageous offers that Divine Providence makes them even in these sad Regions, why may not their once having descended hither tend to their greater enjoyment, when they shall have returned to their pristine Station? And why may not the specifical nature of the Soul be such,

such, that it be essentially interwoven into our Being, that after a certain period of times or ages, whether she sin or no, she may arrive to a fixedness at last in her heavenly Station with greater advantage to such a Creature, than if she had been fixed in that state at first.

The thing may seem least probable in those that descend into these Regions of Sin and Mortality. But in those that are not obstinate and refractorie, but close with the gracious means that is offered them for their recoverie, their having been here in this lower State, and retaining the memorie (as doubtless they do) of the transactions of this Terrestrial Stage, it naturally enhances all the enjoyments of the pristine felicitie they had lost, and makes them for ever have a more deep and vivid resentment of them. So that through the richnes of the Wisdom and Goodness of God, and through the Merits and conduct of the Captain of their Salvation, our Saviour Jesus Christ, they are, after the strong conflicts here with sin and the corruptions of this lower Region, made more than Conquerours, and greater gainers upon the losses they sustained before from their own folly. And in this most advantageous state of things, they become Pillars in the Temple of God, there to remain for ever and ever. So that unless straying Souls be exceedingly perverse and obstinate, the exitus of things will be but as in a

Tragick Comedy, and their perverseness and obstinacie lies at their own doors : for those that finally miscarrie, whose number this confident Writer is to prove to be so considerable that the enhanced happiness of *the standing* part of pre-existent Souls and *the recovered* does not far preponderate the infelicitie of the others condition. Which if he cannot do, as I am confident he cannot, he must acknowledge, That God in not forcibly *fixing* pre-existent Souls in the state they were first created, but leaving them to themselves, acted not from the *Supremacy* of his *Will* over his *Goodness*, but did what was *best*, and according to that Sovereign Principle of Goodness in the Deitie.

And now for that snitling Dilemma of this eager Opposer of Pre-existence, touching the freedom of acting and mutabilitie in humane Souls, whether this mutabilitie be a *Specifick* properly and essential to them, or a separable *Accident*. For if it were essential, says he, then how was Christ a perfect man, his humane nature being ever void of that lapsabilitie which is essential to humantie? and how come men to retain their specifick nature still, that are translated to Celestial happiness, and made unalterable in the condition they then are? To this I answer, That the *Pre-existentiaries* will admit, that the Soul of the *Messiah* was created as the rest, though in an hap-

happie condition, yet in a lapfable; and that it was his peculiar merit, in that he fo faithfully, constantly, and entirely adhered to the Divine Principle; incomparably above what was done by others of his Classis; notwithstanding that he might have done otherwise; and therefore they will be forward to extend that of the Author to the *Hebrews*, chap. i. v. 3. (*Thy Throne, O God, is for ever and ever, the Scepter of Righteousness is the Scepter of thy Kingdom. Thou hast loved Righteousness, and hated Iniquity; therefore God, even thy God, hath anointed thee with the Oyl of Gladness above thy Fellows*) to his behaviour in his pre-existent state, as well as in this. And whenever the Soul of Christ did exist; if he was like us in all things, sin onely excepted, he must have a capacitie of sinning, though he would not sin; that capacitie not put into act being no sin, but an Argument of his Vertue; and such as if he was always devoid of, he could not be like us in all things, sin onely excepted. For *posse peccare non est peccatum.*

And as for humane Souls changing their Species in their unalterable heavenly happiness, the Species is not then changed, but perfected and compleated; namely, that facultie or measure of it in their *Plastick*, essentially latent there, is by the Divine Grace so awakened, after such a series of time and things, which they have experienced, that now they are

firmly united to an heavenly Body or ethereal Vehicle for ever. And now we need say little to the other member of the Dilemma, but to declare, that free will, or mutability in humane Souls, is no *separable Accident*, but of the essential texture of them; so as it might have its turn in the series of things. And how consistent it was with the Goodness of God and his Wisdom, not to suppress it in the beginning, has been sufficiently intimated above. Wherefore now forasmuch as there is no pretext that either the *Wisdom* or *Justice* of God should streighten the time of the creation of humane Souls, so that their existence may not commence with that of Angels; or of the Universe, and that this figment of the *Supremacy* of Gods mere *Will* over his other Attributes is blown away, it is manifest that the Argument for the *Præ-existence* of Souls drawn from the Divine Goodness, holds firm and irrefragable against whatever Opposers.

We have been the more copious on this Argument, because the Opposer and others look upon it as the strongest proof the *Pre-existentialaries* produce for their Opinion. And the other Party have nothing to set against it but a fictitious *Supremacy* of the *Will* of God over his *Goodness* and other Attributes. Which being their onely Bulwark, and they taking Sanctuary nowhere but here, in my apprehension they plainly herein give up the cause, and establish

blish the Opinion which they seem to have such an antipathy against. But it is high time now to pass to the next Chapter.

Chap. 10. p. 75. *To have contracted strong and inveterate habits to Vice and Lewdness, and that in various manners and degrees, &c.* To the unbyassed this must needs seem a considerable Argument, especially when the Parties thus irreclaimably profligate from their Youth, some as to one Vice, others to another, are found such in equal circumstances with others, and advantages, to be good ; born of the same Parents, educated in the same Family, and the like. Wherefore having the same bodily Extraction, and the same advantages of Education, what must make this great difference as they grow up in the Body, but that their Souls were different before they came into it ? And how should they have such a vast difference in the proclivity to Vice, but that they lived before in the state of Pre-existence, and that some were much deeper in rebellion against God and the Divine Reason, than others were, and so brought their different conditions with them into these Terrestrial Bodies ?

Pag. 75. *Then how a Swallow should return to her old trade of living after her Winter sleep, &c.* Indeed the Swallow has the advantages of Memory, which the incorporate Soul has not in her incorporation into a Terrestrial

Body after her state of *Silence*. But the vital inclinations, which are mainly if not onely fitted in the *Plastick*, being not onely revived, but (signally vitious of themselves) revived with advantage, by reason of the corruption of this coarse earthly Body into which the Soul is incorporate, they cannot fail of discovering themselves in a most signal manner, without any help of memory, but from the mere pregnantie of a corrupt Body, and formerly more than ordinarily debauched *Plastick* in the state of Pre-existence.

Pag. 76. *Whenas others are as fatally set against the Opinions, &c.* And this is done, as the ingenious Author takes notice, even where neither Education nor Custom have interposed to sophisticate their Judgments or Sentiments. Nay, it is most certain, that they sometime have Sentiments and entertain Opinions quite contrary to their Education. So that that is but a slight account, to restore this Phænomenon into Education and Custom, whenas Opinions are entertained and stiffly maintained in despite of them. This I must confess implies that the aerial Inhabitants philosophize, but conjecturally onely, as well as the Inhabitants of the Earth. And it is no wonder that such Spirits as are lapsed in their *Morals*, should be at a loss also in their *Intellectuals*; and though they have a desire to know the truth in Speculations, it suiting so well with their pride, that yet they should be subject to various errors

and hallucinations as well as we, and that there should be different, yea opposite Schools of Philosophie among them. And if there be any credit to be given to *Cardanus* story of his Father *Facius Cardanus*, things are thus *de facto* in the aerial Regions. And two of the Spirits which *Facius Cardanus* saw in that Vision (left upon Record by him, and of which he often told his Son *Hieronymus* while he was living) were two Professors of Philosophie in different Academies, and were of different Opinions; one of them apertly professing himself to be an *Aven-Roist*. The story is too long to insert here. See Dr. *H. Moore* his *Immortality of the Soul*, book 3. chap. 17.

So that lapsed Souls philosophizing in their Aerial State, and being divided into Sects, and consequently maintaining their different or opposite Opinions with heat and affection which reaches the *Plastick*, this may leave a great propension in them to the same Opinions here, and make them almost as prone to such and such Errours, as to such and such Vices. This, I suppose, the ingenious Author propounds as an Argument credible and plausible, though he does not esteem it of like force with those he produced before. Nor does his Opposer urge any thing to any purpose against it. The main thing is, That these Propensities to some one Opinion are not universal, and blended with the constitution of every

person, but are thin sown, and grow up sparingly. Where there are five, says he, naturally bent to any one Opinion, there are many millions that are free to all. If some, says he, descend into this life big with aptnesses and proclivities to peculiar Theories, why then should not all, supposing they pre-existed together, do the like? As if all in the other Aereal State were Professors of Philosophie, or zealous Followers of them that were. The solution of this difficulty is so easie, that I need not insist on it.

Pag. 78. *Were this difference about sensibles, the influence of the body might then be suspected for a cause, &c.* This is very rationally alladged by our Author, and yet his Antagonist has the face from the observation of the diversity of mens Palates and Appetites, of their being differently affected by such and such strains of Musick, some being pleased with one kind of Melodie, and others with another, some pleased with Aromatick Odours, others offended with them, to reason thus: If the Bodie can thus cause us to love and dislike *Sensibles*, why not as well to approve and dislike *Opinions* and *Theories*? But the reason is obvious why not; because the liking or disliking of these Sensibles depends upon the grateful or ungrateful motion of the Nerves of the Bodie, which may be otherwise constituted or qualified in some complexions than in other some.

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But for Philosophical Opinions and Theories, what have they to do with the motion of the Nerves? It is the Soul herself that judges of those abstractedly from the Senses, or any use of the Nerves or corporeal Organ. If the difference of our Judgment in Philosophical Theories be resolvable into the mere constitution of our Bodie, our Understanding itself will hazard to be resolved into the same Principle also: And Bodie will prove the onely difference betwixt Men and Brutes. We have more intellectual Souls because we have better Bodies, which I hope our Authors Antagonist will not allow.

Pag. 78. *For the Soul in her first and pure nature has no Idiosyncrasies, &c.* Whether there may not be certain different Characters proper to such and such Classes of Souls, but all of them natural and without blemish, and this for the better order of things in the Universe, I will not rashly decide in the Negative. But as the Author himself seems to insinuate, if there be any such, they are not such as fatally determine Souls to false and erroneous apprehensions. For that would be a corruption and a blemish in the very natural Character. Wherefore if the Soul in Philosophical Speculations is fatally determined to falsehood in this life, it is credible it is the effect of its being injured thereto in the other.

Pag. 79. *Now to say that all this variety*
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proceeds primarily from the mere temper of our Bodies; &c. This Argument is the less valid for Pre-existence, I mean that which is drawn from the wonderful variety of our Genius's, or natural inclinations to the employments of life, because we cannot be assured but that the Divine Providence may have essentially, as it were, impressed such Classical Characters on humane Souls, as I noted before. And besides, if that be true which *Menander* says,

"Ἄνθρωποι δαίμονι ἀνδρὶ συμπαράσκειται,
Ἐνθὺς ἀνθρώπων μυσταγωγὸς αὐτὸν εἶναι."

That every man, as soon as he is born, has a Genius appointed him to be his Instructor and Guide of his Life: That some are carried with such an impetus to some things rather than others, may be from the instigations of his assisting Genius. And for that Objection of the Author's Antagonist against his Opinion touching those inclinations to Trades, (which may equally concern this Hypothesis of *Menander*) that it would then be more universal, every one having such a Genius; this truth may be smothered by the putting young people promiscuously to any Trade, without observing their Genius. But the *Chineses* suppose this truth, they commonly shewing a Child all the Employments of the City, that he may make his own choice before they put him to any.

But if the Opinion of *Menander* be true, that every

every man has his guardian *Genius*, under whose conduct he lives; the Merchant, the Musician, the Plowman, and the rest; it is manifest that these *Genii* cannot but receive considerable impressions of such things as they guide their Clients in. And pre-existent Souls in their aerial estate being of the same nature with these *Dæmons* or *Genii*, they are capable of the same Employment, and so tincture themselves deep enough with the affairs of those parties they preside over. And therefore when they themselves, after the state of *Silence*, are incorporated into earthly Bodies, they may have a proneness from their former tincture to such methods of life as they lived over whom they did preside. Which quite spoils the best Argument our Author's Antagonist has against this Topick; which is, That there are several things here below which the *Geniusses* of men pursue and follow with the hottest chase, which have no similitude with the things in the other state, as Planting, Building, Husbandrie, the working of Manufactures, &c. This best Argument of his, by *Menander's* Hypothesis, which is hard to confute, is quite defeated.

And to deny nothing to this Opposer of Pre-existence which is his due, himself seems unsatisfied in resolving these odd *Phænomena* into the temper of Bodie. And therefore at last hath recourse to a *secret Causality*, that is, to
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he knows not what. But at last he pitches upon some such Principle as that whereby the Birds build their Nest, the Spider weaves her Webs, the Bees make their Combs, &c. Some such thing he says (*though he cannot think it that prodigious Hobgoblin* the Spirit of Nature) may produce these strange effects, may byass also the fancies of men in making choice of their Employments and Occupations. If it be not the *Spirit of Nature*, then it must be that Classiſſical Character I spoke of above. But if not this, nor the preponderancies of the Pre-existent state, nor *Menander's* Hypothesis, the *Spirit of Nature* will bid the fairest for it of any besides, for determining the inclinations of all living Creatures in these Regions of Generation, as having in itself *vitally*, though not *intellectually*, all the Laws of the Divine Providence implanted into its essence by God the Creator of it. And speaking in the Ethnick Dialect, the same description may belong to it that *Varro* gives to their God Genius. *Genius est Deus qui præpositus est, ac vim habet omnium rerum gignendarum*, and that is the Genius of every Creature that is congenit to it in vertue of its generation. And that there is such a *Spirit of Nature* (not a God, as *Varro* vainly makes it, but an unintelligent Creature) to which belongs the *Nascency* or *Generation* of things, and has the management of the whole matter of the Universe, is copiously proved to be

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be the Opinion of the Noblest and Ancientest Philosophers, by the learned Dr. *R. Cudworth* in his *System of the Intellectual World*, and is demonstrated to be a true Theorem in Philosophie by Dr. *H. Moore* in his *Euchiridion Metaphysicum*, by many, and those irrefutable Arguments; and yet I dare say both can easily pardon the mistake and bluntness of this rude Writer, nor are at all surprized at it as a Novelty, that any ignorant rural *Hobbs* should call the *Spirit of Nature* (a thing so much beyond his capacitie to judge of) a prodigious *Hobgoblin*.

But to conclude, be it so that there may be other causes besides the pristine inurements of the Pre-existent Soul, that may something forcibly determine her to one course of life here, yet when she is most forcibly determined, if there be such a thing as Pre-existence, this may be rationally supposed to concur in the efficiency. But that it is not so strong an Argument as others to prove Pre-existence, I have hinted already.

Pag. 79. *For those that are most like in the Temper, Air, Complexion of their Bodies, &c.* If this prove true, and I know nothing to the contrary, this vast difference of Genius's, were it not for the Hypothesis of their Classical Character imprinted on Souls at their very creation, would be a considerably tight Argument. But certainly it is more honest than
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for the avoiding Pre-existence to resolve the Phenomenon into a *secret Causality*, that is to say, into one knows not what.

Pag. 82. *There being now no other way left but Pre-existence, &c.* This is a just excuse for his bringing in any Argument by way of overplus that is not so apodictically concluding. If it be but such as will look like a plausible solution of a Phenomenon (as this of such a vast difference of Genius's) Pre-existence once admitted, or otherwise undeniably demonstrated, the proposing thereof should be accepted with favour.

Chap. 11. pag. 85. *And we know our Saviour and his Apostles have given credit to that Translation, &c.* And it was the authentick Text with the Fathers of the Primitive Church. And besides this, if we read according to the Hebrew Text, there being no object of Job's knowledge expressed, this is the most easie and natural sense: *Knowest thou that thou wast then, and that the number of thy days are many?* This therefore was reckoned amongst the rest of his ignorances, that though he was created so early, he now knew nothing of it. And this easie sense of the Hebrew Text, as well as that Version of the Septuagint, made the Jews draw it in to the countenancing of the Tradition of the *negyruks*, that is, the Pre-existence of Souls, as *Grotius* has noted of them.

Pag. 85. *As reads a very credible Version.* R. Menasse Ben Israel reads it so: [I gave thee Wisdom,] which Version, if it were sure and authentick, this place would be fit for the defence of the Opinion it is produced for. But no Interpreters besides, that I can find, following him, nor any going before him, whom he might follow, I ingenuously confess the place seems not of force enough to me to infer the conclusion.

He read, I suppose, *וְיָדָעְתָּ* in *Piel*, whence he translated it, *Indidi tibi Sapieniam*; but the rest read it in *Cal.*

Pag. 86. *And methinks that passage of our Saviours Prayer, Father, glorifie me with the glorie I had before the World began, &c.* This Text, without exceeding great violence, cannot be evaded. As for that of *Grotius* interpreting [that I had] *that which was intended for me to have*, though it make good sence, yet it is such Grammar as that there is no School-boy but would be ashamed of it; nor is there, for all his pretences, any place in Scripture to countenance such an extravagant Exposition by way of Parallelism, as it may appear to any one that will compare the places which he alleadges, with this; which I leave the Reader to do at his leisure. Let us consider the Context, *Joh. 17. 4. I have glorified thee upon earth, during this my Pilgrimage and absence from thee, being sent hither by thee. I have finished the work which thou gavest me to do,* and

and for the doing of which I was sent, and am thus long absent. *And now, O Father, glorifie me, ~~magis~~ ^{magis} ~~magis~~ ^{magis} apud teipsum,* in thine own presence, *with the glorie which I had before the world was, ~~magis~~ ^{magis} ~~magis~~ ^{magis} apud te,* or in thy presence. What can be more expressive of a Glorie which Christ had *apud Patrem*, or at his Fathers home, or in his presence before the world was, and from which for such a time he had been absent?

Now for others that would salve the busi-
ness by communication of Idioms, I will set
down the words of an ingenious Writer that
goes that way: *Those Predicates,* says he, *that*
in a strict and vigorous acception agreed onely to
his Divine Nature, might by a communication of
Idioms (as they phrase it) be attributed to his
Humane, or at least to the whole Person com-
pounded of them both, than which nothing is more
ordinarie in things of a mixt and heterogeneous
nature, as the whole man is stiled immortal from
the deathlesness of his Soul: thus he. And
there is the same reason if he had said that
man was stiled mortal (which certainly is far
the more ordinarie) from the real death of
his Bodie, though his Soul be immortal. This
is wittily excogitated. But now let us apply
it to the Text, expounding it according to his
communication of Idioms, affording to the
Humane Nature what is onely proper to the
Divine, thus.

Father,

Father, glorify me [my Humane Nature] *with the glorie that I* [my Divine Nature] *had before the world was.* Which indeed was to be the Eternal, Infinite, and Omnipotent brightness of the Glory of the Father *Ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης τοῦ πατρὸς.*

This is the Glory which his Divine Nature had before the World was. But how can this Humane Nature be glorified with that Glory his Divine Nature had before the world was, unless it should become the Divine Nature, that it might be said to have pre-existed? (But that it cannot be. For there is no confusion of the Humane and Divine Nature in the Hypostasis of Christ :) Or else because it is hypostatically united with the Divine Nature; but if that be the Glory, that he then had already, and had it not (according to the Opposers of Pre-existence) before the world was. So we see there is no sence to be made of this Text by communication of Idioms, and therefore no sence to be made of it without the Pre-existence of the Humane Nature of Christ. And if you paraphrase [me] thus, My Hypostasis consisting of my Humane and Divine Nature, it will be as untoward sence. For if the Divine Nature be included in [me] then Christ prays for what he has already, as I noted above. For the Glory of the eternal *Logos* from everlasting to everlasting, is the same, as sure as he is the same with himself.

Pag. 86. *By his expressions of coming from the*
 G *Father,*

Father, descending from Heaven, and returning thither again, &c. I suppose these Scriptures are alluded to, *John 3. 13. 6. 38. 16. 28. I came down from Heaven not to do my own will, but the will of him that sent me. I came forth from the Father, and am come into the world; again I leave the world, and go to the Father.* Whereupon his Disciples said unto him, *Lo now speakest thou plainly, and speakest no Parable.* But it were a very great Parable, or Enigm, that one should say truly of himself, that he came from Heaven, when he never was there. And as impossible a thing is it to conceive how God can properly be said to come down from Heaven, who is alwaies present every where. Wherefore that in Christ which was not God, namely his Soul, or Humane Nature, was in Heaven before he appeared on Earth, and consequently his Soul did pre-exist. Nor is there any refuge here in the communication of Idioms. For that cannot be attributed to the whole Hypostasis, which is competent to neither part that constitutes it. For it was neither true of the Humane Nature of Christ, if you take away Pre-existence, nor of the Divine, that they descended from Heaven, &c. And yet *John 3. 13, 14.* where Christ prophesying of his Crucifixion and Ascension, saith, *No man hath ascended up to Heaven, but he that came down from Heaven, even the Son of man, [i. e. the Son of man] who was in Hea-*

Heaven. So Erasmus saith, it may be rendred a Participle of the present tense, having a capacity to signifie the time past, if the sence require it, as it seems to do here. *Qui erat in Calo, viz. antequam descenderat.* So Erasmus upon the place.

Wherefore these places of Scripture touching Christ being such inexpugnable Arguments of the Pre-existence of the Soul of the *Messiah*; the Writer of *No Pre-existence*, methinks, is no where so civil or discreet as in this point. Where, he saies, *he will not squabble about this, but readily yield that the Soul of Christ was long extant before it was incarnate.* But then he presently flings dirt upon the *Pre-existentiaries*, as guilty of a shameful presumption and inconsequence, to conclude the Pre-existence of all other Humane Souls from the Pre-existence of his. *Because he was a peculiar favourite of God, was to undergo bitter sufferings for Mankind; and therefore should enjoy an happy Pre-existence for an Anti-præmium. And since he was to purchase a Church with his own most precious Blood, it was fit he should pre-exist from the beginning of the world, that he might preside over his Church as Guide and Governour thereof; which is a thing that cannot be said of any other soul beside.*

This is a device which, I believe, the *Pre-existentiaries*, good men, never dreamt of, but they took it for granted, that the creation of

all Humane Souls was alike, and that the Soul of Christ was like ours in all things, *sin only excepted*; as the Emperour *Justinian*, in his Discourse to *Menas* Patriarch of *Constantinople*, argues from this very Topick to prove the Non-pre-existence of our Souls, from the Non-pre-existence of Christs, *he being like us in all things, sin only excepted*. And therefore as to Existence and Essence there was no difference. Thus one would have verily thought to have been most safe and most natural to conclude, as being so punctual according to the declaration of Scripture, and order of things. For it seems almost as harsh and repugnant to give Angelical Existence to a Species not Angelical, as Angelical Essence. For according to them, it belongs to Angels only to exist *a mundo condito*, not to Humane souls. Let us therefore see what great and urgent occasions there are, that the Almighty should break this order.

The first is, That he may remonstrate the Soul of the *Messiah* to be his most special Favourite. Why? That is sufficiently done, and more opportunely, if other souls pre-existed to be his corrivals. But his faithful adhesion above the rest to the Law of his Maker, as it might make him so great a Favourite: so that transcendent privilege of being hypostatically united with the Godhead, or Eternal *Logos*, would, I trow, be a sufficient Testimony of
Gods

Gods special Favour to him above all his fellow Pre-existent Souls.

And then, which is the second thing for his *Anti-præmial* Happiness (though it is but an *Hysteron Proteron*, and preposterous conceit, to fancie wages before the work) had he less of this by the coexistence of other souls with him, or was it not rather the more highly encreased by their coexistencie? And how oddly does it look, that one solitary Individual of a Species should exist for God knows how many ages alone? But suppose the soul of the *Messiah*, and all other souls created together, and several of them fallen, and the Soul of the *Messiah* to undertake their recovery by his sufferings, and this declared amongst them; surely this must hugely inhanse his Happiness and Glory through all the whole order of Humane souls, being thus constituted or designed Head and Prince over them all. And thus, though he was rejected by the Jews and despised, he could not but be caressed and adored by his fellow-souls above, before his descent to this state of humiliation. And who knows but this might be part at least of that Glory which, he says, he had before the world was? And which this ungrateful world denied him, while he was in it, who crucified the Lord of life.

And as for the third and last, That the Soul of the *Messiah* was to pre-exist, that he might preside over the Church all along from the be-

gining of it. What necessity is there of that? Could not the Eternal *Logos* and the Ministry of Angels sufficiently discharge that Province? But you conceive a congruity therein; and so may another conceive a congruity that he should not enter upon his Office till there were a considerable lapse of Humane Souls which should be his care to recover; which implies their Pre-existence before this stage of the Earth. And if the Soul of the Messiah, united with the *Logos*, presided so early over the Church; that it was meet that other unlapserd souls, they being of his own tribe, should be his *Satellitium*, and be part of those ministering Spirits that watch for the Churches good, and zealously endeavour the recovery of their sister-souls, under the conduct of the great Soul of the *Messiah*, out of their captivity of sin and death.

So that every way Pre-existence of other souls will handsomly fall in with the Pre-existence of the soul of the *Messiah*, that there may be no breach of order, whenas there is no occasion for it, nor violence done to the Holy Writ, which expressly declares Christ to have been *like to us in all things* (as well in *Existence* as *Essence*) *sin only excepted*; as the Emperour earnestly urges to the Patriarch *Menas*. Wherefore we finding no necessity of his particular pre-existing, nor convenience, but what will be doubled if other Souls pre-exist with him;

him; it is plain, if he pre-exist, it is as he is an Humane soul, not as such a particular soul; and therefore what proves his soul to pre-exist, proves others to pre-exist also.

Pag. 87. *Since these places have been more diffusely arged in a late discourse to this purpose.* I suppose he means in the *Letter of Resolution* concerning *Origen*. Where the Author opens the sense of *Philip. 2. 6.* learnedly and judiciously, especially when he acknowledges Christs being *in the form of God*, to be understood of his Physical Union with the Divine *Logos*. Which is the Ancient Orthodox Exposition of the Primitive Fathers, they taking this for one notable Testimony of Scripture, for the Divinity of Christ. Whenas they that understand it Politically of Christs Power and Authority onely, take an excellent weapon out of the hands of the Church wherewith she used to oppose the Impugners of Christs Divinity. But how can Christ being God (*verus Deus*, as *Katablus* expounds *ὁ μὴ ὢν θεός*) empty himself, or any way deteriorate himself as to his Divinity, by being incarnate, and taking upon him *ἡμῶν ὁμοίαν* the form of the *terrestrial Adam*? For every *earthly* man is *ὁμοίος ὁμοῦντος*, as the Apostle seems to intimate, *Rom. 8. 21.* as this ingenious Writer has noted; and the Apostle likewise seems so to expound it in the Text, by adding presently by way of Exegesis, *καὶ ἐν ὁμοιότητι ἡμῶν γεννητὸς* and was made in the likeness of men;

men; like that Gen. 5. 3. *Adam begot a son in his own likeness,* a terrestrial man as himself was. Wherefore the Incarnation of Christ being no exinanition to his *Divinity*, there was an *Humanity* of Christ, viz. his *Soul*, in a glorious state of Pre-existence, to which this voluntary exinanition belonged.

Pag. 87. *Was it for this mans sin, or his fathers, that he was born blind?* For the avoiding the force of this Argument for proving that Pre-existence was the Opinion of the Jews; and that Christ when it was so plainly implied in the Question, by his silence, or not reproving it, seemed to admit it, or at least to esteem it no hurtful Opinion: They alledge these two things: First, That these Enquirers having some notions of the Divine Prescience, might suppose that God foreknowing what kind of person this blind man would prove, had antedated his punishment. The other is; That the Enquirers may be conceived to understand the blind mans original sin. So that when they enquired whether the man was born blind for his own or his Parents sin, they might onely ask whether that particular Judgment was the effect of his Parents, or of his own original pravity. This is *Cameron*.

But see what forced conceits Learned men will entertain, rather than not to say something on a Text. What a distorted and preposterous

will but give occasion to wanton or wrathful
whelps to worry her, and tug her into the dirt
by them. And we may easily observe how
greedily they catch at such occasions, though it
be not much that they can make out of
them, as we may observe in the next Chap-
ter.

Chap. 13. pag. 96. Pill. 1. *To conceive him
as an immense and all-glorious Sun, that is conti-
nually communicating, &c.* And this as certainly
as the Sun does his light, and as restrainedly.
For the Suns light is not equally imparted to
all subjects, but according to the measure of
their capacity. And as Nature limits here in
natural things, so does the Wisdom and Justice
of God in *free* Creatures. He imparts to them
as they capacitate themselves by improving
or abusing their Freedom.

Pag. 100. Pill. 3. *Be resolved into a Prin-
ciple that is not meerly corporeal.* He suspects
that the descent of heavy bodies, when all is
said and done, must be resolved into such a
Principle. But I think he that without preju-
dice peruses the Eleventh and Thirteenth
Chapters (with their *Scholies*) of Dr. *Mores En-
chiridion Metaphysicum*, will find it beyond
suspicion, that the Descent of heavy bodies is
to be resolved into some corporeal Principle;
and that the *Spirit of Nature*, though you
should call it with the *Cabalists* by that start-
ling

ling name of *Sandalphon*, is no such prodigious *Hobgoblin*, as rudeness and presumptuous ignorance has made that Buckeram Writer in contempt and derision to call it.

Page 101. *As naturally as the fire mounts, and a stone descends.* And as these do not so (though naturally) meerly from their own intrinſick nature, but in vertue of the *Spirit of the Universe*; ſo the ſame reaſon there is in the diſpoſal of Spirits. *The Spirit of Nature* will range their *Pluſticks* as certainly and orderly in the Regions of the World, as it does the matter it ſelf in all places. Whence that of *Plotinus* may ſilly be underſtood, That a Soul enveigled in viciousneſs, both here and after death, according to her nature *ἐκείνη* is thruſt into the ſtate and place ſhe is, *κατὰ τὴν φύσιν αὐτῆς*, as if ſhe were drawn thither by certain inviſible or Magical ſtrings of Nature's own pulling. Thus is he pleaded to expreſs this power or vertue of the *Spirit of Nature* in the Universe. But I think that tranſpoſition ſhe makes of them is rather *ἡμετερογενὴς*, than either *ἐκείνη* or *ἰσχυρὴ*, a tranſvection of them, rather than *πυλῆς* or *traction*. But theſe are overnice Curioſities.

Page 101. *As likely ſome things relating to the ſtate of Spirits, &c.* That is to ſay, Spirits by the miniftry of other Spirits may be carried into ſuch regions as the *Spirit of Nature* would not have tranſmitted them to, from the place where

where they were before, whether for good or evil. Of the latter kind whereof, I shall have occasion to speak more particularly in my Notes on the next Chapter.

Pag. 101. Pill. 4. *The souls of men are capable of living in other bodies besides terrestrial, &c.* For the *Pre-existential* allow her successively to have lived, first, in an *Ethereal* body, then in an *Aereal*; and lastly, after the state of *Silence*, to live in a *Terrestrial*. And here I think, though it be something early, it will not be amiss to take notice what the *Anti-pre-existential* alledged against this Hypothesis; for we shall have the less trouble afterwards.

First, therefore, they say, That it does not become the Goodness of God to make Mans Soul with a triple *Vital Congruity*, that will fit as well an *Aereal* and *Terrestrial* condition, as an *Ethereal*. For from hence it appears, that their Will was not so much in fault that they sinned, as the constitution of their Essence. And they have the face to quote the account of *Origen*, pag. 49. for to strengthen this their first Argument. The words are these: *They being originally made with a capacity to joyn with this terrestrial matter, it seems necessary according to the course of nature that they should sink in to it, & so appear terrestrial men.* And therefore, say they, there being no descending into these earthly bodies without a lapse or previous sin, their very constitution necessitated them to sin. The

The second Argument is, That this Hypothesis is inconsistent with the bodies Resurrection. For the *Aereal* bodie immediately succeeding the *Terrestrial*, and the *Æthereal* the *Aereal*, the business is done, there needs no resuscitation of the *Terrestrial* body to be glorified. Nor is it the same *numerical body of flesh* still, as it ought to be, if the Resurrection-body be *Æthereal*.

The third is touching the *Aereal* Body; That if the soul after death be tyed to an *Aereal* body (and few or none attain to the *Æthereal* immediately after death) the souls of very good men will be forced to have their abode amongst the very Devils. For their Prince is the Prince of the Air, as the Apostle calls him; and where can his subjects be, but where he is? So that they will be enforced to endure the companie of these foul Fiends; besides all the incommodious changes in the Air, of Clouds, of Vapours, of Rain, Hail, Thunder, tearing Tempests and Storms; and what is an Image of Hell it self, the darkness of Night will overwhelm them every four and twenty hours.

The fourth Argument is touching the *Æthereal* state of Pre-existence. For if souls when they were in so Heavenly and happy an estate could lapse from it, what assurance can we have, when we are returned thither, that we shall abide in it? it being but the same Happiness we were in before: and we having the
same

same *Plastic* with its triple *Fatal Congruity*, as we had before. Why therefore may we not lapse as before?

The fifth and last Argument is taken from the state of *Silence*. Wherein the Soul is supposed devoid of perception. And therefore their number being many, and their attraction to the place of conception in the Womb being merely Magical, and reaching many at a time, there would be many attracted at once; so that scarce a *Fetus* could be formed which would not be a multiform Monster, or a cluster of Humane *Fetus's*, not one single *Fetus*. And these are thought such weighty Arguments, that Pre-existence must sink and perish under their pressure. But, I believe, when we have weighed them in the balance of unprejudiced Reason, we shall find them light enough.

And truly, for the first; It is not only weak and slight, but wretchedly disingenuous. The strength of it is nothing but a maimed and fraudulent Quotation, which makes ashew as if the Author of the *Account of Origen*, bluntly affirmed, without any thing more to do, that souls being originally made with a capacity to joyn with this terrestrial matter, it seems necessary, according to the course of nature, that they should sink into it, and so appear terrestrial men: Whereas if we take the whole Paragraph as it lies, before they cast themselves in-

to this fatal necessity ; they are declared to have a freedom of will, whereby they might have so managed their happy Estate they were created in, that they need never have sinned. His words are these: *What then remains, but that through the faulty and negligent use of themselves, whilst they were in some better condition of life, they rendered themselves less pure in the whole extent of their powers, both Intellectual and Animal; and so by degrees became disposed for the susception of such a degree of corporeal life, as was less pure, indeed, than the former; but exactly answerable to their present disposition of Spirit. So that after certain Periods of time they might become far less fit to actuate any sort of body, than the terrestrial; and being originally made with a capacity to joyn with this too, and in it to exercise the Powers and functions of life, it seems necessary, &c.*

These are the very words of the Author of the Account of *Origen*, wherein he plainly affirms, that it was the fault of the Souls themselves, that they did not order themselves then right when they might have done so, that cast them into this terrestrial condition. But what an Opposer of Pre-existence is this, that will thus shamelessly falsifie and corrupt a Quotation of an ingenious Author, rather than he will seem to want an Argument against his Opinion! Wherefore briefly to answer to this Argument, It does as much become the Goodness

ness of God to create souls with a triple *Vital Congruity*, as to have created *Adam* in Paradise with free Will, and a capacity of sinning.

To the Second, the Pre-existentiaries will answer, That it is no more absurd to conceive (nor so much) that the soul after death hath an Airy body, or it may be some an *Ethereal* one, than to imagine them so highly happy after death without any body at all. For if they can act so fully and beatifically without any body, what need there be any Resurrection of the body at all? And if it be most natural to the soul to act in some body, in what a long unnatural estate has *Adams* soul been, that so many thousand years has been without a body? But for the soul to have a body, of which she may be the *inhabitant*, certainly is most natural, or else she will be in an unnatural state after the Resurrection to all Eternitie. Whence it is manifest, that it is most natural for the soul, if she act at all, to have a body to act in. And therefore, unless we will be so dull as to fall into the drouzie dream of the *Psychopannychites*, we are to allow the soul to have some kind of body or other till the very Resurrection.

But those now that are not *Psychopannychites*, but allow good Souls the joys and glories of Paradise before the Resurrection of the Body, let them be demanded to what end the soul should have a Resurrection-body; and what they

they would answer for themselves, the *Pre-existent* will answer for their position that holds the Soul has an *Aethereal* body already, or an *Aereal* one which may be changed into an *Aethereal* body. If they will alledge any Concinnity in the business, or the firm promise of more highly compleating our Happiness at the union of our terrestrial bodies with our souls at the Resurrection. This, I say, may be done as well supposing them to have bodies in the mean time as if they had none. For those bodies they have made use of in the interval betwixt their Death and Resurrection, may be so thin and dilute, that they may be no more considerable than an *Interula* is to a Royal Robe lined with rich Furrs, and embroidered with Gold. For suppose every mans bodie at the Resurrection framed again out of its own dust, bones, sinews and flesh, by the miraculous Power of God, were it not as easie for these subtile Spirits, as it is in the *inspiration*, to enter these bodies, and by the Divine Power assisting, so to inactuate them, that that little of their Vehicle they brought in with them, shall no more destroy the individuation of the Body, than a draught of wine drunk in, does the individuation of our body now, though it were, immediately upon the drinking, actuated by the Soul. And the soul at the same instant actuating the whole Aggregate, it is exquisitely the same numerical bo-

die, even to the utmost cariosity of the School-men. But the Divine Assistance working in this, it is not to be thought that the soul will loose by resuming this Resurrection-body, but that all will be turned into a more full and saturate Brightness and Glory, and that the whole will become an heavenly, spiritual, and truly glorified Body, immortal and incorruptible.

Nor does the being thus turned into an heavenly or spiritual Body, hinder it from being still the same Numerical body, forasmuch as one and the same Numerical matter, let it be under what modifications it will, is still the same numerical matter or body; and it is gross ignorance in Philosophie that makes any conceive otherwise.

But a rude and ill-natured Opposer of Pre-existence is not content that it be the same numerical body, but that this same numerical body be still flesh, peevishly and invidiously thereby to expose the Author of the *Account of Origen*, who, pag. 120. writes thus: *That the bodie we now have, is therefore corruptible and mortal, because it is flesh; and therefore if it put on incorruption and immortality, it must put off it self first, and cease to be flesh.* But questionless that ingenious Writer understood this of natural flesh and blood, of which the Apostle declares, *That flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God.* But as he says,

Ἐστὶ σὰρξ ψυχρὴ καὶ ἐστὶ σὰρξ ἀφθαρτὴ καὶ ἰσχυρὴ, There is a natural body and there is a spiritual body: So if he had made application of the several kinds of *Flesh* he mentions, of Men, of Beasts, of Fishes, and Birds, he would have presently subjoyned, *Ἐστὶ σὰρξ ψυχρὴ καὶ ἐστὶ σὰρξ ἀφθαρτὴ καὶ ἰσχυρὴ, There is a natural flesh and there is a spiritual flesh.* And 'tis this *spiritual* Flesh to which belongs incorruption and immortality, and which is capable of the Kingdom of Heaven. But for the *σὰρξ ψυχρὴ, the natural flesh*, it must put off it self, and cease to be *natural* flesh, before it can put on immortality and incorruption.

So little inconsistency is there of this Hypothesis (as touching the souls acting in either an Aereal or Æthereal Vehicle, during the interval betwixt the Resurrection and her departure hence) with the Resurrection of the bodies: But in the mean time, there is a strong bar thereby put to the dull dream of the *Psycho-panychiles*, and other harshnesses also eated or smoothed by it.

Now as for the third Argument, which must needs seem a great *Scare-crow* to the illiterate, there is very little weight or none at all in it. For if we take but notice of the whole *Atmosphere*, what is the dimension thereof, and of the three Regions into which it is distributed, all these Pugbears will vanish. As for the Dimension of the whole Atmosphere, it is by the skillful reputed about fifty to Italick miles

high, the *Convex* of the middle Region thereof about four such miles, the *Concave* about half a mile. Now this distribution of the Air into these three *Regions* being thus made, and the Hebrew tongue having no other name to call the *Expansum* about us, but שמים *Heaven*, here is according to them a distribution of Heaven into *three*, and the highest Region will be part of the *third* Heaven.

This therefore premised, I answer, That though the souls of good men after death be detained within the Atmosphere of the Air, (and the Air it self haply may reach much higher than this Atmosphere that is bounded by the mere ascent of exhalations and vapours) yet there is no necessity at all that they should be put to those inconveniencies, which this Argument pretends, from the company of Devils, or incommodious changes and disturbances of the Air. For suppose such inconveniencies in the middle and lowest Region, yet the upper Region, which is also part of the third Heaven, those parts are ever calm and serene. And the Devils Principality reaching no further than through the middle and lowest Region next the earth, (not to advertise that his quarters may be restrained there also) the souls of the departed that are good, are not liable to be pester'd and haunted with the ungrateful Presence or Occursions of the deformed and grim Retinue, or of the vagrant vassals

fals of that foul Feind, that is Prince of the Air, he being onely so of these lower parts thereof, and the good souls having room enough to congregate together in the upper Region of it.

Nor does that promise of our Saviour to the thief on the Cross, that that very day he should be with him in Paradise, at all clash with this Hypothesis of Aereal Bodies, both because Christ by his miraculous power might confer that upon the penitent thief his fellow-sufferer, which would not fall to the share of other penitents in a natural course of things; and also because this third Region of the Air may be part of Paradise it self: (*In my Fathers house there are many Mansions*) and some learned men have declared Paradise to be in the Air, but such a part of the Air as is free from gross Vapours and Clouds; and such is the third Region thereof. In the mean time we see the souls of good men departed, freed from those Panick tears of being infested either by the unwelcome company of Fiends and Devils, or incommodated by any dull cloudy obscurations, or violent and tempestuous motions of the Air.

Onely the shadowy Vale of the Night will be cast over them once in a *Nycthemeron*. But what incommodation is that, after the brisk active heat of the Sun in the day-time, to have the variety of the more mild beams of the

Moon, or gentle, though more quick and chearful, scintillations of the twinkling Stars? This variety may well seem an addition to the felicity of their state. And the shadowyness of the Night may help them in the more composing Introversions of their contemplative mind, and cast the soul into ineffably pleasing slumbers and Divine extasies; so that the transactions of the Night may prove more solacing and beatifick sometimes, than those of the day. Such things we may guess at afar off, but in the mean time be sure, that these good and serious Souls know how to turn all that God sends to them to the improvement of their Happiness.

To the fourth Argument we answer, That there are not a few reasons from the nature of the thing that may beget in us a strong presumption that souls recovered into their Celestial Happiness will never again relapse, though they did once.

For first, it may be a mistake that the Happiness is altogether the same that it was before. For our first Paradisiacal Bodies from which we lapsed, might be of a more crude and dilute *Æther*, not so full and saturate with Heavenly glory and perfection as our Resurrection-body is.

Secondly, The soul was then unexperienced, and lightly coming by that Happiness she was in, did the more heedlessly forgo it, before

she

she was well aware; and her mind roved after new adventures, though she knew not what.

Thirdly, It is to be considered, whether Regeneration be not a stronger tenour for enduring Happiness, than the being created happy. For this being wrought so by degrees upon the *Plastick*, *συγγνωστὴ ἀκαθάρτου*, with *ineffable groans and piercing desires after that Divine Life, that the Spirit of God co-operating exciteth in us*; when Regeneration is perfected and wrought to the full by these strong Agonies, this may rationally be deemed a deeper tincture in the soul than that she had by mere Creation, whereby the soul did indeed become Holy, innocent and happy, but not coming to it with any such strong previous conflicts and eager workings and thirstings after that state, it might not be so firmly rooted by far as in Regeneration begun and accomplished by the operation of Gods Spirit, gradually but more deeply renewing the Divine Image in us.

Fourthly, It being a renovation of our Nature into a pristine state of ours, the strength and depth of impression seems increased upon that account also.

Fifthly, The remembrance of all the hardships we underwent in our lapsed condition, whether of Mortification or cross Rancounters, this must likewise help us to persevere when once returned to our former Happiness.

Sixthly, The comparing of the evanid pleasures of our lapsed or terrestrial life, with the fulness of those Joys that we find still in our heavenly, will keep us from ever having any hankering after them any more.

Seventhly, The certain knowledge of everlasting punishment, which if not true, they could not know, must be also another sure bar to any such negligencies as would hazard their settled felicity. Which may be one reason why the irreclaimable are eternally punished, namely, that it may the better secure eternal Happiness to others.

Eighthly, Though we have our triple *Vital Congruity* still, yet the *Plastick* life is so thoroughly satisfied with the *Resurrection-body*, which is so considerably more full and saturate with all the heavenly richness and Glorie than the former, that the *Plastick* of the soul is as entirely taken up with this one Bodie, as if she enjoyed the pleasures of all three bodies at once, *Æthereal*, *Aereal*, and *Terrestrial*.

And lastly, Which will strike all sure, He that is able to save to the utmost, and has promised us *eternal life*, is as true as able, and therefore cannot fail to perform it. And who can deny but that we in this State I have described, are as capable of being *fixed* there, and confirmed therein, as the Angels were after *Lucifer* and others had fallen?

And now to the fifth and last Argument against

gainst the state of *Silence*, I say it is raised out of mere ignorance of the most rational as well as most *Platonical* way of the souls immediate descent *εἰς τὴν φύσιν*. For the first Mover or stirrer in this matter, I mean in the formation of the *Fœtus*, is the *Spirit of Nature*, the great *ἀρχὴ πνευματικὴ* of the Universe, to whom *Plotinus* somewhere attributes *τὴν πρῶτον γενεάν δι' ἣν πρὸς εἶμαρ ἰναίμεθα: εἰς τὴν ὕλην*. The first *Predelineations* and *prodrome Irradiations* into the matter, before the particular soul, it is preparing for, come into it. Now the *Spirit of Nature* being such a spirit as contains *Spermatically* or *Vitally* all the Laws contrived by the Divine Intellect, for the management of the Matter of the World, and of all Essences else *unperceptive*, or *quatenus unperceptive*, for the good of the Universe; we have all the reason in the world to suppose this *Vital* or *Spermatical* Law is amongst the rest, *viz.* That it transmit but one soul to one prepared conception. Which will therefore be as certainly done, unless some rare and odd casualty intervene, as if the Divine Intellect it self did do it. Wherefore one and the same *Spirit of Nature* which prepares the matter by some general *Predelineation*, does at the due time transmit some one soul in the state of *Silence* by some particularizing Laws (that fetch in such a soul rather than such, but most sure but one, unless as I said some special casualty happen) into the prepared Matter, act-
ing

ing at two places at once according to its *Sym-
energetical* vertue or power.

Hence therefore it is plain, that there will be no such clusters of *Fetus's* and monstrous deformities from this Hypothesis of the souls being in a state of *Silence*. But for one to shuffle off so fair a satisfaction to this difficulty, by a precarious supposing there is no such Being as the Spirit of Nature, when it is demonstrable by so many irrefragable Arguments that there is, is a Symptome of one that philosophizes at random, not as Reason guides. For that is no reason against the existence of the Spirit of Nature, because some define it *A Substance incorporeal, but without sense and animadversion, &c.* as if a spirit without sense and animadversion were a contradiction. For that there is a *Spirit of Nature* is demonstrable, though whether it have no sense at all is more dubitable. But though it have no sense or perception, it is no contradiction to its being a Spirit, as may appear from Dr. *H. Mores Brief Discourse* of the true Notion of a Spirit. To which I direct the Reader for satisfaction, I having already been more prolix in answering these Arguments than I intended. But I hope I have made my presage true, that they would be found to have no force in them to overthrow the Hypothesis of a threefold *Vital Congruity* in the Plastick of the soul. So that this fourth *Pillar*, for any execution they can do, will stand unshaken.

Pag. 103. *For in all sensation there is corporeal motion, &c.* And besides, there seems an essential relation of the Soul to Body, according to *Aristotles* definition thereof, he defining it *involuntarily* *that which actuates the body*. Which therefore must be idle when it has nothing to actuate, as a Piper must be silent, as to piping, if he have no Pipe to play on.

Chap. 14. pag. 113. *The ignobler and lower properties or the life of the body were languid and remiss, viz. as to their proper exercises or acting for themselves, or as to their being regarded much by the Soul that is taken up with greater matters, or as to their being much relished, but in subserviency to the enjoyment of those more Divine and sublime Objects; as the Author intimates towards the end of his last Pillar.*

Pag. 114. *And the Plastick had nothing to do but to move this passive and easie body, &c.* It may be added, and keep it in its due form and shape. And it is well added [accordingly as the concerns of the higher faculties required] For the *Plastick* by reason of its *Vital Union* with the vehicle, is indeed the main instrument of the motion thereof. But it is the *Imperium* of the *Perceptive* that both excites and guides its motion. Which is no wonder it can do, they being both but one soul.

Pag. 114. *To pronounce the place to be the Sun,*

Sun, &c. Which is as rationally guessed by them, as if one should fancy all the Fellows and Students Chambers in a Colledge to be contained within the area of the Hearth in the Hall, and the rest of the Colledge uninhabited. For the Sun is but a common *Focus* of a *Vortex*, and is less by far to the *Vortex*, than the Hearth to the Ichnographie of the whole Colledge, that I may not say little more than a Tennis-ball to the bigness of the earth.

Pag. 115. *Yet were we not immutably so, &c.* But this mutability we were placed in, was not without a prospect of a more full confirmation and greater accumulation of Happiness at the long run, as I intimated above.

Pag. 116. *We were made on set purpose defatigable, that so all degrees of life, &c.* We being such Creatures as we are and finite, and taking in the enjoyment of those infinitely perfect and glorious Objects onely *pro modulo nostro*, according to the scantness of our capacity, diversion to other Objects may be an ease and relief. From whence the promise of a glorified body in the Christian Religion, as it is most grateful, so appears most rational. But in the mean time it would appear most irrational to believe we shall have eyes and ears and other organs of external sense, and have no suitable Objects to entertain them.

Pag. 117. *Yea, methinks'tis but a reasonable reward to the body, &c.* This is spoken something

thing popularly and to the sense of the vulgar, that imagine the body to feel pleasure and pain, whenas it is the soul onely that is perceptive and capable of feeling either. But 'tis fit the body should be kept in due plight for the lawful and allowable corporeal enjoyments the soul may reap therefrom for seasonable diversion.

Pag. 117. *That that is executed which he hath so determined, &c.* Some fancy this may be extended to the enjoying of the fruits of the Invigouration of all the three *Vital Congruities* of the *Plastick*, and that for a soul orderly and in due time and course to pass through all these dispensations, provided she keep her self sincere towards her Maker, is not properly any lapse or sin, but an harmless experiencing all the capacities of enjoying themselves that God has bestowed upon them. Which will open a door to a further Answer touching the rest of the Planets being inhabited, namely, That they may be inhabited by such kind of souls as these, who therefore want not the Knowledge and assistance of a Redeemer. And so the earth may be the onely *Nosocomium* of sinfully lapsed souls. This may be an answer to such far-fetched Objections till they can prove the contrarie.

Pag. 118. *Adam cannot withstand the inordinate appetite, &c.* Namely, after his own remissness and heedlessness in ordering himself, he

he had brought himself to such a wretched weakness.

Pag. 121. *The Plastick faculties begin now fully to awaken, &c.* There are three *Vital Congruities* belonging to the *Plastick* of the Soul, and they are to awake orderly, that is, to operate one after another downward and upward, that is to say, In the lapse, the *Aereal* follows the *Æthereal*, the *Terrestrial* the *Aereal*. But in their Recovery or Emergency out of the lapse, The *Aereal* follows the *Terrestrial*, and the *Æthereal* the *Aereal*. But however, a more gross turgency to *Plastick* operation may happily arise at the latter end of the *Aereal* Period, which may be as it were the disease of the soul in that state, and which may help to turn her out of it into the state of *Silence*, and is it self for the present silenced therewith. For where there is no union with bodie, there is no operation of the Soul.

Pag. 121. *For it hath an aptness and propensity to act in a Terrestrial body, &c.* This aptness and fitness it has in the state of *Silence*, according to that essential order of things interwoven into its own nature, and into the nature of the *Spirit* of the *World*, or great *Archæus* of the Universe, according to the eternal counsel of the Divine Wisdom. By which Law and ap-
pointment the soul will as certainly have a fitness and propensity at its leaving the *Terrestrial* body to actuate an *Aereal* one.

Pag. 122. *Either by mere natural Congruity, the disposition of the soul of the world, or some more spontaneous agent, &c.* Natural Congruity and the disposal of the *Plastick* soul of the world (which others call the *Spirit of Nature*) may be joyned well together in this Feat, the Spirit of Nature attracting such a soul as is most congruous to the predelineated Matter which it has prepared for her. But as for the spontaneous Agent, I suppose, he may understand his ministry in some supernatural Birth. Unless he thinks that some Angels or Genii may be employed in putting souls into bodies, as Gardiners are in setting Pease and Beans in the beds of Gardens. But certainly they must be no good Genii then that have any hand in assisting or setting souls in such wombs as have had to do with Adulterie, Incest, and Buggerry.

Pag. 123. *But some apish shews and imitations of Reason, Vertue and Religion, &c.* The Reason of the unregenerate in Divine things is little better than thus, and Vertue and Religion which is not from that Principle which revives in us in real Regeneration, are, though much better than scandalous vice and profaneness, mere pictures and shadows of what they pretend to.

Pag. 123. *To its old celestial abode, &c.* For we are Pilgrims and strangers here on the earth, as the holy Patriarchs of old declared.

And

And they that speak such things, saith the Apostle, plainly shew *in their words* that they seek their native country, for so *their* properly signifies. And truly if they had been mindful of that earthly country, out of which they came, they might, saith he, have had opportunity of returning. But now they desire a better, to wit, an heavenly, *Hebr. 11.*

Pag. 124. *But that they step forth again into Airy Vehicles.* This is their natural course, as I noted above. But the examples of *Enoch* and *Elias*, and much more of our ever Blessed Saviour, are extraordinary and supernatural.

Pag. 125. *Those therefore that pass out of these bodies before their Terrestrial Congruity be spoyled, weakened, or orderly unwound, according to the tenour of this Hypothesis, &c.* By the favour of this ingenious Writer, this Hypothesis does not need any such obnoxious Appendage as this, *viz.* That souls that are outed these *Terrestrial* bodies before their *Terrestrial Congruity* be spoiled, weakned, or orderly unwound, return into the state of *Inactivity*. But this is far more consonant both to *Reason* and *Experience* or *Storie*, that though the *Terrestrial Congruity* be still vigorous, as not having run out it may be the half part, no not the tenth part of its Period, the soul immediately upon the quitting of this body is invested with a bodie of Air, and is in the state of *Activity*
not

not of *Silence* in no sense. For some being murdered have in all likelihood in their own persons complained of their murderers, as it is in that story of *Anne Walker*; and there are many others of the same nature.

And besides, it is far more reasonable, there being such numerous multitudes of *silent souls*, that their least continuance in these *Terrestrial* bodies should at their departure be as it were a *Magical Kue* or *Tessera* forthwith to the *Aereal Congruity of life* to begin to act its part upon the ceasing of the other, that more souls may be rid out of the state of *Silence*. Which makes it more probable that every soul that is once besmeared with the unctuous moisture of the Womb, should as it were by a *Magick Ointment* be carried into the *Air* (though it be of a still-born Infant) than that any should return into the state of *Silence* or *Inactivity* upon the pretence of the remaining vigour of the *Terrestrial Congruity of life*. For these Laws are not by any consequential necessity, but by the free counsel of the Eternal Wisdom of God consulting for the best.

And therefore this being so apparently for the best, this Law is interwoven into the *Spirit of the World* and every particular soul, that upon the ceasing of her *Terrestrial Union*, her *Aereal Congruity of life* should immediately operate, and the Spirit of Nature assisting, she should be drest in *Aereal robes*, and be found

among the Inhabitants of those Regions: If
souls should be remanded back into the state
of Silence that depart before the Terrestrial
Period of *Vital Congruity* be orderly undound,
so very few reach the end of that Period, that
they must in a manner all be turned into the
state of *Inactivity*. Which would be to grieve
Penelope's Web, to do and undo because the
day is long enough, as the Proverb is, which
as it rather seems too short, by reason of the
numerosity of *Silent* souls that expect their
turn of Recovery into Life.

Page. 125. But *only follow the clew of this
Hypothesis*. The Hypothesis requires no such
thing, but it rather clashes with the first and
chiefest Pillar thereof, viz. *That all the Divine
designs and actions are laid and carried on by
Infinite Goodness*. And I have already intima-
ted how much better it is to be this way that I
am pleading for, than that of this other wise in-
genious Writer.

Page. 125. *Since by long and hard exertise in
this body, the Plastick Life is well tamed and de-
bilitated, &c.* But this is not at all necessary,
no not in those souls whose *Plastick* may be
deemed the most rampant. Dis-union from
this Terrestrial body immediately tames it, I
mean, the *Terrestrial Congruity of Life*; and its
operation is stopt, as surely as a string of a lute
never so smartly vibrated is streightways si-
lenced by a gentle touch of the finger, and ano-
ther

ther single string may be immediately made to sound alone, while the other is mute and silent. For, I say, these are the *free* Laws of the *Eternal Wisdom*, but *fatally* and *vitally*, not *intellectually* implanted in the *Spirit of Nature*, and in all *Humane Souls* or *Spirits*. The whole *Universe* is as it were the *Automatal Harp* of that great and true *Apollo*; and as for the general striking of the strings and stopping their vibrations, they are done with as exquisite art as if a free intellectual Agent plaid upon them. But the *Plastick* powers in the world are not such, but onely *Vital* and *Fatal*, as I said before.

Pag. 126. *That an Aereal body was not enough for it to display its force upon, &c.* It is far more safe and rational to say, that the soul deserts her *Aereal Estate* by reason that the *Period of the Vital Congruity* is expired, which according to those fatal Laws I spoke of before is determined by the *Divine Wisdom*. But whether a soul may do any thing to abbreviate this *Period*, and excite such symptoms in the *Plastick* as may shorten her continuance in that state, let it be left to the more inquisitive to define.

Pag. 128. *Where is then the difference betwixt the just and the wicked, in state, place, and body?* Their difference in place I have sufficiently shewn, in my Answer to the third Argument against the *triple Congruity of Life* in the

Plastick of Humane Souls, how fitly they may be disposed of in the Air. But to the rude Buffoonry of that crude Opposer of the Opinion of Pre-existence, I made no Answer. It being methinks sufficiently answered in the Scholia upon *Sect. 12. Cap. 3. Lib. 3.* of Dr. *H. Mores Immortalitas Animæ*, if the Reader think it worth his while to consult the place. Now for State and Body the difference is obvious. The *Vehicle* is of more pure Air, and the Conscience more pure of the one than of the other.

Pag. 130. For according to this Hypothesis, the gravity of those bodies is less, because the quantity of the earth that draws them is so, &c. This is an ingenious invention both to salve that Phænomenon, why Bodies in Mines and other deep subterraneous places should seem not so heavy nor hard to lift there, as they are in the superiour Air above the earth; and also to prove that the crust of the earth is not of so considerable a thickness as men usually conceive it is. I say, it is ingenious, but not so firm and sure. The Quick-silver in a *Torricellian* Tube will sink deeper in an higher or clearer Air, though there be the same Magnetism of the earth under it that was before. But this is not altogether so fit an illustration, there being another cause than I drive at conjoynd thereto.

But that which I drive at is sufficient of it self

self to save this Phenomenon. A Bucket of water, while it is in the water comes up with ease to him that draws it at the Well; but so soon as it comes into the Air, though there be the same earth under it that there was before, it feels now exceeding more weighty. Of which I conceive the genuine reason is, because the *Spirit of Nature*, which ranges all things in their due order, acts proportionately strongly to reduce them thereto, as they are more heterogeniously and disproportionately placed as to their consistencies. And therefore by how much more crass and solid a body is above that in which it is placed, by so much the stronger effort the Spirit of Nature uses to reduce it to its right place; but the less it exceeds the crassness of the Element it is in, the effort is the less or weaker.

Hence therefore it is, that a stone or such like body in those subterraneous depths seems less heavy, because the air there is so gross and thick, and is not so much disproportionate to the grossness of the stone as our air above the earth here is; nor do I make any doubt, but if the earth were all cut away to the very bottom of any of these Mines, so that the Air might be of the same consistency with ours, the stone would then be as heavy as it is usually to us in this superioor surface of the earth. So that this is no certain Argument for the proving that the crust of the earth is of such

thinness as this Author would have it, though I do not question but that it is thin enough.

Pag. 131. *And the mention of the Fountains of the great Deep in the Sacred History, &c.* This is a more considerable Argument for the thinness of the crust of the earth; and I must confess I think it not improbable but that there is an Aqueous hollow *Sphaericum*, which is the Basis of this habitable earth, according to that of Psalm 24. 2. *For he hath founded it upon the seas, and established it upon the floods.*

Pag. 131. *Now I intend not that after a certain distance all is fluid matter to the Centre;* That is to say, After a certain distance of earthly Matter, that the rest should be fluid Matter, namely, Water and Air, to the Centre, &c. But here his intention is directed by that veneration he has for *Des Cartes*. Otherwise I believe if he had freely examined the thing to the bottom, he would have found it more reasonable to conclude all fluid betwixt the *Concave* of the Terrestrial Crust and the *Centre* of the Earth, as we usually phrase it, though nothing be properly Earth but that Crust.

Pag. 131. *Which for the most part very likely is a gross and fœtid kind of air, &c.* On this side of the *Concave* of the Terrestrial Crust there may be several Hollows of fœtid air and stagnant water, which may be so many particular lodgings for lapsed and unruly Spirits.

But

But there is moreover a considerable Aqueous *Sphericum* upon which the earth is founded, and is most properly the Abyss; but in a more comprehensive notion, all from the *Convex* thereof to the *Centre* may be termed the Abyss, or the Deepest place that touches our imagination.

Pag. 131. *The lowest and central Regions may be filled with flame and æther, &c.* That there was the Reliques of a Sun after the Incrustation of the Earth and Aqueous Orb, is according to this Hypothesis reasonable enough. And a kind of Air and Æther betwixt this diminished Sun and the *Concave* of this Aqueous Orb, but no crass and opaque concamerations of hard Matter interposed betwixt

Which is an Hypothesis the most kind to the ingenious Author of *Telluris Theoria Sacra*, that he could wish. For he holding that there was for almost two thousand years an opaque earthy Crust over this Aqueous Orb unbroke till the Deluge, which he ascribes to the breaking thereof, it was necessary there should be no opaque Orb betwixt the Central Fire and this Aqueous Orb; for else the Fishes for so long a time had lived in utter darkness, having eyes to no purpose, nor ability to guide their way or hunt their prey. Onely it is supposed, which is easie to do, that they then swam with their backs toward the Centre, whereas as now

they swim with their bellies thitherward; they then plying near the *Concave*, as now near the *Convex* of this watry Abyſs. Which being admitted, the difference of their poſture will neceſſarily follow according to the Laws of Nature, as were eaſie to make out, but that I intend brevity in theſe Annotations.

Onely I cannot forbear by the way to advertiſe how probable it is that this Central Fire which ſhone clear enough to give light to the Fiſhes ſwimming near the *Concave* of this Watry Orb, might in proceſs of time grow dimmer and dimmer, and exceeding much a bate of its light, by that time the Cruſt of the Earth broke and let in the light of the Sun of this great *Vortex* into this Watry Region, within which, *viz.* in the Air or *Æther* there, there has been ſtill a decay of light, the Air or *Æther* growing more thick as well as that little Central Fire or Sun, being more and more inveloped with fuliginous ſtuff about it. So that the whole Concavity may ſeem moſt like a vaſt duſky Vault, and this dwindling overclouded Sun a Sepulchral Lamp, ſuch as, if I remember right, was found in the Monuments of *Olybius* and *Tulliola*. An hideous diſmal forlorn Place, and fit Receptracle for the *Methim* and *Rephaim*.

And the Latin Tranſlation, *Job 26. 5.* excellently well accords with this ſad Phænomenon. *Ecce Gigantes gemunt ſub Aquis, & qui*
babi-

habitant cum eis. Here is that *anagorai nēdus*, or *enēdus*, as *Symmachus* translates the word. And it follows in the verse, *Nudus est Informis coram eo*, Hell is naked before God. And *Symmachus* in other places of the Proverbs puts *an* and *enēdus* together, which therefore is the most proper and the nethermost Hell. And it will be *an* in the highest sense, whenever this lurid Light (as it seems probable to me it sometime will be) is quite extinct, and this *Central Fire* turned into a *Terrella*, as it may seem to have already happened in *Saturn*. But we must remember, as the Author sometimes reminds us, that we are embellishing but a Romantick Hypothesis, and be sure we admit no more than Reason, Scripture, and the Apostolick Faith will allow.

Pag. 132. *Are after death committed to those squalid subterraneous Habitations, &c.* He seems to suppose that all the wicked and degenerate souls are committed hither, that they may be less troublesome to better souls in this air above the earth. But considering the Devil is call'd the Prince of the Air, & that he has his Clients and Subjects in the same place with him; we may well allow the lower Regions of the Air to him, and to some wicked or unregenerate souls promiscuously with him, though there be subterraneous Receptacles for the worst and most rebellious of them, and not send them all packing thither.

Pag. 126. *That they are driven into those Dungeons by the invisible Ministers of Justice, &c.* He speaks of such Dungeons as are in the broken Caverns of the Earth, which may be so many vexatious Receptacles for rebellious Spirits which these invisible Ministers of Justice may drive them into, and see them committed; and being confined there upon far severer penalties if they submit not to that present punishment which they are sentenced to, they will out of fear of greater Calamity be in as safe custody as if they were under lock and key. But the most dismal penalty is to be carried into the Abyss, the place of the *Rephaim* above described. This is a most astonishing commination to them, and they extremely dread that sentence. Which makes the Devils, *Luke 8. 31.* so earnestly beseech Christ that he would not command them *et in abyssum amittantur* to pack away into the Abyss.

This punishment therefore of the Abyss where the *Rephaim* or *evil spirits* groan, is door and lock that makes them, whether they will or no, submit to all other punishments and confinements on this side of it. *Michael Psellus* takes special notice how the Daemons are frightened with the menaces *The eis me athenas is me amittantur* with the menaces of the sending them away packing into the Abyss and subterraneous places. But these may signifie no more than Cavities that are in the ruptures of the earth,

earth, and they may steal out again if they will adventure, unless they were perpetually watched, which is not so probable. Wherefore they are imprisoned through fear of that great horrid Abyss above described, and which as I said is an iron lock and door of brass upon them.

But then you will say, What is the door and lock to this terrible place? I answer, The inviolable Adamantine Laws of the great *Sandalphon* or *Spirit* of the *Universe*. When once a rebellious Spirit is carried down by a Minister of Justice into this Abyss, he can no more return of himself, than a man put into a Well forty fathoms deep is able of himself to ascend out of it.

The unlapſed Spirits, it is their priviledge that their Vehicles are wholly obedient to the will of the Spirit that inactuates them, and therefore they have free ingreſs and egreſs every where; and being ſo *little paſſive* as they are, and ſo *quick* and *ſwift* in their motions, can perform any Miniſtries with little or no incommodation to themſelves. But the Vehicles of lapſed Spirits are *more paſſive*, and they are the very chains whereby they are tyed to certain Regions by the iron Laws of the Spirit of the *Universe*, or Hylarchick Principle, that unfailingly ranges the Matter everie where according to certain orders. Wherefore this Serjeant of Juſtice having once depoſited his Prisoner with-
in

in the *Concave* of the *Aqueous Orb*, he will be as certainly kept there, and never of himself get out again, as the man in the bottom of the Well above-mentioned. For the Laws of the same Spirit of Nature that keeps the man at the bottom of the Well (that everie thing may be placed according to the measure of its consistencie) will inhibit this Captive from ever returning to this Superiour Air again, because his Vehicle is, though foul enough, yet much thinner than the Water; and there will be the the same ranging of things on the *Concave* side of the *Aqueous Orb*, as there is on the *Convex*.

So that if we could suppose the Ring about *Saturn* inhabited with any living creatures, they would be born toward the *Concave* of the Ring as well as toward the *Convex*, and walk as steadily as we and our Antipodes do with our feet on this and that side of the earth one against another. This may serve for a brief intimation of the reason of the thing, and the intelligent will easily make out the rest themselves, and understand what an ineluctable fate and calamity it is to be carried into that dusky place of dread and horreur, when once the Angel that has the Keys of the Abyss or bottomless pit has shut a rebellious Spirit up there, & chained him in that hideous Dungeon.

Pag. 133. Others to the Dungeon, and some to the most intolerable Hell the Abyss of fire. The Dungeon here, if it were understood with an
Em,

Emphasis, would most properly denote the Dungeon of the *Rephaim*, of which those parts nearest the Centre may be called the Abyss of Fire more properly than any Vulcano's in the Crust of the earth. Those souls therefore that have been of a more fierce and fiery nature, and the Causers of Violence and Bloodshed, and of furious Wars and cruel Persecutions of innocent and harmless men, when they are committed to this Dungeon of the *Rephaim*, by those inevitable Laws of the subteraqueous *Sandalphon*, or *Demogorgon*, if you will, they will be ranged nearest the Central Fire of this Hellish Vault. For the Vehicles of souls symbolizing with the temper of the mind, those who are most haughty, ambitious, fierce, and fiery, and therefore, out of Pride and contempt of others in respect of themselves and their own Interest, make nothing of shedding innocent blood, or cruelly handling those that are not for their turn, but are faithful adherers to their Maker, the Vehicles of these being more thin and fiery than theirs who have transgressed in the *Concupiscible*, they must needs surmount such in order of place, and be most remote from the *Concave* of the *Aqueous Orb* under which the *Rephaim* groan, and so be placed at least the nearest to that Abyss of Fire, which our Author terms the most intolerable Hell.

Pag. 133. *Have a strict and careful eye upon them, to keep them within the confines of their Goal,*

Genl. &c. That this, as it is a more tedious Province, so a needles one, I have intimated above, by reason that the fear of being carried into the Abyss will effectually detain them in their confinements. From whence if they be not released in time, the very place they are in may so change their Vehicles, that it may in a manner grow natural to them, and make them as incapable of the Superiour Air as Bats and Owls are, as the ingenious Author notes, to bear the Suns Noon-day Beams, or the Fish to live in these thinner Regions. *¶* To *model* *ben* *2*
to *pag* *114* *¶* Under severe penalties prohibit all audacious excursions into the upper World, though I confess this seems not so probable, &c. The Author seems to reserve all the Air above the earth to good souls only, and that if any bad ones appear, it must be by either stealth or license. But why bad souls may not be in this lower Region of the Air as well as Devils, I understand not. Nor do I conceive but that the Kingdom of Darkness may make such Laws amongst themselves, as may tend to the ease and safety of those of the Kingdom of Light. Not out of any good-will to them, but that themselves may not further smart for it if they give license to such and such exorbitancies. For they are capable of pain and punishment, and though they are permitted in the world, yet they are absolutely under the power of the Almighty, and of the Grand Minister

nister of his Kingdom, the glorious Soul of the
Messiah.

Pag. 137. The interval Central Fire should
have got such strength and irresistible vigour, &c.
But how or from whence, is very hard to con-
ceive. I should rather suspect, as I noted above,
that the Fire will more and more decay till it
turn at last to a kind of *Terribilis*, like that ob-
served within the Ring of *Saurin*, and the
Dungeon become utter Darkness, where there
will be weeping and wailing and gnashing of
teeth, as well as in the furnace of Fire.

Pag. 141. And so following the Law of its
proper motion, shall fly away out of this Vortex,
&c. This looks like an heedless mistake of
this ingenious Writer, who thought he speak the
language of *Cartesius*; seems however to have
recalled to mind his Principles. For the Sun
according to his Principles is never like to be-
come a *Sun* again. Nor if it had so become,
would it then become a *Comet*. For such as
Comets according to his Philosophy are in-
flated *Suns*, and Planets or Earths in a manner,
and so to be deemed so soon as they settle in
any Vortex, and take their course about the
Centre thereof. Nor if the Earth become a
Sun again, is it like to leave our Vortex ac-
cording to the *Cartesian* Principles, but rather be
swallowed down into the Sun of our Vortex,
and increase his magnitude; the ranging of the
Planets according to *Des Cartes* Mechanical

Laws being from the difference of their solidities, and the least solid next to the Sun. Whither then can this *Sol redivivus* or the Earth turned wholly into the *Materia subtilissima* again be carried, but into the Sun itself? This seems most likely, especially if we consider this *Sol Redivivus* or the Earth turned all into the *Materia subtilissima*, in itself. But if we take into our consideration its particular *Vortex* which carries about the Moon, the business may bear a further debate which will require more time than to be entered upon here. But it seems plain at first sight, that though this *Sol Redivivus* should by vertue of its particular *Motion* be kept from being swallowed down into the Soul and Centre of the great *Vortex*, yet it will never be able to get out of this great *Vortex* according to the frame of *Des Cartes* Philosophy. So that there will be two Suns in one *Vortex*, a Planetary one and a fixt one. Which unexpected monstrositie in Nature will make any curious *Cartesian* more wary how he admits of the Earths ever being turned into a Sun again; but rather to be content to let its Central Fire to incrustate it self into a *Terræla*, there seeming to be an example of this in that little Globe in the midst of the Ring of *Saturn*; but of an Earth turned into a Sun no example at all that I know of.

on Pag. 142. So that the Central Fire remains unconcerned, &c. And so it well may, it being

so considerable a distance from the *Concave* of the *Aqueous Orb*, and the *Aqueous Orb* it self betwixt the *Crust* of the *Earth* and it. But the *Prisoners* of this *Gaol* of the *Rephaim* will not be a little concerned. This *Hell* of a sudden growing so smothering hot to them all, though the *Central Fire* no more than it was. And whatever becomes of those *Spirits* that suffer in the very *Conflagration* it self, yet *Ab hoc Inferno nulla est redemptio*.

Pag. 147. *Those immediate births of unassisted nature will not be so tender, &c.* Besides, the *Air* being replenisht with benign *Dæmons* or *Genii*, to whom it cannot but be a pleasant *Spectacle* to behold the inchoations and progresses of reviving *Nature*, they having the *Curiositie* to contemplate these births, may also in all likelihood exercise their kindness in helping them in their wants; and when they are grown up, assist them also in the methods of *Life*, and impart as they shall find fit the *Arcana* of *Arts* and *Sciences* and *Religion* unto them, nor suffer them to symbolize overmuch in their way of living with the rest of their fellow terrestrial *Creatures*. If it be true that some hold, that even now when there is no such need, every one has his *Genius* or *Guardian Angel*, it is much more likely that at such a season as this, every tender *Fetus* of their common Mother the *Earth*, would be taken into the care of some good

Dæmon or other, even at their very first budding out into life.

Pag. 148. *But all this is but the frolick exercise of my Pen choosing a Paradox.* And let the same be said of the Pen of the Annotator, who has bestowed these pains not to gain Profelytes to the Opinions treated of in this Discourse, but to entertain the Readers Intellectuals with what may something enlarge his thoughts; and if he be curious and anxious, help him at a pinch to some ease of mind touching the ways of God and his wonderful Providence in the World.

Pag. 149. *Those other expressions of Death, Destruction, Perdition of the ungodly, &c.* How the entering into the state of Silence may well be deemed a real Death, Destruction and Perdition, that passage in *Lucretius* does marvelously well set out.

Nam si tantopere est animi mutata potestas,

Omnis ut actarum exciderit retinentia rerum,

Non, ut opinor, ea ab letho jam longiter errat

Quapropter fateare necesse est, quæ fuit ante

Interiisse, &c. *De Rerum Natura, Lib. 3.*

And again in the same book he says, though we were again just as we were before, yet we having no memory thereof, it is all one as if we were perfectly lost. And yet this is the condition of the soul which the Divine Nemesis

sends into the state of Silence, because afterwards she remembers nothing of her former life. His words are these:

*Nec, si materiam nostram collegerit ætas
Post obitum, rursúmque; redegerit ut sita nunc est,
Atque iterum nobis fuerint data lumina vitæ,
Pertineat quicquam tamen ad nos id quoque; factum*

Interrupta semel quom sit retinentia nostri.

Page. 150. In those passages which predict new Heavens and a new Earth, &c. I suppose he alludes especially to that place in the Apocalypse, Chap. 21. where presently upon the Description of the Lake of Fire in the precedent Chapter which answers to the Conflagration, it is said, *And I saw a new Heaven and a new Earth.* But questionless that passage, as in other places, is *Politically* to be understood, not *Physically*, unless this may be the ingenious Authors meaning, That the Writer of the Apocalypse adorning his style with allusions to the most rousing and most notable real or Physical Objects (which is observable all along the Apocalypse) it may be a sign that a new Heaven and a new Earth succeeding the Conflagration, is one of those noble Phænomena true and real amongst the rest, which he thought fit to adorn his style with by alluding thereto. So that though the chief intended

sense of the Apocalypse be *Political*, yet by its allusions it may countenance many noble and weighty Truths whether *Physical* or *Metaphysical*. As, The existence of Angels, which is so perpetually inculcated all along the Book from the beginning to the ending: The Divine Shechina in the celestial Regions: The Dreadful Abyfs in which rebellious Spirits are chained, and at the commination whereof they so much tremble: The Conflagration of the Earth; and lastly, The renewing and restoring this Earth and Heaven after the Conflagration.

Pag. 150. *The main Opinion of Pre-existence is not at all concerned, &c.* This is very judiciously and soberly noted by him. And therefore it is by no means fairly done by the Opposers of Pre-existence, while they make such a pudder to confute any passages in this Hypothesis, which is acknowledged by the *Pre-existentiaries* themselves to be no necessary or essential part of that Dogma. But this they do, that they may seem by their Cavils (for most of them are no better) against some parts of this unnecessarie Appendage of Pre-existence, to have done some execution upon the Opinion it self; which how far it extends, may be in some measure discovered by these Notes we have made upon it. Which stated as they direct, the Hypothesis is at least possible; but that it is absolutely the true one, or should be thought

thought so, is not intended. But as the ingenious Author suggests, it is either this way or some better, as the infinite Wisdom of God may have ordered. But this possible way shews Pre-existence to be neither impossible nor improbable.

Pag. 151. *But submit all that I have written to the Authority of the Church of England, &c.* And this I am perswaded he heartily did, as it is the duty of every one, in things that they cannot confirm by either a plain demonstration, clear authority of Scripture, Manifestation of their outward Senses, or some rousing Miracle, to compromise with the Decisions of the National Church where Providence has cast them, for common peace and settlement, and for the ease and security of Governments. But because a fancy has taken a man in the head, that he knows greater *Arcana* than others, or has a more orthodox belief in things not necessarie to Salvation than others have, for him to affect to make others *Profelytes* to his Opinion, and to wear his badge of Wisdom, as of an extraordinarie Master in matters of Theory, is a mere vanitie of Spirit, a ridiculous piece of pride and levitie, and unbecoming either a sober and stanch'd man or a good Christian. But upon such pretences to gather a Sect, or set up a Church or Independent Congregation, is intolerable Faction and Schism, nor can ever bear a free and strict ex-

amination according to the measures of the truest *Morals* and *Politicks*.

But because it is the fate of some men to believe Opinions, to others but probable, nor it may be so much (as the motion of the Earth suppose, and *Des Cartes* his *Vortices*, and the like) to be certain Science, it is the interest of every National Church to define the truth of no more Theories than are plainly necessary for Faith and good manners; because if they either be *really*, or *seem* to be mistaken in their unnecessary Decisions or Definitions, this with those that are more knowing than ingenuous will certainly lessen the Authority and Reverence due to the Church, and hazard a secret enmity of such against her. But to adventure upon no Decisions but what have the Authority of Scripture (which they have that were the Decisions of General Councils before the Apostasie) and plain usefulness as well as Reason of their side, this is the greatest Conservative of the Honour and Authority of a Church (especially joyned with an exemplary life) that the greatest Prudence or Politicks can ever excogitate. Which true Politicks the Church of *Rome* having a long time ago deserted, has been fain, an horrid thing to think of it! to support her Authority and extort Reverence by mere Violence and Blood. Whenas, if she had followed these more true and Christian Politicks, she would never

never have made herself so obnoxious, but for ought one knows, she might have stood and retained her Authority for ever.

In the mean time, this is suitable enough, and very well worth our noting, That forasmuch as there is no assurance of the Holy Ghost's assisting unnecessary Decisions, though it were of the Universal Church, much less of any National one; so that if such a point be determined, it is uncertainly determined, and that there may be several ways of holding a necessary Point, some more accommodate to one kind of men, others to another, and that the Decisions of the Church are for the Edification of the people, that either their *Faith* may be more firm, or their *Lives* more irreprehensible: these things, I say, being premised, it seems most prudent and Christian in a Church to decline the Decision of the circumstances of any necessary point, forasmuch as by deciding and determining the thing one way, those other handles by which others might take more fast hold on it are thereby cut off, and so their assent made less firm thereto.

We need not go far for an example, if we but remember what we have been about all this time. It is necessarie to believe that we have in us an Immortal Spirit capable of Salvation and Damnation, according as we shall behave ourselves. This is certainly revealed to us, and is of indispensable usefulness. But though

this Opinion or rather Article of Faith be but one, yet there are several waies of holding it. And it lies more easie in some mens minds, if they suppose it created by God at every conception in the Womb; in other some, if they conceive it to be *ex Traduce*; and lastly in others, if it pre-exist. But the waies of holding this Article signifie nothing but as they are subservient to the making us the more firmly hold the same. For the more firmly we believe it, the greater influence will it have upon our lives, to cause us to live in the fear of God, and in the waies of Righteousness like good Christians.

Wherefore now it being supposed that it will stick more firm and fixt in some mens minds by some one of these three waies, rather than by either of the other two, and thus of any one of the three; It is manifest, it is much more prudently done of the Church not to cut off two of these three handles by a needless, nay, a harmful Decision, but let every one choose that handle that he can hold the Article fastest by, for his own support and Edification. For thus every one laying firm hold on that handle that is best fitted for his own grasp, the Article will carry all these three sorts of believers safe up to Heaven, they living accordingly; whenas two sorts of them would have more slippery or uncertain hold, if they had no handle offered to them but those

those which are less suitable to their grasp and Genius.

Which shews the Prudence, Care, and Accuracy of Judgment in the Church of *England*, that as in other things, so in this, she has made no such needless and indeed hurtful Decisions, but left the modes of conceiving things of the greatest moment, to every ones self, to take it that way that he can lay the fastest hold of it, and it will lie the most easily in his mind without doubt and wavering. And therefore there being no one of these handles but what may be useful to some or other for the more easie and undoubted holding that there is in us an Immaterial and Immortal Soul or Spirit, my having taken this small pains to wipe off the soil, and further the usefulness of one of them by these Annotations, if it may not merit thanks, it must, I hope, at least deserve excuse with all those that are not of too sower and tetrick a Genius, and prefer their own humours and sentiments before the real benefit of others.

But now if any one shall invidiously object, that I prefer the Christian Discretion of my own Church the Church of *England*, before the Judgment and Wisdom of a General Council, namely, the fifth Oecumenical Council held at *Constantinople* in *Justinians* time under the Patriarch *Eutychius*, who succeeded *Menas* lately deceased, to whom *Justinian* sent that Discourse

course of his against *Origen* and his errors, amongst which *Pre-existence* is reckoned one: In answer to this, several things are to be considered, that right may be done our Mother:

First, What number of Bishops make a general Council, so that from their *Numerosity* we may rely upon their Authority and infallibility that they will not conclude what is false.

Secondly, Whether in whatsoever matters of debate, though nothing to the Salvation of mens souls, but of curious Speculation, fitter for the Schools of Philosophers than Articles of Faith for the edification of the people (whose memory and conscience ought to be charged with no notions that are not subservient to the rightly and duly honouring God and his onely begotten Son our Lord Jesus Christ, and to the faithful discharging their duty to man) the assistance of the Spirit of God can rationally be expected; or onely in such things as are necessary to be professed by the people, and very useful for the promoting of Life and Godliness. And as *Moses* has circumscribed his Narrative of the Creation within the limits of *Mundus Plebeiorum*, and also the Chronology of time according to Scripture is bounded from the first *Adam* to the coming again of the second to Judgment, and Sentencing the wicked to everlasting punishment, and the righteous to life

life everlasting: so whether the Decisions of the Church are not the most safely contained within these bounds, and they faithfully discharge themselves in the conduct of Souls, if they do but instruct them in such truths only as are within this compass revealed in sacred Scripture. And whether it does not make for the Interest and Dignity of the Church to decline the meddling with other things, as unprofitable and unnecessary to be decided.

Thirdly, Whether if a General Council meet not together *in via Spiritus Sancti*, but some stickling imbitter'd Grantees of the Church out of a pique that they have taken against some persons get through their interest a General Council called, whether is the assistance of the Holy Ghost to be expected in such a meeting, so that they shall conclude nothing against truth.

Fourthly, Whether the Authority of such General Councils as Providence by some notable prodigie may seem to have intimated a dislike of, be not thereby justly suspected, and not easily to be admitted as infallible deciders.

Fifthly, Whether a General Council that is found mistaken in one point, anathematizing that for an Heresie which is a truth, forfeits not its Authority in other points, which then whether falsehoods or truths, are not to be deemed

med so from the Authority of that Council, but from other Topicks.

Sixthly, Since there can be no commerce betwixt God and man, nor he communicate his mind and will to us but by supposition, That our senses rightly circumstantiated are true, That there is skill in us to understand words and Grammar, and schemes of speech, as also common notions and clear inferences of Reason, whether if a General Council conclude any thing plainly repugnant to these, is the Conclusion of such a Council true and valid; and whether the indeble Notices of truth in our mind that all Mankind is possessed of, whether Logical, Moral, or Metaphysical, be not more the dictates of God, than those of any Council that are against them.

Seventhly, If a Council, as general as any has been called, had in the very midnight of the Churches Apostasie and ignorance met, and concluded all those Corruptions that now are obruded by the Church of Rome, as Transubstantiation, Invocation of Saints, Worshipping of Images, and the like, whether the Decisions of such a Council could be held infallible or valid. What our own excellently well Reformed Church holds in this case, is evident out of her Articles. For,

Eighthly, The Church of England plainly declares, *That General Councils when they be gathered together, forasmuch as they be an Assembly*

sembly of men whereof all are not governed with the Spirit and Word of God, they may err, and sometimes have erred even in things pertaining to God. Wherefore, saith she, things ordained by them as necessary to Salvation have neither strength nor Authority, unless it may be declared that they be taken out of Holy Scripture. Artic.

21.

Ninthly, And again, Artic. 20. where she allows the Church to have power to decree Rites and Ceremonies, and Authority in Controversies of Faith, but with this restriction, That it is not lawful for the Church to ordain any thing that is contrary to Gods Word written, neither may it so expound one place of Scripture that it be repugnant to another; she concludes: Wherefore although the Church be a Witness and Keeper of Holy Writ, yet as it ought not to decree any thing against the same, so besides the same ought it not to inforce any thing to be believed for necessity of Salvation. What then, does she null the Authority of all the General Councils, and have no deference for any thing but the mere Word of God to convince men of Heresie? No such matter. What her sense of these things is, you will find in 1 *Eliz. cap.* 1. Wherefore,

Tenthly and lastly, What General Councils the Church of *England* allows of for the conviction of Hereticks you may understand out of these words of the Statute: *They shall not adjudge*

adjudge any matter or cause to be Heresies, but only such as heretofore have been adjudged to be Heresie by the Authority of the Canonical Scriptures, or by the first four General Councils or any of them, or by any other General Council wherein the same was declared Heresie by the express and plain words of the said Canonical Scriptures,

By brief reflections upon some of these ten Heads, I shall endeavour to lessen the Invidiousness of my seeming to prefer the Discretion of the Church of *England* before the Judgment of a General Council, I mean of such a General Council as is so unexceptionable that we may rely on the Authority of their Decisions, that they will not fail to be true. Of which sort whether the fifth reputed General Council be, we will briefly first consider.

For reflecting on the first head, It seems scarcely numerous enough for a General Council. The first General Council of *Nice* had above three hundred Bishops; That of *Chalcedon* above six hundred: This fifth Council held at *Constantinople* had but an hundred sixty odd. And which still makes it more unlike a General Council, in the very same year, viz. 553, the Western Bishops held a Council at *Aquileia*, and condemned this fifth Council held at *Constantinople*.

Secondly, The Pre-existence of Souls being a mere Philosophical Speculation, and indeed held

held by all Philosophers in the affirmative that held the Soul incorporeal; we are to consider whether we may not justly deem this case referrible to the second Head, and to look something like Pope *Zacharies* appointing a Council to condemn *Virgilius* as an Heretick, for holding *Antipoas*.

Thirdly, We may very well doubt whether this Council proceeded *in via Spiritus Sancti*, this not being the first time that the lovers and admirers of *Origen* for his great Piety and Knowledge, and singular good service he had done to the Church of Christ in his time, had foul play pla'd them. Witness the story of *Theophilus* Bishop of *Antioch*, who to revenge himself on *Dioscorus* and two others that were lovers of *Origen* and *Anti-Anthropomorphites*, stickled so, that he caused *Epiphanius* in his See, as he did in his own, to condemn the Books of *Origen* in a Synod. To which condemnation *Epiphanius* an *Anthropomorphite* and one of more Zeal than Knowledge, would have got the subscription of *Chrysostome* the Patriarch of *Constantinople*; but he had more Wisdom and Honesty than to listen to such an injurious demand.

And as it was with those Synods called by *Theophilus* and *Epiphanius*, so it seems to be with the fifth Council. Piques and Heart-burnings amongst the Grandees of the Church seemed to be at the bottom of the business. Bi-

nus in his History of this fifth Council takes notice of the enmity betwixt *Pelagius*, Pope *Vigilius's* Apocrisiarie, and *Theodorus* Bishop of *Cæsarea Cappadociae* an *Origenist*. And *Spondanus* likewise mentions the same, who says, touching the business of *Origen*, that *Pelagius* the Popes Apocrisiarie, *eam questionem in ipsius Theodori odium movisse existimabatur*. And truly it seems to me altogether incredible, unless there were some hellish spight at the bottom, that they should not have contented themselves to condemn the errors supposed to be *Origen's* (but after so long a time after his death, there being in his writings such choppings and changings and interpolations, hard to prove to be his) but have spared his name, for that unspeakable good service he did the Church in his life-time. See Dr. *H. Mares* Preface to his *Collectio Philosophica*, Sect. 18. where *Origen's* true Character is described out of *Eusebius*. Wherefore whether this be to begin or carry on things *in via Spiritus Sancti*, so that we may rely on the Authority of such a Council, I leave to the impartial and judicious to consider.

Fourthly, In reference to the fourth Head, That true wisdom and moderation, and the holy assistance of Gods Spirit did not guide the affairs of this Council, seems to be indicated by the Divine Providence, who to shew the effect of their unwise proceedings in the self-

self-same year the Council late, sent a most terrible Earthquake for forty days together upon the City of *Constantinople* where the Council was held, and upon other Regions of the East, even upon *Alexandria* it self and other places, so that many Cities were levelled to the ground. Upon which *Spondanus* writes thus: *Hæc verò presagia fuisse malorum quæ sunt prædictam Synodum consecuta, nemo negare poterit quicunque ab eventis facta novit iudicare.*

This also reminds me of a Prodigy as it was thought that happened at the sixth reputed General Council, where nigh three hundred Fathers were gathered together to decide this nice and subtle Point, namely, whether an operation or volition of Christ were to be deemed, *Una operatio sive volitio* ~~autem~~ according to that Axiom of some Metaphysicians, that *Actio est suppositi*, and so the Humane and Divine Nature of Christ being coalescent into one person, his volition and operation be accounted one as his person is but one; or because of the two Natures, though but one person, there are to be conceived two operations or two volitions. This latter Dogma obtained, and the other was condemned by this third *Constantinopolitan Council*: whereupon, as *Paulus Diaconus* writes, abundance of Cobwebs or Spiders webs fell or rained, as it were, down upon the heads of the people, to their very great astonishment. Some interpret the Cobwebs of

Heresies; others haply more rightfully of
troubling the Church of Christ with over-
great Niceties and curiosities of Subtile Specu-
lation, which tend nothing to the corroborat-
ing her Faith; and promoting a good Life; and
are so obscure, subtile, and lubricous, that look
on them one way they seem thus, and another
way thus.

To this sixth General Council there seemed
two Operations and two Wills in Christ, because
of his two Natures. To a Council called after
by *Philippicus* the Emperour, and *John* Patri-
arch of *Constantinople*, considering Christ as
one person, there appeared *Numerosissimo Orientalium*
Episcoporum collecto Conventu, as *Spondanus*
has it; but as *Bezius*, *Innumere Orientalium*
Episcoporum multitudini congregata, but one will
and one operation. And certainly this nume-
rous innumerable company of Bishops must
put an end for a General Council as that of less
than three hundred. But that the Authority
of both these Councils are designed upon the
account of the second Head; in that the mat-
ters they consulted about tended nothing to
the corroborating of your Faith, or the pro-
moting of a good Life, I have already intima-
ted. And as for the Council of *Constantinople*,
these things I have attempted to note, in re-
ference to that only Head, but for it seems to
stand an undeniable Argument, that our *First*
Resurrection which are the *Risen Witnesses*, were
either

either exquisitely well seen in Ecclesiastick History; or the good Hand of God was upon them that they absolutely admitted onely the four first General Councils; but after them, they knew not where to be, or what to call a General Council, and therefore would not adventure of any so called for the adjudging any matters Heresie. But if any pretended to be such, their Authority should no further prevail, than as they made out things by expresse and plain words of Canonical Scripture. And for other Synods, whether the Seventh, which is the second of *Nice*, or any other that the Church of *Rome* would have to be General In defence of their own exorbitant points of *Faith* or *Practice*, they will be found of no validity, if we have recourse to the sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth Heads.

Fifthly, In reference to the fifth Head. This fifth Council loseth its Authority in anathematizing what in *Origen* seems to be true according to that expresse Text of Scripture, John 16. 28. (especially compared with others. See *Notes on Chap. 11.*) *I came forth from the Father, and am come into the world; again I leave the world, and go to the Father.* He came forth from his Father which is in Heaven, accordingly as he taught us to pray to him (the Divine *Person* being in a peculiar manner there) He leaves the world and goes to the Father, which all understand of his Ascension into Heaven,

whence his coming from the Father must have the same sense, or else the Antithesis will plainly fail. Wherefore it is plain he came down from Heaven (as he signifies also in other places) as well as returns thither. But he can neither be truly said to come from heaven, nor return thither, according to his Divine Nature. For it never left Heaven, nor removes from one place to another; and therefore this Scripture does plainly imply the Pre existence of the Soul of the Messiah, according to the Doctrine of the Jews, before it was incarnate. And this stricture of the old *Cabala* may give light to more places of St. *Johns* Writings than is fit to recite in this haste; I will onely name one by the by, *1 John 4. 2. Every Spirit that confesseth* *ἑκαστος πνεῦμα ὁμολογῶν*, *that Jesus is the Christ* *ὅτι Ἰησοῦς ἐστιν ὁ Χριστός*, *come in the flesh*, that is to say, is the Christ incarnate, *is of God*. For the Messiah did exist, *viz.* his Soul, before he came into the flesh, according to the Doctrine of the Jews. Which was so well known, that upon the above-cited saying (*John 16. 28.*) of our Saviour, they presently answered, *Lo, now speakest thou plainly, and speakest no Parable*; because he clearly discovers himself by this Character to be the expected Messiah incarnate. Nor is there any possible evasion out of the clearness of this Text from the communication of Idioms, because Christ cannot be said to come down from Heaven according to his Humane Nature before

fore it was there, therefore his Humane Nature was there before it was incarnate.

And lastly, The Authority of the Decision of this Council (if it did so decide) is lessened, in that contrary to the second Head (as was hinted above) it decides a point that Faith and Godliness is not at all concerned in. For the Divinity of Christ, which is the great point of Faith, is as firmly held supposing the Soul of the *Messias* united with the *Logos* before his incarnation, as in it. So that the *spight* onely of *Pelagius* against *Theodorus* to multiply Anathematisms against *Origen*, no use or necessity of the Church required any such thing. Whence again their Authority is lessened upon the account of the third Head.

These things may very well suspend a careful mind, and loth to be imposed upon, from relying much upon the Authority of this fifth Council. But suppose its Authority entire, yet the Acts against *Origen* are not to be found in the Council. And the sixth Council in its Anathematisms, though it mention *Theodore's* Writings, the Epistle of *Ibas* and *Theodorus Mopsuestenus* who were concerned in the fifth Council; yet I find not there a syllable touching *Origen*. And therefore those that talk of his being condemned by that fifth Council, have an eye, I suppose, to the Anathematisms at the end of that Discourse which *Justinian* the Emperour sent to *Menas Patri-*

arch of *Constantinople*, according to which form they suppose the errors of *Origen* condemned. Which if it were true, yet *simple Pre-existence* will escape well enough.

Nor do I think that learned and intelligent Patriarch *Photius* would have called the simple Opinion of Pre-existence of souls *ἀσύνθετον*, but for those Appendages that the injudiciousness and rashness of some had affixed to it. Partly therefore reflecting upon that first Anathematism in the Emperours Discourse that makes the pre-existent souls of men first to be *Νηπύ* as if their highest felicity consisted in having no body to inactuate (which plainly clashes with both sound Philosophy and Christianity, as if the *Νηπύ* and *Rephaim* were all one, and they were not *Νηπύ* till they were *ἀσύνθετον* *τῷ σώματι*, *grown cold to the Divine Love*, and onely gathered body as they gathered corruption, and were alienated from the Life of God; which is point-blank against the Christian Faith, which has promised us, as the highest prize, a glorified body:) And partly what himself adds, that one soul goes into several bodies; Which are impertinent Appendages of the Pre-existence of the soul, false, useless and unnecessary; and therefore those that add these Appendages thereto, violate the sincerity of the Divine Tradition to no good purpose.

But this simple Doctrine of Pre-existence is so unexceptionable and harmless, that the

third collection of Councils in *Iustellus*, which is called *adrianus*, though it reckon the other errors of *Origen* condemned in the fifth Council, omits this of Pre-existence. Certainly that Ecclesiastick that framed that Discourse for the Emperour, if he did it not himself, had not fully, deliberately and impartially considered the Dogma of Pre-existence taken in its self, nor does once offer to answer any Reasons out of Scripture or Philosophy that are produced for it. Which if it had been done, and this had been the onely error to be alledged against *Origen*, I cannot think it credible, nay scarce possible, though their spight had been never so much against some lovers of *Origen*, that they could have got any General Council to have condemned so holy, so able, so victorious a Champion for the Christian Church in his life-time for an Heretick, upon so tolerable a punctilio, about three hundred years after his death. What Father that wrote before the first four General Councils, but might by the Malevolent, for some odd passage or other, be doomed an Heretick, if such severity were admittable amongst Christians?

But I have gone out further than I was aware, and it is time for me to bethink me what I intended. Which was the justifying of my self in my seeming to prefer the Discretion of our own Church in leaving us free to hold the

Incorporeity and Immortality of the soul by any of the three handles that best fitted every mans Genius, before the Judgment of the fifth General Council, that would abridge us of this liberty. From which Charge I have endeavoured to free my self, briefly by these two ways: First, by shewing how hard it is to prove the fifth Oecumenical Council so called, to be a legitimate General or Oecumenical Council, and such as whose Authority we may relie on. And secondly, if it was such, by shewing that it did not condemn simply the Pre-existence of souls, but Pre-existence with such and such Appendages. So that there is no real clashing betwixt our Church and that Council in this.

But however this is, from the eighth and ninth Heads it's plain enough that the Church of *England* is no favourer of the Conclusions of any General Council that are enjoyned as necessary to Salvation, that be either repugnant to Holy Scripture, or are not clearly to be made out from the same; which Non-pre-existence of Souls certainly is not, but rather the contrary. But being the point is not sufficiently clear from Scripture either way to all, and the Immortality of the Soul and subsistence after death is the main useful point; that way which men can hold it with most firmness and ease, her Candour and Prudence has left it free to them to make use of.

And

And as for General Councils, though she does not in a fit of Zeal, which *Theodosius* a Prior in *Palestine* is said to have done, anathematize from the Pulpit all people that do not give as much belief to the four first General Councils as to the four Gospels themselves; yet, as you may see in the tenth Head, she makes the Authority of the first four General Councils so great, that nothing is to be adjudged Heresie but what may be proved to be so either from the *Scripture* or from these four Councils: Which Encomium might be made with less skill and more confidence by that Prior, there having been no more than four General Councils in his time. But it was singular Learning and Judgment, or else a kind of Divine Sagacity in our first Reformers, that they laid so great stress on the first four General Councils, and so little on any others pretended so to be.

But in all likelihood they being perswaded of the truth of the prediction of the Apostasie of the Church under Antichrist how universal in a manner it would be, they had the most confidence in those General Councils which were the earliest, and that were held within those times of the Church which some call *Symmetrical*. And without all question, the two first General Councils, that of *Nice*, and that other of *Constantinople*, were within those times, viz. within four hundred years after Christ;

Christ; and the third and fourth within the time that the ten-horned Beast had his horns growing up, according to Mr. *Made's* computation. But the Definitions of the third and fourth Councils, that of *Ephesus*, and that other of *Chalcedon* (which are to establish the *Divinity* of Christ, which is not to be conceived without the Union of both Natures into one person; as also his *Theanthropy*, which cannot consist with the confusion of both Natures into one) were virtually contained in the Definitions of the first and second Councils. So that in this regard they are all of equal Authority, and that unexceptionable. First, because their Decisions were concerning points necessary to be decided one way or other, for the settlement of the Church in the objects of their Divine Worship. And therefore they might be the better assured that the assistance of the Holy Ghost would not be wanting upon so weighty an occasion. And secondly, in that those two first Councils were called while the Church was *Symmetrical*, and before the *Apostasy* came in, according to the testimony of the Spirit in the Visions of the *Apocalypse*.

Which Visions plainly demonstrate, that the Definitions of those Councils touching the *Triunity* of the Godhead and *Divinity* of Christ are not Idolatrous, else the *Apostasy* had begun before the time, these Oracles declare it did; and if not Idolatrous, then they are most

certainly true. And all these four Councils driving at nothing else but these necessary points to be decided, and their decision being thus plainly approved by the suffrage of the Holy Ghost in the Apocalypse, I appeal to any man of sense and judgment if they have not a peculiar prerogative to be believed above what other pretended General Council soever; and consequently with what *special* or rather *Divine* sagacity our first Reformers have laid so peculiar a stress on these four, and how consistent our Mother the Church of *England* is to herself; *that the decisions of General Councils have neither strength nor Authority further than the matter may be cleared out of the Holy Scriptures.* For here we see, that out of the Holy Scriptures there is a most ample testimony given to the Decisions of these four General Councils. So that if one should with *Theodosius* the Prior of *Palestine* in a fit of Zeal anathematize all those that did not believe them as true as the four Evangelists, he would not want a fair Plea for his religious fury.

- But for men after the *Symmetrall* times of the Church, upon Piques and private quarrels of Parties, to get General Councils called as they fancy them, to conclude matters that tend neither to the confirmation of the real Articles of the Christian Faith, or of such a sense of them as are truly useful to life and godliness; and herein to expect the infallible assistances

assurances of the Holy Spirit, either upon such terms as these, or for rank worldly interest, is such a presumption as to a free Judgment will look little better than Simony, as if they could hire the assistance of the Holy Ghost for money.

Thus have I run further into the consideration of General Councils, and the measure of their Authority, than was requisite upon so small an occasion; and yet I think there is nothing said, but if seriously weighed may be useful to the intelligent Reader, whether he favour Pre-existence or not. Which is no further to be favoured than is consistent with the known and approved Doctrines of the Christian Faith, nor clashes any thing with the soundest Systemes of Divinity, as Dr. *H. More* shews his way of exhibiting the Theorie does not, in his *General Preface* to his *Collectio Philosophica*, Sect. 19. whose cautious and castigate method I have imitated as near as I could in these my Annotations. And he has indeed been so careful of admitting any thing in the Hypothesis that may justly be suspected or excepted against, that his Friend Mr. *Glanvil* might have enlarged his Dedication by one word more, and called him *Repurgatorem Sapientiae Orientalis*, as well as *Restauratorem*, unless *Restaurator* imply both: It being a piece of Restoration, to free an Hypothesis from the errors some may have corrupted it with, and

to recover it to its primeval purity and sincerity.

And yet when the business is reduced to this harmless and unexceptionable state, such is the modesty of that Writer, that he declares that if he were as certain of the Opinion as of any demonstration in Mathematicks, yet he holds not himself bound in conscience to profess it any further than is with the good-liking or permission of his Superiours. Of which temper if all men were, it would infinitely contribute to the peace of the Church. And as for my self, I do freely profess that I am altogether of the self-same Opinion and Judgment with him.

ANNO.

to recover it to its primitive purity and fervor.

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with him.

A N N O

Annotations

UPON THE
Discourse of TRUTH.

Into which is inserted
By way of DIGRESSION,
A brief Return
To Mr. BAXTER's Reply,

Which he calls
A Placid COLLATION
With the Learned
Dr. HENRY MORE,

Occasioned by the Doctors ANSWER to a
LETTER of the Learned *Psychopirist*.

Whereunto is annexed
A DEVOTIONAL HYMN,
Translated for the use of the sincere Lovers
of true PIETY.

LONDON: Printed for J. Collins, and S. Lowndes, over against
Exeter-Change in the Strand. 1683.

way to a mans Happiness? And yet all these must be true, and infinitely more such contradictions than we can possibly imagin, if the mutual respects and relations of things be not eternal and indispensable: which that they are, I shall endeavour to prove.

SECT. IV.

The Entrance into the first part of the Discourse, which is of Truth in the Object: That the Divine Understanding does not make the Respects and Relations of its Objects, but finds them or observes them.

First, we must premise that * Divine Understanding cannot be the Fountain of the Truth of things; * nor the Foundation of the references of one to another. For it is against the nature of all Understanding, to make its Objects. * It is the nature of Understanding, *ut moveatur, illuminetur, formetur, &c.* Of its Object, *ut moveat, illuminet, format.* *Intellectus in actu primo* hath it self unto its object, as the Eye unto the Sun; it is irradiated, inlightened and actuated by it: And *Intellectus in actu secundo*, hath it self unto its Object, as the Image to that it represents; and the perfection of Understanding consists in being actuated by,
and

and in an adequate Conformity to its object, according to the nature of all Idea's, Images or Representations of things. The Sum is this, * No Idea's or Representations are or make the things they represent ; all Understanding is such ; therefore no Understanding doth *make* the Natures, Respects and Relations of its Objects.

SECT. V.

That the Divine Will does not determine the References and Dependencies of things, because that would subvert his other Attributes.

* **I**T remains then, that absolute, arbitrary and independent *Will* must be the Fountain of all Truth ; and must determine the References and Dependencies of things : * which assertion would in the *First* place destroy the nature of God, * and rob him of all his Attributes. For then it's impossible that there should be such a thing as Divine *Wisdom* and *Knowledge*, which is nothing else but an apprehension of common notions, and the natures and mutual respects and relations of things. For if the Nature of God be such, that his arbitrary imagination that such and such things have such and such natures and
Depen-

Dependencies, doth make those things to have those Natures or Dependencies, he may as easily Unimagine that Imagination; and then they that before had a mutual Harmony, Sympathy and Agreement with one another, shall now stand at as great a distance and opposition. And thus the Divine Understanding will be a mere Protæan *Chimera*, a Casual Conflux of intellectual Atomes: Contradictions are true, if God will understand them so, and then the foundation of all Knowledge is taken away, and God may as truly be said to know nothing as every thing; nay, * any Angel or Man may as truly be said to know all things, as God himself; for then every thing will be alike certain; and every apprehension equally conformable to Truth. These are infallible consequences, and a thousand more as absurd as these, if contradictory Propositions may be both true: and whether they be so or no, it's a meer casual Dependence upon the Arbitrarious pleasure of God, if there be not a necessary immutability and eternal opposition betwixt the being and the not being of the same thing, at the same time and in the same respect. Likewise all those Truths we call *Common Notions*, (the Systeme and Comprehensions of which, is the very Essence of Divine Wisdom; as the conclusions issu-

ing

ing from them , not by any operose deduction , but a clear intuitive light , are the very Nature of Divine Knowledge , * if we distinguish those two Attributes in God.) I say, all these propositions of immediate and indemonstrable Truth, if these be only so, because so understood by God, and so understood by God because he pleased so to have them, and not because there is an indispensable relation of Harmony and Proportion betwixt the Terms themselves; then it is a thing meerly casual, and at the pleasure of God to change his former apprehensions , and Ideas of those Truths , and to make their contradictories as Evident, Radical and Fundamental as themselves but even now were ; and so Divine Wisdom and Knowledge will be a various, fickle and mutable thing , a meer tumult and confusion. All these consequences infallibly flow from this certain Principle , That upon a changeable and uncertain Cause, Effects must needs have a changeable and uncertain Dependence. And there is nothing imaginable in it self, more changeable and uncertain than *Will* not regulated by the dictates of Reason and Understanding.

SECT. VI.

The avoidance of the foregoing ill consequences by making God immutable, with an Answer thereto,

IF any deny these Consequences and Deductions, * because they suppose that God is mutable and changeable; I answer, by bringing this as another absurdity, that if there be no indispensable and eternal respects of things, it will rob God of his Immutability, and unchangeableness: for if there be no necessary dependence betwixt *Unchangeableness* and *Perfection*, what should hinder, but that if God please to *think* it so, it will be his perfection to be changeable? and if *Will*, as *such*, be the only principle of his Actions, it is infallibly his Perfection to be so. For 'tis the Perfection of every Being to act according to the principle of its Nature, and it is the nature of an arbitrary Principle to act or not, to do or undo upon no account but its own will and pleasure; to be determined, and tied up, either by it self, or from abroad, is violent and contranatural.

SECT.

S E C T. VII.

An hideous, but genuine Inference of a Pamphleteer from this principle, that absolute and Sovereign Will is the Spring and Fountain of all Gods actions.

AND therefore from this principle, that absolute and Sovereign Will is the Spring and Fountain of all Gods Actions, it was rightly inferr'd by a late Pamphleteer, that God will one day damn all Mankind, Good and Bad, Believers and Unbelievers, notwithstanding all his Promises, Pretensions or Engagements to the contrary; because this damning all mankind in despite of his Faithfulness, Justice, Mercy and Goodness will be the greatest advancement of his Sovereignty, Will and Prerogative imaginable. His words are, *God hath stored up Destruction both for the perfect and the wicked, and this does wonderfully set forth his Sovereignty; his exercising whereof is so perfect, that when he hath tied himself up fast as may be, by never so many promises, yet it should still have its scope, and be able to do what it will, when it will, as it will: Here you have this principle improved to the height. And however you may look upon this Author as some new Light, or Ignis fatuus of the*

the times, yet I assure you in some pieces by him set forth, he is very sober and rational.

SECT. VIII.

That the Denial of the mutual Respects and Relations of things unto one another to be eternal and unchangeable, despoils God of that universal Rectitude of his Nature.

IN the next place, to deny the mutual respects and *rationes rerum* to be immutable and indispensable, * will spoil God of that *universal rectitude* which is the greatest Perfection of his Nature: For then Justice, Faithfulness, Mercy, Goodness &c. will be but contingent and arbitrary Issues of the Divine Will. This is a clear and undeniable Consequence. For if you say these be indispensable perfections in God, for instance, if *Justice* be so, then there is an eternal relation of Right and Equity betwixt every Being and the giving of it that which is its propriety; if *Faithfulness*, then there is an indispensable agreement betwixt a promise and the performance of it; if *Mercy*, then there is an immutable and unalterable suitableness and harmony between an indigent Creature, and pity and commiseration; if *Goodness*, then there is an everlasting Proportion

portion and Symmetry between fulness and its overflowing and disspreading of it self, which yet is the thing denyed: * For to say they are indispensibly so, because God understands them so, seems to me extream incogitancy; for that is against the nature of all understanding, which is but the Idea and Representation of things, and is then a true and perfect Image, when it is exactly conformed to its Object; And therefore, if things have not mutual respects and relations eternal and indispensable, then all those perfections do solely and purely depend upon absolute and independent Will, as *Will*; And consequently, it was and is indifferent in it self that the contrary to these, as, *Injustice, Unfaithfulness, Cruelty, Malice, Hatred, Spite, Revenge, Fury*; and whatever goes to the constitution of Hell it self, should have been made the top and highest perfections of the Divine Nature: which is such Blasphemy as cannot well be named without horror and trembling. For instead of being a God, such a nature as this is, joyned with Omnipotency, would be a worse Devil than any is in Hell. And yet this is a necessary and infallible consequence from the denial of these mutual respects and relations of things unto one another, to be eternal and unchangeable.

SECT. IX.

That the Denial of the unchangeableness of the said mutual Respects and Relations of things to one another, takes away all Knowledge of God and of our own Happiness, and lays a Foundation of the most incurable Scepticism imaginable.

AND as by the denial of these, the Nature of God is wholly destroyed, so in the second place, the *mind* of *Man* would have no certainty of Knowledge, or assurance of Happiness. He can never come to know there is a God, and consequently not the Will and Mind of God, which if there be no intrinsical and indispensable respects and relations of things, must be the ground and foundation of all Knowledge; for what means or arguments should we use to find out, or prove a Divine Nature? It were folly and madness to sit down and consider the admirable contrivement and artifice of this great Fabrick of the Universe; how that all natural things seem to act for some end, though themselves take no Cognizance of it: How the Sun by its motion and situation, or (which is all one) by being a Centre of the Earth's Motion, provides Light and Heat, and Life for this inferiour World,

World, how living Creatures bring forth a most apt compofure and ftructure of parts and members, and with that a being endued with admirable Faculties; and yet themfelves have no infight into, nor confultation about this incomparable Workmanfhip; how they are furnifhed with Powers and Inclinations for the prefervation of this Body when it is once brought into the World; how without prævius deliberation they naturally take in that Food which without their intention or animadverfion is concocted in their Ventricle, turned into Chyle, that Chyle into Bloud, that Bloud diffufed through the Veins and Arteries, and therewith the feveral Members nourifhed, and decays of ftrength repaired; I fay, the gathering from all thefe (which one would think were a very natural confequence) that there is a wife Principle which directs all thefe Beings unknown to you, in their feveral motions, to their feveral ends, (fupposing the dependence and relations of things to be contingent and arbitrary) were a piece of folly and incogitancy; For how can the Order of thofe things fpeak a wife and underftanding Being, which have no relation or refpect unto one another; but their whole agreement, fuitablenefs and proportion is a meer casual iffue of abfolute and independent Will? If any thing may be the caufe of any effect, and a proportion

nate mean to any end, who can infer infinite Wisdom from the dependence of things and their relations unto one another? * For we are to know that there is a God, and the Will of that God before we can know the mutual Harmony, or Disproportion of things; and yet, if we do not know these principal respects that things have among themselves, it is impossible we should ever come to the knowledge of a God: For these are the only arguments that any Logick in the world can make use of to prove any conclusion. But suppose we should come to know that there is a God, which, as I have demonstrated, denying the necessary and immutable truth of common Notions, and the indispensable and eternal relations of things, is altogether impossible: However, let it be supposed; yet how shall we know that these common Notions, and principles of natural instinct, which are the foundation of all Discourse and Argumentation, are certain and infallible Truths; and that our *Senses*, (which with these former Principles, we suppose this Divine Nature to have given us to converse with this outward world) were not on purpose bestowed upon us, to befool, delude and cheat us; if we be not first assured of the *Veracity* of God? And how can we be assured of that, if we know
not

not that Veracity is a perfection ? and how shall we know it is so, unless there be an intrinsecal relation betwixt Veracity and Perfection ? For if it be an arbitrary respect depending upon the Will of God, there is no way possible left whereby we should come to know that it is in God at all ; And therefore we have fully as much reason to believe that all our common Notions and Principles of natural instinct, whereupon we ground all our reasonings and discourse, are meer Chimæra's to delude and abuse our faculties ; and all those Ideas, Phantasms and Apprehensions of our external senses, we imagine are occasioned in us by the presence of outward objects, are meer Spectrums and Galleries, where-with poor mortals are besfooled and cheated ; as that they are given us by the first Goodness and Truth to lead us into the Knowledge of himself and Nature.

This is a clear and evident consequence, and cannot be denied by any that doth not complain of darkness in the brightest and most Meridian Light. And here you have the foundations laid of the highest Scepticism ; for who can say he knows any thing, when he hath no basis on which he can raise any true conclusions ?

SECT. X.

*That the denying the Eternal and immutable
Respects of things frustrates all the noble
Essays of the mind or understanding of
man.*

THUS you see the noble faculties of man, his Mind and Understanding, will be to no end and purpose, but for a Rack and Torture; for what greater unhappiness or torment can there be imagined, than to have Faculties, whose Accomplishment and Perfection consists in a due conformation unto their objects, and yet to have no objects unto which they may be conformed; to have a Soul unmeasurably breathing after the embraces of Truth and Goodness, and after a search and enquiry after one and the other, and to find at last they are but airy, empty and uncertain Notions, depending upon the arbitrary determinations of boundless and independent Will; which determinations she sees it beyond her reach ever to come to any knowledge of?

SECT. XI.

That in the abovesaid denial are laid the Foundations of Rantism, Debauchery, and all Diffoluteness of Life.

Here you have likewise the true Foundations of that we call *Rantism*; for if there be no distinction 'twixt Truth and Falshood, Good and Evil, in the nature of the things themselves, and we never can be assured what is the mind and pleasure of the supream and absolute Will (because Veracity is not intrinsically and *ex natura rei*, a Perfection, but only an Arbitrarious, if any Attribute in the Deity) * then it infallibly follows , that it is all one what I do, or how I live; and I have as much reason to believe that I am as pleasing unto God , when I give up my self unto all Filthiness, Uncleanness and Sin; when I swell with Pride, Envy, Hatred and Malice, &c. as when I endeavour with all my Might and Strength to purge and purifie my Soul from all pollution and defilement both of Flesh and Spirit; and when I pursue the mortification of all my carnal Lusts and Inclinations: And I have fully as much ground and assurance, that the one is the ready Way to Happiness, as the other.

SECT. XII.

That our assurance of future Happiness is quite cut off by the Denying of the Eternal and immutable respects of things.

ANd this is another branch of this ~~second~~ Absurdity, from the denial of the intrinsecal and eternal respects and relations of things, that a man would not have any assurance of future Happiness ; for though it be true indeed , or at least we fancy to our selves that God hath sent *Jesus Christ* into the world, and by him hath made very large and ample promises, that whosoever believes in him and conforms his life unto his precepts, shall be made heir of the same Inheritance and Glory which Christ is now possessed of and invested with in the Kingdom of his Father ; yet what ground have we to believe that God does not intend only to play with and abuse our Faculties , and in conclusion to damn all those that believe and live as is above expressed ; and to take *them only* into the Injoyments of Heaven and Happiness, who have been the great Opposers of the Truth, and Gospel , and Life and Nature of *Jesus Christ* in the world? For if there be no eternal and indispensable Relation of Things,

Things, then there's no intrinsecal Evil in Deceiving and Falsifying, in the damning the Good, or saving obstinate and contumacious Sinners (whilst such) notwithstanding any promises or threatenings to the contrary : and if the things be in themselves indifferent, it is an unadvised Confidence to pronounce determinately on either side. Yea further, suppose we should be assured that God is *Verax*, and that the Scripture doth declare what is his Mind and Pleasure ; yet if there be not an intrinsecal opposition betwixt the Being and not Being of a thing at the same time, and in the same respect ; then God can make a thing that hath been *done*, *undone* ; and that whatever hath been done or spoken either by himself, or Christ, or his Prophets, or Apostles, should never be done, or spoken by him or them ; though He hath come into the world, yet that He should not be come ; though He hath made these promises, yet that they should not be made ; though God hath given us Faculties, that are capable of the enjoyment of himself, yet that he should not have given them us ; and that yet we should have no Being, nor think a thought while we fancy and speak of all these contradictions : In fine, it were impossible we should know any thing, * if the opposition of contradictory terms depend upon the

appears from what has been said above, that this discerning of a Spirit, which is immediately and essentially of its own nature indiscernible, as well as a Physical Monad is, implying a contradiction, it is no derogation to the Almightyness of God that he cannot do it; all Philosophers and Theologers being agreed on that *Maxim*, That what implies a contradiction to be done, is no Object of Gods Almightyness. Nor is he less Almighty for not being able to do it. So that the prick-ear'd Acuteness of that trim and smug saying, that seemed before to shoot up into the Sky, flags now like the flaccid lugs of the over-laden Animal old *Silenus* rid on when he had a Plot upon the Nymphs by Moon-shine. Pardon the tediousness of the Periphrasis: For though the Poet was pleased to put old *Silenus* on the Ass, yet I thought it not so civil to put the Ass upon old Mr. *Baxter*.

But he proceeds, pag. 80. *Your words, says he, like an intended Reason, are* [For that cannot be God from whom all other things are not produced and created] to which he answers, (1.) *Relatively*, says he, *(as a God to us) it's true, though quoad existentiam Essentiaë, he was God before the Creation.* But, I say, if he had not had the power of creating, he had been so defective a Being, that he had not been God. But he says (2.) *But did you take this for any shew of a proof? The sense implied is this* [All things are

are not produced and created by God, if a spiritual ample substance be divisible by his Omnipotence that made it : Yea ; Then he is not God. *Negatur consequentia.* *Ans.* Very scholastically disputed ! Would one think that Reverend Mr. *Baxter*, whom Dr. *More* for his Function and Grandevity sake handles so respectfully, and forbears all such Juvenilities as he had used toward *Eugenius Philalethes*, should play the Doctor such horse-play, having been used so civilly by him before ? What Buffoon or Antick Mime could have distorted their bodies more ill-favour'dly and ridiculously, than he has the Doctors' solid and well-composed Argument ? And then as if he had done it in pure innocency and simplicity, he adds a Quaker-like [Yea] thereunto. And after all, like a bold Scholastick Champion, or Polemick Divine, courageously cries out, *Negatur consequentia.* What a fardle of freaks is there here, and illiberal Artifices to hide the Doctors' sound Reasoning in the 28th Section of his Answer to the *Psychopirists Letter* ? Where having plainly proved that God can create an *Indiscerpible* Being though of a large Metaphysical amplitude, and that there is nothing objected against it, nor indeed can be, but that then he would seem to puzzle his own Omnipotency, which could not discern such a Being ; the Doctor shews the vanity of that Objection in these very words : *The same, says he,*

may be said of the *Metaphysical Monads* (namely, that God cannot discern them) and at that rate he shall be allow'd to create nothing, no not so much as *Matter* (which consists of *Physical Monads*) nor himself indeed to be. For that cannot be God, from whom all other things are not produced and created. What reason can be more clear or more convincing, That God can create a Spirit in the proper sense thereof, which includes *Indiscernibility*? there being no reason against it but what is false, it plainly implying that he can create nothing, and consequently that he cannot be God. Wherefore that Objection being thus clearly removed, God, as sure as himself is, can create a Spirit, penetrable and *indiscernible*, as himself is, and is expressly acknowledged to be so by Mr. Baxter himself, pag. 51. And he having created Spirits or *Immaterial Substances* of an opposite Species to *Material*, which are *impenetrable and discernible* of their immediate nature, how can these *Immaterial* substances be any other than *Penetrable* and *Indiscernible*? Which is a very useful Dogma for assuring the souls personal subsistence after Death. And therefore it is a piece of grand Disingenuity in Mr. Baxter, to endeavour thus to slur and obscure so plain and edifying a Truth, by mere Antick Distortions of words and sense, by alterations and mutilations, and by a kind of sophistick Buffoonry. This is one specimen of

of his *Disingenuity* towards the Doctor, who in his *Answer* has been so civil to him. And now I have got into this *Digression*, I shall not stick to exemplify it in several others.

As secondly, pag. 4. in those words: *And when I presume most, I do but most lose my self, and misuse my understanding. Nothing is good for that which it was not made for. Our Understandings, as our Eyes, are made onely for things revealed. In many of your Books I take this for an excess.* So Mr. Baxter. Let me now interpose a word or two in the behalf of the Doctor. Is not this a plain piece of *Disingenuity* against the Doctor, who has spent so great a part of his time in Philosophie (which the mere *Letter* of the Scripture very rarely reveals any thing of) to reproach him for his having used his understanding so much about things not revealed in Scripture? Where should he use his Understanding and Reason, if not in things unrevealed in Scripture; that is, in Philosophical things? Things revealed in Scripture are Objects rather of Faith than of Science and Understanding. And what a Paradox is this, that our Understandings, as our Eyes, are made onely for things revealed? When our Eyes are shut, all the whole visible world, by the closing of the *palpebræ* is veiled from us, but it is revealed to us again by the opening of our eyes; and so it is with the eye of the Understanding. If it be shut through

Pride, Prejudice, or Sensuality, the mysteries of Philosophy are thereby veiled from it; but if by true vertue and unfeigned sanctity of mind *that* eye be opened, the Mysteries of Philosophy are the more clearly discovered to it, especially if points be studied with *singular industry*, which Mr. *Baxter* himself acknowledges of the Doctor, pag. 21. onely he would there pin upon his back an *Humble Ignoramus* in some things, which the Doctor, I dare say, will easily admit in many things, yea in most; and yet, I believe, this he will stand upon, that in those things which he professes to know, he will challenge all the world to disprove if they can. And for probable Opinions, especially if they be useles, which many Books are too much stuffed withal, he casts them out as the lumber of the mind, and would willingly give them no room in his thoughts. Firmness and soundness of Life is much better than the multiplicities of uncertain Conceits.

And lastly, whereas Mr. *Baxter* speaking of himself, says, *And when I presume most, I do but most lose my self*; He has so bewildered and lost himself in the multifarious, and most-what needless points in Philosophy or Scholastic Divinity, that if we can collect the measures of the Cause from the amplitude of the Effect, he must certainly have been *very presumptuous*. He had better have set up his Staff
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in his *Saints everlasting Rest*, and such other edifying and useful Books as those, than to have set up for either a *Philosopher* or *Polemick Divine*. But it is the infelicity of too many, that they are ignorant — *Quid valeant humeri, quid ferre recusent*, as the Poet speaks, or as the *Pythagoreans* — *Οἷον τῶν Σαλμὼν ἁποβῆαι*. And so taking upon them a part in a Play which they are unfit for; they both neglect that which they are fit for, and miscarry, by reason of their unfitness, in their acting that Part they have rashly undertaken; as *Epictetus* somewhere judiciously observes.

But if that passage, *And when I presume most, I do but most lose my self*, was intended by him as an oblique *Socratical* reproof to the Doctor; let him instance if he can, where the Doctor has presumed above his strength. He has medled but with a few things, and therefore he need not envie his success therein, especially they being of manifest use to the serious world, so many as God has fitted for the reception of them. Certainly there was some grand occasion for so grave a preliminary monition as he has given the Doctor. You have it in the following Page p. 5. *This premised*, says he, *I say, undoubtedly it is utterly unrevealed either as to any certainty or probability, That all Spirits are Souls, and actuate Matter*. See what Heat and Hast, or some worse Principle has engaged Mr. Baxter to do; to father a down-right false-

fallhood upon the Doctor, that he may thence take occasion to bestow a grave admonition on him, and so place himself on the higher ground. I am certain it is neither the Doctors opinion, That *all* Spirits are Souls, and actuate Matter, nor has he writ so any where. He onely says in his Preface to the Reader, *That all created Spirits are ψυχαι [Souls] in all probability, and actuate some matter.* And his expression herein is both modest and true. For though it is not *certain* or necessary, yet it is *very probable*. For if there were of the highest Orders of the Angels that fell, it is very probable that they had corporeal Vehicles, without which it is hard to conceive they could run into disorder. And our Saviour Christs Soul, which actuates a glorified spiritual Bodie, being set above all the Orders of Angels, it is likely that there is none of them is so refined above his Humane Nature, as to have no bodies at all. Not to add, that at the Resurrection we become *σώματα ζώντα*, though we have bodies then; which is a shrewd intimation that the Angels have so too, and that there are no *created* Spirits but have so.

Thirdly, Mr. *Baxter*, pag. 6. wrongfully blames the Doctor for being so defective in his studies as not to have read over Dr. *Glisson De Vita Naturæ*; and says he has talk'd with diverse high pretenders to Philosophie, and askt their judgment of that Book, and found that none
of

of them understood it, but neglected it, as too hard for them; and yet contemned it. His words to Dr. More are these: *I marvel that when you have dealt with so many sorts of Dissenters, you meddle not with so subtle a piece as that of old Dr. Glissons, De Vita Naturæ.* He thinks the subtilty of the Book has deterred the Doctor from reading it, as something above his Capacity, as also of other high Pretenders to Philosophie.

This is a Book it seems calculated onely for the elevation of Mr. *Baxters* subtle and sublime wit. And indeed by the benefit of reading this Book he is most dreadfully armed with the affrightful terms of *Quoddities* and *Quiddities*, of *Conceptus formalis* and *fundamentalis*, of *Conceptus adæquatus* and *inadæquatus*, and the like. In vertue of which *thwacking* expressions he has fancied himself able to play at *Scholastick* or *Philosophick* Quarter-staff with the most doughty and best appointed Wits that dare enter the Lists with him; and as over-neglectful of his flock, like some conceited Shepherds, that think themselves no small fools at the use of the Staff or Cudgil-play, take Vagaries to Fairs or Wakes to give a specimen of their skill; so he ever and anon makes his *Polemick* sallies in Philosophie or Divinity to entertain the Spectators, though very oft he is so rapt upon the knuckles, that he is forced to let fall his wooden Instrument,

and blow his fingers. Which is but a just Nemesis upon him, and he would do well to interpret it as a seasonable reproof from the great Pastor of Souls, to whom we are all accountable.

But to return to his speech to the Doctor; I will adventure to answer in his behalf, That I marvel that whenas Mr. *Baxter* has had the curiosity to read so many Writers, and some of them sure but of small concern, that he has not read that sound and *solid* piece of Dr. *More*, viz. his *Epistola altera ad V. C.* with the *Scholia* thereon, where *Spinozious* is confuted. Which if he had read he might have seen *Volum. Philosoph. Tom. I. pag. 604, 605, &c.* that the Doctor has not onely read that *subtile* Piece of Doctor *Glissons*, but understands so thoroughly his *Hypothesis*, that he has solidly and substantially confuted it. Which he did in a faithful regard to Religion. For that *Hypothesis*, if it were true, were as safe, if not a safer Refuge for *Atheists*, than the mere Mechanick Philosophie is: And therefore you may see there, how *Cuperus*, brought up amongst the *Atheists* from his very childhood, does confess, how the *Atheists* now-a-daies explode the Mechanick Philosophie as not being for their turn, and betake themselves wholly to such an Hypothesis as Dr. *Glissons Vita Naturæ*. But, God be thanked, Dr. *H. More* in the fore-cited place has perfectly routed that

that fond and foul Hypothesis of Dr. *Gliffon*, and I dare say is sorry that so good and old a Knight *errant* in Theologie and Philosophie as Mr. *Richard Baxter* seems to be, should become benighted, as in a wood, at the Close of his daies, in this most horrid dark Harbour and dismal Receptacle or Randevouz of wretched *Atheists*. But I dare say for him, it is his ignorance, not choice, that has lodged him there.

The fourth *Disingenuity* of Mr. *Baxter* towards the Doctor is, in complaining of him as if he had wronged him by the Title of his *Answer* to his *Letter*, in calling it an *Answer* to a *Psychopyrist*, pag. 2. 82. As if he had asserted *that* materiality of Spirits which belongs to bodies, pag. 94. In complaining also of his inconsistency with himself, pag. 10. as if he one while said that Mr. *Baxter* made Spirits to be Fire or *material*, and another while said he made them not Fire or *material*. But to the first part of this Accusation it may be answered, That if it is Mr. *Baxter* that is called the Learned *Psychopyrist*, how is the thing known to the world but by himself? It looks as if he were ambitious of the Title, and proud of the civil treating he has had at the hands of the Doctor, though he has but ill repaid his civility in his Reply. And besides this, there is no more harshness in calling him *Psychopyrist*, than if he had called him *Psycho-Hylist*, there being nothing absurd in *Psychopyrism* but so far

far forth as it includes *Psycho-Hylism*, and makes the Soul *material*.

Which *Psycho-Hylism* that Mr. Baxter does admit, it is made evident in the Doctors Answer, Sect. 16. And Mr. Baxter in his *Placid Collation* (as he mis-calls it, for assuredly his mind was turbid when he wrote it) pag. 2. allows that Spirits may be called Fire *Analogicè* and *Eminenter*, and the Doctor in his Preface intimates that the sense is to be no further stretched, than the *Psychopyrist* himself will allow.

But now that Mr. Baxter does assert that Materiality in created Spirits that belongs to bodies in the common sense of all Philosophers, appears Sect. 16. where his words are these: *But custom having made MATERIA, but especially CORPUS, to signify only such grosser Substance as the three passive Elements are* (he means Earth, Water, Air) *I yield, says he, so to say, that Spirits are not Corporeal or Material.* Which plainly implies that Spirits are in no other sense *Immaterial*, than Fire and *Æther* are, viz. than in this, that they are thinner matter.

And therefore to the last point it may be answered in the Doctors behalf, that he assuredly does nowhere say, That Mr. Baxter does not say that *Spirits* are *Material*, as Material is taken in the common sense of all Philosophers for what is *impenetrable* and *discernible*.

nable. Which is *Materia Physica*, and in opposition to which, a Spirit is said to be *Immaterial*. And which briefly and distinctly states the Question. Which if Mr. Baxter would have taken notice of, he might have saved himself the labour of a great deal of needless verbosity in his *Placid Collation*, where he does over-frequently, under the pretence of more distinctness, in the multitude of words obscure knowledge.

Fifthly, Upon Sect. 10. pag. 21. where Mr. Baxters Question is, *How a man may tell how that God that can make many out of one, cannot make many into one, &c.* To which the Doctor there answers: *If the meaning be of substantial Spirits, it has been already noted, that God acting in Nature does not make many substances out of one, the substance remaining still entire: for then Generation would be Creation.* And no sober man believes that God assists any creature so in a natural course, as to enable it to create: And then I suppose that he that believes not this, is not bound to puzzle himself why God may not as well make many substances into one, as many out of one, whenas he holds he does not the latter, &c. These are the Doctors own words in that Section. In reply to which, Mr. Baxter: *But to my Question, saies he, why God cannot make two of one, or one of two, you put me off with this lean Answer, that we be not bound to puzzle ourselves about it. I think, saies he, that Answer might*

might serve to much of your Philosophical disputes. Here Mr. Baxter plainly deals very disingenuously with the Doctor in perverting his words, which affirm onely, *That he that denies that God can make two substances of one in the sense above-declared, need not puzzle himself how he may make one of those two again.* Which is no lean, but full and apposite Answer to the Question there propounded.

And yet in this his *Placid Collation*, as if he were wroth, he gives ill language, and insinuates, That much of the Doctors Philosophical Disputes are such as are not worth a mans puzzling himself about them; whenas it is well known to all that know him or his Writings, that he concerns himself in no Theories but such as are weighty and useful, as this of the *Indiscernibility* of Spirits is, touching which he further slanders the Doctor, as if it were his mere *Affertion without any Proof*. As if Mr. Baxter had never read, or forgot the Doctors *Discourse of the true Notion of a Spirit*, or what he has writ in the further *Defence* thereof. See Sect. 26, 28, 30, 31. Thus to say any thing in an angry mood, verily does not become the Title of a *Placid Collation*.

Sixthly, The Doctor in Sect. II. of his *Defence of his Notion of a Spirit*, writes thus: I desire you to consider the nature of Light thoroughly, and you shall find it nothing but a certain

certain motion of a *Medium*, whose parts or particles are so or so qualified, some such way as *Cartesianism* drives at. To this Mr. Baxter replies against the Doctor, pag. 59. Really, saies he, when I read how far you have escaped the delusions of *Cartesianism*, I am sorry you yet stick in so gross a part of it as this is; when he that knoweth no more than motion in the nature of Fire, which is the *Active Principle* by which *Mental* and *Sensitive Nature* operateth on *Man* and *Brutes* and *Vegetables*, and all the *Passive Elements*; and all the visible actions in this lower world are performed, what can that mans *Philosophie* be worth? I therefore return your Counsel, study more thoroughly the nature of *Ethereal Fire*.

Satis pro imperio! very *Magisterially* spoken! and in such an igneous Rapture, that it is not continuedly sense. Does *Mental* and *Sensitive Nature* act on *Brutes* and *Vegetables* and all the *Passive Elements*? But to let go that: Is all the Doctors *Philosophie* worth nothing if he hold with *Des Cartes* touching the Phenomenon of *Light* as to the *Material* part thereof? It is the ignorance of Mr. Baxter, that he rejects all in *Des Cartes*, and Judiciousness in the Doctor, that he retains some things, and supplies where his *Philosophie* is deficient. He names here onely the *Mechanical Cause* of *Light*, viz. *Motion*, and duly modified *Particles*. But in his *Enchiridium* he intimates an
higher

higher principle than either Fire or Æther, or any thing that is *Material*, be it as fine and pure as you please to fancie it. See his *Enchirid. Metaphys.* Cap. 19. where he shews plainly, that Light would not be Light, were there not a *Spiritus Mundanus*, or *Spirit of Nature*, which pervades the whole Universe; Mr. *Baxters* ignorance whereof has cast him into so deep a dotage upon *Fire* and *Light*, and fine discernible *Corporeities*, which he would by his Magisterial Prerogative dubb *Spirits*, when to nothing that Title is due, but what is *Penetrable* and *Indiscernible* by reason of the immediate Oneness of its Essence, even as God the Father and Creator of all Spirits is one Indiscernible Substance or Being. And therefore I would advise Mr. *Baxter* to studie more thoroughly the true nature of a Spirit, and to let go these *Ignes Fatui* that would seduce him into thick mists and bogs. For that universal *Spirit of Nature* is most certainly the Mover of the matter of the world, and the Modifier thereof, and thence exhibits to us not onely the Phænomena of *Light* and *Fire*, but of Earth and Water, and frames all Vegetables into shape and growth; and Fire of it self is but a dead Instrument in its hand, as all is in the hand of God, who is *ὁ θεὸς ὁ πατὴρ* and *Ζωὴ τοῦ κόσμου*, as *Synefius*, if I well remember, somewhere calls him in his Hymns.

Seventhly, That is also less ingenuously done
of

of Mr. Baxter, when the Doctor so friendly and faithfully puts him in a way of undeceiving himself, Sect. 17. touching the Doctrine of Atoms, that he puts it off so slightly. And so Sect. 18. where he earnestly exhorts him to studie the nature of Water, as Mr. Baxter does others to studie the nature of Fire; he, as if he had been bitten, and thence taken with that disease the Physicians call *idopsia*, and which signifies the *fear of Water*, has slunk away and quite neglected the Doctors friendly monition; and is so small a Proficient in *Hydrostaticks*, that pag. 68. he understands not what greater wonder there is in the rising of the Dr.'s Rundle, than in the rising of a piece of Timber from the bottom of the Sea. Which is a sign he never read the 13th Chapter of the Dr.'s *Enchiridion Metaphysicum*, much less the Scholia thereon. For if he had, he would discern the difference, and the vast usefulness of the one above that of the other to prove a *Principium Hylarchicum* distinct from the matter of the Universe, against all evasions and tergiversations whatsoever. But these things cannot be insisted on here.

Eighthly, Mr. Baxter, pag. 76. charges the Doctor with such a strange Paradox as to half of it, that I cannot imagine from whence he should fetch it. *You seem*, says he, *to make all substance Atoms, Spiritual Atoms and Material Atoms.* The latter part of the charge the Doctor I doubt not but will acknowledge to be

be true: But may easily prove out of Mr. *Baxter*, pag. 65. that he must hold so too. For his words there are these: *That God is able to divide all matter into Atoms or indivisible parts I doubt not.* And can they be Physically divided into parts of which they don't consist? But Mr. *Baxter* by the same reason making Spirits divisible by God, though not by any Creature, makes them consist of Spiritual Atoms, for they cannot but consist of such parts as they are divisible into. And if they be divisible by God into larger shreds onely but not into Atoms, then every created Spirit, especially particular ones, are so many subtil living Puppets made up of spiritual rags and clouts. But if God can divide them neither into spiritual *Atoms* nor *larger spiritual parcels*, he can't divide them at all. And so according to what the Doctor contends for, they will be, as they ought to be, absolutely indiscerpible.

I omit here to take notice of another absurdity of Mr. *Baxters*, That though the substance of a Spirit he will have to be divisible, yet he will have the form indivisible, pag. 50, 99. and yet both parts to be Spirit still; which implies a contradiction. For then one of the parts will be without the form of a Spirit, and consequently be no Spirit, and yet be a Spirit according to Mr. *Baxter*, who makes Spirits divisible into parts of the same denomination, as when water is divided into two parts, each part is still water, pag. 53.

Ninth.

Ninthly. That which occurs pag. 48. is a gross Disingenuity against the Doctor, where Mr. Baxter says, *And when you make all Spirits to be Souls and to animate some matter, you seem to make God to be but Anima Mundi.* How unfair and harsh is this for you Mr. Baxter, who has been so tenderly and civilly handled by the Doctor in his Answer to your Letter, he constantly hiding or mollifying any thing that occurred therein that might overmuch expose you, to represent him as a favourer of so gross a Paradox as this, That there is no God but an *Anima Mundi*, which is the Position of the *Vaninian Atheists*, which himself has expressly confuted in his *Mystery of Godliness*, and declared against lately in his *Advertisements on Jos. Glanvils Letter to himself*, in the second Edition of *Saducismus Triumphatus*. This looks like the breaking out of unchristian rancour, in a *Reply* which bears the Specious Title of a *Placid Collation*. Which is yet exceedingly more aggravable, for that this odious Collection is not made from any words of the Doctor, but from a fiction of Mr. Baxter. For the Doctor has nowhere Written, nor ever thought that *all Spirits*, but only *all Created Spirits*, might probably be Souls, that is to say, actuate some matter or other. And those words are in his Preface to his Answer to the *Letter of the Psychoprist*, as I noted before. I might reckon up several other

²Disingenuities of Mr. *Baxters* towards the Doctor in this his *Placid Collation*; but I have enumerated enough already to weary the Reader, and I must remember I am but in a *Digression*.

I shall only name one *Disingenuity* more, which was antecedent to them all, and gave occasion both to Mr. *Baxters* Letter, and to the Doctors *Answer* thereto, and to this *Reply* of Mr. *Baxter*. And that was, That Mr. *Baxter* in his *Methodus Theologiae* (as he has done also in a little Pamphlet touching Judge *Hales*) without giving any reasons, which is the worst way of traducing any man or his sentiments, slighted and flurred those two essential Attributes of a Spirit, *Penetrability* and *Discernibility*, which for their certain Truth and usefulness the Doctor thought fit to communicate to the World.

But so far as Mr. *Baxter* has in this his *Reply* produced his Reasons against them, I doubt not but the Doctor will accept it for an amends. And I, as I must disallow of the *Disingenuity* of the omission before, yet to be just to Mr. *Baxter*, I must commend his discretion and judgment in being willing to omit them; they appearing to me now they are produced, so weak and invalid. But such as they are, I shall gather them out of his *Reply*, and bring them into view.

First then, pag. 13. It is alledged, That nothing hath two forms univocally so called.

But

But if *Penetrabilitie* and *Indiscerpibilitie* be added to the *Virtus Vitalis*, to the *Vital Power* of a Spirit, it will have two forms. Therefore *Penetrabilitie* and *Indiscerpibilitie* are to be omitted in the notion of a Spirit. See also p. 22.

Secondly, pag. 14. *Penetrable* and *Indiscerpible* can be no otherwise a form to Spirits; than *Impenetrable* and *Discerpible* are a form to Matter. But *Impenetrable* is onely a modal *Conceptus* of Matter, and *Discerpible* a Relative notion thereof, and neither one nor both contrary to *Virtus vitalis* in a Spirit.

Thirdly, pag. 14. He sees no reason why *Quantity*, and the *Trina Dimensio*, may not as well be part of the form of Matter as *Discerpibilitie* and *Impenetrabilitie*.

Fourthly, pag. 15, 16. Nothing is to be known without the mediation of Sense, except the immediate sensation itself, and the acts of intellection and volition or noition, and what the Intellect inferreth of *the like*, by the perception of these. Wherefore as to the modification of the substance of Spirits, which is contrary to *Impenetrabilitie* and *Divisibilitie*, I may grope, says he, but I cannot know it positively for want of sensation.

Fifthly, pag. 16, 17. If *Indiscerpibilitie* be the essential character of a Spirit, then an Atom of matter is a Spirit, it being acknowledged to be *Indiscerpible*. Wherefore *Indiscerpibilitie* is a false character of a Spirit.

Sixthly, pag. 17, 18. [Penetrable] whether actively or passively understood, can be no proper Character of a Spirit, forasmuch as Matter can penetrate a Spirit, as well as a Spirit Matter, it possessing the same place. See pag. 23.

Seventhly, pag. 40, 41. *Immaterialitie*, says he, *Penetrabilitie* and *Indiscernibilitie*, in your own judgment I think are none of them proper to Spirit. For they are common to diverse *Accidents* in your account, viz. to Light, Heat, Cold. And again in his own words,

Eighthly, pag. 77. If your *Penetrabilitie*, says he, imply not that all the singular Spirits can contract themselves into a *Punctum*, yet that all the Spirits of the world may be so contracted, I find it not yet sufficiently explained. See also pag. 52, 78, 89, 90.

Ninthly, pag. 50. Seeing, says he, you ascribe Amplitude, Quantitie, and Dimensions and Logical Materialitie to the Substantialitie of Spirits, I see not but that you make them Intellectually divisible, that is, that one may think of one part as here, and another there. And if so, though man cannot separate and divide them, if it be no contradiction, God can.

Tenthly, and lastly, pag. 90. The putting of *Penetrability* and *Indiscernibility* into the notion of a Spirit, is needless, and *hazardous*, it being sufficient to hold that God hath made Spirits of no kind of parts but what do Naturally ab-

hor

hor Separation, and so are inseparable unless God will separate them, and so there is no fear of losing our Personality in the other State. But *Penetrability* and *Indiscerpibility* being hard and doubtful words, they are better left out, lest they tempt all to believe that the very Being of Spirits is as doubtful as those words are.

Thus have I faithfully though briefly brought into view all Mr. *Baxters* Arguments against the *Penetrability* and *Indiscerpibility* of Spirits, which I shall answer in order as they have been recited.

To the first therefore I say, that the Doctors Definition of a Spirit, which is [A Substance immaterial intrinsically indued with life and a faculty of motion] where *Substance* is the *Genus*, and the rest of the terms comprize the *Differentia* (which Mr. *Baxter* calls *Conceptus formalis* and *Forma*) I say, that this *Difference* or *Form* though it consist of many terms, yet these terms are not *Heterogeneal*, as he would insinuate, pag. 22. but *Congenerous*, and one in order to another, and essentially and inseparably united in that one substance which is rightly and properly called *Spirit*, and in vertue of that one substance, though their Notions and Operations differ, they are really one inseparable specifick *Difference* or *Form*, as much as Mr. *Baxters* *Virtus vitalis una-trina* is; that is to say, they are

specifick knowable terms, *succedaneous* to the true intimate *specifick Form* that is utterly unknowable; and therefore I say, in this sense these knowable terms are one inseparable specifick Difference or Form whereby Spirit is distinguished from Bodie or *Matter* in a Physical acception. Which the Universality of Philosophers hold to consist in *Impenetrability*, and *Discerpibilitie*, and *Self-inactivitie*. Which if Mr. *Baxter* would have been pleased to take notice of, viz. that a Spirit is said to be a Substance *Immaterial* in opposition to Matter *Physical*, he might have saved himself the labour of a deal of tedious trifling in explication of words to no purpose.

But to shew that this Pretence of more Forms than one in one Substance is but a Cavil, I will offer really the same Definition in a more succinct way, and more to Mr. *Baxters* tooth, and say, As *Corpus* is *Substantia Materialis* (where *Materialis* is the specifick Difference of *Corpus* comprized in one term:) so *Spiritus* is *Substantia Immaterialis* (where *Immaterialis* the specifick Difference of *Spiritus* is likewise comprized in one term, to please the humour of Mr. *Baxter*.) But now as under that one term [*Materialis*] are comprized *Impenetrabilitie*, *Discerpibilitie*, and *Self-Inactivity*; so also under that one term [*Immaterialis*] are comprized, as under one head, *Penetrability*, *Indiscerpibility*, and *Intrinsical life and motion*, that

that is, an essential facultie of life and motion, which in one word may be called *Self-Activi-ty*. Whence *Penetrability*, *Indiscernibility*, and *Self-Activity* are as much one Form of a Spirit, as Mr. *Baxters Vita*, *Perceptio*, and *Appetitus*, is one Form thereof. For though in both places they are three distinct notions, at least as Mr. *Baxter* would have it, yet they are the essential and inseparable Attributes of one substance, and the immediate fruit and result of the *Specifick nature* thereof. They are inseparably one in their Source and Subject.

And this I think is more than enough to take off this first little Cavil of Mr. *Baxters* against the Doctors including *Penetrability* and *Inseparability* in the Form or *Specifick difference* of a Spirit. For all that same is to be called *Form*, by which a thing is that which it is, as far as our Cognitive faculties will reach, and by which it is essentially distinguished from other things. And if it were not for *Penetrabilitie* and *Indiscernibilitie*, *Spirit* would be confounded with *Body* and *Matter*. And *Body* or *Physical Matter* might be *Self-Active*, *Sentient*, and *Intelligent*.

To the Second I answer, That whosoever searches things to the bottom, he will find this a sound Principle in Philosophie, That there is nothing in the whole Universe but what is either *Substantia* or *Modus*. And when a Mode or several Modes put together are

immediately and essentially inseparable from a Substance, they are lookt upon as the *Form*, or the onely knowable *Specifick difference* of that Substance. So that *Impenetrability* and *Discerpibility*, which are immediately essential to, and inseparable from Body or Matter, and Self-Inactivitie, (as *Irrational* is made the specific difference of a Brute) may be added also: These, I say, are as truly the Form or Specifick difference of Body or Matter, as any thing knowable is of any thing in the world. And *Self-Inactivity* at least, is contrary to the *Virtus vitalis* of a *Spirit*, though *Impenetrability* and *Discerpibility* were not. So that according to this æconomy, you see how plainly and exquisitely *Body* and *Spirit* are made opposite *Species* one to another. And 'tis these Modal differences of Substances which we only know, but the *Specifick* Substance of any thing is utterly unknown to us, however Mr. *Baxter* is pleased to swagger to the contrarie, p.44,61. Where he seems to mis-understand the Doctor, as if by *Essence* he did not understand *Substance*, as both *ous* and *Essentia* usually signifie (especially with the Ancients) but any Being at large. But of *Substance* it is most true, we know it onely by its essential *Modes*, but the *Modes* are not the *Substance* it self of which they are *Modes*; otherwise the Substance would want *Modes*, or every Substance would be more substances than one. And Mr. *Baxter* him-

self saith, pag. 62. *To know an essential Attribute, and to know ipsam essentiam scientia inadaequata, is all one.* Which inadequate or partial knowledge, say I, is this, the knowing of the Essential Mode of the Substance, and not knowing the Substance it self; Otherwise if both the Essential Modes were known, and also the *Specifick Substance* to which the Modes belong (more than that those Modes belong to that Substance) the knowledge would be full and adequate, and stretch through the whole Object. So that Mr. *Baxters Scientia inadaequata*, and the Doctors denying the bare Substance it self to be known, may very well consist together, and be judged a mere *ἀσπουδία*. Which is an exercise more grateful it's likely to Mr. *Baxter*, than to the Doctor.

To the third I say, Any one that considers may find a necessarie reason why *Quantitie* or *Trina Dimensio* should be left out in the Form of *Body* or *Matter*, especially why the Doctor should leave it out, because he does professedly hold, That whatever is, has *Metaphysical Quantitie* or *Metaphysical Trina Dimensio*; Which no man can denie that holds God is *Essentially* present every-where. And no man, I think, that does not dote can denie that. Wherefore allowing *Matter* to be *Substance*; in that *Generical* nature, *Trina Dimensio* is comprized, and need not be again repeated in the *Form*. But when in the *Forma*
or

or *Differētia*. Discerpible and Impenetrable is added, this is that which makes the *Trina Dimensio* (included in the *Genus, Substantia*) of a *Corporal* kind, and does constitute that *Species* of things, which we call *Corpora*. This is so plain a business, that we need insist no longer upon it.

Now to the fourth. I answer briefly, That from what knowledge we have by the mediation of the *Senses* and inference of the *Intellect*, we arrive not onely to the knowledge of *like things*, but of *unlike*, or rather *contrary*: As in this very example, we being competently well instructed, indeed assured by our *Senses*, that there is such a kind of thing as *Body*, whose nature is to be *Impenetrable* and *Discerpible*, and our Reason certainly informing us, as was noted even now, that whatever is, has a kind of Amplitude more or less, or else it would be nothing; hence we are confirmed, that not *Extensio* or *Trina Dimensio*, but *Impenetrabilitie* and *Discerpibilitie* is the determinate and adequate nature of what we call *Body*; and if there be any opposite species to *Body*, our Reason tells us it must have opposite Modes or Attributes, which are *Penetrability* and *Indiscerpibility*. This is a plain truth not to be groped after with our fingers in the dark, but clearly to be discerned by the eye of our understanding in the light of Reason. And thus we see (and many examples more we might accumulate) That by the help of our
Senses

Senses and Inference of our Understanding we are able to conclude not onely concerning *like things*, but their *contraries or opposites*. I must confess I look upon this allegation of Mr. Baxter as very weak and faint.

And as for his fifth, I do a little marvel that so grave and grandævous a person as he should please himself in such little flirts of Wit and Sophistry as this of the *Indiscernibility* of an *Atom* or *Physical Monad*. As if *Indiscernibility* could be none of the essential or specifical Modes or Attributes of a Spirit, because a *Physical Monad* or *Atom* is *Indiscernible* also, which is no Spirit. But those very *Indiscernibilities* are *Specifically* different. For that of a *Spirit* is an *Indiscernibility* that arises from the positive perfection and *Oneness* of the Essence, be it never so ample; that of an *Atom* or *Physical Monad*, from imperfection and privativeness, from the mere *littleness* or smallness thereof, so small that it is impossible to be smaller, and thence onely is *Indiscernible*.

The sixth also is a pretty juvenile Ferk of Wit for a grave ancient Divine to use, That *Penetrability* can be no proper Character of a *Spirit*, because Matter can penetrate Spirit as well as Spirit Matter, they both possessing the same space. Suppose the bodie A. of the same amplitude with the bodie B. and thrust the bodie A. against the bodie B. the bodie A. will not nor can penetrate into the same space
that

that the bodie B. actually occupie. But suppose the bodie A. a Spirit of that amplitude, and according to its nature piercing into the same space which the bodie B. occupie, how plain is it that that active piercing into the same space that the bodie B. occupie, is to be attributed to the *Spirit* A. & not to the bodie B. For the *bodie* A. could not get in. These are prettie forc'd distortions of Wit, but no solid methods of due Reason. And besides, it is to be noted, that the main Character of a *Spirit* is, as to *Penetrability*, that *Spirit* can penetrate *Spirit*, but not *Matter* *Matter*.

And now the Seventh is as slight as the Fifth. Diverse Accidents, saith he, penetrate their Subjects, as Heat, Cold, &c. Therefore *Penetrabilitie* is no proper Character of a Spirit. But what a vast difference is there here! The one pierce the matter, (or rather are in the matter merely as continued Modes thereof) the other enters into the matter as a distinct Substance therefrom. Penetration therefore is here understood in this Character of a Spirit, of *Penetratio Substantialis*, when a substance penetrates substance, as a Spirit does Spirit and matter, which Matter cannot do. This is a certain Character of a Spirit. And his instancing in Light as Indiscernible, is as little to the purpose. For the substance of Light, viz. the *Materia subtilissima* and *Globuli*, are discernible. And the motion of them is but a *Modus*, but the point
in

in hand is Indiscerpibillitie of Substance.

To the Eighth I Answer, That Mr. Baxter here is hugely unreasonable in his demands, as if *Penetrabilitie* of Spirits were not sufficiently explained, unless it can be made out, that all the Spirits in the world, Universal and particular, may be contracted into one *Punctum*. But this is a Theme that he *loves* to enlarge upon, and to declaim on very Tragically, as pag. 52. If Spirits have parts which may be extended and contracted, you will hardly easily prove assay, that God cannot divide them. And when in your Writings shall I find satisfaction into how much space one Spirit may be extended, and into how little it may be contracted, and whether the whole Spirit of the World may be contracted into a Nut-shell or a Box, and the Spirit of a Flea may be extended to the Convex of all the world? And again, pag. 78. You never tell into how little parts onely it may be contracted; And if you put any limits, I will suppose that one Spirit hath contracted itself into the least compass possible; and then I ask, Cannot another and another Spirit be in the same compass by their Penetration? If not; Spirits may have a contracted Spirituade which is not Penetrable, and Spirits cannot penetrate contracted Spirits, but onely dilated ones. If yea; then *quæra*, whether all created Spirits may not be so contracted. And I should hope that the Definition of

of a Spirit, includeth not God, and yet that you do not think that his Essence may be contracted and dilated. O that we knew how little we know!

This grave mortal *Epiphorema* with a sorrowful shaking of the Head is not in good truth much misbecoming the sly insinuating cunning of Mr. Richard Baxter, who here makes a shew, speaking in the first person [We] of lamenting and bewailing the ignorance of his own ignorance; but friendly hooks in, by expressing himself in the plural number, the Doctor also into the same condemnation. *Solamen miseris*—as if He neither did understand his own ignorance in the things he Writes of, but will be strangely surpris'd at the hard Riddles Mr. Baxter has propounded, as if no *Oedipus* were able to solve them. And I believe the Doctor if he be called to an account will freely confess of himself, That in the things he positively pronounces of, so far as he pronounces, that he is indeed altogether ignorant of any ignorance of himself therein. But that this is by reason that he according to the cautiousness of his Genius does not adventure further than he clearly sees ground, and the notion appears useful for the publick. As it is indeed useful to understand that Spirits can both *Pervade* matter and *Penetrate* one another, velle God could not be *Essentially* present in all the parts of the *Corporeal* Universe; nor the Spirits of Men and Angels

gels be in God. Both which notwithstanding are most certainly true, to say nothing of the *Spirit of Nature*, which particular Spirits also Penetrate, and are Penetrated by it.

But now for the *Contraction* and *Dilatation* of Spirits, that is not a propertie of Spirits in general as the other are, but of *particular created* Spirits, as the Doctor has declared in his Treatise of the *Immortalitie of the Soul*. So that that hard Question is easily answered concerning Gods contracting and dilating himself; That he does neither, he being no *created* Spirit, and being more absolutely perfect than that any such properties should be competent to him. And it is reasonable to conceive that there is little actually of that propertie in the *Spirit of Nature*, it being no *particular* Spirit, though *created*, but an Universal one, and having no need thereof. For the corporeal world did not grow from a small *Embryo* into that vast amplitude it is now of, but was produced of the same largeness it now has, though there was a successive delineation and orderly polishing and perfecting the vast distended parts thereof. And to speak compendiously and at once, That God that has Created all things in *number, weight & measure*, has given such measures of *Spiritual Essence* and of the facultie of *contracting* and *dilating* the same, as also of *Spiritual Subtlety* of substance, as serves the ends of his Wisdom and Goodness in creating such a species of Spirit.

rit. So that it is fond, unskilful, and ridiculous, to ask if the whole Spirit of the world can be contracted into a Nut-shell, and the Spirit of a Flea extended to the Convex of the Universe. They that talk at this rate err as Aliens from the Wisdome of God, and ignorant of the Laws of Nature, and indeed of the voice of Scripture itself. Why should God make the Spirit of a Flea, which was intended for the constituting of such a small Animal, large enough to fill the whole world? Or what need of such a contraction in the *Spirit of Nature* or *Plastick Soul* of the corporeal Universe, that it may be contrived into a Nut-shell?

That it has such *Spiritual subtiltie* as that *particular* Spirits may contract themselves in it so close together, as to be commensurate to the first Inchoations of a *Fætus*, which is but very small, stands to good reason, and Effects prove it to be so. As also this smalness of a *Fætus* or *Embryo* that *particular* Spirits are so far contracted at first; and expand themselves leisurely afterwards with the growth of the bodie which they regulate. But into how much lesser space they can or do contract themselves at any time, is needles to know or enquire. And there is no Repugnancie at all, but the *Spirit of Nature* might be contracted to the like *Essential Spissitude* that some *particular* Spirits are; but there is no reason to conceit that it ever was or ever will be so contracted, while the World stands.

Nor

Nor lastly is there any Inconvenience in putting indefinite limits of *Contraction* in a Spirit, and to allow that after such a measure of *Contraction*, though we cannot say just what that is, it naturally contracts no further, nor does another so contracted naturally penetrate this thus contracted Spirit. For as the usefulness of that measure of *Self-Penetrability* and *Contraction* is plain, so it is as plain, that the admitting of it is no incongruitie nor incommoditie to the Universe, nor any confusion to the *Specifick* modes of *Spirit* and *Bodie*. For these two Spirits, suppose, contracted to the utmost of their natural limits, may naturally avoid the entering one another, not by a dead *Asylum* as in Bodies or Matter, but by a vital Saturitie, or natural Uneasiness in so doing. Besides that, though at such a contracted pitch they are naturally *impenetrable* to one another, yet they demonstrate still their *Spirituality*, by *Self-Penetration*, haply a thousand and a thousand times repeated. And though by a Law of life (not by a dead *Asylum*), they are kept from penetrating one another, yet they both in the mean time necessarily penetrate Matter, as undergoing the diverse measures of *essential Spissitude* in the same. So that by the increase of that *essential Spissitude*, they may approach near to a kind of *Hylopathic* disposition of *Impenetrability*, and thence, by the Matter of the Universe (out of which they

P.

never

never are) be curb'd from contracting themselves any further, than to such a degree; and I noted at first, that *Spiritual Subtily*, as well as *Amplitude*, is given in measure to created Spirits. So that *Penetrabilite* is still a steadie Character of a Spiritual Essence or Substance, to the utmost sense thereof. And to argue against *Impenetrability* its being the propertie of *Matter* from this kind of Impenetrability of *contracted Spirits*, is like that quibbling Sophistrie against *Indiscerpibility* being the propertie of a *Spirit*, because a *Physical Monad* is also *indiscerpible*.

The ninth Objection is against the *Indiscerpibility* of Spirits, and would infer, that because the Doctor makes them intellectually divisible, therefore by Divine Power, *if it imply no contradiction*, a Spirit is Discerpible into Physical parts. But this is so fully satisfied already by the Doctor in his *Discourse of the true Notion of a Spirit*, and its *Defence*, to say nothing of what I have said already above to prove it *does imply a contradiction*, that I will let it go, and proceed.

To the tenth and last Allegation, which pretends, That these two terms *Penetrable* and *Indiscerpible* are *needless* and *bazardous* in the Notion of a Spirit. But how *useful* or *needful Penetrability* is, is manifest from what we have said to the eighth Objection. And the needfulness of *Indiscerpibility* is also sufficiently

ently shewn by the Doctor in his *Defence of the true Notion of a Spirit*, Sect. 30. But now for the *Hazardousness* of these terms, as if they were so hard, that it would discourage men from the admitting of the Existence of Spirits; It appears from what has been said to the eighth Objection, That *Penetrability* is not onely intelligible and admissible, but necessarily to be admitted, in the Notion of a Spirit, as sure as God is a Spirit, and that there are Spirits of men and Angels, and that the Souls of men are not made of Shreds, but actuate their whole grown bodie, though at first they were contracted into the compass of a very small *Fœtus*. And that there is no Repugnancie that an Essence may be ample, and yet indiscerpible, Mr. *Baxter* himself must allow, who, pag. 51. plainly declares, *That it is the vilest contradiction to say that God is capable of division*. So that I wonder that he will call [Penetrable] and [Indiscerpible] *hard* and *doubtful* words, and such as might stumble mens belief of the Existence of Spirits, when they are terms so *plain* and *necessary*. Nor can that *Unitie* that belongs to a Spirit be conceived or understood without them, especially without *Indiscerpibilitie*. And indeed if we do not allow *Penetrability*, the Soul of a man will be far from being *one*, but a thing *discontinued*, and scatter'd in the pores of his corporeal consistencie.

We will conclude with Mr. *Baxters* Conceit of the *Indivisibleness* of a Spirit, and see how that will corroborate mens faith of their Existence, and put all out of hazard. Various Elements, saith he, pag. 59. vary in *Divisibility*; *Earth* is most divisible; *Water* more hardly, the parts more inclining to the closest contact; *Air* yet more hardly; and in *Fire*, no doubt the *Discernibility* is yet harder: And if God have made a Creature so strongly inclined to the unitie of all the parts, that no Creature can separate them but God onely, as if a Soul were such, it is plain that such a Being need not fear a dissolution by Separation of parts. *Ans.* This is well said for an heedless and credulous multitude; but this is not to Philosophize, but to tell us, that God works a perpetual Miracle in holding the small tenuous parts of the Soul together, more pure and fine than those of *Fire* or *Æther*; but here is no natural cause from the thing it self offered, unless it be, that in every Substance, or rather Matter, the parts according to the tenuitie and puritie of the Substance, incline to a closer Contact and inseparable Union one with another; which is a conceit repugnant to experience, and easily confuted by that ordinarie accident of a Spinner hanging by its weak thread from the brim of ones Hat; which feeble line yet is of force enough to divide the Air, and for that very reason, because it consists

ists of thinner parts than Water or Earth. ⁱⁿ ^{As}
 also, we can more easily run in the Air than
 wade in the Water; for the very same reason.
 These things are so plain, that they are not to
 be dwelt upon.

But Mr. Baxter is thus pleased to shew his
 Wit in maintaining a weak Cause, which I am
 perswaded he has not so little judgment as that
 he can have any great confidence in. And
 therefore in sundry places he intimates that he
 does allow or at least not deny but that *Penetrabil-
 itie* and *Indiscerpibilitie* is contained in
 the Notion of a Spirit; but not as part of the
Conceptus formæ, but as *Dispositio* or *Modus
 substantie*, but yet withal such a *Dispositio* as
 is essential to the substance that with the *con-
 ceptus formæ* added, makes up the true No-
 tion of a Spirit. See pag. 30, 32, 61, 89.
 And truly if Mr. Baxter be in good earnest
 and sincere in this agreement without all
 equivocation, that *Penetrabilitie* and *Indiscer-
 pibilitie* is Essential to the true Notion of a
 Spirit, onely they are to be admitted as *Dis-
 positio Substantie*, not as *Partes Formæ*, I confess,
 as he declares pag. 94. That the difference be-
 twixt him and the Doctor lyeth in a much
 smaller matter than was thought; and the Do-
 ctor I believe will easily allow him to please
 his own fancy in that. But then he must un-
 derstand the terms of *Penetrabilitie* and *In-
 discernibilitie* in the Doctors sense, viz, of a

Spirits penetrating not *inter partes*, but *per partes materiales*, and possessing the same space with them. And of an *Indiscernibleness* not arising from thinner and thinner parts of matter, as he imagines Air to be more hardly discernible than Earth or Water, forasmuch as by reason of its thinness its parts lye closer together, as was above noted: but from the immediate essential Oneness of substance in a Spirit, according to the true Idea of an *Indiscernible Being* in the Divine Intellect, which, whether in Idea or in Actual Existence, it would cease to be, or rather never was such, if it were discernible, and therefore implies a contradiction on it should be so. But if a Spirit be not *Penetrable* in the Doctors sense, it is really *Impenetrable*; and if not *Indiscernible* in his sense, it is really *Discernible*, and consequently divisible into Physical Monads or *Atoms*, and therefore constituted of them, and the last Inference will be that of the Epigrammatist:

Nella figura, nel nulla abito, nel nulla m' muovo.
Per ciò che alcun nulla m' distingue.

To this sense:

*All a vain Jest, All Dust, All Nothing deem,
 For of mere Atoms all composed been.*

And thus the fairest and firmest structures of Philosophical Theorems in the behalf of the Providence of God, the Existence of Spirits, and the Immortality of the Soul, will become a

Castle

Castle of Come-Down, and fall quite to the ground. Whence it was rightfully done of the Doctor to lay such stress upon these two terms *Penetrabilitie* and *Indiscerpibilitie*, they being the essential Characteristicks of what is truly a *Spirit*, and which if they were taken out of the world, all would necessarily be *Matter*, I mean *Physical Matter* (to prevent all quibblings and fiddlings about words and phrases) and this *Physical Matter* would be the Subject and Source of all *Life* whatever, *Intellective*, *Sensitive* and *Vegetative*. And Mr. *Baxter* did ill in not onely omitting these terms himself in his Notion of a *Spirit*, but in publickly slighting and disgracing of the Doctors using of them, and afterwards in so stomaching his vindication of the same in publick, whenas we see that without them there can be nothing but *Physical Matter* in the world, and *God* and *Angels* and the *Souls of men* must be such *Matter*, if they be any thing at all: and therefore in such an errour as this, Mr. *Baxter* with Christian patience might well have born with the Doctors calling it, not onely a *Mistake*, but a *Mischief*. And I hope by this time he is such a proficient in that Vertue, that he will chearfully bear the publication of this my Answer in the behalf of the Doctor to all his Objections against these two essential and necessarie Characters of a *Spirit*; and not be offended if I briefly run over his smaller *Criticisms*

cisms upon the Doctors Definition of the same, which do occur, pag. 80, 81. and elsewhere, as I shall advertise.

The Doctors Definition of a Spirit in his Discourse of that Subject, Sect. 29. is this [A Spirit is a Substance immaterial intrinsically indued with life and the facultie of motion] where he notes that *Immaterial* contains virtually in it *Penetrability* and *Indiscernibility*. Now let us hear how Mr. *Baxter* criticizes on this Definition.

First, saies he, pag. 80. Your Definition is common, good and true, allowing for its little imperfections, and the common imperfection of mans knowledge of Spirits. If by [Immaterial] you mean not [without Substance] it signifieth truth, but a negation speaketh not a formal Essence. *Ans.* How very little these *imperfections* are, I shall note by passing through them all; and for the *common* imperfection of mans *knowledge of Spirits*, what an unskilful or hypocritical pretence that is, the Doctor hath so clearly shewn in his *Discourse of the true Notion of a Spirit*, Sect. 16, 17, 18, 19. that it is enough to send the Reader thither for satisfaction. But as for [Immaterial] how can any one think that thereby is meant [without Substance] but those that think there is nothing but Matter in the Physical sense of the word, in the world? As if [Substance Immaterial] was intended to signifie [Substance with-

without Substance]! And lastly, the Doctor will denie that [In] in *Immaterial* signifies negatively here more than in *Immortal*, *Incorruptible*, or *Infinite*; but that it is the indication of opposite properties to those of *Physical Matter*, viz. *Impenetrability* and *Discerpibility*; and that therefore *Immaterial* here includes *Indiscerpibility* and *Penetrability*.

Secondly, pag. 81. Spirit it self, saies he, is but a metaphor. *Ans.* Though the word first signified other things before it was used in the sense it is here defined, yet use has made it as good as if it were originally proper. With your Logicians, in those Definitions, *Materia est Causa ex qua res est, Forma est Causa per quam res est id quod est*; *Materia* and *Forma* are Metaphorical words; but use has made them in those Definitions as good as proper; nor does any sober and knowing man move the least scruple touching those Definitions on this account. To which you may add, that *Aristotles* caution against Metaphors in defining things; is to be understood of the Definition it self, not the *Definitum*; but *Spirit* is the *Definitum* here, not the Definition.

Thirdly, [Intrinsically indued with life] tells us not that it is the *Form*. Qualities, and proper Accidents are *intrinsical*. *Ans.* Mr. Baxter, I suppose, for clearness sake, would have had *Form* written over the head of this part of the Definition; as the old bungling painters

painters were wont to write, This is a Cock,
 and this a Bull; or as one wittily perstringed
 a young Preacher that would name the Logi-
 cal Topicks he took his Arguments from, say-
 ing he was like a Shoemaker that offered his
 Shoes to sale with the Lasts in them. I thought
 Mr. Baxter had been a more nimble Logician
 than to need such helps to discern what is the
Genus in the Definition, what the *Differentia*
 or *Forma*. And for [intrinsically indued] I per-
 ceive he is ignorant of the proper force and
 sense of the word *Intrinsicus*, which signifies
 as much as ~~in~~ not ~~in~~ onely, which implies
 that this life is from the intimate Essence of a
 Spirit *quatenus* a Spirit, and therefore can
 be no common qualitie nor a facultie clat-
 ted on, as Mr. Baxter fancies God may clart
 on Life the specifick Form of Spirit, as he
 himself acknowledges, on Matter, though
Materia quatenus Materia implies no such
 thing; but, I say, *Spiritus quatenus Spiritus*
 does, which is both the Source and proper Sub-
 ject of life. But it is the effect of an ill per-
 turbed sight, to fancie flaws where there are
 really none. And to fancie that a *Vis Vitalis*,
 or Power of living can belong to *Materia Phy-*
sica immediately, which power must necessari-
 ly be the Result of an Essence specifically di-
 stinct from Physical Matter, I think may justly
 be called clarting of this Power on a Subject it
 belongs not to, nor is intrinsecal to it, there be-
 ing

ing no new specifick Essence from whence it should spring.

Fourthly, The [Facultie of motion] saies he, is either a Tautologie included in *Life*, or else if explicatorie of *Life*, it is defective. *Ans.* It is neither Tautological nor Exegetical, no more than if a man should define *Homo*, *Animal rationale risibile*. [Risibile] there, is neither Tautological, though included in *Animal rationale*; nor Exegetical, it signifying not the same with *Rationale*. And the Definition is as true with *Risibile* added to it, as if omitted. But the addition of *Risibile* being needless, is indeed ridiculous. But it is not *Ridiculous* to add the faculty of motion in this Definition of a Spirit, because it is not *needless*, but is added on purpose to instruct, such as Mr. *Baxter*, that an *intrinsic* facultie of motion belongs to Spirit *quatenus* Spirit, and indued with *Life*; when as yet he, pag. 35. will not admit that self-motion is an indication of *Life* in the subject that moves itself, although it is the very prime argument that his beloved and admired Dr. *Glisson* useth to prove, that there is *universally life in Matter*. But it is the symptome of an over-Polemical Fencer, to deny a thing merely because he finds it not for his turn. In the mean time it is plain the Doctor has not added [the facultie of motion] rashly out of oversight, but for the instructing the ignorant in so important a truth, That there

there is no *substance* but there is *Life and Spirit*. This is so great a truth, that the *Platonists* make it to be the main Character of Soul or Spirit, to be *immaterial*, as you may see in *Proclus*.

Fifthly, No man, saith he, can understand that the Negative [*Immaterial*], by the terms, includeth *Penetrability* and *Indiscripibility*. *Ans.* No man that rightly understands himself but must conceive that [*Immaterial*] signifies an opposite or contrary condition to [*Material*]: and he knowing (as who is ignorant of it) that the proper and essential characters of [*Material*] in *substantia materialis*, is to be *Impenetrable* and *Indiscribable*, he will necessarily, even whether he will or no, discover that [*Immaterial*] which signifies the opposite to these in *substantia immaterialis*, must denote *Penetrability* and *Indiscripibility*.

Sixthly, You do not say here, saith he, that they are the *Form*, but elsewhere you do, and the *Form* should be *express*, and not onely *virtually* contained, as you speak. *Ans.* What would you have him in the very Definition it self, which is so clear as one, say, This is the *Genus*, thus the *Form*, as those bunglers I mentioned above writ the names of the Animals they had so badly drawn? And that the *Form* should be *express* is true, but it is sufficient it be *express* in such a comprehensive term as contains under it all that belongs to such a Species.

Species. As when we have divided *Quens* into *Planta* and *Animal*, if we then define *Animal* to be *Vivens sensu præditi*, that one word *sensus*, is sufficient, because it reaches any Species of Animal, and none but Animals. And yet here the Doctor is not so niggardly as to pinch the expression of all the Form or Difference, into that one word *Immaterial*, whereby he here onely intimates *Penetrability* and *Indiscernibility*; but for fuller explication addeth, *Intrinsically indued with Life and the facultie of motion*. But lastly, For his elsewhere calling *Penetrability* and *Indiscernibility* the *Form* of a Spirit, he nowhere makes them the whole *Form* of a Spirit, but makes the Logical *Form* or *Differentia* of a Spirit, to be all that which he has expressed in this Definition, viz. [Immaterial] which denotes *Penetrability* and *Indiscernibility*, and [Intrinsical life and motion]. And it is evident that when he calls this *Differentia* in his Definition, *Form*, that he does not mean the very *specifick* Substance or Essence, whereby a Spirit is a Spirit, but onely essential or inseparable *Attributes*, which onely are known to us, and which are only in an improper sense said to be the *Form* it self, or *specifick* Nature. They are onely the *Result* of the *Form* and *Notes* of an Essence or Substance *Specifically* distinct from some other Substance.

It is not so in *substantial* Forms as in Geometrical

trical *Forms* or *Figures*, as to Visibilitie or Perceptibilitie. *Dic tu formam hujus lapidis*, says *Senaliger* to *Cardan*, & *Phyllida solus habeto*. But there are inseparable and essential *Properties* of a *substantial Form*, necessarily resulting from the Form it self, as there are in external *Forms* or *Figures*. As for example, from the *form* of a *Globe*, which is a round Form, defined from the equalitie of all lines from one point drawn thence to the Superficies. From this form does necessarily and inseparably result the Character of an easie rouling Mobilitie. That a bodie of this Form is the most easily moved upon a Plain, of any bodie in the world. And so from the *Form* of a piece of Iron made into what we call a *Sword*; Fitness for striking, for cutting, for stabbing, and for defending of the hand, is the necessarie result from this Form thereof. And so I say that from the intimate and essential *Form* of a *Spirit*, suppose, essentially and inseparably result such and such properties by which we know that a Spirit is a distinct Species from other things, though we do not know the very *specifick* essence thereof. And therefore here I note by the by, that when the Doctor saies any such or such Attributes are the *Form* of a Spirit, he does *datâ operâ balbutire cum balbutientibus*, and expresses himself in the language of the Vulgar, and speaks to Mr. *Baxter* in his own Dialect. For it is the declared opinion

of the Doctor, that the intimate *Form* of no Essence or Substance is knowable, but onely the inseparable Fruits or Results thereof, Which is a Principle wants no proof, but an appeal to every mans faculties that has ordinarie wit and sinceritie.

Seventhly, They are not the *Form*, saith he, but the *Dispositio vel Conditio ad formam*. Anf. You may understand out of what was said even now, that *Penetrabilitie* and *Indiscernibilitie* are so far from being *Dispositio ad formam*, that they are the *Fruits* and *Results* of the intimate and *Specifick Form* of a *Spirit*, and that they suppose this *Specifick Form* in order of nature to preceede them, as the *Form* of a *Globe* preceeds the rousing *mobilitie* thereof. In vertue of a *Spirits* being such a *Specifick substance*, it has such inseparable attributes resulting from it, as a *Globe* has *mobilitie*. And as the *Globe* is conceived *first*, and *mobilitie* inseparably resulting from it; so the *Specifick Nature* of a *Spirit*, which is its true and intimate *Form*, and made such according to the eternal *Idea* thereof in the Intellect of God, being one simple *Specifick substance* or *Essence*, has resulting from it those essential or inseparable properties which we attribute to a *Spirit*, itself in the mean time remaining but one simple self-subsistent *Actus Entitativus*, whose *Penetrabilitie* and *Indivisibilitie* Mr. Baxter himself, pag. 99. says is easily defendible. And the

the Doctor, who understands himself, I dare say for him, defends the *Penetrabilitie* and *Indivisibilitie* of no Essences but such.

Eighthly, If such Modalities, says he, or Consistence were the *Form*, more such should be added which are left out. *Ans.* He should have nominated those which are left out. He means, I suppose, *Quantity* and *Trina Dimensio*, which it was his discretion to omit, they being so impertinent as I have shewn above, in my Answer to his third Objection against the *Penetrabilitie* and *Indiscerpibilitie* of a Spirit.

Ninthly, *Penetrabilitie* and *Indiscerpibilitie* are two Notions, and you should not give us, says he, a compound Form. *Ans.* This implies that *Penetrability* and *Indiscerpibility* are the *Form* of a Spirit; but I have said again and again, they are but the *Fruits* and *Result* of the *Form*. A Spirit is one simple *Specifick* Essence or substance, and that true *Specifickness* in its Essence, is the *real* and *intimate Form*, or *Conceptus formalis* thereof, but that which we know not (as I noted above out of *Julius Scaliger*) though we know the essential and inseparable Attributes thereof, which may be many, though in *one simple* specifick Substance, as there are many Attributes in God immediately and inseparably resulting from his most *simple* specifick Nature.

Tenthly, Yea you compound, saith he, *Penetrability* and *Indiscerpibility* with a quite different notion [life and the faculty of motion], which is truly the *Form*, and is one thing, and not compounded of notions so different as *Consistence* and *Virtue* or *Power*. *Ans.* I say again, as I said before, that neither *Penetrability* nor *Indiscerpibility*, nor *Life* nor *Motion*, are the *specifick Form* it self of a Spirit; which is a simple Substance, but the *Fruits* and *Results* of this *specifick Form*; and all these have a proper *Cognition* with one another, as agreeing in *Immateriality* or *Spirituality*: and now the common sagacity of mankind has prelag'd, that the most noble functions of life are performed by that which is most *subtile* and most *one*, as *Penetrability* and *Indiscerpibility* makes the consistence of a Spirit to be, the Doctor has noted in his *Discourse of the true nature of a Spirit*. Mr. Baxter in reading Theological Systems may observe, That Attributes as much differing among themselves as these, are given to the most simple Essence of God.

Eleventhly, You say, says he, pag. 82. Life intrinsically issues from this Immaterial Substance: But the *Form* is concreated with it, and issues not from it. *Ans.* I grant that the *Form* is concreated with the Spirit. For a Spirit is nothing else but such a *specifick* simple Substance or Essence, the *specifickness* of whose nature

nature onely is its real intimate *Form*. And if we could reach by our Conception that very *Form* it self, it would be but the *Conceptus inadæquatus* of one simple Substance, and be the true *Conceptus formalis* thereof; and the *Conceptus fundamentalis*, to speak in Mr. *Baxters* or Dr. *Glissons* language, would be Substance in general; which is contracted into this *Species* by this real intimate *Form*; which both considered together, being but one simple Essence, they must needs be created together, according to that Idea of a Spirit which God has conceived in his eternal mind. And life will as naturally and necessarily issue from such a *Species* or *Specifick Essence*, or from Substance contracted into such a *Species* by the above-said *Form*, as *Mobility* does issue from the form of a Globe. From whence it is plainly understood how Life does intrinsically issue from immaterial Substance, nor is the *Form* it self but the Fruit thereof. And as it were but trifling to say that the power of easie rolling every way on a Plain were the very *Form* of a Globe, the word *Power* or *Vertue* being but a dark, loose, general, dilute term, and which belongs to every thing, and is restrained onely by its Operation and Object; but it is the *Form* or Figure of the Globe that is the immediate cause that that *Vertue* or *Power* in general is so restrained to this easie rolling: so it is in Mr. *Baxters* pretended *Form* of a Spirit, which he makes

makes *Virtus vitalis*, a power of living: Power there, is such a dark dilute term, loose and general. But that it is determined to life, it is by that intimate specifick Form, which we know not; but onely this we know, That it is to the Power of living as the Figure of a Globe is to the Power of easie rolling, and that in neither, one can be without the other. There must be a Specifick Essence, which is the root of those Powers, Properties, or Operations from whence we conclude distinct Species of things: For 'tis too coarse and slovenly to conceit, that these are clarted on them, but the Specifick Powers arise immediately, and inseparably from the Specifick Nature of the thing; else why might they not be other powers as well as these?

Twelfthly and lastly, pag. 32. But do you verily believe, saith he, that *Penetrability* or *Subtility* is a sufficient *Efficient* or *Formal* cause of Vitalitie, Perception and Appetite, and so of Intellection and Volition? I hope you do not.

Ans. I hope so of the Doctor too; and before this, I hoped that Mr. *Baxter* had more insight into the nature of a *Formal* cause and into the Laws of Logick, than once to imagine that any one in his Wits could take *Penetrability* to be the *Formal* cause of *Intellection* and *Volition*. For then every Spirit being *Penetrable*, every Spirit even of a plant, at least of the vilest *Animalculum*, would have Intellection

and Volition. Nor, for the same reason, can any body think that *Penetrability* is a *sufficient* Efficient cause of Intellection and Volition. Nor is it so much as the *Efficient* cause of *Vitality*, *Perception*, *Appetite*, much less the *Formal*. So infinitely is Mr. Baxter out in these things. But the case stands thus: The Substance of that species of things which we call a *Spirit*, and is so by that *intimate specifick Form* which I named before, this substance is the cause of *Vitality* in such a sense as the round Form of a Globe, or any matter of that Form is, *quatenus* of that Form, the cause of its own rolling *Mobilitie*. I say therefore, that *Vitality* is as immediate and necessarie a Fruit, or Effect of the *real and intimate Form* of a *Spirit*, as that easie *mobilitie* is of the Form of a Sphere or Globe; And such a kind of *Vitality*, *Vegetative*, *Sensitive*, *Intellective* of such a Species of Spirit; These kinds of *Vitalities* are the Fruits or Effects necessarie and immediate of the above-said so specified Substances; that is to say, they are immediately *Self-living*, and all of them *Penetrable* and *Indiscernible* of themselves, *quatenus Spirits*, all these essential attributes arising from the simple essence or specified substance of every Spirit, of what Classis soever, created according to its own *Idea* eternally shining in the Divine Intellect.

As for example; In the *Idea* of a *Plastick Spirit*

Spirit onely; *Penetrability*, *Indiscernibility*, and *Plastick Vitality*, whereby it is able to organize Matter thus and thus, are not three Essences clarted upon some fourth Essence, or glewed together one to another, to make up such an Idea: But the Divine Intellect conceives in itself one simple specifick Essence immediately and intrinsically of it self, indued with these essential Properties or Attributes. So that when any thing does exist according to this Idea, those three properties are as immediately Consequential to it, and as effectually, as *Mobility* to the *Form* of a *Globe*. It is the *specifick Substance* that is the necessary Source of them, and that acts by them as its own connate or natural instruments, fitted for the ends that the eternal Wisdom and Goodness of God has conceived or contrived them for.

For it is manifest, that those essential Attributes of a Spirit contrarie to Matter are not in vain. For whenas a *Plastick Spirit* is to actuate and organize Matter, and inwardly dispose it into certain forms, *Penetrability* is needful, that it may possess the Matter, and order it throughout; As also that *Oneness* of Essence and *Indiscernibility*, that it may hold it together. For what should make any mass of Matter *one*, but that which has a special *Oneness* of Essence in it self, quite different from that of Matter? And forasmuch as all Souls

are indued with the *Plastick* whether of Brutes or Men, not to add the Spirits of Angels; still there holds the same reason in all ranks, that Spirits should be as well *Penetrable* and *Indiscernible* as *Vital*. And if there be any *Platonick* ^{Niss} that have no *Plastick*, yet *Penetrability* must belong to them, and is of use to them, if they be found to be within the verges of the Corporeal Universe (and why not they as well as God himself?) and *Indiscernibility* maintains their Supposital Unitie, as it does in all Spirits that have to do with Matter, and are capable of a *vital* coalescencie therewith. But I have accumulated here more Theorie than is needful. And I must remember that I am in a *Digression*.

To return therefore to the particular point we have been about all this while. I hope by this time I have made it good, that the Dr.'s *Definition* of a *Spirit* is so clear, so true, so express, and usefully instructive (and that is the scope of the Doctors Writings) that neither he himself, nor any body else, let them consider as much as they can, will ever be able to mend it. And that these affected Cavils of Mr. *Baxter* argue no defects or flaws in the Doctors Definition, but the ignorance and impotencie of Mr. *Baxters* Spirit, and the undue elevation of his mind, when notwithstanding this unexceptionableness of the Definition, he, pag. 82. out of his Magisterial Chair of Judicature pro-

pronounces with a gracious nod, *You mean well—* but all our Conceptions here must have their **ALLOWANCES**, and we must confess their weakness. This is the Sentence which grave Mr. Baxter, *alto supercilio*, gives of the Doctors accurate Definition of a Spirit, to humble him; and exalt himself, in the sight of the *populacie*. But is it not a great weakness, or worse, to talk of favourable *allowances*, and not to allow that to be *unexceptionable* against which no just exception is found?

But to give Mr. Baxter his due, though the extream or extimate parts of this Paragraph, pag. 82. which you may fancie as the skin thereof, may seem to have something of bitterness and toughness in it, yet the Belly of the Paragraph is full of plums and sweet things. For he saies, *And we are all greatly beholden to the Doctor for his so industrious calling foolish Sensualists to the study and notion of invisible Beings, without which, what a carcass or nothing were the world?*

But is it not pity then, while the Doctor does discharge this Province with that faithfulness and industrie, that Mr. Baxter should disturb him in his work, and hazzard the fruits and efficacie thereof, by eclipsing the clearness of his Notions of *Spiritual Beings*, (for *Bodies* may be also *invisible*) by the interposition or opposition of his own great Name against them, who, as himself tells the

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world in his *Church-History*, has wrote *four score Books*; even as old Dr. *Glisson* his Patron or rather Pattern in Philology arrived to at least *four score Years* of age? And Mr. *Baxter* it seems is for the common Proverb, The older the wiser; though *Elihu* in *Job* be of another mind, who saies there, *I said Days should speak; and multitude of Years should teach Wisdom; But there is a Spirit in man, and the Inspiration of the Almighty giveth him Understanding.* But whither am I going?

I would conclude here according to promise, having rescued the Doctors Definition of a Spirit from Mr. *Baxters* numerous little *Criticisms*, like so many shrill busie Gnats trumpeting about it, and attempting to infix their feeble *Proboscides* into it; and I hope I have silenced them all.

But there is something in the very next Paragraph which is so wrongfully charged upon the Doctor, that I cannot forbear standing up in his justification. The Charge is this: That he has fathered upon Mr. *Baxter* an Opinion he never owned, and nick-named him *Psychopyrist* from his own fiction. As if, says he, we said that *Souls* are *Fire*, and also took *Fire*, as the Doctor does, for *Candles* and *hot Irons*, &c. onely. But I answer in behalf of the Doctor, as I have a little toucht on this matter before, That he does indeed entitle a certain Letter (which he answers) to a *Learned Psychopyrist* show

as the Author thereof: But Mr. *Baxters* name is with all imaginable care concealed. So that he by his needless owning the Letter, has notched that nick-name (as he calls it) of *Psychopyrift* upon himself, whether out of greediness after that alluring Epithet it is baited with, I know not; but that he hangs thus by the gills like a Fish upon the Hook, he may thank his own self for it, nor ought to blame the Doctor. Much less accuse him for saying, that Mr. *Baxter* took *Fire* in no other sense than that in Candles and hot Iron, and the like. For in his *Preface*, he expressly declares on the *Psychopyrists* behalf, that he does not make this *crass* and *visible* Fire the Essence of a Spirit, but that his meaning is more subtile and refined. With what conscience then can Mr. *Baxter* say, that the Doctor affirms that he took Fire in no other sense than that in Candles and hot Iron, and the like, and that he held *all* Souls to be such Fire? whenas the Doctor is so modest and cautious, that he does not affirm that Mr. *Baxter* thinks any to be such; though even in this *Placid Collation*, he professes his inclination towards the Opinion, that *Ignis* and *Vegetative Spirit* is all one, pag. 20, 21. I have oft professed, saith he, that I am ignorant whether *Ignis* and *Vegetative Spirit* be all one, (to which I most incline) or whether *Ignis* be an active nature made to be the instrument, by which the three spiritual natures,

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Vegetative, Sensitive, and Mental work on the three passive natures, Earth, Water, Air.

And again, pag. 66. If it be the Spirit of the world that is the nearest cause of illumination, by way of natural activity, then that which you call the *Spirit* of the *World*, I call *Fire*; and so we differ but *de nomine*. But I have (saith he as before) professed my ignorance, whether *Fire* and the *Vegetative nature* be all one, (which I incline to think) or whether *Fire* be a middle active nature between the *spiritual* and the mere *Passive*, by which *Spirits* work on *bodie*. And, pag. 71. I doubt not but *Fire* is a Substance permeant and existent in all mixt bodies on Earth. In your bloud it is the prime part of that called the *Spirits*, which are nothing but the *igneous* principle in a pure Aereal Vehicle, and is the organ of the *Sensitive* faculties of the Soul. And if the Soul carry any Vehicle with it, it's like to be some of this. I doubt you take the same thing to be the *Spirit* of the *world*, though you seem to vilifie it. And, pag. 74. I suppose you will say, the *Spirit* of the world does this. But call it by what name you will, it is a pure active Substance, whose form is the *Virtus motiva, illuminativa & calefactiva*, I think the same which when it operateth on due seminal Matter is *Vegetative*. And lastly, pag. 86. I still profess my self in this also uncertain, whether *Natura Vegetativa* and

and *Igneæ* be all one, or whether *Igni* be *Natura Organica* by which the three *Superiour* (he means the *Vegetative*, *Sensitive*, and *Intellective* Natures) operate on the *Passive*. But I incline most to think they are all one, when I see what a glorious *Fire* the *Sun* is, and what operation it hath on Earth, and how unlikely it is that so glorious a Substance should not have as noble a formal nature as a Plant.

This is more than enough to prove that Mr. *Baxter* in the most proper sense is inclined to *Psychopyrism* as to the *Spirit of the world*, or *Vegetative soul* of the *Universe*; that that *Soul* or *Spirit* is *Fire*: And that all created Spirits are *Fire*, analogicè and *eminenter*, I have noted above that he does freely confess.

But certainly if it had not been for his ignorance in the Atomick Philosophie which he so greatly despiseth, he would never have taken the *Fire* it self, a *Congeries* of agitated particles of such figures and dimensions, for the *Spirit of the world*. But without further doubt have concluded it onely the instrument of that Spirit in its operations, as also of all other created Spirits, accordingly as the Doctor has declared a long time since in his *Immortalitas Animæ*, Lib. 2. Cap. 8. Sect. 6. And finding that there is one such universal *Vegetative Spirit* (properly so called) or *Διὰ τὴν ὅλην* of the world, he could not miss of concluding the *whole Universe* one great

great *Plant*, or if some obscure degree of sense be given to it, one large *Zoophyton* or *Plant-animal*, whence the Sun will be endued or actuated as much by a *Vegetative Nature* as any particular *Plant* whatsoever; whereby Mr. *Baxter* might have took away his own difficultie he was entangled in. But the truth is, Mr. *Baxters* defectiveness in the right understanding of the *Atomick Philosophy*, and his Aversness therefrom, as also from the *true System of the world*, which necessarily includes the *motion of the Earth*, we will cast in also his abhorrence from the *Pre-existence of Souls* (which three Theories are hugely necessary to him that would Philosophize with any success in the deepest points of natural Religion and Divine Providence) makes him utter many things that will by no means bear the Test of severer Reason.

But in the mean time this Defectiveness in sound Philosophie neither hinders him nor any one else from being able Instruments in the Gospel-Ministrie, if they have *wis* and *prudence* in a due measure; If they have a firm *Faith* in the revealed Truths of the Gospel, and skill in *History*, *Tongues* and *Criticism*, to explain the Text to the people, and there be added a sincere Zeal to instruct their Charge, and (that they may appear in good earnest to believe what they teach) they lead a life devoid of scandal and offence, as regulated by those Gospel-Rules they

they propose to others; *this*, though they have little of the ^{virtue} properly so called, that reaches to the deepest account of things, (but instead thereof, *Prudence* and *Ingenuity*) will sufficiently enable them to be Guides to the people, especially by adhering in Matters of moment to the Ancient Apostolick and unapostatized Church, and presuming nothing upon their private Spirit against the same. Such, questionless, will prove able and safe Pastors, and will not fail of being approved of by our Lord Jesus the great Shepherd and Bishop of our Souls.

But if any such, as I noted above, for that they conceit themselves also dapper fellows at Gudgeons or Quarter-staff, shall, leaving their Flocks solitary in the fields, out of an itch after applause from the Country-Fry, gad to Wakes and Fairs to give a proof of their dexterity at those Rural exercises; if they shall, I say, for their pains return with a bruised knuckle or broken pate, who can help it? it will learn them more wit another time. Thus much by way of *Digression* I thought fit to speak, not out of the least ill-will to Mr. Baxter, but onely in behalf of the Doctor, hoping, though it is far from all that may be said, that yet it is so much, and so much also to the purpose, that it will save the Doctor the labour of adding any thing more thereto. So that he may either enjoy his Repose, or betake
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himself to some design of more use and moment.

In the mean time, I having dispatcht my *Digression*, I shall return to the main business in hand. I think it may plainly appear from what has been said, that it is no such harsh thing to adventure to conclude, That the Truth of the Divine Intellect *quatenus conceptive, speculative, or observative*, which a *Platonist* would be apt to call *Nous simple*, as the Divine Intellect *exhibitive* *Nous unifié*, (for though it be but one and the same Intellect, yet for distinctness sake we are fain to speak as of two) does consist in its Conformity with the Divine Intellect *exhibitive*, with the immutable Idea's, Respects and References of things there. In conceiving and observing them (as I may so speak) to be such as they are represented in the said Intellect *quatenus* necessarily and unalterably representing such Idea's with the immediate Respects and References of them. In this consists the Truth of the Divine Intellect *Speculative*. But the Transcendental Truth of things consists in their Conformity to the Divine Intellect *Exhibitive*. For every thing is true as it answers to the immutable Idea of its own nature discovered in the Divine Intellect *Exhibitive*. To which also the same Divine Intellect *quatenus Conceptive, Speculative, or Observative*, gives its suffrage steadily and unalterably, conceiving these immutable Idea's

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of things in their *Objective Existence* what their natures will be, with their necessary references, aptitudes or ineptitudes to other things when they are produced into act.

From whence we may discern, how that saying of this ingenious Author of the *Discourse of Truth* is to be understood. Where he writes, *It is against the nature of all Understanding to make its Object.* Which if we will candidly interpret, must be understood of all understanding *quatenus* merely *conceptive, speculative* or *observative*, and of framing of its Object at its pleasure. Which as it is not done in the settled Idea of a Sphere, Cylinder and Pyramid, no more is it in any other Idea's with their properties and aptitudes immediately issuing from them, but all the Idea's with their inevitable properties, aptitudes, or ineptitudes are necessarily represented in the Divine Intellect *Exhibitive*, immutably such as they are, a Triangle with its three Angles equal to two right ones, a right-angled Triangle with the power of its *Hypotenusa* equal to the powers of the *Basis* and *Cathetus* both put together: Which things seem necessary to every sober man and rightly in his wits, our understanding being an *Abstract* or *Copy* of the Divine Understanding. But those that say that if God would, he might have made the three Angles of a Triangle unequal to two right ones, and also the powers of the *Basis* and *Cathetus*

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of a right-angled Triangle unequal to the power of the *Hypotenusa*, are either Buffoons and Quibblers, or their Understandings being but creatural huffiness of mind and an ambition of approving themselves the Broachers and maintainers of strange Paradoxes, has crazed their Intellectuals, and they have already entred the suburbs of down-right Phrensie and Madnes.

And to conclude; Out of what has been insinuated, we may reconcile this harsh sounding Paradox of our Author, that seems so point-blank against the current doctrine of the Metaphysical Schools, who make Transcendental Truth to depend upon the Intellectual Truth of God, which they rightly deem the Fountain and Origine of all Truth, whenas he plainly declares, *That the Divine Understanding cannot be the Fountain of the Truth of things*: But the seeming absurdity will be easily wiped away, if we take notice of our distinction touching the Divine Understanding *quatenus* merely *conceptive, speculative or observative*, and *quatenus* necessarily (through its own infinite and immutable pregnancie and fecundity) *Exhibitive* of the distinct and determinate Ideas or natures of things, with their immediate Properties, Respects or Habitudes in their *Objective Existence*, representing them such as they certainly will be if reduced into act. His assertion is not to be understood of the Divine Under-

Understanding in this latter sense, but in the former. But being it is one and the same Understanding, though considered under this twofold Notion, our Author, as well as the ordinarie Metaphysicians, will agree to this truth in the sense explained; That the Divine Understanding is the Fountain of the truth of things, and that they are truly what they are, as they answer to their Idea's represented in the *Exhibitive* Intellect of God. How the Author himself comes off in this point, you will better understand when you have read the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth Sections of his Discourse. Let this suffice in the mean time for the removing all stumbling-blocks from before the Reader.

Pag. 168. *Nor the foundation of the references one to another*; that is to say, The Divine Understanding *quatenus Conceptive* or *Speculative*, is most certainly not the Foundation of the references of things one to another; but the Divine Understanding *quatenus Exhibitive*, that represents the Idea's or natures of things in their *Objective Existence* such as they would be if reduced really into act, represents therewith all the references and habitudes they have one to another. Which habitudes are represented not as flowing from or arbitrarily founded in any Intellect whatsoever, but as resulting from the natures of the things themselves that respect one another, and are repre-

presented in the *Exhibitive* Understanding of God. Which is the main thing that this ingenious Author would be at, and such as will serve all his intents and purposes.

Pag. 168. *It is the nature of Understanding ut moveatur, illuminetur, &c.* Namely, of Understanding *quatenus Conceptive* or *Speculative*, not *quatenus Exhibitive*.

Pag. 169. *No Idea's or Representations either are or make the things they represent, &c.* This Assertion is most certainly true. But yet they may be such Idea's and Representations as may be the measure of the Truth of those things they represent : And such are all the Idea's in the Divine Intellect *Exhibitive*, their settled distinct natures necessarily exhibited there in virtue of the absolute perfection of the Deitie, though only in their *Objective Existence*, are the measures of the Truth of those things when they are reduced into act, as I have noted above ; but they are not the things themselves reduced into act, no more than an Autographon is the very Copy.

Ibid. *All Understanding is such ; that is, Idea's and Representations of the natures of things in their Objective Existence, the Patterns of what and how they are when they Exist, and what references and aptitudes they have.* I suppose he means here by Understanding, not any power of the mind to conceive any thing, but Understanding properly so called,

viz.

viz. that, whose Objects are *in se* or *in re*, as the Platonists speak, the Idea's or Representations of such things as are necessarily and unalterably such, not fictions at pleasure. Let the Intellect *Speculative* be such Idea's or Representations as these, and then what it perceives, conceives, or observes, it does not make, but it is made to its hand, as not being able to be otherwise, nor it self to think otherwise. And therefore it is rightly inferred as follows: That no *Speculative Understanding* in that restrict sense above-named makes at pleasure the natures, respects and relations of its Objects represented in the Intellect *Exhibitive* in their *Objective Existence*, but finds them there. Nor does any Intellect whatsoever make them at pleasure, but they are necessarily and unalterably represented in the *Exhibitive Intellect* of the Deitie, both their natures, respects, and habitudes, as I noted above.

Sect. 5. pag. 169. *It remains then that absolute, arbitrary and independent Will must be the Fountain of all Truth, &c.* It being supposed that the Divine Understanding and the independent Will of God are the onely competitors who should be the Fountain of all Truth, and the former Section proving in a sense rightly understood, that the Divine Understanding cannot be the Fountain of Truth, it remains that the mere Will of God should be

the Fountain of Truth, and that things are true onely because he wills they be so. As if four bore a double proportion to two because God would have it so; but if he would that Two should bear a double proportion to Four, it would immediately be so.

Ibid. *Which Assertion would in the first place destroy the nature of God, &c.* Nay, if he will, it destroys his very *Existence*. For if all Truths depend upon Gods Will, then this Truth, *That God Exists*, does. And if he will the contrary to be true, namely, *That he does not Exist*, what becomes of him then?

Ibid. *And rob him of all his Attributes.* That it robs him of Science and assured Knowledge, whose Objects are τα ἀμεταβάτα καὶ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ ἀκαταρρέτα, Things immutable and necessary, this Section makes good. And that it despoils him of his Rectitude of Nature, the Eighth Section will shew.

Pag. 170. *Any Angel or man may as truly be said to know all things as God himself, &c.* Because this supposition takes away all the steady and scientific Knowableness in things, it taking away their settled, fixt and necessary habitudes one to another, as if *double* proportion of Four to Two did no more belong to it in Truth and Reality than *Sub-double*, and that Four in Truth were no more the Quaternarie number than the Binary, but indifferently either, as the Will of God will have

have it. This plainly pulls up by the roots all pretence of Science or Knowledge in God, Angels, and Men. And much more, flatly to assert, That if God will, contradictions may be true. For this plainly implies that there is really no Repugnancy nor Connection of one thing with another, and that therefore no one thing can be proved or disproved from another.

Pag. 171. *If we distinguish those two Attributes in God, &c.* namely, of *Wisdom* and *Knowledge*, as if the one were *Noematical*, the other *Dianoetical*; although that discursiveness is more quick than lightning, or rather an eternal intuitive discernment of the consequence or cohesion of things at once.

Sect. 6. pag. 172. *Because they suppose that God is mutable and changeable, &c.* This can be no allegation against the other Arguings, because we cannot be assured of the Immutability or Unchangeableness of God, but by admitting of what those arguings drive at, namely, That there is an immutable, necessary and unchangeable reference and respect or connection of things one with another. As for example, of Immutableness or Unchangeableness with Perfection, and of Perfection with God. For to fancie God an imperfect Being is nonsense to all men that are not delirant; and to fancie him Perfect, and yet Changeable in such a sense as is here understood, is as absurd

a Contradiction or Repugnance: Wherefore they that would oppose the fore-going Arguings by supposing God Unchangeable, must acknowledge what is aimed at, That there is a necessary and unchangeable respect and connection betwixt things, or else their opposition is plainly weak and vain. But if they grant this, they grant the Cause, and so Truth has its just victory and triumph. This Section is abundantly clear of itself.

Sect. 8. pag. 174. *Will spoil God of that universal Rectitude which is the greatest perfection of his nature, &c.* In the fifth Section it was said, That the making the Will of God the Fountain of all Truth robs him of all his Attributes. And there it is proved how it robs him of his Wisdom and Knowledge. Here it is shewn how it robs him of his Justice, Mercy, Faithfulness, Goodness, &c.

Pag. 175. *For to say they are indispensably so because God understands them so, &c.* This, as the Author saies, must be extream Incogitancy. For the Truth of the Divine Understanding Speculative consists in its Conformitie with the Idea's of things and their Respects and Habitues in the Divine Understanding Exhibitive, which necessarily, unchangeably and unalterably represents the natures of things with their Respects and Habitues in their Objective Existence, such as they necessarily are when they do really exist. As of a Sphere,

Pyramid,

Pyramid, Cube and Cylinder. And there is the same reason of all natures else with their Respects and Habitues, that they are as necessarily exhibited as the Cube and Cylinder, and their Habitues and Respects one to another, as the proportion that a Cylinder bears to a Sphere or Globe of the same altitude and equal diameter. Which *Archimedes* with incomparable clearness and subtiltie of wit has demonstrated in his Treatise *De Sphæra & Cyliandro*, to be *ratio sesquialtera*, as also the Superficies of the Cylinder with its Bases to bear the same proportion to the Superficies of the Sphere. And as these Ideas are necessarily and unalterably with their Respects and ~~repre~~ represented, so are all Idea's else, *Physical* and *Moral*, as I have noted above. And the nature of Justice, Mercy, Faithfulness and Goodness are with their habitues and respects as fixedly, determinately and unalterably represented in their Idea's, as the Sphere and Cylinder, or any other Form or Being whatsoever.

Sect. 9. pag. 178. *For we are to know that there is a God, and the Will of God, &c.* That is to say, If there be no settled natures and respects and habitues of things in the order of Nature antecedent to any *Will* whatever, Meditation or Contrivance, nor there be any certain nature, respects, habitues, and connections of things in themselves; it will be necessary that we first know there is a God, and

what his *Will* is touching the natures, respects and habitudes of things. Whether these which we seem to discern and do argue from are the same he means and wills, or some other. And so there will be a necessity of knowing God and his Will, before we have any means to know him; or, which is all one, we shall never have any means to know him upon this false and absurd Hypothesis.

Sect. 11. pag. 181. *Then it infallibly follows that it is all one what I do or how I live, &c.* This, as the following words intimate, is to be understood in reference to the pleasing God, and to our own future Happiness. But it is manifest it is not all one what I do or how I live (though I did suppose there were no real distinction betwixt Truth and Falshood, Good and Evil in the sense here intended) in reference to this present condition in this World, where the sense of pain and ease, of imprisonment and liberty, and of the security or safety of a mans own person will oblige him to order his life in such a manner as hath at least the imitation of Temperance, Faithfulness, and Justice.

Sect. 12. pag. 183. *If the opposition of Contradictory Terms depend upon the arbitrary resolves of any Being whatsoever.* The plainness and irretragableness of this Truth, that the opposition of contradictory Terms is an affection, habitude or *relation* betwixt those terms that no power in Heaven or Earth can abolish, methinks

methinks should assure any that are not pure Sots or crazie Fantasticks, that there may be many other such unalterable and immutable Habitudes of Terms, Natures or Things that are every jot as unabolishable as this. Which is no derogation to the Divine Perfection, but an Argument of it; unless we should conceit that it is the height of the Perfection of Divine Omnipotence to be able to destroy himself. And truly to fancie an ability in him of destroying or abolishing those eternal, necessary and immutable habitudes or respects of the natures of things represented in their Idea's by the Divine Intellect *Exhibitive*, is little less than the admitting in God an ability of destroying or abolishing the Divine Nature it self, because *ipso facto* the Divine Wisdom and Knowledge would be destroyed, as was shewn in the fifth Section, and what a God would that be that is destitute thereof!

Wherefore it is no wonder that those men that are sober and in their wits, find it so impossible in themselves but to conceive that such and such natures are steadily such and no other, and betwixt such and such natures there are steadily and immutably such habitudes and respects and no others. Forasmuch as the Intellect of man is as it were a small compendious Transcript of the Divine Intellect, and we feel in a manner in our own Intellects the firmness and immutability of the Divine, and

of

of the eternal and immutable Truths exhibited there. So that those that have their minds so crackt and shatter'd as to be able to fancy that if God would, he could change the *καλὰς ἰδέας* or common notions into their Contradictories, as *The whole is less than its Part*, &c. must have very crazy Intellectuals, and have taken their lodging at least in the suburbs of downright dotage or Phrensie, as I noted above.

Pag. 184. *If any one should affirm that the Terms of common notions have an eternal and indispensable relation to one another*, &c. That this privilege is not confined to the common notions they are abundantly convinced of that have bestowed any competent study upon Mathematicks, where the connection of every link of the demonstration is discerned to be as firmly and indissolubly knit, as the Terms of a common notion are the one with the other. And it is our Impatience, Carelessness or Prejudices that we have not more conclusions of such certitude than we have in other studies also.

Sect. 13. pag. 184. *For if there be Truth antecedently to the Divine Understanding*, &c. This Objection of the Adversaries is framed something perversly and invidiously, as if the other party held, That there were Truth antecedently to the Divine Understanding, and as if from thence the Divine Understanding would be a mere passive Principle actuated by something without, as the Eye by the Sun.

Sun! But it is a plain case, out of what has been declared, that the Divine Understanding (though there be such eternal Natures and unchangeable respects and habitudes of them represented in the Idea's that are in the *Exhibitive* Intellect of the Deity) that it is, I say, before any external Object whatever, and yet always had exhibited to it self the eternal and unalterable natures and respects of things in their Idea's. And it was noted moreover, that the Truth of the external Objects, when brought into act, is measured by their Conformity to these Idea's.

Besides, the Divine Understanding being before all things, how could there be any Truth before it, there being neither Understanding nor Things in which this Truth might reside? Or the Divine Understanding be a mere passive Principle actuated by something without, as the eye by the Sun, whereas unquestionably the Divine Intellect *quatenus Exhibitive* is the most active Principle conceivable; nay, indeed *Actus purissimus*, the most pure Act, as Aristotle has defined God: It is an eternal, necessary, and immutable Energy, whose very Essence is a true and fixt Ideal Representation of the natures of all things, with their respects and habitudes resulting eternally from the Divine fecundity at once. How then can this, which is so pure and pregnant an Energy, be a mere passive Principle, or be actuated by any
externa

external Object, when it was before any thing was? But a further Answer is to be found of the Authour himself in the Fifteenth Section.

Pag. 185. *Which is to take away his independency and self sufficiency.* Namely, If there be mutual and unalterable *Congruities* and *Incongruities* of things, as if they would determine God in his actions by something without himself. Which is a mere mistake. For the pregnant fulness of the Divine Essence and perfection eternally and necessarily exerting it self into an Ideal display of all the natures, properties, respects and habitudes of things, whether *Congruities* or *Incongruities*, and these fixt, immutable, necessary and unchangeable in their Ideal or *Objective Existence*; And in time producing things according to these *Paradigms* or *Patterns* into actual Existence by his Omnipotence, and ever sustaining, supporting and governing them by his unfailing Power and steady and unchangeable Wisdom and Counsel; I say, when all things are thus from God, sustained by God, and regulated according to the natures he has given them, which answer the *Patterns* and *Paradigms* in him, how can any such determination of his Will any way clash with his Self-sufficiency or Independency, whenas we see thus, that all things are from God and depend of him, and his actions guided by the immutable Ideas in his

Sect. 14. *the Discourse of Truth.* 261

his own nature, according to which all external things are what they are, and their Truth measured by their Conformity with them. But there is a fuller answer of the Author's, to this Objection, in the sixteenth and seventeenth Sections.

Sect. 14. pag. 187. *And to fetter and imprison Freedom and Liberty it self in the fatal and immutable chains and respects of things, &c.* This is a misconceit that favours something of a more refined *Anthropomorphitism*, that is to say, Though they do not make the Essence of God finite and of an Humane figure or shape, yet they imagine him to have two different Principles in him, an extravagant and undetermined lust or appetite, as it is in man, and an Intellectual or rational Principle, whose Laws are to correct the luxuriancies and impetuosities of the other, and to bridle and regulate them. But this is a gross mistake; For there is no such blind and impetuous will in God upon which any Intellectual Laws were to lay a restraint, but his whole nature being *pure and Intellectual*, and he acting according to his own nature, which contains those Ideas and immutable respects, Congruities and Incongruities of things there eternally and unalterably represented, he acts with all freedom imaginable, nor has any chains of restraint laid upon him, but is at perfect liberty to do as his own nature requires and suggests.

gests. Which is the most absolute liberty that has any sound or shew of Perfection with it, that can be conceived in any Being.

Sect. 15. pag. 189. *And does as it were draw them up into its own beams.* This is something a sublime and elevate expression. But I suppose the meaning thereof is, That the natures and respects of the things of this lower Creation, the Divine Understanding applies to the bright shining Idea's found in his own exalted nature, and observes their Conformity therewith, and acknowledges them true and right as they answer to their eternal Patterns.

Sect. 16. pag. 189. *To tie up God in his actions to the reason of things, destroys his Liberty, Absoluteness, and Independency.* This is said, but it is a very vain and weak allegation, as may appear out of what has been suggested above. For reasons of things and their habitudes and references represented in the eternal Idea's in their *Objective Existence*, which is the Pattern of their natures when they exist actually, is the very life and nature of the Divine Understanding; And as I noted above, the most true and perfective libertie that can be conceived in any Being is, that without any check or tug, or lubricity and unsteadiness, it act according to its own life and nature. And what greater Absoluteness than this? For that which acts according to its own nature, acts also according

to its own will or appetite. And what greater Independencie than to have a power upon which there is no restraint, nor any modification of the exercise thereof, but what is taken from that which has this power? For the eternal and immutable reasons of things are originally and Paradigmatically in the Divine Understanding, of which those in the Creatures are but the Types and transitorie Shadows. The Author in this Section has spoke so well to this present Point, that it is needless to super-add any thing more.

Sect. 17. pag. 191. In this seventeenth Section the Author more fully answers that Objection, As if Gods acting according to the reasons of things inferred a dependency of him upon something without himself; Which he does with that clearness and satisfaction, that it is enough to commend it to the perusal of the Reader.

Sect. 18. pag. 193. *Truth in the power or faculty is nothing else but a Conformity of its conceptions or Idea's unto the natures and relations of things which in God we may call, &c.* The Description which follows is (though the Author nowhere takes notice of that distinction) a Description of the Divine Understanding *quatenus Exhibitive*, not *Conceptive* or *Speculative*. The Truth of which latter does indeed consist in the Conformity of its Conception unto the natures and relations of things, but not
of

of things *ad extra*, but unto the natures, habitudes and respects of things as they are necessarily, eternally and immutably represented in the Divine Understanding *Exhibitive*, which is the Intellectual World, which the Author here describes, and *τὸ πρῶτον τῆς ἀληθείας* the vast Champion or boundless field of Truth. So that in those words [unto the natures and relations of things which in God we call an actual, steady, immoveable, eternal omniformity, &c.] Which is to be referred to [the Natures and Relations of things] as is evident to any that well considers the place. And with this sense that which follows the description is very coherent.

Pag. 194. Now all that Truth that is in any created Being, is by participation and derivation from this first Understanding (that is, from the Divine Understanding *quatenus Exhibitive*) and Fountain of Intellectual Light. That is, according to the *Platonick* Dialect, of those steady, unalterable and eternal Idea's (*τὰς ἀμετάβλητους*) of the natures and respects of things represented there in the Divine Understanding *Exhibitive* in their *Objective Existence*; In conformity to which the Truth in all created things and Understandings doth necessarily consist.

Pag. 195. Antecedently to any Understanding or Will, &c. That is, Antecedently to any Understanding *Conceptive*, *Observative* or *Speculative* whatsoever, or to any Will; but not antecedently

essentially to the Divine Understanding *Exhibitive*. For that is antecedent to all created things, and contains the steady, fixt, eternal, and unalterable natures and respects or habits, before they had or could have any Being. I say it contains the Truth and measure of them; nor can they be said to be truly what they are, any farther than they are found conformable to these eternal, immutable Ideas, Patterns and Paradigms, which necessarily and eternally are exerted, and immutably in the Divine Understanding *Exhibitive*. And of these Paradigmati- cal things there, what follows is most truly affirmed.

Page 195. *For things are what they are, and cannot be otherwise without a Contradiction, &c.* This was true before any external or created things did exist. True of every Form in that eternal *Omniformity*, which the *Platonists* call the Intellectual World, as the Author has observed above in this Section. A Circle is a Circle, and a Triangle a Triangle there, nor can be otherwise without a Contradiction. And so of a Globe, Cylinder, Horse, Eagle, Whale, Fire, Water, Earth, their Ideal fixt and determinate natures, habitudes, aptitudes, and respects necessarily and immutably there exhibited, are such as they are, nor can be otherwise without a contradiction. And because it is thus in the Divine Nature or Essence, which is the root and fountain of the exteriour Crea-

S
tion,

tion, the same is true in the created Beings themselves. Things are there also what they are, nor can they be a Globe suppose, or a Cylinder, and yet not be a Globe or a Cylinder at once, or be both a Globe and Cylinder at once; and so of the rest. As this is a contradiction in the Intellectual World, so is it in the Exteriour or Material World, and so, because it is so in the Intellectual. For the steadiness and immutableness of the nature of all things, and of their respects and habitudes, arise from the necessity, immutability, and unchangeableness of the Divine Essence and Life, which is that serene, unclouded, undisturbed, and unalterable Eternity, where all things with their respects and aptitudes, their order and series, are necessarily, steadily and immutably exhibited at once.

P. 195. *As they conform & agree with the things themselves, &c.* The more *Platonical* sense, and more conformable to that we have given of other passages of this learned and ingenious Author is, if we understand the things themselves, at least primarily, to be the *Admiranda* of *Plato*, which is the term which he bestows upon his *Idea's*, which are the Patterns or Paradigms according to which every thing is made, and is truly such so far forth as it is found to agree with the Patterns or Originals in which all Archetypal Truth is immutably lodged. All created things are but the *Copies* of these, these the

the Original, the *Authentic* or Writing it self, from whence *Plato* calls them *Ἀρχαῖα*, as if those Archetypal Forms were the forms or things themselves, but the numerous created Beings here below, only the *Copies* or Imitations of them. Wherefore no Conception or Idea's that we frame, or any Intellect else as *Conceptive* merely and *Speculative*, can be true, but so far as they agree with these *Ἀρχαῖα*, in that sense we have declared, or with created things so far as they are answerable to the *Ἀρχαῖα* or Archetypal things themselves. And from hence is sufficiently understood the nature of *Truth* in the *Subject*.

These few cursory Notes I thought worth the while to make upon these two learned and ingenious Writers, the Subjects they have written on being of no mean importance and use, and the things written in such a time of their age, as if men be born under an auspicious Planet, best fits their minds for the relishing and ruminating upon such noble Theories. For I dare say, when they wrote these Discourses or Treatises, they had neither of them reached so much as half the age of man as it is ordinarily computed. Which has made them write upon these Subjects with that vigour and briskness of Spirit that they have.

For the constitution of Youth, in those that have not an unhappy Nativity, is far more heavenly and Angelical than that of more

grown age, in which the Spirit of the World is more usually awakened, and then begins that Scene which the Poet describes in his *De Arte Poetica*,

Quærit opes & amicitias, inservit honori.

their mind then begins to be wholly intent to get wealth and riches, to enlarge their Interest by the friendship of great Persons, and to hunt after Dignities and Preferments, Honours and Employments in Church or State, and to those more heavenly and Divine Sentiments through disuse and the presents of more strong and filling Impressions are laid asleep, and their Spirits thickened and clouded with the gross fumes and steams that arise from the desire of earthly things, and it may so fall out, if there be not special care taken, that this mind they have drawn in by their coarse desires, may come to that opaque hardness and inertia, that their Terrestrial body may prove a real dungeon, & cast them into an utter oblivion of their chiefest concerns in the other State.

Nec auras
Respicit clausi tenebris & carcere cæco.

Which I thought fit to take notice of, as well for the instruction of others, as for a due Appre-
pretiation of these two brief Treatises of these

florid Writers, they being as it were the Virgin-Honey of these two *Attick* Bees, the *Pri-*
mitia of their Intemperate Youth, where an
happy natural complexion, and the first Rud-
ments of Christian Regeneration may seem to
have conspired to the writing of two such use-
ful Treatises.

Useful, I say, and not a little *grateful* to men
of refined Fancies and gay Intellectuals, of be-
nign and Philosophical tempers, and Lovers of
great Truths and Goodness. Which natural
constitution were a transcendent privilege in-
deed, were there not one great danger in it to
those that know not how to use it skilfully.
For it does so nearly ape, as I may so speak,
the Divine Benignity it self, and that unself-
interested Love that does truly arise from no
other seed than that of real Regeneration
(which Self-mortification and a serious endea-
vour of abolishing or utterly demolishing our
own will, and quitting any thing that would
captivate us, and hinder our union with God
and his Christ, does necessarily precede) that
too hastily setting up our rest in these mere
complexional attainments, which is not *Spirit*
but *Flesh*, though it appear marvellous sweet
and goodly to the owner, if there be not due
care taken to advance higher in that Divine
and Eternal Principle of real Regeneration, by
a constant mortification of our own will, there
may be a perpetual hazzard of this *Flesh* grow-

ing corrupt and fly-blown, and sending up at last no sweet savour into the nostrils of the Almighty. *That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the spirit is spirit;* And all flesh is grass, and the beauty thereof as the flower of the field; but that which is born of the eternal Seed of the living Word, abideth for ever and ever.

And therefore there is no safe Anchorage for the Soul, but in a perpetual endeavour of annihilating of her own Will, that we may be one with Christ, as Christ is with God. Otherwise if we follow the sweet enticing Counsels of mere Nature, though it look never so smugly on it, it will seduce us into a false liberty, and at last so corrupt our Judgment, and blind us, that we shall scarce be able to discern him that is that great Light that was sent into the world, but become every man an *Ignis Fatuus* to himself, or be so silly as to be led about by other *Ignes Fatui*, whenas it is most certain that Christ is the only way, the Truth and the Life, and he that does not clearly see that, when he has opportunity to know it, let his pretence to other knowledge be what it will, it is a demonstration that as to Divine things he is stark blind. But no man can really adhere to Christ, and unwaveringly, but by union to him through his Spirit; nor obtain that Spirit of life, but by resolved Mortification of his own will, and a deadness to all
world-

worldly vanities, that we may be restored at last to our solid happiness which is through Christ in God, without whose Communion no soul can possibly be happy.

And therefore I think it not amiss to close these my Theoretical Annotations on these two Treatises, with that more Practical and Devotional Hymn of *A. B.* that runs much upon the mortification of our own Wills, and of our Union and Communion with God, translated into English by a Lover of the Life of our Lord Jesus.

S 4

THE

THE
Devotional HYMN

O Heavenly Light ! my Spirit to Thee draw,
With powerful touch my senses smite,
Thine arrows of Love into me throw
With flaming dart
Deep wound my heart,
And wounded seize for ever, as thy right.

2.

O sweetest Sweet ! descend into my Soul,
And sink into its low'st abyss,
That all false Sweets Thou may'st controul,
Or rather kill,
So that Thy will
Alone may be my pleasure and my bliss.

3.

Do thou my faculties all captivate
Unto thy self with strongest tie ;
My will entirely regulate :
Make me thy Slave,
Nought else I crave,
For this I know is perfect Liberty,

Thou
11-2

4

Thou art a Life, the sweetest of all Lives,
Nought sweeter can thy Creature taste;
Tis this alone the Soul revives.

Be Thou not here,

All other cheer

Will turn to dull satiety at last.

5.

O limpid Fountain of all virtuous Leare!

O well-spring of true Joy and Mirth!

The root of all contentments dear!

O endless Good!

Break like a flood

Into my Soul, and water my dry earth.

6.

That by this Mighty power I being rest

Of every Thing that is not O N E,

To Thee alone I may be left

By a firm will

Fixt to Thee still,

And inwardly united into one.

7.

And so let all my Essence, I Thee pray,

Be wholly fill'd with thy dear Son,

That thou thy Splendour mayst display

With blissful rays

In these hid ways

Wherein Gods nature by frail Man is won.

For

274 The Devotional HYMN

8.

For joynd thus to Thee by thy sole aid
 And working (whilst all silent stands
 In mine own Soul, nor ought's assay'd
 From Self-desire)
 I'm made entire
 An instrument fit for thy glorious Ends.

9.

And thus henceforwards shall all workings cease,
 Unless't be those Thou dost excite
 To perfect that Sabbathick Peace
 Which doth arise
 When Self-will dies,
 And the new Creature is restored quite.

10.

And so shall I with all thy Children dear,
 While nought debars Thy workings free,
 Be closely joynd in union near,
 Nay with thy Son
 Shall I be one,
 And with thine own adored Deitie.

11.

So that at last I being quite releas'd
 From this strait-lac'd Egoity,
 My soul will vastly be increas'd
 Into that ALL
 Which ONE we call,
 And one in'r self alone doth all imply.

Here's

The Devotional HYMN 275

12.

Here's Rest, here's Peace, here's Joy and holy Love,
The Heaven's here of true Content,
For those that hither sincerely move,
Here's the true Light
Of Wisdom bright,
And Prudence pure with no self-seeking mien.

13.

Here Spirit, Soul and cleansed Body may
Bathe in this Fountain of true Bliss
Of Pleasures that will ne're decay,
All joyful Sights
And hid Delights;
The sense of these renew'd here daily is.

14.

Come therefore come, and take an higher flight,
Things perishing leave here below,
Mount up with winged Soul and Spright,
Quick let's be gone
To him that's One,
But in this One to us can all things show.

15.

Thus shall you be united with that ONE,
That ONE where's no Duality;
For from this perfect GOOD alone
Ever doth spring
Each pleasant thing,
The hungry Soul to feed and satisfy.

Where

276 The Devotional HYMN

26.

Wherefore, O man! consider well what's said,

To what is best thy Soul incline,

And leave off every evil trade.

Do not despise

What I advise;

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